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In the Categories, Aristotle recognizes two relations that an entity can bear to a 
subject: it can either inhere in or be said-of a subject. In this dissertation, I offer an 
interpretation of the natures of these relations and their relata. I also examine 
Aristotle’s views about predication, the nature of truthmakers, and ontological priority.  
At Categories 1a24-25, Aristotle offers a definition of inherence which, on the 
most natural reading, holds that a nonsubstance can inhere in a substance only if it 
cannot exist without that substance. An entity that inheres in a particular substance 
must be a nonsubstantial particular which is numerically distinct from any entity that 
inheres in a distinct substance. This reading of 1a24-25, however, is inconsistent with 
the most natural reading of Aristotle’s claim 2a34ff that the universal color must 
inhere in a particular body. To render Aristotle’s claims consistent, we must 
reinterpret either 1a24-25 or 2a34ff. In chapters 2-6, I show that various attempts to 
reinterpret these passages are not successful.  
I argue that Aristotle’s claims really are inconsistent. In chapters 7-10, I 
consider what might have led Aristotle to this inconsistency. I conclude that 
Aristotle’s error results from a confusion about the nature of the said-of relation.  
In chapter 7, I argue that Aristotle regards the said-of relation as a whole-part 
relation holding between universals and particulars, but is confused about whether the 
said-of relation is purely extensional. In chapter 8, I argue that the same confusion 
infects some of Aristotle’s views about kath’ hauto and katholou predication in the De  
Interpretatione and Analytics. In chapter 9, I examine Aristotle’s views about 
ontological priority relations between particulars and universals. I note that none of the 
types of priority defined in the Categories will secure Aristotle’s view that particulars 
are prior to universals. I reconstruct a view with the desired result from Aristotle’s 
discussion of one thing’s being a “cause of being” for another. I conclude in chapter 
10 that Aristotelian primary substances are prior to all other entities in that they alone 
are nonrelational entities.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
THE CATEGORIES AND FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY 
  In the Categories, Aristotle sets out to describe the fundamental logical 
structure of the world. He points out that the true things we say about the world can be 
thought of as the answers to various questions about objects. Imagine that yesterday 
we saw a six-foot tall pale grammarian trying on shoes in the Agora and complaining 
to his daughter about the blisters on his feet. In giving the rather complex description 
above, I answer several potential questions about the man. I tell you what the object is, 
a man; I tell you something quantitative, he was six feet tall; I tell you something 
about the qualities of the man, grammatical and pale; I tell you something about the 
relations that the man bore to other things, he was the father of a daughter; I tell you 
where and when the man was; and so on. Aristotle claims that there are ten most 
general kinds of question that we can ask, corresponding to which there are ten most 
general kinds of term indicating ten most general kinds of entity—substance, quantity, 
quality, relation, and so forth.  
Aristotle also tells us that we make true or false statements about the world by 
combining the terms for these entities. Aristotle often speaks about this combination of 
terms as predication, and the word ‘kategoria’ normally translated as ‘category’ might 
be taken to mean something like ‘predicate’.
1 We are accustomed to using the noun 
‘predicate’ to denote a certain type of linguistic object. Corresponding to this use of 
                                                 
1   For a fuller discussion of the right way to construe ‘katêgoria’ see Michael Frede’s 
“Categories in Aristotle” (1981), and J.L.Ackrill’s commentary on the Categories and De 
Interpretatione.  I agree with Ackrill that Aristotle primarily uses ‘katêgorein’ to talk about a relation 
between entities—one thing is predicated of another. There is no harm in allowing at this point that 
Aristotle recognizes both a relation between words and a relation between entities, and that each of 
these can be called ‘predication’. However, we should keep in mind that in linguistically predicating 
one term of another, I claim that the metaphysical predication relation holds between the referents of the 
linguistic predicate and linguistic subject.    2 
‘predicate’, there is a relation between terms. Let’s call the relation between two terms 
where the first is predicated of the second ‘linguistic predication’ (or l-predication). 
We can think of each simple instance of l-predication as the verbal answer to one of 
questions talked about above.  
Aristotle, however, does not use ‘katagorein’ primarily to denote a relation 
between terms. Rather he commonly uses ‘katagorein’ to talk about a relation between 
entities. Let’s call the relation that holds between entities ‘metaphysical predication’ 
(m-predication). Aristotle is perfectly at ease with a sentence like “Human is 
predicated of Socrates”. However, this sentence might strike a contemporary 
philosopher as a gross confusion of use and mention, and she might prefer “‘Human’ 
is predicated of Socrates” or even “ ‘Human’ is predicated of ‘Socrates’”. We should 
keep in mind that Aristotle allows predication to be a relation between things.  
It is clear that Aristotle takes l-predication and m-predication to be related in 
an important way. When we l-predicate one term of another, we make a statement the 
truth of which depends on whether various entities stand in the m-predication relation 
to one another. Aristotle takes assertion or affirmation to require the ‘weaving 
together’ (‘sumplekein’) of terms.
2 When we make an affirmative assertion, it is true 
just in case the entities referred to by the terms are combined in the world. At 
Metaphysics Θ.10, Aristotle says: 
What is [and what is not] in the strictest sense are truth and falsity. In 
the objects, this is being compounded and divided, so that whoever 
thinks the divided to be divided or the compounded to be compounded 
                                                 
2   As Ackrill (1963) p73ff notes, Aristotle’s use of ‘sumplokên’ calls to mind Plato’s use of the 
same term in the Sophist. Plato tells us that an assertion requires that a verb and a name be woven 
together, and that a simple list of words is not yet an assertion, see Sophist 262e6. Plato also seems to 
think that true speech requires a weaving together of entities in the world, see Sophist 240c1 and 259e6. 
Aristotle further develops a similar view of what an assertion is in the De Interpretatione.   3 
speaks  the  truth,  and  whoever  holds  contrary  to  the  things  errs. 
(1051b1-5)
3 
 
In a similar vein at Metaphysics E.4, Aristotle writes: 
What is as truth and what is not as falsity are about composition and 
division,  and  together  these  concern  the  apportionment  of  a 
contradiction.  For  truth  has  the  affirmation  in  the  case  of  what  is 
compounded and the denial in the case of what is divided, and falsity 
has the contradictory of this apportionment. (1027b18-23) 
From these statements, I take it to be clear that Aristotle has a correspondence 
theory of truth. There are many difficult issues involved in spelling out exactly what a 
correspondence theory of truth involves.
4 However, for present purposes we can start 
with a bare bones principle. We can understand the Minimal Correspondence 
Principle (MCP) as claiming merely that truth supervenes on being.
5 In other words, 
there could be no change in which statements, thoughts or propositions about the 
world were true without some change in the world itself.
6 It seems clear both that 
Aristotle subscribes to this principle, and that it is true. However, there are two 
respects in which (MCP) is far too weak to do any useful work in characterizing a 
correspondence theory of truth.  
First of all, correspondence theorists generally want to say that what 
propositions, thoughts or statements are true depends on what the world is like, while 
the converse does not hold. Supervenience is merely a modal covariation relation, and 
does nothing to capture such dependence. Furthermore, in this instance, the 
supervenience seems to run in both directions; it is equally true that being supervenes 
                                                 
3   Aristotle states at several places that truth and falsity have to do with combination and 
division. See De Interpretatione 1, 3, Categories 4, 5, 10. Aristotle uses the terms from the verbs 
‘suntithêmi’ and ‘sunkeisthai’ for composition and compound.  
4   See Pitcher (1964), Horwich (1999), and Blackburn and Simmons (1999), and Armstrong 
(2004) for a discussion of these issues.  
5   This phrase is originally from Bigelow (1988), and shows up quite often in subsequent 
discussions of truthmaking. See Armstrong (2004) for a discussion of the supervenience principle and 
its shortcomings as a way of formulating correspondence theories of truth.   
6   I am assuming that statements, propositions, etc. have their meanings essentially.   4 
on truth, since we couldn’t have a change in the way the world was without having 
some change in which statements about the world are true. (MCP), therefore, can’t 
capture the asymmetry in the relation that Aristotle takes to hold between world and 
language.  
Second of all, (MCP) says nothing about what sorts of features of the world get 
into the subvenience base for truths. But unless we make some kind of distinction 
about which features of the world do and which features of the world do not get into 
the minimal subvenience base for truth, (MCP) will be unable to distinguish the 
correspondence theory of truth from some of its main competitors. For example, if we 
allow changes in which theories are most useful to count as changes in the world, then 
(MCP) is compatible with pragmatic theories of truth. If we allow changes in which 
theories would be acceptable at the ideal end of human enquiry to count as changes 
about the world, then a theory like Putnam’s which takes truth to be equivalent to ideal 
justifiability will satisfy (MCP).
7 If we allow radical changes in human perceptual 
capacities or explanatory interests to count as changes in the world, and think that such 
changes could have an effect on what sorts of theories are maximally coherent, (MCP) 
will be compatible with a coherence theory of truth.  
It is clear that Aristotle, like any self-respecting correspondence theorist, 
would take his theory of truth to be incompatible with pragmatism, human-faced 
realism, or coherentism about truth. Furthermore, Aristotle clearly recognizes that 
while being and truth ‘reciprocally imply the existence of each other’, the truth of our 
thoughts or statements asymmetrically depends on the nature of the world. For 
example, at Metaphysics Θ.10, he writes: 
It  is  not  through  our  thinking  truly  that  you  are  white  that  you  are 
white, but through your being white that saying this we speak the truth. 
(1051b6-9) 
                                                 
7   I am thinking of the theory that Hilary Putnam outlines in Reason Truth and History (1981).   5 
And at Categories 12: 
For among the things that reciprocate concerning the implication of 
being, the thing that is somehow the cause of being for the other can 
rightly be called prior by nature. And it is clear that there are some such 
cases. For there being a man reciprocates concerning the implication of 
being with the true statement about it. For if there is a man, then the 
statement  by  which  we  say  that  there  is  a  man  is  true.  And  it 
reciprocates, for if the statement by which we say that there is a man is 
true, then there is a man. But the true statement is in no way the cause 
of the thing’s being, while the thing certainly appears to be somehow 
the cause the statement’s being true. For the statement is said to be true 
or false by the thing’s being or not being. (14b11-22) 
 
I take these statements to show that Aristotle is committed to a form of 
Metaphysical Realism (MR), which I take to involve a commitment to two theses. 
First, Aristotle holds that the truth of our statements and thoughts asymmetrically 
depends on the way that the world is. Second, Aristotle holds that facts about how we 
think, what theories we find to be useful, etc., are not to be counted among the features 
of the world that underlie the truth of our beliefs and statements.
8 Since Aristotle 
subscribes to (MCP) and (MR), we can attribute to him the following Weak Truth-
Maker Thesis (WTMT).   
                                                 
8   The version of metaphysical realism that I attribute to Aristotle here is similar to that laid out 
in Irwin (1988) pp5-7. There are some problems with my characterization. After all, some of the true 
claims that we make about the world will be claims about our beliefs and theories, and truths about our 
beliefs and theories will be belief- and theory-dependent in some way. Nevertheless, it seems that we 
want to call Aristotle a realist about our psychological states. It is difficult to spell out exactly how to 
deal with these issues, but I think that the following is correct in broad outline. Both the realist and the 
idealist can accept the claim that (i) all statements not about the mind depend on mind-independent 
features of the world. The idealist, however, holds that the antecedent in the above conditional is never 
satisfied, since all claims are about minds. Perhaps, if we add to (i), (ii) at least some of our claims are 
not about the mind, we will be on our way to a specification of the sort of metaphysical realism at issue. 
It will be a further matter to specify what sorts of claims are about the mind, and this might be 
something about which different realists will have different opinions; e.g. some metaphysical realists 
might include colors as the sorts of things that are mind-dependent, others might disagree. Finally, even 
in the case of psychological states, we can distinguish between the fact that someone is in a certain state 
and the claim or the belief that she is in such a state. We can then claim that realism amounts to the 
view that the fact that a person has a belief is not dependent on anyone’s claiming or believing that the 
person has that belief.    6 
(WTMT) Whenever a statement or thought is true, the truth of the 
statement depends on a mind-independent feature of reality.
9 
(WTMT) is still compatible with vastly divergent theories. For all it says, there 
might be a single feature of reality responsible for the truth of every true statement; 
such a theory would be maximally coarse-grained, since there is only one fact. On the 
opposite extreme, there might be a different feature of reality making true each true 
statement; facts are as fine-grained as the linguistic expressions that report them. 
Between these two unattractive extremes, there are a vast number of intermediate 
positions. If we want a truly substantive theory of truthmaking, (WTMT) must be 
supplemented with answers to two questions. First, what are truthmakers in general? 
Second, which truthmakers are there? In response to the first question, we might want 
to know whether truthmakers are simple or complex entities. If they are complex, then 
what are their parts and how do these parts go together to form truthmakers?  
Two theorists might give the same answer to the first question, but might 
disagree about which truthmakers exist. For example, say that two people agree that 
truthmakers are complex entities containing universals and particulars as parts that 
stand in a fundamental relation of instantiation. Furthermore, say that both people take 
the sentence, “Bob is in pain” to be a true sentence. However, say that one of these 
two people is a reductive materialist while the other is a dualist. The second will 
affirm, while the first will deny, that some truthmakers have immaterial minds as 
particular components. The first will claim that the truthmaker for “Bob is in pain” 
will be the very same item as the truthmaker for the claim that Bob is in some physical 
state, while the second will claim that we need two distinct truthmakers for these 
claims.
10  
                                                 
9   Subject to the proviso that the statement isn’t about a mind or theory. See the previous note for 
some thoughts about how to expand the principle to deal with statements about minds and theories.  
10   The following example might be helpful. Take the a posteriori realism about universals 
espoused by Armstrong in Universals and Scientific Realism (1978). The fact that there are real 
universals in Armstrong’s ontology counts as an answer to the general question of ontology, our first   7 
In the Categories and De Interpretatione, Aristotle goes a long way toward 
answering these questions. He fleshes out an ontology of truthmaking by telling us 
what sorts of entities exist in the world, and telling us by which fundamental relations 
these entities combine with each other to yield truthmakers for our various claims 
about the world. Aristotle begins with the thought that the structure of our true 
statements roughly mirrors the structure of the world, and holds that corresponding to 
the combination of terms in a true affirmative sentence, there is a combination of 
things in the world.  
Aristotle assumes that it is acceptable to work from data about linguistic 
predication to a theory of metaphysical predication, even though he does not think that 
the correspondence between our conceptual/linguistic apparatus and the world is due 
to the world’s somehow being constructed or shaped by our concepts or language. As 
a thoroughgoing metaphysical realist, Aristotle’s view that an examination of our 
language and intuitions can help reveal the nature of the world reflects a kind of 
hopeful optimism. Aristotle holds that human beings are rational creatures whose 
natural end is to understand the world, and that the world is structured in a way that 
allows things to achieve their natural ends. As such, he thinks that we can discover the 
nature of the world by rational investigation. 
Aristotle thinks that human beings already understand, if only tacitly or 
potentially, a good deal about the nature of the world. Furthermore, this tacit 
understanding is embedded in the structure of human language and thought. 
Nevertheless, Aristotle does not take the match between language and world to be 
perfect. It would be a mistake to think that we will be able simply to read the structure 
                                                                                                                                           
question above. The further claim that which universals exist is to be answered by looking at our best 
scientific theories specifies the way in which we should answer the second question above.    8 
of the world off the structure of language. An examination of two passages will be 
helpful here.  
At the outset of the Sophistical Refutations, Aristotle tells us that it sometimes 
appears that an argument succeeds as a deduction or refutation when it does not 
actually succeed. There are several reasons for the apparent success and actual failure 
of an argument, but Aristotle tells us that “the most clever and common (such) 
argument is the one “through names” (ho dia tôn onamatôn).” (165a5-6) He goes on to 
explain why we are susceptible to fallacious arguments through names: 
For  since  it  is  not  possible  to  bring  the  things  themselves  into 
conversation, we instead use the names of the things as symbols, and 
we suppose that the things that follow in the case of the names also 
follow in the case of the things, just like those performing a calculation 
do in the case of the counters. (165a6-10) 
  Take a very simple case of counting. Every time a cow walks into a pen, I put 
one black rock in a bowl. Every time that a cow walks out, I remove one black rock 
from that bowl. Provided that I have followed this procedure correctly, someone could 
find out how many cows were in the pen by counting the number of rocks in the bowl. 
There is a simple isomorphism between the cow-pen world and the rock-bowl model, 
and my understanding of this fact allows me to find out about the former by examining 
the latter.  
Aristotle tells us that our use of names in reasoning is supposed to accomplish 
a function similar to the function accomplished by our cow counting system. When we 
use words in various ways in arguments, we are supposed to be able to find out things 
about the world. Often when we go wrong in an attempt to find out about the world by 
attending to language, our failure will be due to some sort of breakdown in the 
isomorphism between our linguistic models of the parts of the world that we are 
talking about, and those parts of the world.    9 
Such breakdown of isomorphism is inevitable according to Aristotle. At 
165a10-13 he claims, “Names and the multitude of accounts are limited, but the things 
are unlimited in number. It is necessary then for the same account or a single name to 
signify more than one thing.”(165a10-13)
 The existence of this sort of equivocation 
indicates that the isomorphism between language and world sometimes fails, and this 
failure of isomorphism explains one reason for the existence of apparent refutations or 
deductions that are not true refutations or deductions. An argument that commits the 
fallacy of equivocation will be a merely apparent refutation or deduction. 
Unscrupulous sophists, who are more concerned with appearing wise than with being 
wise, exploit this failure of isomorphism to get over on their unsuspecting victims.  
Just as in the case of counting those who aren’t clever at using the 
counters are misled by the experts, the same happens in the case of 
arguments where those inexperienced with the meanings of names mis-
reason in their own discussions and when listening to others. (165a13-
17)  
In order to prevent ourselves from falling into error, we have to be on the lookout for 
ways in which our language fails to accurately mirror reality. We will be able to use 
logic, thought of as a theory about “what follows in the case of the names”, as a tool 
for gaining knowledge about the world only if we have some assurance that there is 
not a mismatch between our names and the world.   
In addition, Aristotle thinks that the syntactic structure of language can 
sometimes fail to mirror the ontological structure of reality.
11 For example, in chapter 
22 of the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle notes that we can truly say both (a) and (b). 
  (a) The white (thing) is a log. 
                                                 
11   These two passages, therefore, show that isomorphism between ordinary language and the 
world fails in two ways. First, the two domains are not the same size. Second, while the M-predication 
relation is asymmetrical, the L-predication relation is not (at least if we take this to be something that 
holds between grammatical subject and grammatical predicate in ordinary natural language sentences). 
Both these failures of isomorphism can be corrected, however. First, we need to pay careful attention to 
phenomena like homonymy and equivocation. Second, we need to avoid confusing the surface 
grammatical structure of ordinary language with the underlying logical structure.    10 
  (b) The log is white.  
Nevertheless, Aristotle tells us that (a) is somewhat misleading.   
When  I  say  that  the  white  is  a  log,  I  mean  that  something  which 
happens to be white is a log, but not that the white is an underlying 
subject  for  the  log.  For  it  was  neither  being  white  nor  being  this 
particular white, that it came to be a log—so that it is not [white] unless 
coincidentally.
12 However, when I say that the log it white, I do not say 
that something different is white and that that happens to be a log, as 
for example when I say that the musical is white (in this case, I mean 
that the man who happens to be musical is white). Instead, the log is the 
underlying  subject  that  came  to  be  white,  not  by  being  something 
different than what is essentially a log or this log. If we must legislate, 
let’s say that speaking the second way is predicating and that speaking 
the first way either is not predicating at all, or else is predicating not 
unqualifiedly, but coincidentally. What is predicated is something like 
the white, and that of which it is predicated is something like the log.  
(83a4-18)  
Aristotle makes two important points in this passage. First, an object’s being the 
referent of the grammatical subject of a predicative sentence does not entail that the 
object is the ontological subject of the instance of metaphysical predication 
underwriting the truth of that sentence. Second, he claims that being an ontological 
subject is essentially connected to being the sort of thing that can underlie change. 
Therefore, if we want to derive any conclusions about the nature of reality from an 
examination of the way that we talk about reality, we need to pay close attention to the 
order of predication. When we speak in a way that does not properly reflect the 
predicative structure of the world, Aristotle tells us that we either fail to predicate at 
                                                 
12   I follow Irwin and Fine (1995) here and take the ‘so that…’ clause to indicate that the thing in 
question is only coincidentally pale. Barnes (1994) translates the last clause “…hence it is not a log 
except incidentally”. Tredennick (1960) also takes Aristotle to be saying that the thing in question is 
only wooden or a log coincidentally. Both translations are possible renderings of the Greek, “…Àst' 
oÈk ¶stin éll' ≥ kata suµbebhkÒw” which specifies no subject complement for ‘¶stin’. 
Nevertheless it seems difficult to square ‘it is a log coincidentally’ with what Aristotle is doing in the 
rest of the passage. He seems to be saying that the underlying subject is essentially a log (see 83a14) but 
only coincidentally a white thing. Furthermore, he emphasizes that unqualified linguistic predication 
requires that the ontological subject rather than a coincident of the ontological subject be the referent of 
the grammatical subject of the sentence.    11 
all, or else that we predicate only in a derivative sense. Only when the syntactic 
structure of a predicative sentence is truly isomorphic with the ontological structure of 
the world do we have a case of unqualified predication.
13  
Take a sentence in which we have unqualified predication, like “The log is 
white.” The truthmaker for this sentence will involve the holding of some relation 
between the semantic value of ‘white’ and the semantic value of ‘the log’ where the 
latter is a metaphysical subject. For the time being, let’s simply call this relation ‘m-
predication’. Imagine that we had a collection of the truthmakers for all cases of 
unqualified predication. We will have gone a long way toward being able to specify 
the truthmakers for all the sentences in which there is coincidental predication going 
on. For example, the truthmaker for “The white is (a) log” will be the same as the 
truthmaker for “The log is white.” In some cases, the story will be more complicated. 
For example, take “The musician is white.” Aristotle seems to think that this sentence 
is made true by the facts that both musical and white are m-predicated of a single 
underlying subject. 
A certain story about truthmaking is naturally suggested by the passages 
above. There are certain entities in the world that serve as ontological subjects, and 
there are entities (call them ‘ontological predicates’) which stand in a relation of m-
predication to these. When we say true things about the world, our statements are 
made true by the holding of the m-predication relation between these entities. If we 
want to get a better  understanding of what Aristotle takes to be going on, we need to 
get clear on three questions. What sorts of entities are ontological subjects? What sorts 
of entities are ontological predicates? What is the relation of m-predication holding 
                                                 
13   I think that there are two lessons to take from these passages. First of all, Aristotle wants us to 
distinguish the ontological form of truthmakers from the orthographic-grammatical form of sentences. 
Second, Aristotle thinks that we often have the ability to tell when the form of a sentence fails to reflect 
the form of the underlying truthmaker, and to modify our understanding of the sentence accordingly. 
For example, “The white is a log” really means that white is m-predicated of the log.    12 
between these, and can it be analyzed in terms of more fundamental relations?  We 
can begin to answer these questions by looking at some of Aristotle’s comments in the 
Categories.  
At Categories 1a16, Aristotle divides the things that are said (tôn legomenôn) 
into two classes. There are the things that are said with combination (kata sumplokên 
legetai) and those said without combination (aneu sumplokês). The things said with 
combination are simple assertions like ‘Man runs,’ or ‘Man wins,’, while ‘man’, ‘runs’ 
and ‘wins’ are said without combination. Despite the fact that Aristotle here uses only 
one-word expressions as examples of things said without combination, we should not 
take the distinction that he is making here to be a purely syntactic one between one 
word and multiple word expressions. Aristotle later counts some multiple word 
expressions to be among the things said without combination. At 1b25 Aristotle tells 
us that each thing said without combination, including complex expressions like ‘in the 
Lyceum (‘en Lukeiô’) and ‘in the agora’ (‘en agora’), signifies an item in one of the 
ten categories. So an expression’s being syntactically simple is not a necessary 
condition for its being a thing said without combination.  
Aristotle also tells us that the combination of simple expressions with each 
other produces affirmations that can be true or false. However, the combination of 
uncombined expressions with each other to form an affirmation involves more than 
simply giving a list of expressions. ‘Hippos’ and ‘leukon’ are given as simple 
expressions the first signifying a substance, the second a quality. However, the 
expression ‘hippos leukon’ is not an affirmation, or even a grammatical sentence. I do 
not think that Aristotle would take ‘hippos leukon’ to be either a thing said without 
combination or to be a thing said with combination. If we want to count the division of 
things that are said into combined and uncombined to be an exhaustive one, then we 
should hold that ‘hippos leukon’ isn’t a single thing that it said at all. Rather than   13 
having one thing said with combination, we have two simple expressions, ‘hippos’ and 
‘leukon’, each of which is said without combination. To get a single thing said with 
combination, simple expressions must be woven together in the proper manner.
14  
We can also ask about the status of one-word paronymous expressions like 
‘grammatikos’ said in reference to a grammarian. Should we count these as things said 
without combination? To answer this question, we must ask whether ‘grammatikos’ 
signifies an item in a single category. If ‘grammatikos’ simply indicates a certain 
particular human being, then there is no problem with counting it as a thing said 
without combination. On the other hand, if ‘grammatikos’ indicates the combination 
of grammaticality with a particular human being, something like ‘grammatical man’, 
then the expression would not indicate an object in a single category and so should not 
count as an expression said without combination by the test that Aristotle gives at 
1b25ff.
15 However, neither does ‘grammatikos,’ seem to be an affirmation of anything, 
and we might think that it should thus fail to count as something said with 
combination. If we are going to preserve the exhaustivity of the with 
combination/without combination distinction, we are forced to hold that 
‘grammatikos’ does not count as a single thing that is said at all, but is something 
more or less like an abbreviation of ‘grammatikos anthrôpos’ which is a list of things 
said without combination that has yet to be woven together into a single assertion.
16  
                                                 
14   In the De Interpretatione, Aristotle tells us that the formation of an assertion requires the use 
of a verb. The distinction between a two-member list of simple expressions and a single complex 
assertion is also a central concern of Plato’s in the Sophist. 
15   Ackrill (1963) pp73-74 hypothesizes that Aristotle would not countenance a one-word 
expression meaning ‘white man’ as an expression said without combination, since it would not signify 
an item in a single category. Either the expression is said with combination, in which case Aristotle’s 
examples like ‘Man runs,’ and ‘Man wins,’ pick out only a sub-category of things said with 
combination. Or Aristotle’s division is not an exhaustive one. I respond to this by holding that not every 
syntactically simple expression counts as a single thing that is said in the technical sense under 
consideration by Aristotle.     
16   Notice that the examples Aristotle gives at 1a16ff—“Anthrôpos trechei,’ and ‘Anthrôpos nika’ 
—involve a subject and an inflected verb. ‘Grammatikos anthropos’ is missing the verb necessary to 
make it an assertion. Notice also that Aristotle gives the inflected verb forms ‘trechei’ and ‘nika’ as 
examples of things said without combination. Later, however, when Aristotle gives the expressions   14 
One general observation to make here concerns Aristotle’s method. He begins 
with some observations about how we speak (1a16ff), and makes a distinction 
between syntactically simple and syntactically complex expressions. He then claims 
that corresponding to the things that are said without combination, certain entities exist 
which can be grouped into the categories (1a20-1b10 & 1b25-2a11). We then find 
mismatches between the structure of the linguistic data that Aristotle begins with, and 
the structure of the ontology that he ends up with. For example, we see that some 
syntactically simple expressions do not indicate a single entity, while some multiple 
word expressions do indicate a single entity.  
I suggest that Aristotle wants to attribute these differences to failures of 
ordinary language to mirror the underlying structure of the world. Aristotle will put 
some restrictions on what it is to be a proper thing that is said, and these restrictions 
will be semantic. A proper thing that is said either indicates a single categorial item, or 
indicates a combination of simple categorial items. We are told in the De 
Interpretatione that the task of affirming a combination requires a verb. Without a 
verb we cannot turn a list of things said without combination into a single thing said 
with combination. 
At Categories 1a20, Aristotle turns from the division of the things that are said 
(ta legomena) to the division of the things that are (ta onta). Aristotle is drawing a 
contrast between ‘ta legomena’ (at 1a16) and ‘ta onta’ (at 1a20), indicating that he 
now means to talk about the nature of the things in the world signified by our 
expressions, rather than about the expressions themselves.  
Aristotle divides entities (ta onta) into four basic types by introducing two 
relations that a given entity can bear or fail to bear to a subject. There is the inherence 
                                                                                                                                           
without combination that signify entities in the categories, he uses infinitives (2a2-4). If the infinitives 
count as names of categorical items, should inflected verb forms be treated in the same way as other 
paronymous expressions? They are derived from the names of entities by a change in ending.    15 
relation, some entities are in a subject (en hupokeimenô), some fail to be in any 
subject.  And there is the said-of relation, some entities are said-of a subject (kath' 
hupokeimonou tinos legatai), some are not said-of any subject. Any entity can be 
placed in one of four types depending on whether or not it stands in each of these 
relations to a subject. The four types of entities, and examples, given by Aristotle are 
as follows: 
  (i) Those said-of a subject, but not in any subject. e.g. man is said-of a 
subject, the individual man, but is not in any subject. 
(ii) Those in a subject, but not said-of any subject. e.g. the individual 
grammatical knowledge is in a subject, the soul, but is not said-of any 
subject; and the individual white is in a subject, the body (for all color 
is in <a> body), but is not said-of any subject. 
(iii) Those both said-of a subject and in a subject. e.g. knowledge is in a 
subject, the soul, and is also said-of a subject, grammatical knowledge. 
(iv) Those neither in a subject, nor said of a subject. e.g. the individual 
man (ho tis anthropos) or the individual horse (ho tis hippos)—for 
nothing of this sort is either in a subject or said-of a subject. 
  Traditionally commentators have taken the entities which are said-of a subject 
to be universals, and those which are not said-of any subject to be particulars, and the 
entities which are in a subject to be accidents, and those which are not in any subject 
to be substances.
 17  So, the four-fold division gives us (i) universal or secondary 
substances, (ii) particular accidents,
18 (iii) universal accidents, (iv) particular or 
                                                 
  17   See, for example, the commentaries on the Categories by Ammonius, Simplicius, and Porphyry. 
See Ammonius In Aristotelis categorias commentarius pp. 9, 25-27; Simplicius In Aristotelis categorias 
commentarium Vol. 8 pp. 44-51; Porphyry In Aristotelis categorias expositio per interrogationem et 
responsionem Vol. 4,1 pp. 73-88.  
18   For the present we need attach no ontological weight to this use of ‘particular’. One of the 
primary controversies surrounding the interpretation of the Categories concerns the status of type-ii 
entities. What does Aristotle take a particular accident to be, and in what sense is it particular? In order   16 
primary substances. Aristotle takes the division of the onta into types (i)-(iv) to be an 
exhaustive and exclusive categorization of all the entities in the universe. This division 
complements the division of the things that are into the ten categories in chapter 4. 
Each of the things said without combination signifies an entity in one of the ten 
categories, and each of these entities is of one of types (i)-(iv).  
  Corresponding to the inherence and the said-of relation, there are two ways in 
which an entity can be an ontological subject. We might understand the relation that I 
have been calling ‘m-predication’ to this point as a disjunction of the inherence and 
said-of relations. For one entity to be m-predicated of another is for the first to inhere 
in the second or for the first to be said of the second. Accordingly, the ultimate 
truthmakers for our claims will consist in the obtaining of the inherence and said-of 
relations between the things that are.
19 Furthermore, I think that Aristotle takes 
inherence and the said-of relation to be fundamental relations, and takes the holding of 
these relations between entities to be fundamental facts. A relation is fundamental if 
the holding of the relation between entities is not ontologically analyzable into the 
                                                                                                                                           
to answer this question we need to look more closely at Aristotle’s statements about inherence and the 
said-of relation, which I do at length in what follows.  
19  This analysis of m-predication turns out to be too simple. First of all, I will argue in chapter 8, 
that Aristotle needs to accept a more complex analysis of some true cases of linguistic predication. 
When we linguistically predicate ‘pale’ of ‘Socrates’, the truthmaker is the inherence of a 
nonsubstantial particular pallor in Socrates. However, there is also the universal pallor, which can be 
metaphysically predicated of Socrates, because in it said-of something that inheres in Socrates. 
Furthermore, while I begin by holding that Aristotle takes all truthmakers to involve the holding of 
relations between distinct entities, I do not think that this story is quite right. In chapter 10, I argue that 
Aristotle will take some truthmakers—the ones making true claims about the essence of an entity—to 
be non-relational. So, for example, I start out taking “Socrates is human” to be made true by the 
universal human’s being said-of Socrates. However, I will later deny that the most fundamental way of 
thinking about the truthmaker for “Socrates is human” involves a relation between Socrates and any 
other entity. Rather the truthmaker involves only the intrinsic nature of Socrates—it this way I take the 
truthmaker to be non-relational. Socrates’ being human explains the holding of the said-of relation 
between the universal and Socrates, rather than vice versa. Further development of my position will 
have to await the development of some further technical apparatus. For now, I will take a relation to be 
fundamental if the fact that the relation holds between entities cannot be explained in terms of the 
holding of other relations between entities.   17 
holding of any further relations between entities. What I mean by a fundamental 
relation should become clearer by an examination of some examples.  
A trope-theorist might give the following sort of account of the truthmaker for 
“Socrates is pale”.
20 The fundamental entities in the world are tropes or particular 
property instances, like the paleness of Socrates which is numerically distinct from the 
paleness of Coriscus. There are two fundamental relations that tropes can stand in to 
each other—resemblance and bundling. “Socrates is pale” is true if and only if there is 
a trope t, which is a paleness trope, and ‘Socrates’ refers to a bundle of tropes that 
includes t. For t to be a paleness trope is for it to be a member of a primitive perfect 
resemblance class which includes all and only paleness tropes. The relations of 
resemblance and bundling are fundamental relations on this ontology, in that they are 
not susceptible of further analysis. For a paleness trope to be part of a bundle of tropes 
just is for it to stand in a certain relation to these other tropes. Most importantly, the 
fact that certain tropes are cobundled does not consist in the existence of any further 
cobundling trope. Facts about cobundling are rock-bottom facts. The same goes for 
resemblance. The fact that two pale tropes perfectly resemble each other is not 
accounted for by the existence of any further  resemblance trope. The fundamental 
ontology of this trope-theorist contains tropes, and the fundamental facts consist in the 
holding of resemblance and bundling relations between these tropes.    
On the other hand, a realist about universals might give the following account 
of the truth-maker for the sentence “Socrates is pale”.
21 There are two sorts of 
                                                 
20   For a discussion and defense of trope theories, see Stout “Are the Characteristics of Particular 
Things Universal or Particular?” (1923), Williams “The Elements of Being” (1953), Campbell “The 
Metaphysic of Abstract Particulars” (1981), and Abstract Particulars (1990). I am assuming that ‘pale’ 
refers to a real quality of objects, and that the trope theorist would think that there are paleness tropes. 
While many trope-theorists might prefer to deny the real existence of color tropes as objective features 
of external objects, I do not think that much in what follows rests on the choice of example.  
21   See Armstrong (1978), and (1989). I assume that paleness is a real universal for the sake of the 
example.    18 
fundamental entity in the world: universals and particulars. There is a fundamental 
relation, instantiation, which particulars bear to universals—that is, particulars 
instantiate universals. “Socrates is pale” is true if and only if the particular referred to 
by ‘Socrates’ instantiates the universal indicated by ‘is pale’, call it ‘paleness’. We 
explain the fact that Socrates is pale by saying that the instantiation relation holds 
between Socrates and paleness. ‘Is pale’ is not a primitive predicate on this picture. 
Instead the application of the predicate ‘is pale’ to an object is to be analyzed in terms 
of that object’s bearing the instantiation relation to the universal paleness. On the 
other hand, take the fact that an object bears the instantiation relation to the universal 
paleness.  The relational predicate ‘...bears the instantiation relation to…’ is primitive. 
We do not analyze instantiation in terms of the holding of any further relation between 
the universal paleness, the particular, and some other universal like instantiation. 
According to the position under consideration, we cannot analyze the application of 
‘instantiates’ by pointing to anything more fundamental.  
A relation is fundamental, if the fact that entities stand in the relation is not 
analyzable in terms of any further relation between entities. Imagine a theorist who is 
a non-reductive realist about love, and who also accepts the existence of real 
universals. Such a theorist might say that the truth of “Ernie loves Bert” is to be 
analyzed in terms of the particulars, Ernie and Bert (perhaps in some particular order), 
and the universal relation loving. The entities in question are combined in some way to 
form the truthmaker for the sentence; let’s say that Ernie and Bert together instantiate 
loving. There is an entity in this ontology that corresponds to the predicate ‘loves’, the 
universal loving. However, there is no entity in this ontology that corresponds to the 
predicate ‘instantiates’. Rather, some of the entities that the proponent of universals 
accepts simply bear the instantiation relation to others, and this fact is not further   19 
analyzable. Instantiation is, accordingly, a fundamental relation in the universalist’s 
ontology.
22   
I suspect that every ontology will accept some relations as fundamental.
23 If we 
were to require that every relational claim be susceptible to the same type of analysis, 
we would end up being subject to a version of Bradley’s regress.
24 Armstrong worries 
about this threat of Bradley’s regress, and hopes to avoid it by asserting that 
instantiation is not really a relation at all, but is a “non-relational tie”.
25 However, this 
language is somewhat obscure. It is unclear what a tie between two objects is 
supposed to be, if it is not a relation. In later works, Armstrong claims that 
instantiation is a relation, but holds that it is unlike other relations in that it is 
fundamental.
26 It seems clear to me that if we want to accept instantiation as part of 
our fundamental story about the world, then we must hold that it is a relation. If we 
want to avoid Bradley’s regress, we need to hold that not every relation is susceptible 
                                                 
22   The same distinction can be made about whatever the semantic values of non-relational 
predicates are supposed to be. In some cases, the fact that x is F cannot be analyzed into the holding of 
some relation between x and some entity indicated by F. Take the predicate ‘is a universal’ in “Redness 
is a universal.” It doesn’t seem plausible to hold that the truthmaker for this claim is that the entity 
Redness instantiates the universal Univeralhood. It seems better to hold that ‘is a universal’ is a 
primitive predicate which is not analyzable in terms of any further entities.   
23   At least it seems to me that a sensible method in ontology will be to take certain relations or 
predicates to be fundamental, and to take others to be analyzable. I suppose, however, that there are 
alternatives. On one of these, there are no fundamental relations at all and analysis can proceed forever. 
On another, every relation and every predicate will be equally fundamental and none will be further 
analyzable. I suppose that we could also have a theory on which some monadic predicates are 
fundamental. The ontology outlined by Armstrong in A World of States of Affairs (1997) seems to be 
such a theory. We are given states of affairs as primitive entities, and we arrive at particulars and 
universals by applying the predicates ‘is a universal part of’ and ‘is a particular part of’ to the states of 
affairs. These predicates seem to be fundamental.  
24   Say that (a) Socrates’ instantiating Paleness is to be analyzed along the same lines as Socrates’ 
being pale. Then (b) the instantiation relation will have to hold between instantiation on the one hand, 
and Socrates and Paleness on the other. But, (c) if the holding of this second instantiation relation is 
susceptible of analysis, then (d) Instantiation will have to stand in the instantiation relation to 
instantiation on the one hand, and instantiation, Socrates and Paleness on the other. And so on… This 
sort of regress strikes me as exactly the sort of thing that Aristotle is concerned to avoid. 
25   See Armstrong (1978). Also see Armstrong (1989) and Armstrong’s A World of States of 
Affairs (1997).  
26   See Armstrong (1989). Armstrong also uses the phrase ‘fundamental nexus’. I think that what 
is important here is the fact that the fundamental relations do not admit of further ontological analysis.    20 
of further analysis. The relations that do not admit of analysis must be recognized as 
fundamental.  
I have said a bit about what I mean in claiming that inherence and the said-of 
relation should be counted as fundamental relations for Aristotle. But can we give an 
account of what it is for a relation to be fundamental in Aristotle’s terms? I think that 
we can. While Aristotle classifies the things that are (ta onta) in terms of whether they 
bear the inherence and said-of relations to anything, he does not take inherence and the 
said-of relation themselves to be among the onta. Inherence and the said-of relation do 
not seem to be entities at all. Rather the entities corresponding to the things said 
without combination bear these relations to one another. The fundamental facts on 
Aristotle’s view are the holding of the inherence relation and the said-of relation 
between the onta. Furthermore, when Aristotle tells us at 1b25ff that each of the things 
said without combination signifies an entity in one of the categories, there is good 
reason to deny that he is thinking of inherence and the said-of relation as among the 
categorial entities.
27 In claiming that a relation—such as inherence or the said-of 
relation—is fundamental for Aristotle, I mean that it is a relation that holds between 
entities in the categories, and which is not such that its holding can be further analyzed 
in terms of other relations between categorial entities. 
When we give an ontology, we want to specify the fundamental types of 
entities that exist, and the fundamental relations that these entities stand in to one 
another. We can then specify the ultimate truth-conditions for all our claims about the 
                                                 
27   Here is an argument for not counting inherence as one of the onta. Take a particular instance of 
inherence, and ask whether it inheres in anything or not. If it does not, then it is a substance, which is 
unacceptable. If it does, then we must explain the fact that it inheres in something as a matter of the 
holding of the inherence relation between it and something else. But then we can ask whether the 
resulting inherence relation inheres in anything, and we are off on Bradley’s regress. We will run into 
the same sort of regress if we think that the holding of inherence and said-of relations can be 
paraphrased in terms of categorial entities. I take it to be the case that Aristotle would find such 
regresses unacceptable.    21 
world in terms of these entities and relations. So far I have claimed that Aristotle takes 
inherence and the said-of relation to be two fundamental relations.  
Inherence is a relation that holds between accidents and substances. Accidents 
inhere in substances, and are ontologically dependent on the substances in which they 
inhere, in that it follows from the very nature of the accident in question that it inheres 
in the substance in which it inheres. I argue at some length that Aristotle accepts the 
existence of both particulars and universals in the category of substance and in each of 
the non-substantial categories. Nonsubstantial particulars are entities like the particular 
instance of grammaticality belonging to Socrates, or the particular instance of pallor 
inhering in Socrates. Every nonsubstantial particular inheres in a particular substance 
upon which it is ontologically dependent. Both nonsubstantial particulars and 
particular substances have natures, in that neither is a bare particular.  
Nevertheless, although they have natures, each of these particulars has a very 
simple nature. The nature of each particular can be fully specified by locating it in the 
various kinds to which it belongs. For example, the particular human being has a 
nature that is exhausted by being human, or its being rational, two-footed, terrestrial 
animal. The particular pallor has a nature that is exhausted by its being a specific 
shade of color. Any other property that we attribute to the human being or to the 
particular instance of pallor belongs to it because of relations that it stands in to other 
things. So when we say e.g. that Socrates is pale, what we say is true because the 
individual Socrates stands in a relation to an instance of pallor. When we say that the 
pale thing is musical, what we say is true if both the instance of pallor and the instance 
of musicality inhere in a particular substance.  At the most basic level of Aristotle’s 
ontology, we have a whole bunch of particular entities, with each of the nonsubstantial 
particulars inhering in particular substances.    22 
Aristotle does not take particulars to be the only entities that exist, however. 
He also accepts the existence of universals, which are said-of both particulars and 
subordinate universals. I said above that we specify the nature of a particular by 
locating it in the kinds to which it belongs. These kinds are universals. I argue that 
Aristotle takes universals to be wholes which have particulars as parts, and that he 
takes the said-of relation to be a whole-part relation. I suggest that Aristotle takes the 
relation between universals and particulars to be something like the relation that holds 
between animals and their atomic constituents. Neither an animal nor an Aristotelian 
universal is a simple collection of its parts. Nor, however, is either an entity that is 
completely independent of the parts that constitute it at any given time. On my view, 
Aristotle thinks of universals as entities that endure through time and are composed 
out of different particulars at different times. Furthermore, these universals bear 
inherence and said-of relations to one another, and the holding of these relations 
between universals is not simply reducible to the relations that their particular parts 
bear to each other. Aristotle conceives of science as the study of the relations that 
universals bear to one another, and takes these relations to underwrite the long-term 
stability of the world.  
Aristotle also holds that substantial individuals are primary substances. In this 
way, substantial individuals are ontologically prior to other things. However, it is 
difficult to see how substantial individuals can be prior to other things given some of 
what Aristotle says about priority. In the end, I think that Aristotle takes primary 
substances to be prior to other things by being ‘causes of being’ for those things.    
In the following two chapters, I give a preliminary analysis of what Aristotle 
says about the inherence and said-of relations in the Categories. It soon becomes 
evident that there are major interpretative difficulties involved in getting clear about 
the precise nature of these relations. What Aristotle says at one point often conflicts   23 
with what he says elsewhere. In chapters 4-6, I focus on the difficulties involved in 
constructing a coherent account of the inherence relation, and argue both that Aristotle 
accepts the existence of nonsubstantial particulars and that he takes inherence to 
involve ontological dependence. As a result of these views, I am forced to say that 
some of Aristotle is mistaken to claim that universal accidents can inhere in particular 
substances.   
In chapter 7, I argue that Aristotle takes the said-of relation to be a kind of 
whole-part relation, and that he takes universals to be constituted by particulars. In 
chapter 8, I examine Aristotle’s claim that non-substantial universals inhere in 
particular substances on which they are not ontologically dependent. I consider a 
number of possible explanations for Aristotle’s making this claim, which conflicts 
with his definition of inherence. I also suggest, in chapter 8, that Aristotle’s 
problematic claims about inherence are ultimately rooted in his view that particular 
substances are ontologically fundamental. However, given Aristotle’s explicit 
definitions of priority in the Categories, it is hard to see how particular substances 
could be prior to other things, and in chapter 9, I turn to the task of trying to 
reconstruct a notion of ontological priority that will do the work that Aristotle wants 
done. I argue that there is a notion of priority suggested, but not fully developed, in the 
Categories according to which one entity is prior to another by being a cause of being 
for it. Primary substances are ontologically fundamental by being causes of being for 
other entities. In chapter 10, I continue to examine ontological priority in Aristotle, 
and suggest that Aristotle takes particular substances to be ontologically fundamental 
because they alone are purely nonrelational entities. In other words, while the essence 
of any other entity at least partially consists in fundamental relations that it bears to 
other things, the essence of a primary substance does not consist in its bearing any 
such relations to other things.     24 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
THE SAID-OF RELATION  
Section 2.1: Preliminary Characterization of the Said-Of Relation 
  In this chapter I examine Aristotle's characterization of the said-of relation, and 
consider some problems involved in trying to understand this relation. Throughout the 
Categories, Aristotle tells us that the genera and species of an entity (1b10ff, 2b7ff), as 
well as the differentiae characteristic of an entity's species and genera (3a1-3, 3a21ff), 
are said-of that entity.
1 Furthermore, the genus and differentia are said-of a species, 
and the higher genera and differentiae are said of the lower genera.  
  At 1b10ff, we are told that the said-of relation is transitive:  
  (TransOF) If x is said-of y and y is said-of z, then x is said-of z.  
  Aristotle also tells us that differentiae are genus-specific (1b16ff.), which we 
can render as follows. Where g and g* are genera and d is a differentia: 
(GSDOF) If g and d are immediately said-of g*, then d is said-of any 
entity only if g* is also said-of that entity.
2 
  Aristotle also characterizes the said-of relation in terms of linguistic 
predication, and contrasts it with the inherence relation. At 2a19ff, he writes: 
  It is clear... that if something is said of a subject both its name and its 
definition are necessarily predicated of the subject. For example, man is 
said of a subject, the individual man, and the name is of course 
predicated (since you will be predicating ‘man’ of the individual man), 
and also the definition of man will be predicated of the individual man 
(since the individual man is also [a] man). Thus both the name and the 
definition will be predicated. But as for things that are in a subject, in 
most cases neither the name nor the definition is predicated of the 
subject. In some cases there is nothing to prevent the name from being 
                                                 
1   I use ‘said-of’ with the hyphen to translate Aristotle’s use of the technical phrase ‘kath’ 
hupokeimenou tinos legesthai.’ For example, Aristotle tells us that human (the species) is said-of the 
individual human by writing, “[A]nthrôpos kath’ hupokeimenou legetai tou tinos anthrôpos.” We might 
translate this sentence more literally as “Human is said of some particular human as subject.”     
2   See Categories, 1b16-24.   25 
predicated of the subject, but it is impossible for the definition to be 
predicated. For example, white, which is in a subject (the body), is 
predicated of the subject; for a body is called ‘white’. But the definition 
of white will never be predicated of the body. (2a19-34. translation 
Ackrill)
3 
  Aristotle indicates that he is willing to allow features about the way that we 
ordinarily talk to count as evidence for whether one item is said-of another. Aristotle 
marks a distinction between the said-of relation, which holds between things, and the 
relation of linguistic predication, by his use of two different phrases. That which is 
said-of a subject (tôn kath’ hupokeimenou legomenôn) is such that both its name and 
definition are (linguistically) predicated of the subject (katêgoreisthai tou 
hupokeimenou). The said-of relation is part of Aristotle’s formal ontology, it is a 
technical notion that he is introducing. However, he takes himself to be offering a test 
for whether the said-of relation holds in terms of what we ordinarily say. I take 
‘katêgoreisthai tou hupokeimenou’ to be a less technical expression in terms of which 
Aristotle wants to explicate the said-of relation. It will be useful to examine how the 
less technical relation of being predicated of a subject is supposed to work.
4  
  The predication that is involved in ‘being predicated of a subject’ 
(katêgoreisthai tou hupokeimenou) is thought of as a relation that holds between a 
name or other linguistic expression and a non-linguistic object. Let’s call this relation 
                                                 
3   φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι τῶν καθ' ὑποκειμένου λεγομένων ἀναγκαῖον καὶ 
τοὔνομα καὶ τὸν λόγον κατηγορεῖσθαι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου· οἷον ἄνθρωπος καθ' ὑποκειμένου 
λέγεται τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου, καὶ κατηγορεῖταί γε τοὔνομα,  – τὸν γὰρ ἄνθρωπον κατὰ τοῦ 
τινὸς ἀνθρώπου κατηγορήσεις· –  καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου 
κατηγορηθήσεται,  – ὁ γὰρ τὶς ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν· –  ὥστε καὶ τοὔνομα καὶ ὁ λόγος 
κατὰ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου κατηγορηθήσεται. τῶν δ' ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ὄντων ἐπὶ μὲν τῶν πλείστων 
οὔτε τοὔνομα οὔτε ὁ λόγος κατηγορεῖται τοῦ ὑποκειμένου· ἐπ' ἐνίων δὲ τοὔνομα μὲν οὐδὲν 
κωλύει κατηγορεῖσθαι τοῦ ὑποκειμένου, τὸν δὲ λόγον ἀδύνατον· οἷον τὸ λευκὸν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ 
ὂν τῷ σώματι κατηγορεῖται τοῦ ὑποκειμένου,  – λευκὸν γὰρ σῶμα λέγεται, –  ὁ δὲ λόγος τοῦ 
λευκοῦ οὐδέποτε κατὰ τοῦ σώματος κατηγορηθήσεται. 
4   I use, ‘…is said-of a subject’ to translate ‘kath’ hupokeimenou tinos legetai’, which is a bit of 
Aristotle’s technical vocabulary. Aristotle sometimes uses ‘kath’ hupokeimenou’ and a form of the verb 
‘katêgorein’ to indicate the said-of relation. The roundabout use of an object plus ‘kath’ hupokeimenou’ 
indicates the use of the technical notion. The less prolix ‘katêgorein’ + epi + object indicates the less 
technical notion ‘is predicated of’. I use ‘said-of’ with the hyphen to indicate that the technical relation 
is indicated.   26 
L-Pred. We can give truth-conditions for the holding of the L-Pred relation in terms 
of the well-formedness and truth of certain sentences. Where 
A
 is a linguistic 
expression, x is an object, and L(x) is a function from an object to an expression 
uniquely designating that object:
5  
  (LPred) L-pred(
A
,x) if and only if  
L(x) is (a/an) A
 is true.
6  
What we want to capture is a relation between a linguistic item and a nonlinguistic 
entity that holds whenever the sentence formed by linguistically-predicating the 
linguistic item of an expression denoting the entity is a true sentence. Next we need to 
say something about names and definitions. 
  Aristotle distinguishes cases in which an entity is merely indicated in a case of 
linguistic predication from cases in which the entity is named. For example, in the 
sentence “Socrates is brave,” Aristotle thinks that both ‘Socrates’ and ‘brave’ 
(‘andreios’ is the masculine singular) indicate entities.
7 ‘Socrates’ indicates a certain 
individual man, and ‘brave’ indicates a certain quality. However, while ‘Socrates’ is 
the name of the individual that it indicates, ‘brave’ is not the name of the entity that it 
indicates. The name of the quality in question is ‘bravery’ (‘hê andreia’ is feminine 
singular).
8 The attempt to linguistically predicate the name ‘bravery’ of Socrates, 
presents us with the ungrammatical “Socrates is bravery”.
9  
                                                 
5   Assume for the sake of simplicity that each entity has exactly one uniquely designating 
expression, let this expression be its name in a language with no ambiguous names.  
6   This is an English translation of a schema that, in the Greek, lacks the indefinite article. The 
Greek sentences translated by “Socrates is a man,” (‘Sôkratês anthrôpos esti,’) and “Socrates is pale,” 
(‘Sôkratês leukos esti.’) have a similar syntactic structure.  
7   I use ‘indicate’ as neutral between naming and designating without naming. In a canonical 
definition as Aristotle conceives it, the expression indicating the differentia will be an adjective, and the 
expression indicating the genus will be the name of the genus. A problem might arise, since the name of 
the differentia is best taken to be an abstract noun and it is not clear that we will be able properly to 
linguistically predicate this term of the subject in question.  
8   See Categories 1a12ff. I largely follow Ackrill in my view about this passage. What Aristotle 
says here is closely related to his views about paronymy. Aristotle introduces the concept of paronymy, 
“When things get their name from something, with a difference in ending, they are called paronymous. 
Thus, for example, the grammarian (ho grammatikos) gets his name from grammar (hê grammatikê), 
and the brave-man (ho andreios) gets his from bravery (hê andreia).” A full discussion of paronymy is   27 
  In the case of predicating a thing’s definition of a subject, I take Aristotle to be 
thinking of linguistically predicating a definition-indicating phrase of the subject in 
question. Take the case of human and Socrates. Assume that the phrase ‘rational 
animal’ gives the definition of human. We can L-predicate the name of human, 
‘anthrôpos’ of Socrates, and we can L-predicate the phrase ‘rational animal’ of 
Socrates.  In the case of Socrates and white, we are unable to linguistically predicate 
the definition of white of Socrates. The sentence resulting from an attempt to do so—
something like “Socrates is (a) lightest color”—is at best a category mistake.  In cases 
where one item is not said-of another, Aristotle tells us that we will never be able to L-
predicate the definition-phrase of the entity in question.  
  We end up with the following test for whether the said-of relation holds 
between two entities. Let N(x) and Def(x) be functions from entities to linguistic 
expressions. N(x) takes us to the linguistic expression that is the name of x. Def(x) 
takes us to a linguistic phrase of the form 
Aish B
 
 where 
Aish
 is an (adjectival) 
expression indicating the immediate differentia of x, and 
B
 is an expression 
indicating the immediate genus of x. So in ‘rational animal’ the differentia of man, 
rationality, and the genus of man, animal, are both indicated while only the latter is 
named.  We can see Aristotle first as laying down a necessary condition on the holding 
of the said-of relation: 
                                                                                                                                           
beyond the scope of this project, but there are a couple of points that can be made. First, paronyms are 
not words, but things. One thing’s being a paronym of another depends on a relation between non-
linguistic entities. Ho andreios is called ‘ho andreios’, because a certain man bears a relation to a 
certain quality, where the quality in question is named ‘hê andreia’. While I cannot establish my 
claim here, I think that ‘ho andreios’ is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, the phrase can be 
used to refer to a certain man, the underlying subject of the instance of bravery; on the other hand, the 
phrase can be used to refer to the complex of that man and the quality of grammaticality. In the latter 
case, I do not think that ‘ho andreios’ serves as an expression that refers to a single categorial entity, 
nor do I think that ‘ho andreios’ serves as a single thing which is said.  
9   In Greek, the sentence (‘Sôkratês andreia esti.’) would have a mismatch in the gender of the 
subject and adjective. The sentence would not even be syntactically well-formed. Notice, however, that 
to linguistically predicate ‘animal’ of Socrates in Greek, we have to use the neuter form of the noun 
‘animal’: ‘Sôkratês zôon esti.’ In this sentence, we do predicate the name of the universal animal of 
Socrates.    28 
(OF) For any two entities x and y, if x is said-of y then L-Pred(N(x), 
y), and L-pred(Def(x),y).  
  Does Aristotle think that we can give sufficient conditions for the holding of 
the said-of relation in terms of L-predication as well? While he does not explicitly say 
as much, he does tell us that in cases where the inherence relation holds, the definition 
of the inherent entity is never properly linguistically predicated of the subject. On the 
assumption that Aristotle takes inherence and the said-of relations to be the only 
relations that underlie true linguistic predication and to be exclusive of each other, the 
consequent of (OF) will then be sufficient for the antecedent. I do not think that 
Aristotle intends a relation other than inherence and the said-of relation to hold 
between an ontological predicate and its subject.
10 Accordingly, I suggest that he 
would accept: 
(OF1) For any two entities x and y, x is said-of y if and only if  
L-Pred(N(x), y), and L-pred(Def(x),y).   
  It is important to emphasize that (OF1) is intended as a test for whether or not 
the said-of relation holds, and not as an ontological analysis of the said-of relation. 
Aristotle is not trying to define the said-of relation in terms of anything more 
ontologically fundamental. The linguistic facts are not meant to explain the holding of 
the said-of relation. Rather, the linguistic facts are the way they are because our 
language reflects the difference between inherence and the said-of relation. Why is it 
the case that we can say, “Socrates is (a) man,” but not “Socrates is (a) bravery”? It is 
because the syntax of our language reflects a certain deep truth about the world—the 
fact that Socrates bears a different relation to bravery than he does to man.
11 We 
                                                 
10   I do not think that Aristotle means to hold that there is a relation between entities other than the 
said-of relation which holds when both the definition and name of one is linguistically predicable of the 
other. However, perhaps Aristotle takes identity to be such a relation. If he does, then my discussion of 
the logical properties of the said-of relation below will be affected.  
11   Notice, there is a certain problem with Aristotle’s methodology here. We end up with the same 
kind of grammatical monster in the case of “Socrates is humanity”. Aristotle’s even having a test here 
relies on a substantive doctrine about which of the many phrases indicating an entity are names of the 
entity.  And our intuitions about which words count as names will depend on what category we think an   29 
cannot linguistically-predicate the name and definition of bravery of Socrates, because 
bravery does not bear the said-of relation to Socrates.   
  What is the difference between the relation that Socrates bears to man and the 
relation that Socrates bears to bravery? There are various ways in which we could 
describe the difference between the relations. People sometimes mark the distinction 
by saying that man is essentially predicated of Socrates, while bravery is accidentally 
or nonessentially predicated of Socrates.
12 We might try to fill out an account on 
which the differences between the said-of and inherence relations are to be explained 
in terms of differences between essential and accidental predication. For example, we 
might point out that while it is possible for Socrates to fail to be brave, it is not 
possible for Socrates to fail to be human. We might try to give an analysis of the said-
of relation in terms of various modal facts along with a predication relation that is 
neutral between inherence and the said-of relation. For example, say that we think that 
property possession is a matter of bearing a relation of instantiation to a universal. We 
might say that to possess a property essentially is for it to be necessary that you have 
that property, while to possess a property nonessentially is for it to be possible for you 
not to possess the property. We will then have analyzed essential possessing a 
property in terms of necessity and a neutral notion of property possession. 
  I want to contrast this approach to essential and nonessential property 
possession with Aristotle’s. On my view, Aristotle does not take the holding of the 
said-of relation between human and Socrates to be analyzed into a neutral relation of 
predication and some modal facts. Rather, I think that Aristotle takes predication to be 
analyzable in terms of inherence and the said-of relation. Furthermore, I think that the 
                                                                                                                                           
entity belongs to, which will already bring in substantive intuitions about what is said of what. If (OF1) 
was supposed to be more than a practical test, Aristotle would be in serious trouble. 
12   Matters are somewhat complicated by the fact that Aristotle allows that there are necessary but 
nonessential properties of things, so-called propria. I think that Aristotle takes propria to inhere in their 
subjects, rather than to be said-of their subjects.     30 
holding of the said-of relation explains the modal facts about for Aristotle, rather than 
vice versa.
13 I take Aristotle to propose the said-of relation as a fundamental relation in 
his ontology. Any attempt to define essential predication in Aristotelian terms will 
ultimately make reference to the said-of relation. The essence of something is the 
account of what the thing is, where this is to be thought of as the real definition of the 
object. In trying to explicate what the real definition of an entity is, we will talk about 
the said-of relation. The species is said-of the individual, and it is the primary answer 
to the question of what the individual is because it is immediately said-of the 
individual. Real definitions of a species are given in terms of the immediate genus of 
the species, and the final differentia distinguishing that species from every other 
species in the genus. The notion of species, and of immediate genus and differentia, 
are themselves to be defined in terms of the said-of relation. The species of an 
individual is the entity which is immediately said-of that individual; the genus and 
differentia of a species are the entities immediately said-of the species.
14 The proper 
                                                 
13   In chapter 10, I argue that Aristotle takes all essential facts about an entity to be grounded in 
the identity of that entity, while all accidental facts are grounded in relations between distinct entities. 
In other words, the truthmakers for essential predication are nonrelational, while the truthmakers for 
other types of predication are relational. However, for the time being, I want to talk as if the 
truthmakers for essential predication involve the holding of the said-of relation between an entity and its 
species, genera, and differentiae. I will argue in chapter 7 that Aristotle takes the said-of relation to be a 
type of whole-part relation by which universals are composed of subordinate universals and particulars. 
In one way, I think that the holding of the said-of relation between universals and particulars is simply a 
brute fact about the world for Aristotle. Certain particulars go together to compose certain universals. 
On the other hand, I have some sympathy with a view on which it is primitive perfect similarity 
between particulars that grounds their being parts of the same universal. On the latter view, we might 
think that the similarity is more fundamental than the said-of relation. However, I am somewhat 
inclined to think that such primitive perfect similarity could exist even in an ontology that did not 
recognize the existence of universals—for example, certain theories on which there are tropes but no 
universals seem to fit the bill. Since Aristotle does accept universals in addition to particulars and 
internal relations of perfect similarity between particulars, we should not take his theory to be one on 
which the said-of relation reduces to similarity, in which case, we cannot give an analysis of the said-of 
relation solely in terms of similarity. Since, I don’t see any other relation which Aristotle holds can be 
added to similarity to give us an account of the said-of relation, I think that he takes the relation to be 
fundamental.    
14   It is unclear whether Aristotle holds that every species has both a genus and differentia said of 
it. If some items are related to others as determinates to determinables, then there will be no immediate 
differentia said of the determinate.    31 
nominal definition of a term is the phrase produced by combining terms designating 
the entities immediately said-of the referent of that term. Furthermore, everything that 
is involved in giving a full account of the essence of a thing is said-of that thing. On 
the other hand, whenever something external to the essence of an entity is 
metaphysically predicated of a subject, it inheres in that subject.  
  Notice, from the above discussion of inherence and the said-of relation, it 
follows immediately that no entity can both be in and be said-of another entity. In 
cases of inherence, the definition is never predicable, but in cases of when one thing is 
said-of another, the definition is always predicable. We have already seen that the 
said-of relation is transitive. It is clear that the relation is not symmetric, since the 
universal human can be said-of Socrates, but Socrates is not said-of anything. 
Furthermore, it seems that neither the name nor the definition of the species (or 
subordinate differentia) can be linguistically predicated of the genus, and the same 
holds for the names or definitions of lower-order genera being predicated of higher-
order genera. So the species cannot be said-of the genus, nor can lower genera and 
differentiae be said-of higher. That the said-of relation is not reflexive is clear. 
Socrates is a primary substance, and primary substances are said-of no subject. We 
might think that the name of Socrates can be linguistically predicated of Socrates. 
However, Aristotle tells us at 3a36-37 that there is no predicate from a primary 
substance and it is unclear whether he would take “Socrates is Socrates” as a case of 
linguistic predication. Even if Aristotle does take the name of Socrates to be L-
predicated of Socrates, since Aristotle does not take there to be any definition of 
particulars,
15 there is no definition of Socrates available to be L-predicated of 
anything.   
                                                 
15   For example, see Metaphysics 1036a3-5, 1039a28-b4.    32 
  However, it is less clear whether the relation is irreflexive. (OF1) requires us to 
hold that ‘animal’ and the definition of animal can be linguistically predicated of the 
species man, since animal is said-of the species (as well as being said of individual 
men). So the sentence ‘Man is [an] animal,’ expresses a truth, even when ‘man’ refers 
to a species, and a species human is not an animal. An interesting problem comes 
about because the word ‘anthrôpos’ is ambiguous between the species human and an 
individual human being. Greek does not have an indefinite article, but sometimes 
Aristotle disambiguates by using a form of the indefinite pronoun ‘tis’.  Hence, 
Aristotle could take the sentence ‘zôon anthrôpos esti,’ (‘[A] human is [an] animal,’) 
as linguistically predicating ‘zôon’ (the name of the genus animal) of the species 
human, or as predicating the name of the genus of an individual man.
16 Now take a 
sentence like ‘Man is man,’ as used to linguistically predicate the name of the species 
of the species itself. It seems clear that both the name and definition of man are 
linguistically predicable of the species man. Therefore, it seems that in cases where an 
entity has a definition, the entity is said-of itself.
17 Unless Aristotle rules out cases like 
                                                 
16   Some, e.g. Ackrill (1963) have taken this fact to indicate that Aristotle is confusing two different 
relations, the one between a kind and an individual, and the one between a kind and a subordinate kind, 
thereby holding that Aristotle conflates class membership and class inclusion. I think that this can be 
avoided by seeing the relation as something like the parthood relation, which will allow the relation to be 
straightforwardly transitive. Frede develops something like a mereological reading of the said-of relation 
extensively in his “Individuals in Aristotle” (1987). I argue that we should take the said-of relation as a 
relation of whole to part in chapter 7. 
17   It is clear that Aristotle does not think that individual substances have definitions, and that 
individual substances are not said-of anything. What is less clear is whether Aristotle thinks that there 
are sub-specific universals that have no definition. Owen (1965) seems to think that there are such 
entities. If Aristotle thinks that every universal is definable, then every universal will be said-of itself. 
Furthermore, since no universals exist without being said-of a particular, we could conclude that every 
entity that is said-of anything is said-of itself.  
It might appear from the current discussion that the said-of relation is not being taken as 
primitive. However, I think that definability can be defined in terms of the said-of relation. On the 
assumption that the differentia and genus of a species are distinct, then we can say that an entity is 
definable if and only if it has two distinct entities immediately superordinate to it. One entity will be 
immediately superordinate to another if and only if, the second is said-of the first, and the second is not 
said-of anything distinct from the first which is also said-of the first. While we might be able to talk 
about definability independently of the said-of relation and we might have intuitions about which terms 
and entities have definitions, I still take Aristotle to hold that the fact that one entity is in the definition 
of another at bottom precisely is the fact that the said-of relation holds between the two. The fact that   33 
‘Man is man,’ as improper predications, he can’t hold that the said-of relation is 
irreflexive. Rather the relation will be reflexive over the restriction of the class of 
entities to the class of entities that have definitions, and any entity that is said-of 
anything will be said-of itself. Furthermore, if the said-of relation is not irreflexive, 
then it will not be asymmetric but antisymmetric.
18  
  When Aristotle gives examples of entities that are said-of other entities, he 
includes both substances and nonsubstances—human is said-of the individual man, 
and knowledge is said-of a bit of grammatical knowledge. Both substances and 
nonsubstances can be subjects of the said-of relation. On the other hand, Aristotle 
seems to think that only substances can be subjects of the inherence relation.  
  Aristotle draws a strict contrast between things that are numerically one and 
things which are said-of something.  He writes, “Unqualifiedly things that are 
indivisible (ta atoma) and one in number (hen arithmô) are said-of nothing as a 
subject” (1b6-7). Some of the entities that Aristotle takes to be said-of something also 
inhere in something. These entities are nonsubstances, and each of them inheres in a 
substance and is said-of a nonsubstance. These entities will generally be the species 
and genera in a nonsubstantial category. On the other hand, substantial species and 
genera will be said-of a subject, but will not inhere in any subject.  
What we have so far should serve as a preliminary characterization of the said-
of relation.  The said-of relation is intracategorial and serves as a kind of ordering 
relation. At the bottom we have the entities that are not said-of anything. As we move 
on to entities said-of increasing numbers of things we find increasingly general genera. 
                                                                                                                                           
we have intuitions about what sorts of terms are definable before we accept Aristotle’s ontology reflects 
the fact that we have some way of tracking when the said-of relation holds between entities. However, 
the said-of relation needn’t be properly definable in terms of the things to which we have some pre-
theoretic access    
18   So, ∀x∀y (( x is said-of y & y is said-of x) ⊃ x = y). Aristotle will also accept:  
  ∀x(∃y(x is said-of y) ⊃ (x is said-of x)).    34 
While this picture of the taxonomy of entities is standard fare among interpreters of 
Aristotle, there are some troubling comments in the Categories that complicate 
matters. One serious problem involves Aristotle’s treatment of differentiae.  
Section 2.2: The Problem of Differentiae 
  Aristotle tells us that it is not properly definitive of substance to say that 
substance is what is not in any subject. While not being in any subject is necessary, it 
is not sufficient for being a substance, since the differentiae of substances are said-of 
something but are not in anything.  
So, no substance will be among the things in a subject. This is not, 
however, a proper characteristic of substance, but the differentia is also 
not in a subject. For footed and two-footed are said-of man, but are not 
in man; for neither two-footed nor footed are in man. (3a20-25)
19  
  We can see that Aristotle wants to put forward two theses about the 
differentiae of substances. First, the differentiae of substances are not 
themselves substances. Second, the differentiae of substances are said-of 
substances. It is difficult, however, to see how Aristotle can coherently hold 
both these theses. 
  Ackrill (1963) worries that the claim that an entity outside the category 
of substance can be said-of a substance will lead to an absurdity. Given that 
Aristotle takes the said-of relation to be transitive, Ackrill worries that 
Aristotle will be forced to say that a substance belongs to a category other than 
substance. Let s be a primary substance and let D be a differentia said-of s. We 
can construct the following argument:
20 
(1) D is not a substance, and does not belong to the category of substance. 
(2) D is said-of s.  
                                                 
19   ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη οὐσία τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ.  – οὐκ ἴδιον δὲ οὐσίας τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ 
διαφορὰ τῶν μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν· τὸ γὰρ πεζὸν καὶ τὸ δίπουν καθ' ὑποκειμένου μὲν 
λέγεται τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν,  – οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστὶ τὸ δίπουν 
οὐδὲ τὸ πεζόν. (3a20-25) 
20   I take it that Ackrill (1963) has an argument like this one in mind on pg. 85ff.   35 
(3) Every entity belongs to one of the ten categories.  
∴ (4) D belongs to one of the nonsubstantial categories, call the category C. 
(5) If D belongs to C, then C is said-of D.   
∴(6) C is said-of D. 
(7) The said-of relation is transitive. 
∴(8) C is said-of s.  
∴(9) There is a substance that belongs to a nonsubstance category. 
Since (9) is absurd, we must deny one of the premises.  
  I would like to begin by making four preliminary points about the argument 
above. First, this argument assumes that differentiae are entities. I think that this 
assumption is warranted, and that Aristotle takes anything that can be said-of an entity 
to be an entity. Second, I assume that Aristotle accepts (3) and takes every entity to 
belong to a category.  
  Third, I have some concern about whether Aristotle would accept (5) and (6). I 
can’t think of any passage where Aristotle asserts that the categories are said-of 
anything in the technical sense. Aristotle does sometimes call the categories ‘genera’ 
and it has become traditional to call the categories the highest genera. Since Aristotle 
generally takes genera to be said-of subordinate genera, we might conclude that he 
takes the categories to be said-of entities belonging to those categories. However, we 
might think that the categories represent an exception to this general rule. We might 
think that the categories do not count as genera in the ordinary sense. Furthermore, 
even if the categories are genera in the ordinary sense, it isn’t clear that they can 
satisfy the linguistic test laid out in (OF1). Categories will not have definitions, and so 
will not count as things that have their definitions predicated of anything.
21 They 
                                                 
21   Notice that this same argument can be run against any other candidate for a highest genus. If 
we provide a definition by pointing to a higher genus and a differentia, then the highest genera have no 
definitions.    36 
might, therefore, fail to be said-of anything. If categories aren’t said-of anything, then 
we cannot derive (9). While I do think that these concerns should be noted, the attempt 
to deny (5) on their basis strikes me as somewhat desperate, and I think that we should 
accept (5) for the present.
22 
  My fourth preliminary point about the argument above concerns the absurdity 
of (9). We might think that there is something absurd about claiming that any entity 
belongs to two categories. I share Ackrill’s sense that there is something wrong with 
this possibility. Aristotle spends the majority of the Categories telling us how to 
distinguish entities in one category from those in another. However, Aristotle makes a 
couple of curious claims in the Categories that run counter to the intuition that a thing 
cannot be in two categories. In the course of discussing the category of quality at 
8b25ff, Aristotle mentions states and conditions as types of quality. However, at 
11a20 he claims that states and conditions are relatives.  
  Aristotle considers two solutions to this prima facie problem, without finally 
endorsing either of them. First, he suggests that particular states will be qualities, 
while the genera of these states will be relatives. For example, knowledge will be a 
relative while grammar will be a quality and will not be a relative. This solution 
implies that a genus can belong to a different category than its species, and is 
inconsistent (given the transitivity of the said-of relation) with the claim that the 
categories are said-of every entity belonging to the category.
23  
                                                 
22   Notice, that even if someone insists on denying (5), we can recast the argument in other terms. 
For example, while the category of quality might not be said-of anything, there will be genera in the 
category of quality that will be said-of things, e.g. state, condition, affection. If a differentia is in the 
category of quality, one of these will be said-of the differentia. If this differentia is in turn said-of a 
substance, we end up with an analogue of (9) claiming that a substance is a state, condition or affection.  
23   Notice that Aristotle considers not just holding that grammar is a quality but denying that 
grammar is a relative. However, if relative is said-of knowledge and knowledge is said-of grammar, the 
transitivity of the said-of relation requires that relative be said-of grammar. We might use the fact that 
Aristotle considers this solution to indicate that he doesn’t take the categories to be genera in the 
ordinary sense.    37 
  The second solution Aristotle considers is to hold that an entity like grammar 
might belong to two categories (11a37). By allowing that an entity might belong to 
more than one category, Aristotle undermines one of our reasons for thinking that he 
would be troubled by (9). Anyone who thinks that Aristotelian categories are meant to 
serve as an exhaustive and exclusive division of everything that exists will have to 
contend with Aristotle’s claims at 11a37ff.
24  
  Nevertheless, even if Aristotle would allow some entities to belong to multiple 
categories, we might think that there is something especially problematic about 
allowing a substance to belong to a nonsubstantial category. The distinction between 
substance and nonsubstance is of such central importance to Aristotle’s ontology that 
we should be loath to allow that any entity could be both. It is especially problematic 
that a primary substance would end up being in a nonsubstantial category, since 
primary substances are supposed to serve only as subjects while other entities are 
supposed to have further subjects. In what follows, therefore, I will proceed on the 
assumption that (9) really would be a problem for Aristotle, even if he did not properly 
appreciate it as a problem. 
  Therefore, if accepting both (1) and (2) would lead to (9), then we must either 
deny that differentiae are said-of substance or accept that the differentiae of substances 
fall in the category of substance. Ackrill suggests that Aristotle accepts (1), and should 
as a consequence deny (2). According to Ackrill, Aristotle ought to say that 
differentiae inhere in substances. If differentiae are going to belong to a nonsubstantial 
category, it is most natural to claim that they are qualities or qualifications. In the 
                                                 
24   Like Ackrill (1963), I do want the categories to serve as an exhaustive and exclusive division 
of the things that are. I also think that it is problematic to have genera in a different category than their 
species. Therefore, I think that we need to offer a revisionary reading of this passage. We need to 
distinguish the possession of a certain intrinsic quality of the soul from bearing the knowledge relation 
to a certain subject matter. When we talk about grammar being in a subject, there are two things 
inhering in the subject. There is a quality in the subject’s soul as well as a relative.    38 
remainder of this chapter, I want to do a couple of things. First, I want to examine the 
claim that Aristotle takes the differentiae of substances to be qualities or 
qualifications.
25 The evidence is indirect, but I will argue that there is some evidence 
from the Topics and Metaphysics Δ that Aristotle thinks of the differentiae of 
substances as qualities. Second, I want to try to offer an account of why Aristotle 
might have thought of differentiae as qualities. I will suggest that in trying to give an 
informative definition of a substance Aristotle might have thought that he needed 
recourse to entities that were not themselves identical to the substances being defined. 
In short, I will try to present the best case I can for accepting Ackrill’s suggested 
revision of Aristotle.  
  I will then turn to some arguments against Ackrill’s suggestion. I will look at 
some evidence from the Categories that Aristotle thinks about the differentiae of 
substances in a way that is totally at odds with the way that he thinks about ordinary 
qualities. Aristotle emphasizes that differentiae of substances meet the conditions laid 
down in (OF1), and that they do not inhere in substances. Furthermore, I will argue 
that Aristotle can’t take the differentiae of nonsubstances to inhere in their subjects, 
                                                 
25   Ackrill uses ‘qualification’ to translate Aristotle’s use of ‘poion’ which is used as an 
interrogative (‘how’) and as an indefinite adjective (‘of a certain nature’), and reserves ‘quality’ to 
translate Aristotle’s use of the abstract noun ‘poiotês’. Corresponding to the distinction between ‘poion’ 
and ‘poiotês’, Aristotle sometimes uses abstract nouns derived from adjectives as the names of 
qualities. For example, at 9a34 Aristotle tells us that a body is called pale (the neuter adjective ‘leukon’ 
is used) because it has paleness (‘leukotês’ the abstract noun). At other places, I think that Aristotle 
employs a substantive use of the neuter adjective as the name of the quality. For example, when 
Aristotle introduces examples of things in the category of poion, he uses ‘leukon’ and ‘grammatikon’. 
Furthermore at 2a32-34 Aristotle seems to use ‘leukon’ as the name of the entity that inheres in the 
universal body. There are several subtle issues that I am not prepared to go into here. However, I am 
going to make the following assumptions. Aristotle takes the fact that a body is white to consist in the 
inherence of a nonsubstantial entity in a substance. The nonsubstantial entity is not identical to the 
substance in which it inheres. Aristotle sometimes indicates that the entity in question should be called 
‘hê leukotês’ and sometimes seems to think that it can be called ‘to leukon’ or ‘to ti leukon’. On the 
other hand, Aristotle sometimes seems to think that the use of ‘to leukon’ refers not to the 
nonsubstantial entity that inheres in the substance, but rather to the combination of the substance and 
the inherent nonsubstance. In any case, Aristotle does not seem to think that there are two different 
nonsubstantial entities involved in this case. Rather, there is a single nonsubstantial entity that bears the 
inherence relation to a substance.    39 
since nonsubstantial entities can be the subjects for differentiae, but can never be 
subjects of inherence. I will end by suggesting an alternative revisionary reading of 
Aristotle’s position on differentiae. I think that Aristotle should continue to accept (2), 
and will be forced to deny (1). In the end, I think that Aristotle should hold that 
differentiae are identical with the species and genera for which they are the final 
differentiae. I think that this revision is in line with some of what Aristotle says in his 
later works, and that he did eventually adopt a position like the one that I suggest.
26  
  I will begin with the question of whether Aristotle takes the differentiae of 
substances to be nonsubstantial. While Aristotle implies that differentiae are not 
substances, he does not say explicitly in the Categories that differentiae are located in 
any other category. However, on the assumption that only substances belong in the 
category of substance, differentiae will have to be located in another category. 
Furthermore, there are some suggestions in other works that Aristotle takes the 
differentiae of substances to be in the category of quality. While it is unclear how 
much weight we can give to these passages in trying to interpret the Categories, it 
might be worth taking a look at some of them.  
  At Topics IV.2, in the course of emphasizing the distinction between 
differentiae and genera, Aristotle says “…a thing’s differentia never signifies what it is 
(ti esti), but rather some quality (poion ti), as do walking and two-footed.”
 27 When 
Aristotle tells us here that the differentia signifies a quality (poion ti), there is some 
suggestion that he takes the differentiae to be located in a category other than 
substance.
28 Furthermore, when Aristotle gives examples of differentiae, he uses 
                                                 
26   I revisit this issue in chapter 7. 
27   Topics IV.2, 122b16.  I have chosen to translate ‘poion ti’ as ‘some quality’. Were we to 
follow Ackrill, we would translate this as ‘some qualification’. We should note that Aristotle uses the 
same term ‘poion’ here that he uses as the name of the relevant category in the Categories.  
28   As many have pointed out, the Topics and Categories differ in their lists of categories. In the 
Categories Aristotle distinguishes quality and the rest from substance (ousia), while in the Topics (see   40 
neuter adjectives ‘to pezon’ (walking or footed—differentiating terrestrial animals 
from birds and sea creatures) and ‘to dipoun’ (two-footed—Aristotle’s standard 
example of the human differentia). Aristotle in the Categories sometimes uses the 
same grammatical form when he gives the names of qualities.
29  
At Topics VI.6, Aristotle tells us that substance is wholly incapable of being a 
differentia of anything (143a33). Furthermore, he tells us that “it seems that the 
differentia signifies a quality (poion ti)” (144a18). Aristotle’s claim comes at the end 
of a discussion about what counts as the proper genus of virtue. We might try to locate 
virtue in the genus of good and in the genus of state. However, we cannot hold that 
both are genera of virtue since neither is a genus of the other. Aristotle then argues that 
state is the proper genus while good is a differentia, on the grounds that state signifies 
what virtue is (ti esti) while good signifies how virtue is (poion ti). Aristotle then 
concludes with the claim that the differentia signifies some quality (144a18).  
It would be hasty to conclude just on the basis of these passages that Aristotle 
takes the differentiae of substances to signify entities in the category of quality. There 
are two ways to translate Aristotle’s claim at 144a18: “dokei d’ hê diaphora poion ti.” 
While we might translate the passage to say that the differentia-term signifies an entity 
in the category of quality, we can also translate the passage as simply saying that in 
                                                                                                                                           
Top I.9, 103b21ff) he distinguishes quality and the rest from essence (to ti esti literally the what it is). 
We should keep this distinction in mind when comparing the two texts.  
29   At 2a30ff, for example, Aristotle gives the neuter ‘to leukon’ as the name for the quality of 
paleness, and says that the name is linguistically predicated of body, the name of which is also neuter. 
In other places, Aristotle uses feminine abstract nouns as the names of nonsubstantial entities.  For 
example, at 1a15 we are told that the name of the quality of bravery is ‘andreia’ rather than ‘andreion’. 
Matters are complicated by the fact that both ‘pezon’ and ‘dipoun’ also seem to be understood as 
adjectives that modify the unexpressed neuter noun ‘zôon’ (‘animal’). At 3a28, Aristotle writes “pezon 
gar esti ho anthrôpos.” The mismatch in gender between ‘pezon’ and ‘anthrôpos’ indicates that the 
former is not used to modify the latter, but is neuter because it is modifying an understood neuter 
‘zôon’. Finally, Aristotle sometimes uses the expression ‘to pezon’ to indicate a species of the genus 
animal—the land animals as opposed to the birds and fish.     41 
giving a thing’s differentia we tell someone how the thing is rather than what it is.
30 
Aristotle gives the term ‘poion’ a technical sense in the Categories where he uses it as 
a name of a category of entities, but we need not take the term to have this same 
technical sense in the Topics.  
In fact, there is even at least one place in the Categories where Aristotle uses 
‘poion ti’ nontechnically. At 3a10ff, Aristotle distinguishes between primary 
substances, which are properly said to be “a certain this” (tode ti) and secondary 
substances like human and animal, which signify “some qualification” (poion ti). In 
this passage, it is clear that Aristotle is not saying that secondary substances are 
located in a category other than substance, but is simply distinguishing the primary 
substances, which are numerically one, from secondary substances, which are 
predicated of a plurality of things. Furthermore, Aristotle seems to have a slightly 
different aim in the Topics than the aim that I take him to have in the Categories. The 
aim of the Categories is to discriminate among types of entities—we want to 
distinguish among substances, quantities, qualities, relatives, etc. On the other hand, it 
is natural to take the Topics to be drawing the distinction among various things that we 
can say about any entity—I can tell you what it is, how it is, how it is quantified, how 
it is related to other things, etc.
31 
                                                 
30   Note the use of ‘semainein’ here. Aristotle says that the differentia signifies something, and not 
that a linguistic expression like the differentia-term signifies something. Aristotle sometimes allows that 
non-linguistic items signify, but in this case I do not think that there is any harm in taking him to mean 
that certain terms signify how as opposed to what a thing is.  
31   There are two key differences between the Topics and Categories relevant to the current 
discussion. First of all there is the fact that in the Categories, Aristotle is distinguishing ousia from the 
rest of the categorial items, while in the Topics he is distinguishing the ti esti (the essence—literally the 
what it is) from the rest of the categorial items. ‘Ousia’ seems to denote substance, where this is thought 
of as a certain ontologically fundamental type of entity. On the other hand, ‘ti esti’ or essence does not 
seem to denote a sort of entity, but rather to denote the fundamental character of any entity. The second 
difference between the Categories and Topics is closely related to this distinction between ti esti and 
ousia. While ‘ousia’ applies only to entities that are substances, Aristotle allows that nonsubstantial 
entities will have an essence. In fact, in the Topics passage under discussion, Aristotle is talking about 
virtues, which he takes to be states rather than substances in the Categories. In terms of the Categories, 
a state is a type of quality and not a substance. So a state is not a substance (ousia), but is still a thing 
that has an essence (ti esti). These differences between the Categories and Topics make it difficult to   42 
Nevertheless, even if the use of ‘poion’ in the Topics is not taken to be the 
name of a category of entities, we can ask how best to interpret the passage in the 
Topics in terms of the ontology of the Categories. A natural suggestion would be to 
hold that Aristotle takes terms for genera and terms for differentiae to signify different 
entities. ‘State’ indicates the genus of virtue, while ‘good’ indicates a differentia of 
virtue.
32 ‘State’, ‘virtue’, and ‘good’ will indicate three distinct entities. Each of these 
entities will be located in a category—perhaps both state and good will turn out to be 
distinct entities in the category of quality.
33  
In a similar way, we might take ‘two-footed’ and ‘animal’ and ‘human’ to 
indicate three different entities. Human will be in the category of substance, as will 
animal since we say what a human is by telling someone that it is an animal. When we 
give the genus or species of a substance, we specify a secondary substance, which 
Aristotle takes to be an entity in the category of substance. It seems that the genera of 
an entity will generally belong to the same category as that entity, for example when I 
tell you what a given quality, like pale, is I mention a more general quality, like 
color.
34 On the other hand, in giving the differentia we say how something is. If there 
is an entity indicated by the differentia-term, it seems natural to take this entity to be a 
sort of quality.
 If we try to produce a single theory to make sense out of what Aristotle 
                                                                                                                                           
take the fact that Aristotle uses ‘poion’ in talking about differentia as conclusive evidence that he takes 
the differentiae of substances to belong to the category of quality.  
32   Notice that if things that are not states can also be called good, and there is no homonymy 
involved, we will have a problem with Aristotle’s claim at 1b16ff that a differentia can belong to two 
genera only if one is subordinate to the other. Aristotle does not always seem to respect this condition.  
33   It turns out to be quite difficult to say which category each of these entities belongs. Aristotle 
suggests that a state is a sort of condition and that both are types of quality (8b26ff). He also suggests 
that states and conditions are relatives (11a20ff). Furthermore, Aristotle seems to hold that ‘good’ does 
not  univocally designate an entity in a single category at all.  
34   Against this suggestion see Categories 11a37ff.where Aristotle indicates that higher genus 
(e.g. knowledge) will be a relative, while the more specific instance (e.g. grammaticality) will be a 
quality.  This passage is also particularly difficult for my interpretation of the Categories. As Ackrill 
points out in his commentary, claims such as this one are a real threat to the integrity of the ontological 
scheme of the Categories. My view is that we need to offer a revisionary account of what Aristotle says 
in this passage, as well as a revisionary account of what he says about the differentiae of substance.    43 
says about differentiae in both the Topics and the Categories, the best option seems to 
be to take differentia-terms to indicate entities in the category of quality. 
Aristotle also indicates that differentiae are a sort of quality in Metaphysics 
Δ.14.
35  
In one way the differentia of substance is called quality ([to] poion), 
For example human is such an animal since it is two-footed, and horse 
is such an animal since it is four-footed, and a circle is such a shape 
since it is angleless.
36 So the differentia with respect to substance is 
quality (poiotêtos). The differentia of substance then is called a quality 
(hê poiotês) in one way. (1020a34-b1)  
Aristotle reiterates his claim that the differentia of substance is a quality at 1020b14-
15, calling it the primary sort of quality. On the assumption that Aristotle held that 
differentiae could be located in one of the ten categories, it seems most natural to 
claim that he thought of them as belonging to the category of quality.    
I want to offer a suggestion about why Aristotle might have thought of 
differentiae as qualities rather than substances, by considering the process of 
collection and division inherited from Plato and the way in which this process relates 
to the task of giving proper definitions.
37 Say that we are dividing a certain collection 
of entities. It seems that a proper pattern of division has the following formal 
characteristics. Whenever we divide a genus into subordinate-genera, everything that 
                                                 
35   Once again, there is a problem with relying too heavily on a passage from the Metaphysics in 
interpreting the Categories. Nevertheless, I think that discussion of quality in Metaphysics Δ can shed 
some light on what Aristotle thinks in the Categories. Δ seems to be an earlier work than many of the 
other books in the Metaphysics. Ross, for example, holds that Δ predates many of the physical works, 
which in turn predate most of the other books of the Metaphysics. I lack the space, and expertise, to 
argue convincingly that Δ is of a piece with the Categories. However, I do think that the views of 
differentiae expressed in the Categories, Topics and Δ go together, and that they all seem to predate 
Aristotle’s consideration of metaphysical questions arising from thoughts about the unity of definition.  
36   In each of these examples I use the expression ‘is such a ____’ to translate ‘poion ti ___’. Ross 
translates the same Greek phrase as ‘is a ____ of a particular quality’. I have tried to choose a 
noncommittal translation. Two things are interesting to note about this chapter of Δ. First, Aristotle does 
call the differentia ‘poiotês’ in this passage. So, even if we think that only the use of ‘poiotês’ rather 
than the use of ‘poion’ commits Aristotle to the claim that differentiae are in the category of quality, we 
here have evidence that he thinks of differentiae as qualities. Second, Aristotle seems to slide back and 
forth between the use of ‘to poion’ and ‘hê poiotês’ in this passage.  
37   See especially Plato’s Sophist and Statesman.   44 
is in the original genus is in one of the subordinate genera (the division is exhaustive). 
Furthermore, the division is exclusive in that no item is in more than one coordinate 
genus (a genus at the same level of division). Furthermore, proper divisions seem to 
conform to the following condition: if G and H are distinct genera of F, then either G 
is a genus of H or H is a genus of G.
38  
We can represent the results of collection and division graphically as a 
Porphyrian tree, which has the following basic structure. Say that we are collecting 
and dividing substances. The root node of the tree will be substance. At each 
subsequent level of the tree we will get subgenera of the immediately superordinate 
genus. So on the assumption that there are only horses and humans among the land 
animals, we end up with a tree that has the following structure: 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
38   This is the condition that Aristotle relies on in his argument that good is a differentia of and 
not a genus of virtue at Topics 144a9ff. I’m not sure whether this condition has a name, but if we 
represent the results of collection and division as a Porphyrian tree, this condition guarantees that there 
is a unique path from the root of the tree to any other point on the tree. Note that this condition is said to 
govern the genus-of relation, and not the said-of relation. Notice that if this condition were put on the 
said-of relation, then we could derive a contradiction from the claim that the differentiae of substances 
are in a category other than substance. Later I will suggest that Aristotle ought to take this condition to 
apply to the said-of relation, and that he can do so only by identifying differentiae with genera and 
species.    45 
Imagine that we start out with all the substances grouped together. We want to 
carve this collection at the joints, and to find the various subordinate genera until we 
arrive at infimae species and finally at the individual primary substances like Socrates 
or Bucephalus. If our divisions at each stage are to be non-arbitrary, then they must be 
made in virtue of real features that things have. In trying to divide land animal into 
human and horse, we need to find some distinction on which to base the division. One 
possibility is that we simply point out that part of the collection is human and that the 
other part is equine. Perhaps humanity and equininity are themselves the basic feature 
in virtue of which we can make the division. It might be uninformative to say that 
horses are the equine land animals or that humans are human land animals, but 
perhaps this is the best we can hope for.  
Aristotle, however, seems to think that we say something more informative. 
An Aristotelian definition of a kind will indicate both the immediate genus of that kind 
and the differentia that distinguishes that kind from all other members of its genus. He 
holds that there is something that can be added to land animal, such that it is identical 
neither to land animal nor to human, and which is such that when we add it to land 
animal we get a proper real definition for human. This something is indicated by ‘two-
footed‘ or ‘rational’. It is obvious that the terms ‘rational’ and ‘two-footed’ are not 
identical to the term ‘human’, but we can ask whether the entity indicated by the 
differentia-term is or is not the very same entity as the one indicated by the species-
term. I suggest that in the Categories, and the other texts that I discuss above, Aristotle 
thinks that the species-term and differentia-term indicate different entities.  
   However, it then follows from the nature of division that the entity indicated 
by the differentia-term cannot be a substance. We can get this conclusion by the 
following argument. Assume, for example, that rational≠human. Assume for reductio 
that ‘rational’ indicates a substance, and so is genus at some level of division. It can’t   46 
be a coordinate genus with human or with any of human’s superordinate genera, 
without violating the condition on branching outlined above.
39 Rational can’t be 
subordinate to human, because then rationality would belong to only part of human. It 
can’t be superordinate to human, because then it would distinguish more than just 
humans among the animals (or more than just the animals among a higher genus). But 
these are the only ways in which anything could be a genus of something in the 
category of substance. So rational cannot be a substance. We must hold that the entity 
indicated by ‘rational’ is in another category and deny that it stands in the genus 
relation to human. In terms of the Porphyrian tree, there is just no place on the 
substance tree for rational to go.
40    
  A simpler argument can be given for the same conclusion. We want to divide 
all the substances into the ultimate kinds. However, we want to perform this division 
on the basis of what the substances are like. But the question, “What is it like?” is 
answered by referring to a quality. When we say that a thing has a differentia, we do 
not say what it is, but what it is like. Therefore, the entity corresponding to the 
differentia-term is a quality and not a substance. Allen Bäck (2000) thinks that 
Aristotle is led to separate differentiae from substances by the fact that we indicate 
differentiae in our nominal definitions by adjectives rather than by nouns. Since we 
indicate the differentiae by adjectives, we should see that they are nonsubstantial 
attributes rather than substances.
41 
                                                 
39   This argument generalizes: it can’t be the case that both human and rational are genera to 
which Socrates belongs, and that neither occurs as a node in the path from Substance to the other. So 
rational cannot be a coordinate genus with any genus superordinate to human. Furthermore, if rational 
and human are coordinate genera, then there must be something that differentiates rational from human, 
and we are on our way to a vicious regress.  
40   Notice that if Aristotle has something like this reasoning in mind, then he will run into a 
problem when he gives genus and differentia definitions of qualities. The differentia of a quality is said-
of that quality, and so is the genus of that quality. However, neither the genus nor the differentia can be 
said-of each other. By the reasoning above, the differentiae of qualities are going to be forced of the 
quality tree. 
41   On Bäck’s view, Aristotle holds that differentiae are in an accidental category and are 
essentially predicated of substances. Bäck identifies essential predication with the said-of relation, and   47 
  I have tried to offer some evidence that Aristotle takes differentiae of 
substances to be nonsubstantial entities in the Categories, and to give a plausible 
reconstruction for why he might have done so. However, if the differentiae of 
substances are qualities, it is hard to see how they can be said-of substances given 
(OF1). Aristotle claims that footed (to pezon) and two-footed (to dipoun) are 
differentiae, and that each is said-of human. However, (OF1) then requires that both 
the name and the definition of the entity indicated by ‘to dipoun’ must be properly 
linguistically predicated of both the species and the individual humans that are 
members of the species. Aristotle holds that the name of a quality will often fail to be 
properly L-predicated of a substance, since the gender of the quality name and the 
gender of the substance name will often fail to agree. However, he recognizes some 
cases where the name of the substance has the same gender as the name of the quality 
where we will be able to properly L-predicate the name of a quality of a substance. For 
example, ‘leukon’ which is the name of a quality can be L-predicated of body, since 
the word for body, ‘to sôma’, is neuter.
42 However, the ‘leukon’ could not be properly 
L-predicated of human, since the genders of ‘anthrôpos’ and ‘leukon’ do not match. 
When I predicate paleness of a particular man, I use the masculine term ‘leukos’ which 
indicates but does not name the quality. Aristotle takes the neuter ‘to dipoun’ to be the 
name of the quality of two-footedness.
43 Shouldn’t he then also claim that the name of 
the quality will not be properly L-predicated of human, since the name of the latter is 
grammatically masculine? Furthermore, if two-footedness is a kind of condition or 
                                                                                                                                           
holds that both differentiae and propria are said-of their subjects. I disagree with Bäck with respect to 
propria. Furthermore, while I agree with Bäck that Aristotle does hold that differentiae are 
nonsubstantial items that are said-of substances, I think that this position is unstable.     
42   At least this seems to be Aristotle’s point in this passage. Later on he seems to indicate that the 
name of the quality is the feminine noun ‘hê leukotês’.  
43   Aristotle must think this if what he says next is meant to demonstrate that the name of the 
differentia is properly L-predicated of the species. There is no passage that I can think of where 
Aristotle uses a feminine abstract noun like ‘hê leukotês’ as the name of a differentia.     48 
state, then won’t the definition of ‘dipoun’, like that of ‘leukon’, also fail to be 
properly L-predicated of human? However, Aristotle then ought to claim that two-
footedness fails to be said-of human. I take the above line of reasoning to be similar to 
the one that leads Ackrill to claim that Aristotle ought to have taken differentiae to 
inhere in substances rather than to be said-of substances.
44  
  Aristotle, however, explicitly treats the differentia term ‘pezon’ in a different 
way than he treats adjectives for other qualities. He writes “For example, if footed is 
said of man then the definition of footed will be also be predicated of man; for man is 
footed (pezon gar estin ho anthrôpos).”(3a26-28) In the clause “pezon gar estin ho 
anthrôpos,” the gender of ‘pezon’ does not match that of ‘anthrôpos’. The mismatch 
here is explained by the fact that ‘pezon’ should be taken as an adjective modifying the 
unwritten neuter noun ‘to zôon’ (animal) rather than as an adjective modifying 
‘anthrôpos’. However, if this is the explanation for the propriety of linguistically 
predicating ‘pezon’ of human, then we can ask why we can’t extend the same 
treatment to any other adjective? For example, why can’t we linguistically predicate 
‘leukon’ of human and claim that it is short for ‘leukon zôon’? It might seem 
unprincipled for Aristotle to treat the two cases differently.   
  However, I think that we can see a principled reason behind Aristotle’s claims 
if we keep in mind his requirement at 1b16ff that the differentiae of different and 
nonsubordinate genera are never the same. I have given this condition as (GSDOF) 
above, and it follows from this condition that when I call something footed, it is 
implied that the thing in question belongs to the animal genus. There is no such 
implication when I call something pale. Aristotle takes himself to be justified in using 
“pezon gar estin ho anthrôpos,” to predicate footed of man because ‘pezon’ just means 
‘pezon zôon’. I take Aristotle to be relying on something like this fact when he claims 
                                                 
44   See Ackrill (1963) pp85-87.    49 
in De Interpretatione 11 that ‘two-footed tame animal’ indicates a unity in a way that 
‘white walking man’ does not indicate a unity.
45  
It is also interesting to observe that Aristotle sometimes uses ‘to pezon’ as the 
name, not for a differentia, but for a sub-genus of animals—the beasts as opposed to 
birds and fish.
46 However, if ‘pezon’ is the name of a genus, then it seems to be the 
name of a secondary substance. The word ‘pezon’ now seems to be ambiguous 
between a sub-genus of animals and the differentia by which the genus of animals is 
divided into subgenera. We might translate the different uses of ‘pezon’ as ‘terrestrial 
animal’ and ‘terrestriality’ respectively, understanding that ‘terrestriality’ means 
‘terrestrial animality’. 
 We can then ask whether Aristotle would want to insist that this is a real case 
of ambiguity—should we hold that there are two different entities indicated when we 
use ‘pezon’ as a differentia-term and when we use it as the name of the genus of 
beasts? It is difficult to give a definitive answer to this question, but I think that 
Aristotle ought to say that there is single entity here. Think about two different uses of 
the word ‘human’ in English.
47 I can use the word as the name of a certain species of 
animal, or I can use the word as an adjective. If we follow Aristotle’s treatment of 
other adjectives, we might take the adjectival use of ‘human’ to indicate without 
naming the entity named ‘humanity’. We might think that ‘human’ is the name of a 
species, while ‘humanity’ is the not the name of the species but is the name of a 
                                                 
45   In the De Interpretatione passage, Aristotle argues that I make a single assertion when I claim 
that the two-footed animal is F, but I do not make a single assertion when I claim that the white walking 
man is F. I take the singularity of the first assertion to rely on the fact that ‘two-footed tame animal’ 
indicates a single entity which is then said to be F. On the other hand, ‘white walking man’ indicates 
three different entities, and when I claim that the white walking man is F, the truth-maker will involve 
the inherence of three entities, those indicated by ‘white’, ‘walking’ and ‘F’ in the substance indicated 
by man.  
46   See 14b33ff also see Ackrill (1963) p86. Where ‘pezon’ serves as the name of the genus of 
land animals ‘pezon estin ho anthrôpos,’ (Man is a beast) will be no more grammatically remarkable 
than ‘zôon estin ho anthrôpos,’ (Man is an animal) used to predicate animal of man. 
47   I am individuating words purely orthographically. If anyone thinks that we have two words 
here with the same orthography, please modify what I am saying accordingly.    50 
property or attribute in virtue of which things belong to the species.
48 If we do draw 
such a distinction, then we will have two different facts which might be taken to serve 
as truthmakers for the following sentences:
49 
(1) Socrates belongs to the human species.  
(2) Socrates has the feature of humanity.   
The truth-maker for the first sentence will consist in the holding of a relation between 
Socrates and the species, while the truth-maker of the second will consist in the 
holding of a relation between Socrates and whatever entity is indicated by ‘humanity’. 
However, I do not think that Aristotle accepts the existence of two separate 
truthmakers in this case. Rather, I think that he would hold that there is a single 
underlying fact, human’s being said-of Socrates, which makes both sentences true.  
  I suggest that Aristotle ought to treat ‘pezon’ in a similar way. There is not one 
entity that is said-of Bucephalus bears in virtue of which he is a member of the genus 
of footed animals, and a different entity said-of Bucephalus in virtue of which he 
possesses the attribute of footedness. Rather there is a single underlying fact here—
pezon is said-of Bucephalus. The same treatment can be extended to cases where 
different words are used to indicate a genus or species and to indicate the differentia 
distinctive of that genus or species. So, for example, we will not have distinct facts in 
virtue of which it is true to say “Socrates is human” and true to say “Socrates is 
bipedal.”
50 Rather there will be a single entity indicated by ‘human’ and ‘bipedal’, and 
this entity’s being said-of Socrates will make both sentence true.  
                                                 
48   Alternatively we might have the kind and the property of belonging to that kind as different 
things.  
49   Notice that (1) is normally expressed in English by “Socrates is a human” while (2) is 
expressed by ‘Socrates is human.’ I noted above that a single Greek sentence, ‘Sôkratês anthrôpos 
estin,’ would translate each of these English sentences. The question now is whether Aristotle would 
take the Greek sentence to be truly ambiguous. Are there two different facts that the sentence could be 
used to express.  
50   This is on the assumption that bipedal animality really is the human essence.     51 
I am aware that my suggestion here involves a revision of Aristotle’s view in 
the Categories. Aristotle seems to think that the differentia’s being said-of an entity is 
a fact distinct from the secondary substance’s being said-of an entity. However, on the 
view that I am suggesting, this distinction turns out to disappear.  
When I discussed collection and division above, I claimed that in looking for 
the differentiae in virtue of which a genus is to be divided into species we wanted to 
find something that was identical neither to the genus to be divided nor to any of the 
species resulting from the division. Corresponding to this suggestion is the idea that 
the differentia and genus are both parts of the essence of the species—I reveal part of 
the essence by telling you the genus and another part of the essence by telling you 
what the differentia is. However, given that Aristotle doesn’t take the differentia to 
characterize anything outside the genus, it will be redundant to give the genus once I 
have given the differentia. It seems then that I can reveal the whole essence of the 
species by revealing the differentia.
51  
What we have here goes beyond coextension or necessary coextension of 
predicates. A proprium of a kind is an attribute that necessarily characterizes all and 
only members of that kind. For example, Aristotle takes grammaticality to be a 
proprium of human beings. Nevertheless, Aristotle denies that we reveal the essence 
of the species by indicating one of its propria. Furthermore, Aristotle takes propria to 
inhere in their species. We have two different entities here, grammaticality and human, 
which are necessarily connected. On the other hand, in holding that the essence of 
                                                 
51   Notice that this view is at odds with Aristotle’s claims in the Topics that revealing the 
differentia does not reveal what something is. On the view that I am suggesting here, revealing the 
differentia more precisely reveals what the thing is than does revealing the genus. I think that Aristotle 
accepts a view similar to the one outlined here in Metaphysics Z.11. While I do not want to take what 
Aristotle says in Z as evidence of what he thinks in the Categories, I am suggesting that the position 
Aristotle takes in Z seems to be the natural result of a certain extension of what he says in the 
Categories. To the extent that my reading of the Categories is revisionary, I hope that it offers a 
revision that is Aristotelian in spirit.      52 
humanity is bipedal (animality), I think that Aristotle holds that humanity just is 
bipedal (animality).
52 Ultimately, I think that we can best extricate Aristotle from the 
difficulties raised earlier in this chapter not by denying that the differentiae of 
substances are said-of substances, but by recognizing that there is no ontological 
distinction between differentiae of substances and the species and genera that the 
differentiae are supposed to help define.
53  
While any adequate treatment of the text is beyond the scope of this chapter, I 
think that there is some evidence in Metaphysics Z that Aristotle came to have a view 
like the one that I am suggesting. In his discussion of the unity of definition in Z.12, 
Aristotle suggests that when division is accomplished properly, the final differentia 
will be the form and substance of the entity that we are seeking to define (1038a25ff). 
The specification of the final differentia renders all intermediate differentiae 
superfluous. When I have told you that human beings are two-footed, I have already 
told you that they are footed. I have also already told you that they are animals, that 
they are living corporeal substances. When we represent a properly executed division 
as a Porphyrian tree, each node will correspond to a real entity. Furthermore, the tree 
will accurately depict which entities are said-of one another. However, the features 
that we refer to in dividing a genus into its component species will not refer to entities 
distinct from the species themselves.    
                                                 
52   We can still hold that defining human as bipedal or rational animal is more informative than 
defining human as human animal, just as we can say that defining water as H2O is more informative 
than defining water as water without holding that there are ‘being H2O’ and ‘being water’ refer to 
different properties.   
53   On the revision suggested here, the holding of the said-of relation between a differentia and a 
species will turn out to be a case of the holding of the relation between a thing and itself.     53 
CHAPTER 3 
 
INHERENCE: A PRELIMINARY CHARACTERIZATION 
Section 3.1: Inherence and Individuals  
  I want to begin the discussion of inherence and nonsubstantial individuals by 
offering a preliminary characterization of the inherence relation. At 1a24, in the midst 
of characterizing the entities that are in a subject but not said-of any subject, Aristotle 
tells us what he means when he claims that something is in a subject. It will be helpful 
in the discussion that follows to have the relevant passage in front of us: 
Some things are in a subject, but are not said-of any subject—by in a 
subject I mean what is in something not as a part and which cannot 
exist separately from what it is in. For example, the individual 
grammaticality is in a subject, the soul, but it is said-of no subject, and 
the individual pallor is in a subject, the body—for all color is in (a) 
body—but it is said-of no subject. (1a23-29)
 1 
  The most prima facie natural way of taking Aristotle’s elucidation of his 
technical sense of the phrase ‘in’ is the one given by Ackrill in his commentary of the 
Categories (p.74-75). Therefore, I use Ackrill’s analysis as a starting point for further 
discussion.  
  (IN) For any x, x is in1 y, if and only if x is in2 y, x is not a part of y, 
and it is not possible for x to exist apart from y. 
A notable problem with (IN) is that the word ‘in’ is contained in both the definiens and 
the definiendum. Ackrill (p.74) suggests that we should take the second ‘in’, which I 
render as ‘in2’, to have a non-technical sense. The sentence, ‘x is in2 y’ will count as 
                                                 
1   “τὰ δὲ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι, καθ' ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται,  – ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ 
δὲ λέγω ὃ ἔν τινι μὴ ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχον ἀδύνατον χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν, –  οἷον ἡ τὶς 
γραμματικὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι τῇ ψυχῇ, καθ' ὑποκειμένου δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται, καὶ τὸ τὶ 
λευκὸν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ μέν ἐστι τῷ σώματι,  – ἅπαν γὰρ χρῶμα ἐν σώματι, –  καθ' ὑποκειμένου 
δὲ οὐδενὸς λέγεται·” (1a23-29) I am translating Aristotle’s use of ‘hê tis grammatikê’ and ‘to ti 
leukon’ as ‘the individual grammaticality’ and ‘the individual pallor’ respectively. I will argue that the 
referents of these phrases are best taken to be nonsubstantial particulars, but for now I intend ‘the 
individual grammaticality’ to be as ontologically neutral as possible.     54 
true if and only if an ordinary speaker would accept ‘x is in y’ or a similar sentence.
2 
Aristotle never gives an explicit characterization of the in2 relation, but he seems to 
think that it holds when there is true linguistic predication, but the thing predicated is 
not said-of the subject.
3 
                                                 
2   Ackrill (1963) gives some example sentences: ‘x is of y’, ‘y has x’, ‘x belongs to y’, etc. Some 
problems with this account are noted by Allen (1969) p 36-37 n 9. 
3   As a very rough first pass we might try to characterize the in2 relation as follows: x is in2 y 
only if, where terms 
α
 and 
β
 indicate entities x and y, the sentence in which 
α
 is linguistically 
predicated of 
β
 is true. We cannot make this claim a biconditional. Aristotle later (3a7-21) recognizes 
cases in which e.g. ‘man’ is linguistically predicated of the individual human being, but where “man is 
not in the individual man”. So, mere linguistic predication will not suffice for being in2 a subject. 
Aristotle never gives us a more precise way of recognizing when one thing is in2 another, since he never 
explicitly says anything about the in2 relation. However, I think that Paul Grice’s distinction between 
‘IZZing’ and ‘HAZZing’ might be useful here—see Grice (1988), Code (1983), also see the discussion 
of Grice, Code and Aristotle on S. M. Cohen’s website: http:// 
faculty.washington.edu/smcohen/433/GriceCode.pdf.  
Aristotle explicitly contrasts the relation that a thing has to its essential attributes with the 
relation that a thing bears to its accidents. Grice suggests that we can mark this distinction linguistically, 
by using a different term to say what a thing is than we use to say that a thing has an accident. So: 
Socrates IZZes human, but Socrates HAZZes pallor. I take Aristotle to be pointing to a distinction like 
Grice’s at 3a12-15. “As for secondary substances, it is clear that they are not in a subject. For human is 
said-of the individual human, but it is not in a subject. For man is not in the individual man.” Aristotle 
tells us that human is not in a subject. He then justifies this claim by claiming that human is not in a 
particular human. I take Aristotle’s argument in this passage to trade on the same ambiguity of ‘in’ 
noted by Ackrill in his discussion of the definition of inherence at 1a24-25. I take Aristotle to be 
arguing from the fact that human is not in2 the individual human, to the conclusion that human is not in 
anything in the technical sense. Furthermore, I take his claim that human is not in the individual human 
to rely on the observation that when we call the individual man human we do not indicate an attribute 
that she has, but say what she is. If this is right, then the non-technical in2 might correspond to Grice’s 
relation of HAZZing. I do not mean to suggest here that ‘HAZZing’ picks out a different relation that 
‘inherence’. Rather, I take it that inherence is the fundamental relation that corresponds to HAZZing. In 
a case where a thing HAZZ an attribute, the underlying truthmaker will consist in something’s inhering 
in a substance.  
The case with IZZing is a little more complicated. In any case where we have a true case of 
IZZing, we will have a universal being said-of a subject. However, I am reluctant to say that when we 
say, e.g. “Socrates is human”, the ultimate truthmaker is the fact that the said-of relation holds between 
human and Socrates. I do not think that Socrates is human by bearing a relation to anything else. Rather, 
Socrates being human is a purely nonrelational fact about Socrates. I think that we have two distinct 
facts: Socrates’ being human and the universal human’s being said-of Socrates. Socrates’ being human 
partially explains the fact that human is said-of Socrates, rather than the converse. I discuss these issues 
further in chapter 10.  
I do not think that ‘IZZing’ and ‘HAZZing’ correspond to relations distinct from inherence and 
the said-of relation in terms of which the latter are to be explained. Nevertheless, I think that Aristotle 
takes us to have intuitions about differences between statements that reveal the essence of a thing and 
statements that assert a relation between different things. These intuitions are correct because the former 
sorts of statements involve the said-of relation and the latter involve the inherence relation.          55 
  Given this understanding of (IN), it seems that Aristotle must hold that entities, 
which are in1 individuals, are themselves individual. For, given (IN), it follows that if 
a given entity is in an individual substance, then that entity could not exist without that 
very substance. On the assumption that individual substances can exist in the absence 
of one another, it follows that an entity that inheres in one individual substance does 
not also inhere in any others. For example, if x inheres Socrates, then x cannot also 
inhere in Callias. It seems that Socrates could cease to exist, while x continued to 
inhere in Callias, in which case x would be able to exist apart from Socrates.
4 
Therefore, an entity that inheres in one individual must be numerically distinct from 
any entity that inheres in a distinct individual. The pallor in me can be of the same 
type as the pallor in someone else, but cannot be numerically identical to that pallor. 
Since Aristotle clearly takes some entities to inhere in individual substances, he must 
accept the existence of nonsubstantial individuals—entities that inhere in a single 
individual substance on which they are ontologically dependent.  
  By a similar line of reasoning, Aristotle will have to maintain that universal 
accidents can only be in universal subjects.
5 Furthermore, the subject in which a 
universal accident inheres will have to be such that the accident could not exist in the 
absence of that substance. For example, white can be in body, since if body did not 
exist white would not exist. White cannot, however, be in snow, since snow could 
cease to exist without white’s ceasing to exist. 
                                                 
4   Strictly speaking, something might be in both Socrates and Callias if it is the sort of thing that 
would cease to exist were either Socrates or Callias to cease to exist. However, any attribute which we 
want to say belongs to Socrates and Callias, and which is such that Callias could continue to have the 
attribute in the absence of Socrates, cannot belong to Socrates and Callias in virtue of the inherence of a 
single entity in both Socrates and Callias.   
5   I assume that there are no “impure” universals, which are universals that of necessity belong to 
one and only one individual. Take, for example, a universal that belongs to something only if that thing 
is Socrates or bears a certain relation to Socrates. This is “impure” in that the specification of the nature 
of the universal requires reference to particulars, as opposed to a pure universal the specification of 
which requires no mention of an individual. For more on pure and impure universals, see Armstrong 
(1978) and Armstrong (1989).   56 
  Directly after his definition of inherence, Aristotle gives us two examples of 
entities that inhere in a subject but which are not said-of any subject.
6 There are 
several reasons to take Aristotle to be indicating particulars rather than universals in 
these examples. The grammatical form of both ‘the individual white’ (‘to ti leukon’) 
and ‘the individual grammaticality’ (‘hê tis grammatikê’), mirrors the form that 
Aristotle uses to refer to the individual man (‘ho tis anthrôpos’) or to the individual 
horse (‘ho tis hippos’) at 1b4-5. The indefinite pronoun, ‘tis’, is used in the latter 
examples to emphasize the individual nature of the entity being referred to—Aristotle 
is talking about a particular human being rather than the species human. It seems 
likely, therefore, that ‘tis’ is also being used to designate particulars at 1a25-28.  
  Finally, in a passage immediately following the four-fold division of entities, 
Aristotle indicates that entities like the individual grammaticality and individual pallor 
are indivisible and numerically one.  
Things that are indivisible and numerically one are, without exception, 
not said-of any subject. But nothing prevents some of them from being 
in a subject, the individual grammatical knowledge is among the things 
that are in a subject.” (1b6-9)
7  
In talking about the things that are indivisible (to atoma) and numerically one (hen 
arithmô), Aristotle includes both individual substances and individual nonsubstances. 
There is every indication that Aristotle takes these entities to be equally indivisible and 
equally numerically one. The nonsubstantial individual seems to be an individual in 
the same way in which an individual substance is individual. But a primary substance 
seems to be individual by being a non-repeatable, numerically singular, particular 
entity, rather than by being something of which there can be multiple instances. Hê tis 
                                                 
6   I use the term ‘definition’ for Aristotle’s claims at 1a24-25. However, I do not want to suggest 
that Aristotle is trying to find more fundamental relations in terms of which to define the relation of 
inherence. Once again, I take Aristotle to be characterizing a piece of his technical vocabulary in terms 
that he thinks the reader already grasps.   
7   ἁπλῶς δὲ τὰ ἄτομα καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ κατ' οὐδενὸς ὑποκειμένου λέγεται, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ 
ἔνια οὐδὲν κωλύει εἶναι· ἡ γὰρ τὶς γραμματικὴ τῶν ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν.(1b6-9)    57 
grammatikê, therefore, should also be taken to be a nonrepeatable, numerically 
singular, particular entity, rather than to be something multiply instantiable.
8  
  I take the preceding discussion to establish that there is some prima facie 
reason to believe that Aristotle is committed to the existence of what I will call 
‘Nonsubstantial Particulars’ (‘NSPs’ for short). An NSP is a nonsubstantial entity, 
which cannot belong to more than one primary substance. Furthermore, it is essential 
to an NSP that it belong to the primary substance to which it belongs. 
  There is evidence that Aristotle accepts the existence of NSPs, both in the 
Categories and in other works of Aristotle. First, there is the evidence internal to the 
Categories that I have already reviewed. (IN) seems to be the most natural way of 
taking 1a24-25, and, on the assumption that primary substances are subjects of 
inherence, (IN) entails the existence of NSPs. In subsequent chapters, I will examine 
some alternative interpretations of 1a24-25 which do not entail the existence of NSPs. 
I will argue against these alternatives and will attempt to establish that Aristotle must 
take on the ontological commitments entailed by (IN). On the most natural construal 
the ‘ho tis’ locutions used by Aristotle in the Categories, therefore, he is referring to 
NSPs. In subsequent chapters, I argue against the alternative view that Aristotle uses 
‘ho tis’ locutions to refer to determinate universals, the view that, for example, ‘to ti 
leukon’ refers to a fully determinate shade of white.
9 Similarly, Aristotle’s calling an 
entity ‘indivisible’ and ‘numerically one’ strikes me as incompatible with his holding 
that that entity can have a plurality of instances. In subsequent chapters, I argue 
against attempts by opponents of NSPs to hold that something other than a particular 
                                                 
8   Some, e.g. Devereux, in “Inherence and Primary Substance in Aristotle’s Categories”  (1992), 
and Wedin, in “Nonsubstantial Individuals” (1993), take the fact that a nonsubstance is numerically one 
and atomic to settle the issue, and imply that it is a non-repeatable property instance. Others, most notably 
Owen, in  “Inherence” (1965),  and Frede, in “Individuals in Aristotle” (1978), disagree and hold that 
numerical oneness and atomicity can belong to entities that are multiply instantiable.  
9   See Owen (1965),  For denials that ‘to ti leukon’ can refer to something that can be in a plurality 
entities while remaining numerically one, see Devereux (1992) and Wedin (1993) and (2000).   58 
can be indivisible and numerically one.
 10 A second source of evidence that Aristotle 
accepts NSPs comes from passages external to the Categories.
11 Most importantly, I 
argue that Aristotle’s account of alteration in the Physics involves nonsubstantial 
particulars. By taking Aristotle to accept the existence of NSPs, we can give a unified 
account of the ontology of truthmaking and the ontology of alteration. 
Section 3.2: Problems With (IN) 
  There is, however, a major problem with the claim that (IN) is the correct 
reading of 1a24-25. Aristotle claims that the inherence relation holds between entities 
in cases where the right-hand side of (IN) seems clearly to be violated. The first place 
where such a tension appears is within the four-fold division passage itself. When 
Aristotle discusses entities that are both said-of a subject and in a subject he uses the 
universal knowledge as an example, “For example, knowledge (hê epistêmê) is in a 
subject, the soul (tê psuchê), and it is said of a subject, grammatical knowledge 
(grammatikê).”(1b1-3) In this passage ‘hê epistêmê’ refers to the universal knowledge, 
and Aristotle refers to the subject in which knowledge inheres by ‘tê psuchê’, the same 
phrase he uses to indicate the subject in which the individual grammaticality (hê tis 
grammatikê) inheres at 1a26. However, the universal knowledge cannot be said to 
                                                 
  10    For example, see Frede (1978) pp 52-55. Frede thinks that ‘atomos’ and ‘hen arithmô’ will 
characterize any entity that is not said-of a subject. This class can include both individual substances, 
Socrates, and ‘to ti leukon, which Frede does not take to be an NSP. What Frede thinks about the status of 
the nonsubstantial entities, which are indivisible and one in number, is not clear to me. I think that he 
agrees with Owen in taking them to be fully determinate sub-specific universals. However, Frede might 
take ‘universal’ to apply only to entities that are predicable of a subject, in which case the entities at issue 
here are neither NSPs nor universals. Devereux (1992) denies the importance of the definition of 
inherence. He thinks that the definition of inherence does not imply the existence of NSPs, but that other 
textual evidence shows that Aristotle accepts them. Most of Devereux’s evidence comes from 
considerations about Aristotle’s use of ‘atomos’ and ‘hen arithmô’, which Devereux claims cannot have 
the meaning that Frede attaches to them. In addition, Wedin (1993) offers a detailed argument that, based 
on passages in the Categories and De Int, we cannot take ‘atomos’ and ‘hen arithmô’ to have the sense 
Frede needs them to have.  
11   Heinaman, in “Nonsubstantial Individuals in the Categories” (1981), points to a number of 
passages which are best understood on the assumption that Aristotle accepts nonsubstantial particulars. 
I choose to focus on the Physics passages because Aristotle’s thoughts about alteration are of central 
importance in his philosophy, and because an account of Aristotle’s ontology which unifies his thoughts 
about change with his thoughts about predication would be useful.    59 
inhere in a particular soul at 1b1-3, since knowledge could exist separately from a 
particular soul. So ‘hê psuchê’ must be taken to refer to the universal soul at 1b1-3. If 
we take ‘hê psuchê’ to refer to a universal in 1b1-3, then perhaps we should take it to 
refer to the same thing in the 1a26 passage, especially since Aristotle uses the ‘ho tis’ 
locution to indicate individuality at several places in the latter passage.
12 However, if 
we take ‘hê psuchê’ to refer to a universal at 1a26, then the individual grammatical 
knowledge has not been said to be in a particular soul, but to be in a universal. On this 
interpretation, the example does not commit us to holding that the individual 
grammaticality is an NSP. Alternatively, if we take ‘hê psuchê’ to refer to something 
particular in both passages, then Aristotle is holding that the universal knowledge is in 
an individual soul. Since knowledge can exist apart from a particular soul, Aristotle’s 
example is then inconsistent with the analysis of inherence given by (IN).  
The best response to this argument for the defender of (IN) would be to hold 
that ‘hê psuchê’ is being used in one passage to refer to a particular soul and in the 
other passage to refer to the universal soul. While this might not be the most elegant 
way to integrate the passages, Aristotle does use definite article-noun pairs both to 
refer to particulars and to refer to universals. So this passage does not seem decisive 
against (IN). There are, however, far more problematic passages in which Aristotle 
clearly states or implies that a universal can be in a particular substance, or that a 
universal accident can be in a universal subject on which it does not existentially 
depend. I turn to these passages now. 
  At 3a1-6 Aristotle writes: 
As the primary substances stand to everything else, so the species and 
genera of the primary substances stand to all the rest: all the rest are 
predicated of these. For if you call the individual human grammatical it 
                                                 
12   This argument is developed more fully in Frede (1978), pp59-61.   60 
follows that you will call both human and animal grammatical; and 
similarly in other cases.
 13 (3a1-6) 
In this passage, Aristotle tells us that we can predicate of a species and genus whatever 
we predicate of an individual member of that species or genus. This passage will pose 
a problem, if it commits Aristotle to the claim that Socrates’ being white entails the 
inherence of the universal white in the secondary substances human and animal. Since 
the universal white can exist without man and animal, the inseparability condition of 
(IN) would be violated. In response, the proponent of (IN) must claim that something 
can be predicated of the species without inhering in the species. If we opt for this kind 
of response, however, we must deny that one thing is predicated of another only if it is 
either said-of or inherent in the first. We might, for instance, claim that some instances 
of white inhere in some instances of animal, and that this suffices for the white’s being 
predicated of animal, without holding that the inherence relation holds between white 
and animal.
 14  
  However, even if 3a1-6 does not commit Aristotle to a problematic claim that a 
universal accident inheres in an inappropriate universal substance, he seems to commit 
himself to such a claim in the following passage from the Topics.  
Moreover, see if the given genus is said to be in the species as a 
subject, just as white is in the case of snow. So that it is clear that it 
would not be the genus. For the genus is only said-of the species as a 
subject.
15 (127b1-4)
  
                                                 
13   “ὡς δέ γε αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἔχουσιν, οὕτω τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ γένη τῶν 
πρώτων οὐσιῶν πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα ἔχει· κατὰ τούτων γὰρ πάντα τὰ λοιπὰ κατηγορεῖται· τὸν 
γὰρ τινὰ ἄνθρωπον ἐρεῖς γραμματικόν, οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ζῷον γραμματικὸν ἐρεῖς· 
ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων.” (3a1-6) 
14   We might take Aristotle to be claiming only that e.g. the truth of ‘Socrates is pale’ entails the 
truth of ‘Man is pale’, without committing himself to any view about the structure of the truthmaker 
underlying the truth of ‘Man is pale’. In fact, the truthmaker for ‘Man is pale’ might simply be the 
inherence of one or more instances of pallor in one or more individual men. I discuss cases like this one 
at length in chapter 8. In this case, while we accept that the inherence relation holds between individual 
pallors and individual men, we deny that a further inherence relation holds between the universals. 
15   “Ἔτι εἰ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ τῷ εἴδει τὸ ἀποδοθὲν γένος λέγεται, καθάπερ τὸ λευκὸν ἐπὶ τῆς 
χιόνος, ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι οὐκ ἂν εἴη γένος· καθ' ὑποκειμένου γὰρ τοῦ εἴδους μόνον τὸ γένος 
λέγεται.” My attention was called to this passage by Matthews (1989).     61 
At this point in the Topics, Aristotle is discussing a number of tests to figure out 
whether one has correctly specified the genus of a species. He argues that white can’t 
be the genus of the species snow on the grounds that white inheres in snow, while no 
genus inheres in its species. In this passage, Aristotle indicates that the universal white 
inheres in the universal snow. However, since white could exist even if snow did not 
exist, this is a case where (IN) seems to be violated. The proponent of (IN) might deny 
that Aristotle is using ‘in’ in the technical sense in this passage. However, it is 
interesting to note that Aristotle is asking whether the genus is ‘en hupokeimenô tô 
eidei’ which recalls the technical sense of ‘in a subject’. Furthermore, he contrasts 
being in a subject with being said-of a subject, which might indicate that he has 
inherence and the said-of relation in mind in this passage.   
  I turn now to the most problematic passage for the proponent of (IN), and the 
passage that has received the most attention from the critics of (IN). At Categories 
2a34ff, Aristotle writes:  
  All the other things are either said-of the primary substances as subjects 
or are in these subjects. This is clear from an examination of each case. 
For example, animal is predicated of human, and therefore also of the 
particular human; for if it were predicated of none of the particular 
humans, neither would it be predicated be human at all. Again, color is 
in body, and therefore also in the individual body; for if it were not in 
some of the particulars, neither it would not be in body at all. 
Therefore, all the other things are either said-of the primary substances 
as subjects or are in these subjects.
16 (2a34-b5) 
  The claim that all other things are either said-of or in primary substances 
clearly implies that every nonsubstantial universal must either be said-of, or inhere in, 
                                                 
16   “τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα ἤτοι καθ' ὑποκειμένων λέγεται τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἢ ἐν 
ὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς ἐστίν. τοῦτο δὲ φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα προχειριζομένων· οἷον τὸ 
ζῷον κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατηγορεῖται, οὐκοῦν καὶ κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου,  – εἰ γὰρ κατὰ 
μηδενὸς τῶν τινῶν   ἀνθρώπων, οὐδὲ κατὰ ἀνθρώπου ὅλως· –  πάλιν τὸ χρῶμα ἐν σώματι, 
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τινὶ σώματι· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐν τινὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα, οὐδὲ ἐν σώματι ὅλως· ὥστε τὰ 
ἄλλα πάντα ἤτοι καθ' ὑποκειμένων τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν λέγεται ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς 
ἐστίν.” (2a34-b5)   62 
a primary substance. But, since no nonsubstance universal can be said-of a primary 
substance, all nonsubstance universals must inhere in primary substances. However, 
this claim clearly violates the inseparability condition of (IN). To make matters worse, 
Aristotle goes on to directly state that the nonsubstantial universal color is in an 
individual body.  
  So we are in a bit of a mess.
 (IN) seems to be the most natural prima facie 
reading of 1a24ff. However, some passages seem clearly to contradict (IN), and the 
principle of charity should militate against ascribing contradictory beliefs to Aristotle. 
In my discussion of different ways of trying to resolve this problem, I will concentrate 
on the conflict between the definition of inherence at 1a24-25, and the statement that 
universals are in particulars at 2a34ff. If we can find a way to resolve this conflict, we 
should be able to modify it to resolve the other conflicts mentioned above. Before 
outlining the various ways of dealing with the conflict between 1a24-25 and 2a34ff, I 
want to discuss an essential assumption that underlies the claim that such a conflict 
exists.    
Section 3.3: Making Explicit An Underlying Assumption 
  I have claimed that Aristotle’s discussion of inherence at 1a24 as (IN) seems to 
be inconsistent with his claim at 2a34ff that a universal can be in a primary substance. 
It is interesting to note, however, that these passages are inconsistent only on the 
assumption that it really is possible for a nonsubstantial universal to exist separately 
from a particular substance in which it inheres. There is a view on which Aristotle 
could maintain (IN) and could still hold that universal accidents inhere in primary 
substances. Assume that Callias and Socrates are both pale. Socrates’ pallor (an NSP) 
is in Socrates, and Callias’ pallor (a different NSP) is in Callias. If universals are sets 
of NSPs, and the existence of a set depends on the existence of its member, then there 
will be no contradiction in claiming that the universal pale inheres in Socrates. Since   63 
pale could not exist without Socrates’ white and Socrates’ pallor could not exist 
without Socrates, pale could not exist without Socrates. Alternatively, take universals 
to be mereological sums of NSPs, and assume that mereological essentialism is true.
17 
Pale is the mereological sum of all the NSP pallors, and could not exist in the absence 
of any of these parts. The inseparability condition of (IN) will now be met in the case 
of the pale and Socrates. Furthermore, pale is in2 Socrates, and is not a part of 
Socrates. Therefore, white is in1 Socrates.
  
  In order to get a conflict between 1a24-25 and 2a34ff, therefore, we have to 
assume that the relation between universal and particular accidents is not purely 
extensional. Nevertheless, this assumption seems to be pretty reasonable. Aristotle 
seems to think that universals are entities that can endure through time, and survive the 
destruction of their particular instances. It seems essential to Aristotle’s view of 
science that certain facts about universals are eternally true even while particulars are 
relatively ephemeral. Say that Socrates is ill at t1 and healthy at t2. It seems clear that 
Aristotle takes the universal sickness at t1 to be identical to the universal sickness at 
t2. But Socrates’ sickness (an NSP) no longer exists at t2.
18 Therefore, the universal 
sickness cannot be the sort of entity whose existence depends on that of the individual 
sicknesses.
19  
While I do not think that it is plausible to attribute a purely extensional 
understanding of the said-of relation to Aristotle, I do think that it is important to 
recognize that such an understanding would render what Aristotle says at 1a24-25 and 
                                                 
17   By “mereological essentialism”, I here mean the view that if α is the mereological sum of 
β1,…,βn, then α is essentially the sum of β1,…,βn, and that α, therefore, exists in no world where any of 
the βs fails to exist.  
18   We are assuming in this example that other individuals are sick at t2. Aristotle holds that 
sickness exists only if there are some sick individuals. 
19   Nor do I think it is plausible to hold that Aristotle takes a universal to be the set or sum of all 
its past present and future instances. Aristotle seems to think that universals can come into and go out of 
existence, and it seems to me that such a view is incompatible with taking a universal to be composed 
of past, present and future instances.    64 
2a34ff consistent. Furthermore, I will suggest later that there is a close connection 
between Aristotle’s view of the relation between particulars and universals, and the 
part-whole relation. I think that Aristotle is somewhat conflicted about whether the 
relation between universals and particulars is extensional, and I think that conflicting 
intuitions about this relation lead Aristotle to claim that nonsubstantial universals 
inhere in particular substances.  
Section 3.4: Three Basic Types of Solution 
  In chapters 4-8 of this work, I examine the conflict between 1a24-25 and 2a34 
in detail, and, in the course of this examination, I develop an interpretation of 
Aristotle’s ontology in the Categories. I begin by surveying some of the existing 
attempts to resolve the seeming conflict between 1a24ff and 2a34ff. To think about 
matters purely schematically, there are three ways of reconciling 1a24-25 and 2a34ff. 
First, we could reinterpret 1a24-25, and claim that Aristotle does not there commit 
himself to the claim that if x inheres in y, then x cannot exist without y. If x’s 
inherence in y doesn’t entail that x is existentially dependent on y, then it will be 
perfectly fine for Aristotle to claim that color is in a particular body at 2a34. Second, 
we can accept (IN) as the right interpretation of 1a24-25, but deny that Aristotle really 
commits himself at 2a34ff to the claim that a universal inheres in a particular. Third, 
we could take Aristotle to assign different senses to the occurrences of ‘in’ in 1a24-25 
and 2a34ff. We could accept that Aristotle is committed to the claim that if x is in y (in 
the 1a24 sense) then x can’t exist without y, and accept the claim that color is in (in the 
2a34 sense) a particular body the non-existence of which would not entail the non-
existence of color. We will simply deny that these senses of ‘in’ are identical.  
  Each of these strategies exercises the principle of charity. Furthermore, each of 
these strategies holds that Aristotle would take what he says at 1a24-25 and 2a34ff to 
be true upon careful reflection on the content of his statements. In the chapter 4, I   65 
discuss attempts by Michael Frede and G. E. L. Owen to reinterpret 1a24-25. Both 
Frede and Owen deny that Aristotle accepts nonsubstantial particulars, and claim that 
Aristotle takes the entities that inhere in a subject without being said-of any subject to 
be fully determinate universals. I argue that these attempts at reinterpretation should 
be rejected on both textual and philosophical grounds. In chapter 5, I argue that we can 
find independent reasons in support of the claim that Aristotle accepts nonsubstantial 
particulars in the analysis of alteration put forward in Physics I. Insofar as Aristotle is 
committed to NSPs independently of the Categories, the motivation to avoid reading 
1a24-25 in a way that avoids these commitments is lessened. In chapter 6, I argue 
against Terence Irwin’s suggestion that we reinterpret Categories 2a34ff, and James 
Duerlinger’s and Michael Wedin’s attempts to hold that Aristotle uses ‘in’ 
ambiguously. 
  In the end, I think we are forced to hold that Aristotle makes a mistake in his 
claims at 2a34, and think that, on further reflection, Aristotle would have taken what 
he says at 2a34ff to be false.
20 In this regard I follow Ackrill (1963). However, I do not 
think that Aristotle is simply being, in Ackrill’s words, “compressed and careless”. 
Rather, I think that he is led to make his claims at 2a34 by some of his views about the 
relation between particulars and universals, and I think that trying to understand how 
Aristotle arrives at his claim at 2a34 might help us better understand the overall 
ontological picture of the Categories. In chapter 7, I examine the relation between 
universals and particulars, and argue that it is a kind of whole-part relation. I argue 
that Aristotle’s view about universals can be seen as an attempt to steer a middle 
course between nominalism and Platonism about universals. Aristotle holds that 
universals are constituted by particulars, but that they are not identical to mereological 
sums of particulars and can survive changes in their parts.  
                                                 
20   Additionally, I think that Aristotle would also have to deny what he says at Topics 127b1-4.    66 
  In chapter 8, I turn to the question of why Aristotle claims that nonsubstantial 
universals inhere in substantial particulars in the Categories. I suggest that there are 
three things going on. First, Aristotle seems to be torn between reductionism and 
realism about universals. The further he pushes his claim that universals are nothing 
beyond particulars, the more he seems committed to the position that all facts about 
universals can be reduced to facts about particulars. However, insofar as Aristotle 
thinks that scientific claims involve truths about universals that do not reduce to 
claims about particulars, he recognizes that one universal’s inhering in another is not 
reducible to inherence relations between particulars. Second, Aristotle recognizes 
different sorts of predication. One type of predication allows us to construe predicating 
something of a universal subject extensionally, in terms of predicating something of 
some or all the instances of that universal. However, Aristotle also recognizes some 
varieties of predication—kath’ hauto and katholou predication—where predicating 
something of a universal cannot be reduced to predicating something of particulars. 
While Aristotle’s statements about inherence at 2a34ff would follow if he had 
understood inherence in terms of the first sort of predication, there is good reason for 
him to understand inherence in terms of the second sort of predication. Third, Aristotle 
is concerned at 2a34 to emphasize the ontological priority of primary substance. He 
attempts to secure this ontological priority by making primary substances immediate 
subjects for all other entities. However, I argue that Aristotle doesn’t need this strong a 
claim to ensure the ontological priority of his primary substances.
21 
 
                                                 
21   I turn to a fuller discussion of ontological priority in chapters 9 and 10.   67 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
ALTERNATIVE INTERPRETATIONS OF CATEGORIES 1a24-25 
Section 4.1: Overview 
  In this chapter, I discuss Michael Frede’s and G.E.L. Owen’s attempts to 
reconcile Aristotle’s conflicting statements about inherence.
1 Owen and Frede each try 
to eliminate the apparent inconsistency between 1a24-25 and 2a34ff by offering 
analyses of the definition of inherence at 1a24-25 that differ from the analysis given 
by Ackrill.
2 Each alternative analysis is supposed to allow a universal accident to 
inhere in an individual substance. Therefore, the definition on inherence cannot imply 
that x is in y only if x cannot exist without y. However, it is precisely this implication 
of the definition of inherence which served as a crucial bit of evidence that Aristotle 
accepts NSPs. Therefore, in giving an analysis of 1a24-25 consistent with 2a34, this 
type of solution does away with one of our main supports for thinking that Aristotle 
accepts NSPs. It should be stressed that the existence of NSPs is not ruled out by an 
alternative interpretation of 1a24ff. However, Owen and Frede both claim that NSPs 
can be ruled out of Aristotle’s ontology on independent grounds.
3 In what follows, I 
examine the alternative interpretations of 1a24-25 offered by Owen (Section 4.2) and 
Frede (Section 4.3). I argue that each of these alternatives faces serious difficulties. In 
Section 4.4, I offer some arguments against the alternative ontology proposed by both 
                                                 
1   G.E.L. Owen “Inherence” (1965), and Michael Frede “Individuals in Aristotle” (1978).  
2   This is the analysis given as (IN) in the preceding chapter.  
3  Some proponents of this type of solution to the conflict between 1a24-25 and 2a34ff still 
accept the existence of NSPs. They nevertheless hold that the definition of inherence at 1a24ff does not 
entail that only NSPs can be in a particular substance. Devereux (1992) resolves the conflict by offering 
an analysis of inherence that does not require NSPs, but argues that Aristotle is committed to the 
existence of NSPs on other grounds. See also Wedin (1993) and (2000). It is unclear whether Wedin 
means his “improved orthodox” view as an alternative interpretation of 1a24-25.    68 
Owen and Frede. Frede and Owen both claim that Aristotle does not accept the 
existence of NSPs, and both hold that Aristotle takes accidents which are said-of no 
subject to be fully determinate universals. However, I argue that if an entity is a 
universal, then it meets Aristotle’s criteria for being said-of its instances. There turns 
out to be no room in Aristotle’s ontology for the sorts of entities that Frede and Owen 
say inhere in a subject but are not said-of any subject.
4   
Section 4.2: Owen’s Interpretation 
        In “Inherence” (1965), Owen claims that 2a34 provides decisive evidence against 
(IN) as an interpretation of 1a24-25. Let’s reformulate (IN) as follows: 
  (IN) ∀x∀y[x is in1 y if and only if  
(a) x is in2 y & 
(b) x is not a part of y & 
(c) Necessarily(x exists ⊃ y exists)]. 
Since, Owen claims, Aristotle clearly allows for cases of inherence that violate (IN.c), 
(IN) is a poor choice to render Aristotle’s claim at 1a24ff. It might be helpful to look 
more carefully at the wording of Aristotle’s claim at 1a24-25:  
By in a subject, I mean what is in something, not as a part, and cannot 
exist separately from what it is in. (1a24-25)   
ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ λέγω ὃ ἔν τινι μὴ ὡς μέρος ὑπάρχον ἀδύνατον 
χωρὶς εἶναι τοῦ ἐν ᾧ ἐστίν. 
[E]n hupokeimenôi de legô ho en tini mê hôs meros huparchon 
adunaton chôris einai tou en hôi estin.  
Owen suggests that ‘tou en hôi estin’ at line 25 does not refer back to ‘tini’ in line 24. 
Accordingly Owen proposes that we take (a) and (b) in (IN) to be governed by a 
different quantifier than (c). As a first pass, therefore, let’s attribute the following 
interpretation of1a24-25 to Owen: 
                                                 
4   I do not mean to deny that Aristotle accepts fully determinate universals. I think that both 
infimae species in the category of substance and most specific kinds in the other categories will be fully 
determinate universals. However, even a fully determinate universal will be said-of something, and 
Frede and Owen assign these entities to the wrong class within the four-fold division of the onta,     69 
(INO) ∀x∀y [x is in1 y iff  
(a) x is in2 y &  
(b) x is not a part of y & 
(c)  ∃z￿ (x exists ⊃ z exists)].
5 
(INO) does not conflict with the claim that the universal color is in a particular body. 
Color is in Socrates’ body in the non-technical sense of ‘in’, color is not a part of 
Socrates’ body, and there is something, the universal body, such that color could not 
exist if it did not.   
  Of course, (INO) does not by itself preclude the existence of NSPs. Take a case 
where y is an individual and y=z. In such a case, x would be an NSP. Owen, however, 
claims that there will be no such cases, and he makes two additional moves in fleshing 
out his interpretation of the ontology of the Categories. First, he offers two 
independent logical arguments against the existence of NSPs.
6 Second, he provides an 
alternative account of the kind of entities which are in a subject, but which are not 
said-of any subject.  
  In examining Owen’s view, we need to answer three questions. First, how 
plausible is (INO) as a rendering of 1a24-25? Second, how much force do his logical 
arguments against NSPs have? Third, how plausible is it to populate Aristotle’s 
ontology with the entities Owen suggests as an alternative to NSPs?  
  To answer the first question: It seems difficult to justify Owen’s reading of the 
definition of inherence. I think that ‘tou en hôi estin’ in line 25 is most naturally taken 
to refer back to the ‘tini’ in line 24, and that it strains the passage a bit to deny that the 
                                                 
5   (INO.c) is only a first pass, and, as we will see below, I do not think that it turns out to be the 
best way to render Owen’s claim that the two clauses in Aristotle’s definition are governed by different 
quantifiers. Owen writes “[Aristotle’s definition] can be read as saying ‘Z is in something…and Z could 
not exist without this thing to contain it’ but it can equally well be read as saying ‘Z is in 
something…and Z could not exist without something to contain it’.” (Owen, 257/104). So Owen does 
connect the thing on which Z existentially depends to something that Z inheres in. The second clause in 
Owen’s statement is still ambiguous with respect to quantifier placement. 
   6   Both arguments are found in Owen (1965) p 101. Discussions can be found in Moravcsik (1967), 
Allen (1969), and especially Wedin (1993) and (2000). While initially developed independently, my 
discussion of the logical arguments has much in common with Wedin’s.       70 
terms co-refer, or to claim that are to be rendered by variables that are bound by 
different quantifiers. Second, even if we do not think that ‘tou en hôi estin’ refers 
back, (c) is not a good way of rendering what Aristotle actually says. He is not merely 
saying that the inherer existentially depends on something, but that the inherer 
existentially depends on something it is in. So, at the very least (c) needs to be 
amended to (c*).  
  (c*) x cannot exist without being in something.  
However, (c*) is itself ambiguous between two ways of fixing the scope of the 
quantifier with respect to the ‘cannot’. Is there supposed to be something such that x is 
in it, and cannot exist without being in it? Or is it just the case that x cannot exist 
without being in something or other? The two readings roughly correspond to:  
  (c*1) ∃z((x is in z) & Necessarily(x exists ⊃ z exists)). 
  (c*2) Necessarily((x exists) ⊃ ∃z(x is in z)).   
Owen holds that for any universal accident, there is a universal subject that we can 
specify such that the accident is in that universal subject and could not exist without 
being in that subject. For example, color cannot exist without body and knowledge 
cannot exist without soul. So we can take the stronger (c*1) as expressing Owen’s 
intention. The whole definition then is: 
  (INO) ∀x∀y x is in1 y iff  
(a)    (x is in2 y) &  
(b)    (x is not a part of y) & 
(c*1) ∃z ((x is in z) & ￿ (x exists ⊃ z exists)).  
  However, there is still a problem with the amended version of (INO).  Even if 
we allow that there are not grammatical grounds sufficient to require taking ‘tou en 
hôi estin’ to refer back to ‘tini’, it is difficult to take ‘adunaton chôris einai tou en hôi 
estin’ to introduce a bare existential quantifier, and to mean something like ‘unable to 
exist separate from something that it is in’. It is more natural to take the phrase as   71 
meaning either ‘unable to exist separated from whatever it is in’, or ‘unable to exist 
separated from the thing which it is in’. However, we then get (c**) or (c***) as 
alternative readings for (c*). 
  (c**)  ∀z ((x is in z) ⊃  ￿ (x exists ⊃ z exists)). 
  (c***) Iz ((x is in z ) & ￿ (x exists ⊃ z exists)).
7 
However, neither of these interpretations will allow a universal to inhere in something 
on which it is not existentially dependent. Since (c***) has the additional disadvantage 
of going against Aristotle’s claims that whatever is in the individual is also in the 
species and the genus, (c**) seems like a more likely candidate. However, if we take 
(c) as (c**) we are right back to (IN). In short, there does not seem to be a plausible 
way to take ‘tou en hôi estin’ at 1a25 in a way that yields Owen’s reading of the 
definition of inherence.  
  So much for my objections to Owen’s suggested alternative interpretation of 
1a24-25. I now turn to his two logical arguments against NSPs. The first logical 
argument is the “paradox of the breakdown of the categories”, in which Owen claims 
that all NSPs will be in the category of relatives (ta pros ti). Owen argues in the 
following way. If Socrates’ pallor is an NSP, then Socrates’ pallor will be the pallor of 
Socrates. But if Socrates’ pallor is properly called the pallor of Socrates then Socrates’ 
pallor will satisfy the definition of a relative in chapter 7 of the Categories , since 
relatives are those things which are said to be just what they are of or than something.  
  There are a few problems with Owen’s argument here. First, the problem that 
Owen raises for NSPs will beset any account of subject and accident since accidents 
are accidents of subjects.
8 Second, there is the fact that Aristotle retracts the 
                                                 
7   ‘Ix …’ means there is a unique x such that ….   
8   While accidents will not all be relatives in the technical sense of relatives discussed in 
Categories 7, Aristotle does think that all accidents are relational entities in that it is essential to 
accidents that they bear a relation to the substances in which they inhere. I discuss relational entities at   72 
sufficiency of his linguistic test for relatives at 8a35. He allows that some things can 
be said to be what they are of or than something without being relatives. Third, when 
Aristotle distinguishes relatives from other accidents, he holds that they are said to be 
what they are of or than a correlative that reciprocates. Slave and master are given as 
examples of correlatives, as are greater and smaller, owner and property. A slave is a 
slave of a master, and a master is a master of a slave. Something greater is greater than 
something smaller, and something smaller is smaller than something greater. 
Correlatives stand in a symmetrical relation of ontological implication, since the 
existence of each entails the existence of the other. If an entity is a relative, then so is 
whatever that entity is said to be what it is of or than. However, the dependence of 
accident on substance is not symmetrical. Aristotle holds that relatives are even more 
ontologically dependent entities than other accidents. Every accident depends on a 
subject, but relatives additionally depend on things other than the subjects in which 
they inhere. In addition to depending on its subject, a relative will depend of its 
correlative and on the subject of its correlative. Aristotle has the resources to 
distinguish relatives from other accidents, even if he accepts NSPs. Therefore, it is not 
the case that accepting NSPs forces us to claim that all accidents are in the category of 
relatives. We can accept NSPs without suffering a breakdown of the categories.  
  Owen calls his second logical argument “the paradox of implication.” He 
worries that: 
  If X is an individual, the statement that a particular Y (say a particular 
color) is in X will not entail but actually preclude saying that Y without 
qualification is in X. You ask me what color there is in Socrates’ body: 
I reply meticulously “Socrates’ pink”. You may find this to some extent 
uninformative; but when I try to isolate the informative element for you 
I founder. If I say “The color in Socrates’ body is pink”, the dogma 
rules out what I say as ill-formed. Alternatively, ‘pink’ may be 
                                                                                                                                           
some length in chapter 10, and distinguish them from things that belong to the category of relatives (ta 
pros ti).    73 
supposed to stand for a different color with each different individual 
subject. (Owen 1965, pp. 101-102) 
It is difficult to see exactly what Owen is driving at with this objection. The proponent 
of NSPs will hold that Socrates’ pink is in Socrates’ body. Furthermore, since the 
universals  pink and color are said-of Socrates’ pink, it is true to say that the color in 
Socrates’ body is pink and is a color. It is true that according to (IN) neither the 
universal color nor the universal pink can inhere in Socrates’ body. However, Owen 
seems to assume that the truth of the sentence “The color in Socrates’ body is pink” or 
“Socrates is pink”
9 requires pink to inhere in Socrates. No rational proponent of (IN) is 
going to accept this assumption. The fact that makes true a claim like “The color in 
Socrates’ body is pink,” is the fact that the universal pink is said-of the NSP-color that 
inheres in Socrates.
10 Owen’s argument, therefore, depends on an assumption that  will 
be rejected by any proponent of the view he criticizes. 
  The same sort of controversial assumption underlies Owen’s claim that, 
according to (IN), ‘pink’ will stand for a different color in reference to each individual 
object.
11 Owen holds that the analysis of “Socrates and Callias are the same color,” 
requires that the color inhering in Socrates be the same as the color inhering in Callias. 
The proponent of NSPs will agree with this claim, but will accuse Owen of confusing 
numerical with specific sameness. Socrates and Callias will have numerically distinct 
instances of color, but these instances will be of the same type. Two NSPs will be of 
                                                 
9  It seems that Owen could make a stronger case with the second of these sentences. ‘The color 
in Socrates’ body’ is easily taken by the proponent of NSPs to denote an individual instance of color. 
The subject in this sentence is then easily taken to be a member of various kinds in the same way 
Socrates is a member of various kinds. The relation that underlies the truth of this predication is said-of 
relation. The second sentence poses more of a problem if we hold that the predicate term denotes the 
universal pink, and hold that the truth of a sentence 
α is F
 requires that the item denoted by the 
predicate term either inhere or is said-of the item denoted by the subject term. The proponent of (IN) is 
going to deny this assumption. 
10  I argue in chapter 10 that this is not quite right. The instance of pink in Socrates is not pink 
because the universal is said-of it. Rather the universal is said-of it because of its intrinsic nature.   
11   See Owen (1965) p 102.    74 
the same type if and only if a single universal is said-of both of them.
12 Assuming that 
pink is a fully determinate shade, all bodies that are called pink will have NSPs of the 
same color species inherent in them, and they will each, therefore, be pink. What they 
will fail to share is the same NSP, a different particular will inhere in each of them. 
Nothing prevents many objects from containing NSPs of the same species, just as 
nothing prevents there from being several individual men belonging to one species.
13 
Neither of Owen’s logical arguments is successful in showing that Aristotle cannot 
make sense of NSPs.  
  There is one additional argument that Owen includes within his discussion of 
the paradox of implication, but which I think might be developed into an independent 
argument. Owen claims that NSPs will make a hash out of Aristotle’s views on 
negation.  
[Aristotle] knew an argument that could be turned against it [i.e. the 
claim that ‘pink’ stands for different entities when predicated of 
different substances]. It is an academic argument reported by 
Alexander, pretty certainly from Aristotle’s early essay On the Ideas 
(Peri Ideôn) (Alex. In Meta. 81 12-18). ‘When a man denies something 
of a number of things his denial must refer to something single: for in 
saying “man is not white, horse is not white…” he is not denying some 
separate thing of each of them—he refers to one and the same thing. 
For what holds good in asserting holds good in denying too.’…If I say 
that you are one of the people in whose eyes there is no green I am not 
saying that your eyes lack the green proprietary to them [i.e. an NSP]: 
ex hypothesi there is no such green. Nor, therefore, does the 
contradiction of my statement mention any proprietary shade of green. 
(Owen 1965, p102) 
 
                                                 
12   I argue in chapter 10 that Aristotle accepts a theory on which the resemblance of the instances 
explains the fact that a single universal is said-of both of them, rather than vice versa.  
13   If it would be absurd to claim that ‘man’ means a different thing when applied to Callias and 
Socrates, then it is just as absurd to hold that ‘pink’ must mean something different when Socrates is 
called pink due to Socrates’ pink, and Callias is called pink due to Callias’ pink. The NSPs in Callias and 
Socrates are specifically the same, and numerically different.   75 
It is not difficult to see how Owen’s opponent might attempt to reply to this objection. 
Once again the difference between numerical and specific sameness can be exploited. 
Neither the horse nor the man in the example has an inherent color that white can be 
said-of. For example if the horse is gray and the man tan, then there will be a gray 
instance in the horse and a tan instance in the man. The universal white is said-of 
neither of these. In a similar way the lack of green in my eyes is to be analyzed as the 
inherence in my eyes of a non-green color instance—an instance that green cannot be 
said-of. So the NSP view does not have to talk about any non-existent NSPs.
14  
Owen’s interpretation of 1a24-25 is not particularly plausible, nor are his 
logical arguments particularly compelling. Nevertheless, Owen’s interpretation has the 
advantage of rendering 1a24-25 consistent with 2a34ff.  Furthermore, Owen might 
argue that he has a superior account of the entities that are in a subject but said-of no 
subject. We need, therefore, to examine Owen’s proposed ontology to see whether it 
really fares better than the one that he rejects, on interpretative and philosophical 
grounds. In brief, on Owen’s view, the entities in question are fully determinate types 
in each of the accidental categories. So, ‘to ti leukon’ refers to a fully determinate 
shade of a light color, and there are no more determinate shades that to ti leukon can 
be said-of. However, there is nothing to prevent one and the same determinate shade 
from belonging to several individual bodies, so to ti leukon can inhere in a plurality of 
bodies. Owen’s interpretation allows a neat analysis of the truthmakers for linguistic 
predication in terms of the inherence and said-of relations. Take an instance of 
linguistic predication 
α is F
, where  
‘F
’ indicates but does not necessarily name a 
                                                 
14   In responding to this line of objection, we start to get into tricky issues about how Aristotle 
handles negation. Here I simply sketch the kind of reply that a proponent of NSPs might give to this 
objection, and try to show that Owen has not obviously reduced the view to absurdity. Furthermore, it is 
interesting to note that Owen’s view can be made to face a similar objection. Take the scenario 
envisioned by Aristotle in which nobody is sick. Sickness does not then exist. Now deny that Fido is 
sick. The universal does not exist. So how is the negation to be handled? Whatever answer Owen gives 
to this question could be modified to fit the criticism that Owen raises for the proponent of NSPs.   76 
universal, say x, and 
α
 indicates some entity (either universal or individual) y.
15 α is 
F
 is true iff either x inheres in y as a subject or x is said-of y as a subject.
16 As we will 
see later, the sort of interpretation that I favor will require us to tell a more 
complicated story about the relation between linguistic predication and the inherence 
and said-of relations. 
Nevertheless, I think that the ontology that Owen attributes to Aristotle runs 
into both interpretative and philosophical problems. Since Michael Frede attributes the 
same sort of ontology to Aristotle in his interpretation of the Categories, it will be best 
to put off a discussion of the problems faced by such an ontology until after a 
discussion of Frede’s interpretation of 1a24-25.    
Section 4.3:  Frede’s Interpretation of 1a24-25 
  Like Owen, Frede interprets the definition of inherence at 1a24-25 in a way 
that does not entail the existence of NSPs. Also like Owen, Frede thinks that the 
entities that inhere in subjects are generally multiply-instantiable. Nevertheless, 
Frede’s reading of 1a24-25 differs from Owen’s in several ways. It will be helpful to 
begin our discussion by getting clearer on Frede’s view.  
  To this point, I have been assuming, along with Ackrill and Owen, that at 
1a24-25 Aristotle is giving an account of what it is for an accident to stand in the 
                                                 
15   Duerlinger seems mistaken to claim, in "Predication and Inherence in Aristotle's Categories" 
(1970) pp188-189, that Owen’s fully determinate shades are not universals. Duerlinger assumes that 
anything which is said-of nothing cannot be a universal, and cites De Interpretatione 7.17a39-b2 in 
support of this claim. However, it seems that the De Interpretatione passage requires only that 
universals must (by their nature) be predicated of a number of things (‘ho epi pleionôn pephuke 
katêgoreisthai’). Normally when Aristotle is talking about the said-of relation he uses ‘kath’ 
hupokeimenou legatai,’ and he often uses ‘katêgorein’ without ‘kath’ hupokeimenô’ to indicate 
predication in a less technical sense which would include inherence. So the De Interpretatione passage 
alone should not be taken to rule out the existence of universals that are not said of anything, provided 
these universals inhere in more than one thing. 
16   Frede’s account also has this advantage, and Frede explicitly defines inherence by reference to 
linguistic predication and the said-of relation. Any view holding that only NSPs can be in individual 
substances will have to give different accounts for truthmakers of linguistic predication. For example, 
we will have to say that ‘a is F’ is true iff either the thing signified by ‘F’ is said-of the thing signified 
by ‘a’ or is said-of something that inheres in the thing signified by ‘a’.     77 
relation of inherence to a subject. Both (IN) and (INO) reflect this assumption, and 
give us conditions under which any two entities, x and y, stand in the relation of 
inherence. Frede rejects this assumption, and suggests that Aristotle is trying to give us 
conditions under which a given entity has the indefinite relational property of being in 
something or other. In other words, Frede takes Aristotle to be giving conditions under 
which any entity is such that there is some entity in which it inheres.
17 Compare giving 
conditions under which x is the father of y to giving conditions under which x is a 
father. 
We can look again at Aristotle’s language at1a24-25: “[E]n hupokeimenôi de 
legô ho en tini mê hôs meros huparchon adunaton chôris einai tou en hôi estin.” Frede 
agrees with the traditional interpretation (contra Owen) that ‘tou en hôi estin’ refers 
back to ‘tini’, but holds that neither of these refers back to ‘hupokeimenôi’ in 1a24.
18 
Accordingly, Frede suggests the following reading of 1a24-25:  
(INF1) x is in something as its subject, if and only if there is a 
subject y such that 
(a) x is not a part of y, and  
(b) x cannot exist independently of y.
19 
We need to note two additional points about (INF1). First, Frede tells us that the 
parthood involved in (a) is conceptual as opposed to material parthood. Second, Frede 
claims that his analysis is superior to others because it allows us to do without any 
occurrence of ‘in’ in the definiens. I will discuss each of these points in turn. 
                                                 
17   Frede is not alone here. Gareth Matthews (1989) supports Frede’s reading and claims that the 
ancient commentator Ammonius took Aristotle this way as well. According to Ammonius and 
Matthews, Aristotle is attempting at 1a24-25 to give us conditions under which a given entity is an 
accident as opposed to a substance. To be an accident just is to be a thing that inheres in something.      
18   Frede (1978), p61. 
19   See (D) in Frede (1978), p62. Frede omits the ‘only if’, and thus seems to be providing only 
sufficient conditions for a thing’s inhering in a subject. However, Frede’s own discussion often suggests 
that he takes himself to be giving necessary and sufficient conditions for a thing’s membership in the 
class of accidents. See Matthews (1989) for more discussion on this point.       78 
  In addition to the relation of material parthood which I take to be the relation 
that holds between a cat and its tail, Frede talks about two other parthood relations 
recognized by Aristotle: ‘subjective parthood’ and ‘conceptual parthood’.
20 In 
Metaphysics Δ.25, Aristotle writes: 
The elements in the formula which explains a thing are parts of the 
whole; this is why the genus is called a part of the species, though in 
another sense the species is part of the genus.
21 (1023b22-25 trans. 
Ross)     
Frede’s conceptual parthood and subjective parthood correspond to the two senses of 
‘parthood’ under discussion in the above passage. Frede gives the following definition 
of subjective parthood:  
(SP)   x is a subjective part of y if and only if y is said-of x.
22  
Species are parts of their genera in the sense that they are subjective parts of their 
genera.
23 Furthermore, Frede defines what it is for an entity to be an individual—to be 
indivisible (atomos) and numerically one (hen arithmôi)—in terms of subjective 
parthood. An entity is an individual if and only if that entity has no subjective parts. 
According to Frede, therefore, when Aristotle claims that this pallor is individual he 
means only that it is not said-of anything. However, such an individual entity might 
inhere in a plurality of particular subjects.     
  The genus and differentia are conceptual parts of the species. The species is 
defined in terms of the genus and differentia, and these are parts of the account of 
                                                 
20   By “material parthood” I mean the relation that we normally take to hold between composite 
physical entities and their physical parts, e.g. animals and their organs, or cars and their carburetors.    
21   “ἔτι τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ δηλοῦντι ἕκαστον, καὶ ταῦτα μόρια τοῦ ὅλου· διὸ τὸ γένος τοῦ 
εἴδους καὶ μέρος λέγεται, ἄλλως δὲ τὸ εἶδος τοῦ γένους μέρος.” 
22   Frede (1978), 54. Differentiae are also said-of species. So, by Frede’s definition (SP) the 
species is a subjective part of the differentia. However, while Aristotle does claim that the species is 
part of the genus, I don’t know of any passage where he claims that the species is also part of the 
differentia.  
23   In chapter 7, I further examine the nature of the parthood relation that Aristotle thinks 
individuals and subordinate universals stand in to their genera.    79 
what the species is.
24 Frede claims that Aristotle’s discussion of parts of substances at 
3a29-32 concerns conceptual parts of substances, and that it is natural to read 1a24-25 
as dealing with the same sorts of parts.
25 Keeping this in mind, we can amend (INF1) as 
follows:  
(INF1*) x is in something as its subject, if and only if there is a subject y 
such that   
  (a) x is not a conceptual part of y, and  
    (b) x cannot exist independently of y. 
Frede thinks that the point of Aristotle’s discussion at 1a24-25 is to distinguish the 
class of accidents from the class of substances. Most of the work is supposed to be 
done by clause (b). For example, Frede writes: 
There is no particular person, no one subject of the species man, to 
whom one could point and say that the species could not exist without 
this person. The same is true of the genus animal. The genus requires 
species and individuals as subjects to exist. None of these subjects, 
though, is so privileged that one could say of it, without it the genus 
could not exist.
26  
Species do not depend on any individual member of the species, and genera do not 
depend on any particular one of their sub-species. According to (INF1*), therefore, 
genera and species cannot be entities that inhere in something. On the other hand, for 
each of the accidents that does inhere in something, we will be able to specify some 
subject, a substantial universal, such that the accident could not exist without that 
subject. For example, the universal color could not exist without the universal body.  
  According to Frede, clause (a) in (INF1*) is needed to rule out one problematic 
case.  Differentiae do not inhere in anything. Rather differentiae are said-of the species 
                                                 
24   There is some danger of a confusion of use and mention here. Aristotle tells us that one type of 
part is “what is in the account/formula that makes clear each thing” (ta en tôi logôi tôi dêlounti 
hekaston). The name of the genus is part of the formula of the definition of the species. However, I take 
Aristotle to think that this fact about words is grounded in some fact about the nature of the entities 
referred to by the words. ‘Animal’ is part of the formula of definition of human, because what it is to be 
a human is to be an animal of a certain kind.   
25   I argue below that Frede’s reading of 3a29-32 is untenable. I agree with him, however, that it is 
best to take 1a24-25 and 3a29-32 to involve the same sort of parthood.  
26   Frede (1987) p59.    80 
and the individuals in those species. However, differentiae are the sorts of things 
where we can specify a single subject upon which they are existentially dependent. 
For example, the universal rational could not exist without the species universal 
human. Clause (b), therefore, will not rule out the claim that a differentia inheres in 
something. Clause (a) will rule out this problematic case, since differentiae are 
conceptual parts of their species.  
  Frede does not give a clear definition of conceptual parthood, and it is not quite 
clear how we ought to define the relation. I think that there are two possibilities. First, 
we might hold that conceptual parthood is the converse of subjective parthood.  
  (CP1) x is a conceptual part of y if and only if x is said-of y.  
One possible problem with (CP1) is that it allows species and genera to be conceptual 
parts of individual substances, and it is unclear whether Aristotle would hold that an 
individual substance is the sort of thing that has conceptual parts.
27 As an alternative, 
we might require that an entity have a definition if it is to have conceptual parts.  
(CP2) x is a conceptual part of y if and only if x is part of the definition of 
y. 
Presumably the sorts of definitions involved here will be real and opposed to nominal 
or conceptual definitions, and the conceptual parthood relation will hold between 
entities and not between representations of entities.  
  If we construe conceptual parthood as (CP2), then (INF1) will face a series of 
counterexamples. For example, every primary substance will be an entity that inheres 
in something. Take Socrates as an example. There is an entity, say the universal 
human such that Socrates cannot exist without it. Furthermore, since Socrates does not 
have a definition, human isn’t a conceptual part of Socrates according to (CP2). So, if 
                                                 
27   In fact I think that Aristotle does take the same relation to hold between individuals and their 
species as holds between species and their genera—viz., the said-of relation. Perhaps the misgivings 
expressed in this passage result from the choice of the word ‘conceptual’.   81 
(CP2) is right, then (INF1) entails that primary substances inhere in something.
28 But 
this is an absurd result. Frede could avoid the above argument by holding that 
conceptual parthood is to be understood as (CP1). Let’s assume for the time being, 
therefore, that Frede intends (CP1) as the definition of conceptual parthood.
29 (INF1) is, 
therefore, equivalent to: 
(INF2) x is in something as its subject, if and only if there is a subject y 
such that    
(a) x is not said-of y, and 
(b) x cannot exist independently of y.     
However, (INF2) is still susceptible to a number of counter-examples. The species 
human will turn out to be in a subject, since it cannot exist without the differentia 
rational and is not said-of rational. Rational will also turn out to inhere in something, 
since it cannot exist without the universal animal, and rational is not said-of animal.
30 
Furthermore, any particular entity that we can find which is existentially dependent on 
another particular will turn out to be inherent in something according to (INF2). For 
example, Socrates is existentially dependent on the sun and the earth, neither of which 
are said-of Socrates.
31 Finally, we will have all sorts of cases where substance 
universals turn out to be things that inhere in something. Take the universal body. 
                                                 
28   Heinaman (1981) p303 brings a similar case against Frede. Heinaman’s counter-examples are 
misguided, however. Heinaman tries to saddle Frede with the consequence that individuals are in their 
species and genera, and in so doing fails to recognize that Frede is not defining the relation x is in y, but 
the relational property x is in something. The same point goes against Heinaman’s claim that Topics 
127b1-4 counts against Frede’s reading of 1a24-25. The Topics passage claims that white is in snow. 
Heinaman says that this contradicts Frede’s interpretation of 1a24-25 which Heinaman takes to entail 
that white is in snow only if white cannot exist without snow. Heinaman badly misinterprets Frede by 
holding that Frede’s account has this entailment. This is precisely the sort of entailment that Frede finds 
problematic for (IN) and is precisely the sort of entailment that Frede’s definition avoids.  
29   We will see in a moment that this assumption can be dropped, since Frede’s analysis requires 
amendment on any construal of conceptual parthood.  
30   Heinaman (1981) also notes this sort of problem for Frede’s definition, although he seems 
mistaken in taking Frede to define a relation rather than a relational property. 
31   Wedin (1993) and Wedin (2000) bring up a similar point, noting that every particular is 
dependent on the unmoved mover.    82 
Since every body must have a shape, body could not exist unless shape existed. But 
shape is not said-of body. So, according to (INF2), body inheres in something.  
  Each one of these counter-examples to (INF2) can be dealt with by a single 
amendment to (INF2). In fact, Frede may intend the amended definition and simply 
have been careless in the presentation of his view. However, we will see that the 
amended definition cannot claim to be superior to (IN) on grounds of non-circularity. 
(INF2) requires that y be a subject, but is not explicit in requiring that y be a subject for 
x. If we amend (INF2) to make this requirement explicit, we get:  
(INF3) x is in something as its subject, if and only if there is a subject y 
such that         
  (a) y is a subject for x, and  
(b) x is not a conceptual part of y, and  
    (c) x cannot exist independently of y. 
The addition of (INF3.a) dissolves all of the counter-examples mentioned. Human isn’t 
shown to inhere in anything, since rational isn’t a subject for human. Likewise, animal 
is not a subject for rational, the sun and the earth are not subjects for Socrates, and 
shape is not a subject for body. In addition, the amended definition will not be subject 
to the counter-example that led us to define conceptual parthood as (CP1) rather than 
as (CP2). The species human is not a subject for Socrates. Therefore, even if human is 
not part of Socrates’ definition and is a thing Socrates could not exist without, it will 
not follow that Socrates inheres in anything.  
  Nevertheless, if we accept (a) as an amendment, we can ask where in the text 
of 1a24-25 we find evidence that Aristotle holds (a). The only possible answer is that 
Aristotle puts forward this condition by saying that inherers are what are ‘in something 
not as a part’. So the first occurrence of ‘in’ in Aristotle’s definiens is doing some 
work after all, and cannot simply be omitted. For his analysis to be plausible, 
therefore, Frede must give up on the claim that his definition is less circular than its 
competitors. Of course, he is entitled to claim that the first occurrence of ‘in’ is non-  83 
technical just as Ackrill does in presenting (IN). What about the second occurrence of 
‘in’ in the definiens? Does Frede’s account fare better than (IN) by being able to 
eliminate this occurrence of ‘in’? I do not think so. Any interpretation, including (IN), 
which holds that ‘tou en hôi estin’ is anaphoric, and has its reference fixed by ‘tini’ 
can paraphrase away the second occurrence of ‘in’ in the definiens.
32  
  I take (INF3) to be the best formulation of Frede’s view. How plausible is 
(INF3) as an interpretation of 1a24-25? There are two issues that need discussion. First, 
how plausible is Frede’s contention that Aristotle is talking about conceptual parts in 
this passage? Second, how plausible is Frede’s contention that Aristotle is defining a 
relational property rather than a relation? Let’s look at each of these questions in turn.  
Frede’s interpretation of 1a24-25 in terms of conceptual parthood is 
exegetically strained as we can see from a closer examination of some of the very 
passage that Frede takes to support his view.
33 Contrary to Frede’s claim, the mention 
of parthood at 3a29-32 is most naturally construed as referring to ordinary material 
parthood rather than to conceptual parthood. We can begin by examining how 
Aristotle sets the stage for 3a29-32.  
The discussion in 3a29-32 occurs within the context of a more general 
discussion beginning at 3a7, in which Aristotle attempts to show that no substances 
inhere in any subject. From 3a7-21 Aristotle argues that neither primary nor secondary 
substances are in a subject, and attempts to establish that it is a necessary condition for 
an entity’s being a substance that it does not inhere in any subject. From 3a21-28, 
Aristotle argues that the failure to be in a subject is not a feature peculiar to 
                                                 
32   If I am right in my arguments against Owen, he cannot paraphrase away the second occurrence 
of ‘in’ since he does not take ‘tou en hôi estin’ to be anaphoric, but takes the phrase to introduce a new 
quantifier.   
33   For a defense of the conceptual parts reading, see Frede (1978), 60-62. For additional criticism, 
see Heinaman (1981) and Devereux (1992). Wedin (1993) & (2000) also reject Frede’s conceptual 
parthood reading.     84 
substances, but that this feature also belongs to differentiae. Aristotle, therefore, holds 
that an item’s not being in any subject is not sufficient for that item’s being a 
substance. At 3a29 Aristotle takes up a worry about his claim at 3a7-21 that no 
substance is in a subject. He worries that accepting such a condition will force us to 
deny that the parts of substances are substances, even though these parts of substances 
are correctly classified as substances.  
It might be helpful to look more closely at Aristotle’s argument at 3a7-21, 
since it is extremely compressed and seems at first glance to be blatantly question 
begging. Aristotle attempts to defend the claim that substances don’t inhere in 
anything. Let’s call this claim (SDI). Here is what Aristotle says in defense of (SDI): 
It is a characteristic common to every substance not to be in a subject 
[(SDI)]. (a) For a primary substance is neither said-of a subject nor in a 
subject. (b1) And as for secondary substances, it is obvious at once that 
they are not in a subject. For man is said-of the individual man as 
subject but is not in a subject: man is not in the individual man. 
Similarly animal is also said-of the individual man as subject but 
animal is not in the individual man. (b2) Further, while there is nothing 
to prevent the name of what is in a subject from being sometimes 
predicated of the subject, it is impossible for the definition to be 
predicated. But the definition of secondary substances, as well as the 
name, is predicated of the subject: you will predicate the definition of 
man of the individual man, and also that of animal. No substance, 
therefore, is in a subject [reiteration of (SDI)]. (3a7-21; Ackrill’s 
translation and italics, my section headings) 
Aristotle breaks his defense of (SDI) into two parts. Neither (a) nor (b1) appears at 
first to be an argument. Instead it seems as though Aristotle is simply reasserting the 
point that he is trying to establish. In both cases, however, I think that Aristotle is 
presenting a compressed argument for his claim. In (a), I take Aristotle to be making 
the point that primary substances are always metaphysical subjects and that nothing is 
ever a subject for a primary substance. Since an item can inhere in something only if 
that thing is a subject for it, and nothing is the subject for a primary substance, primary 
substances cannot inhere in anything.    85 
As Ackrill claims in his commentary and signals by use of italics in his 
translation, (b1) also contains an argument for the claim that secondary substances do 
not inhere in any subjects. Aristotle realizes that secondary substances do have 
primary substances as subjects, but he claims that the relation between secondary 
substances and these subjects violates the definition of inherence given at 1a24-25. In 
(b1), I take Aristotle to claim that secondary substances are not in a subject in the non-
technical sense of ‘in’. Therefore, secondary substances fail to meet the criteria for 
inherence.  
As Ackrill notes, it is not completely clear what Aristotle means to capture 
with the non-technical sense of ‘in’. It cannot simply be the case that x is in y iff it is 
true to say that y is x, since Aristotle thinks that it is true to say that the individual man 
is (a) man, and that the individual man is (an) animal, but false to say that man and 
animal are in the individual man even in the non-technical sense of ‘in’. Even if we are 
uncertain about the precise application conditions for the non-technical sense of ‘in’, it 
seems clear that Aristotle relies on this non-technical sense of ‘in’ to rule out the claim 
that secondary substances are inherent in a subject.
 34  
                                                 
34   On the interpretation that I favor, Aristotle means to use the in and of distinction to mark a 
difference between relational and non-relational predication. I discuss this issue further in chapter 10. 
Here is the point that I take Aristotle to be trying to make: take any accident, a, of Socrates. The truth of 
‘Socrates is a’ consists in the holding of a relation between Socrates and an entity that is distinct from 
Socrates—this relation is inherence. On the other hand, the truth of ‘Socrates is human’ is ultimately 
grounded in the nature of Socrates himself. No entity distinct from Socrates need be countenanced. On 
the other hand, the universal human is a thing that has Socrates as a part while Socrates exists, and the 
universal human’s being said-of Socrates consists in Socrates being a certain kind of part of the 
universal. When Aristotle claims that the universal man is not in the individual man, he means that the 
individual man and human are not distinct in the way that the individual man and his accidents are 
distinct, and that this sort of distinctness is a precondition both for the non-technical use of ‘in’ and for 
the holding of the inherence relation which ultimately grounds nonessential predication. An instance of 
pallor is a thing that can be in Socrates. On the other hand, when we talk about an instance of humanity, 
this isn’t something that is in Socrates. Rather this just is Socrates. While inherence is grounded in a 
relation between distinct entities, the said-of relation is ultimately grounded in identity. The relation 
between the universal human and Socrates is a kind of whole-part relation, and the relation between 
Socrates and the instance of humanity involved in his being human is identity. See also Matthews and 
Cohen (1968) Grice (1988), Code (1983).       86 
At (b2), Aristotle offers a further argument that secondary substances do not 
inhere in anything. Once again the argument is somewhat compressed. Aristotle 
argues that because the definitions of secondary substances are predicated of primary 
substances, secondary substances do not inhere in these primary substances. Aristotle 
relies on a few subsidiary premises here. First, he seems to rely on a claim that only 
primary substances are subjects for secondary substances. However, what he really 
needs for his argument is the claim that whenever something is a subject for a 
secondary substance the definition of the secondary substance is properly predicated 
of it. Second, he relies on his claim that the definition of something that inheres in a 
subject can never be predicated of the subject (see 2a28ff). We can now see that 
Aristotle is offering a compressed version of something like the following argument.  
(1) If x is a secondary substance, and y is a subject for x, then the 
definition of x is predicated of y.
 35  
(2) If the definition of x is predicated of y, then it is not the case that x 
inheres in y.  
∴(3) If x is a secondary substance and y is a subject for x, then it is not 
the case that x inheres in y. 
(4) If y is not a subject for x, then it is not the case that x inheres in y. 
∴(5) If x is a secondary substance, then it is not the case that x inheres 
in y.   
(6) If x is a primary substance, then x does not inhere in y.  
(7) If x is a substance, then x is either a primary or a secondary 
substance. 
∴(8) If x is a substance, then x does not inhere in y. [(SDI)] 
After showing that primary and secondary substances do not inhere in any 
subject, Aristotle turns to the discussion of differentiae at 3a21. He writes: 
However, this [i.e. not being in any subject] is not peculiar to 
substance, but the differentia is also among the things that are not in a 
                                                 
35   In each sentence in this argument, understand ‘x’ and ‘y’ to fall within the scope of universal 
quantifiers.    87 
subject. Footed and two-footed are said-of human, but are not in a 
subject—neither footed nor two-footed is in human. And the definition 
of the differentia is predicated of that of which the differentia is said. 
For example, if footed is said-of man the definition of footed is also 
predicated of man, since man is footed (animal).
36 (3a21-28) 
Aristotle’s treatment of differentiae at 3a21-28 raises a series of problems.
37 However, 
for present purposes it is enough to note two things. First, Aristotle takes differentiae 
to be the sorts of things that do not inhere in any subject, supporting this claim by 
pointing out that differentiae aren’t in primary substances in the non-technical sense. 
Second, Aristotle denies that the differentiae of substances are substances.  
Having given some idea of the context for 3a29-32, I turn to this passage itself. 
Aristotle writes:  
Let us not be troubled that we may be forced to say that the parts of 
substances are not substances, since they are in a subject (the wholes). 
For things were not said to be in a subject in this way which existed in 
something as parts.
38 (3a29-32) 
Aristotle’s worry seems clear. He does not want the acceptance of (SDI) to rule out his 
claiming that parts of substances are substances. Assume for a moment with Frede that 
Aristotle is talking about conceptual parts in the above passage. There are two classes 
of conceptual parts that we need to look at: the differentiae of substances, and the 
species and genera of substances. Let’s look first at the situation with differentiae. 
Aristotle has just finished telling us that the differentiae of substances are not 
substances. It makes little sense then to think that he wants to allay our fear that (SDI) 
will force us to say that differentiae are not substances.  
                                                 
36   “οὐκ ἴδιον δὲ οὐσίας τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ διαφορὰ τῶν μὴ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐστίν· τὸ γὰρ 
πεζὸν καὶ τὸ δίπουν καθ' ὑποκειμένου μὲν λέγεται τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ δὲ οὐκ ἔστιν,  
– οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐστὶ τὸ δίπουν οὐδὲ τὸ πεζόν. –  καὶ ὁ λόγος δὲ κατηγορεῖται ὁ τῆς 
διαφορᾶς καθ' οὗ ἂν λέγηται ἡ διαφορά· οἷον εἰ τὸ πεζὸν κατὰ ἀνθρώπου λέγεται, καὶ ὁ λόγος 
τοῦ πεζοῦ κατηγορηθήσεται τοῦ ἀνθρώπου,  – πεζὸν γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος.” 
37   I discuss some of these problems, and offer a suggestion about why Aristotle nevertheless 
claims that differentiae aren’t substances in chapter 2.  
38   “μὴ ταραττέτω δὲ ἡμᾶς τὰ μέρη τῶν οὐσιῶν ὡς ἐν ὑποκειμένοις ὄντα τοῖς ὅλοις, μή 
ποτε ἀναγκασθῶμεν οὐκ οὐσίας αὐτὰ φάσκειν εἶναι· οὐ γὰρ οὕτω τὰ ἐν ὑποκειμένῳ ἐλέγετο τὰ 
ὡς μέρη ὑπάρχοντα ἔν τινι.”   88 
  Therefore, Frede’s interpretation will make sense only if Aristotle is trying to 
allay a fear that we will be forced by the combination of (SDI) and some fact about the 
species and genera of substances to claim that species and genera are not substances. 
The only additional fact that would have this implication would be that the species and 
genera of substances turn out to be things that inhere in a subject. Presumably the 
worry here would be that the species and genera of substances inhere in these 
substances. However, Aristotle has just told us at 3a7-21 that the species and genera 
do not inhere in substances, since they are not in substances, even in a non-technical 
sense. Accordingly, it would be quite strange to think that Aristotle sets out at 3a29-32 
to allay a worry that comes about only by assuming the contradiction of what he has 
just said. The conceptual part reading of 3a29-32 is therefore untenable.
39  
On the other hand, if we take the parts of substances under discussion at 3a29-
32 to be ordinary material parts like heads and hands, then we can see that Aristotle is 
responding to a real worry. Heads and hands are things that can be said to be in 
wholes, but they are also said to be substances.
40 If we take (SDI) seriously, it would 
seem that we have to give up on one of these claims about hands and heads. Aristotle 
responds to the worry by claiming that while heads and hands are in wholes in some 
sense of ‘in’, they are parts of these wholes. Since they are parts, they can’t be said to 
inhere in the wholes. So we can hold on to both the claim that parts are in wholes, and 
                                                 
39   In addition, we should note that it is a bit odd to claim that Aristotle uses ‘tois holois’ at 3a30 
to refer to species thought of as having their genera and differentiae as parts. 
40   Aristotle clearly takes heads to be substances in his discussion of relatives at 8a13ff. 
Furthermore, he seems to think that individual heads are primary substances and that there is also a 
secondary substance, head, said-of the individual heads. What about the claim that a material part can 
be ‘in’ a whole? To say that a head is in a person seems to me to sound odd both in English and Greek. 
On the other hand to say that to say that a part is in a whole sounds fine. I take it that material parts can 
be properly said to be in wholes, in some sense of “in”.     89 
that the parts of substances are substances.
41 It seems, therefore, that the material part 
reading of 3a29-32 fares better than the conceptual part reading.  
There is, however, a third possibility for how to construe parthood at 3a29-32. 
We might take the passage to be discussing neither material nor conceptual parthood, 
but rather subjective parthood. On this interpretation Aristotle is worried that 
particular substances will be in their species and genera. He would then be responding 
to this worry by pointing out that particular substances are in their species and genera 
as parts, and that parthood precludes inherence.
42 The view that Aristotle is talking 
about subjective parthood here deserves serious consideration. Aristotle tells us at 
2a14ff: 
The species in which the things primarily called substances [i.e. the 
primary substances] belong, are called secondary substances, as are the 
genera of these species. For example, the individual man belongs in 
species man, and animal is the genus of the species.
43 (2a14ff; my 
emphasis) 
Aristotle’s primary goal in this passage is to tell us what entities count as secondary 
substances. But it is interesting that he talks about primary substances ‘belonging in a 
                                                 
41   What of Frede’s claim that the shift from talk about genus, species, and differentia to talk 
about material parts is overly jarring? I think Frede’s case is weak on this score. Aristotle makes just 
this shift in his discussion of the non-relativity of substances at 8a13-27. In fact, this is the only other 
passage in the Categories where Aristotle discusses parts, and two things are clear in this passage. First 
of all, Aristotle is talking about material parts of substances. Second, Aristotle clearly indicates that he 
takes these material parts of substances, heads and hands, to themselves be substances.  
42   This interpretation occurred to me as a result of reading Gareth Matthews’ paper, “The Enigma 
of Categories 1a20ff and Why it Matters.” (1989). Matthews does not explicitly discuss the passage at 
3a29-32, but takes up the worry that particular substances will turn out to inhere in something on the 
basis of Aristotle’s claim at 2a11-19 that the individual man “belongs in a species” (en eidei men 
huparchei). Matthews worries that this passage, plus the facts that an individual is not part of the 
species and cannot exist separately from its species, will force Aristotle to say that the individual man 
inheres in something. Matthews points out that Ammonius uses the term ‘merikos’ to refer to particulars 
and takes the particular to be in some way a part of the species, and on these grounds constructs a 
possible line of defense for Aristotle. In chapter VII, I develop an account of Aristotelian universals on 
which they have particulars as parts. Nevertheless, I do not think that Aristotle has this type of parthood 
in mind at 1a24-25 and 3a29-32.     
43   “δεύτεραι δὲ οὐσίαι λέγονται, ἐν οἷς εἴδεσιν αἱ πρώτως οὐσίαι λεγόμεναι ὑπάρχουσιν, 
ταῦτά τε καὶ τὰ τῶν εἰδῶν τούτων γένη· οἷον ὁ τὶς ἄνθρωπος ἐν εἴδει μὲν ὑπάρχει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, 
γένος δὲ τοῦ εἴδους ἐστὶ τὸ ζῷον·”   90 
species’ (‘en eidei men huparchei’). He uses a similar turn of phrase at 3a32, where he 
tells us that in talking about the things that are in a subject we did not mean ‘...the 
things belonging in something as a part’ (‘ta hôs merê huparchonta tini’). If 2a14ff 
commits Aristotle to holding that the primary substances ‘belong in’ the species, then 
it might be natural to take 3a32 as clarifying the way in which a primary substance 
belongs in a species.  
I think that there are two problems with taking the parts mentioned at 3a29-32 
to be subjective parts. First of all, the resultant interpretation once again has us taking 
primary substances to be in something in some sense of ‘in’ despite the claim at 3a7-
21 that no substances are in anything even in the non-technical sense of ‘in’. It is a bit 
strange to think that Aristotle takes back in 3a29-32 what he has just said for such a 
wide class of substances. It makes a bit more sense to think that he is just considering 
a special case at 3a29-32, which seems to go against the general rule that he has 
already laid down. The material part reading has him considering only a special case. 
Second, if we want to construe 3a29-32 as talking about subjective parts, then we will 
have to hold that in talking about ‘wholes’ (‘tois holois’) at 3a30, Aristotle means to 
pick out species and genera of substances. Although I argue elsewhere that Aristotle 
does take universals to be wholes which have particulars as parts, I don’t think that it 
is natural to take ‘tois holois’ in this passage to refer to universals.
44 As a result, I am a 
bit skeptical about taking 3a29-32 to be about subjective parts, and I think that it is 
most natural to take Aristotle to be talking about material parthood at both 3a29-32 
and 1a24-25.   
Frede is correct to claim that Aristotle refers back to 1a24-25 at 3a29-32, and 
that the sort of parthood under discussion at 3a29-32 is the same sort of parthood that 
                                                 
44   Heinaman (1981) p301 notes that Aristotle’s only other use of ‘holos’ in the Categories (8a16) 
refers to material wholes, and that his other discussions of parts 8a13-28 and 8b15-21 refer to material 
parts.     91 
is under discussion at 1a24-25. Given the interpretative implausibility of taking the 
discussion at 3a29-32 to involve conceptual parthood, it follows that it is 
interpretatively implausible to take the discussion at 1a24-25 as being about 
conceptual parts. Insofar as Frede’s interpretation of Aristotle’s discussion inherence 
at 1a24-25 depends on taking parthood in that passage as conceptual parthood, 
therefore, his interpretation is untenable.   
It is possible to reject Frede’s interpretation of 1a24-25, and nonetheless agree 
with his contention that Aristotle there seeks to define the relational property of being 
inherent in something rather than the relation of inherence. Gareth Matthews is one 
interpreter who holds such a position.
45 While I have no decisive objection to taking 
1a24-25 as giving a definition of a relational property, I would like to note some 
problems with doing so.  
First of all, if Aristotle is defining the relational property of being an inherer at 
1a24-25, then there is no passage where he tells us what the relation of inherence is. 
However, it seems fairly clear that inherence is a technical notion for Aristotle, and 
that the nature of the relation isn’t simply given by common sense. Furthermore, 
inherence seems to play a central role at the outset of the Categories, and we would 
expect Aristotle to tell us what the relation is. Even given my view that Aristotle takes 
inherence to be a fundamental relation and not a relation that he can define in more 
ontologically basic terms, I would expect him to say something about the sort of 
relation that it is.  
Furthermore, it seems odd to call what is on the right-hand side of (INF3) a 
definition of the relational property of being in a subject. We would normally define 
an indefinite relational property in terms of its constitutive relation. For example, if I 
                                                 
45   See Matthews (1989). At least Matthews does not make his own position dependent on taking 
the parthood discussed at 1a24-25 to be conceptual parthood.    92 
wanted to define the indefinite relational property of being a grandmother, I might 
proceed in the following way: 
(G1) x is a grandmother iff there is some y, such that x is the 
grandmother of y. 
I might pick other relations in terms of which to define the relational property, but it 
would be most natural to pick relations that are definitive of the constitutive relation of 
the relational property. For example, I might define the indefinite relational property 
of being a grandmother as follows: 
(G2) x is a grandmother iff there are y and z such that x is the 
mother of y and y is a parent of z. 
However, it is important to notice that neither (G1) nor (G2) is analogous to what is 
going on in (INF3). We might be given some conditions which all and only inherent 
things meet, but we aren’t told what it is for a thing to be an inherer. Compare the 
situation here with an example hijacked from Quine.
46 Say that we are trying to define 
the indefinite relational property of being a renate (a creature with a kidney).
47 
Imagine that all and only renates are cordates (creatures with hearts). Furthermore, 
imagine that there is some kind of necessity involved here and that it isn’t possible to 
have creatures that have one sort of organ without having the other. I could give the 
following as necessary and sufficient conditions for being a renate: 
(R1) x is a renate iff there is a y such that y is the heart of x.  
(R1) might serve to indicate the class of entities which are renates, but it doesn’t seem 
to tell me what it is for an entity to be a renate. We are in a similar situation with 
(INF3). It might indicate which entities are inherent in something, but it doesn’t tell us 
what is to inhere in something. To explain what I mean further, let’s consider a 
defense of Frede’s interpretation offered by Gareth Matthews.  
                                                 
46   See Quine’s Philosophy of Logic (1970).  
47   Take the relation is a kidney of as primitive, and define is a renate as follows: x is a renate =def 
there is some y such that y is a kidney of x.    93 
It is an advantage of Frede’s view that it allows the universal color to be in an 
individual body without requiring that the universal color existentially depend on that 
individual body. Color can be in several things, as long as it is existentially dependent 
on at least one of the things that it is in. Matthews take the task of defining the 
property of inhering in something to be identical to the task of defining the property of 
being an accident, and he writes:  
To say that something is an accident is to say that something it is in, 
though not necessarily everything it is in, accredits it as an accident—
where accreditation amounts to being the thing it is in (not as a part) 
from which it cannot be separated. By analogy, I may have a 
grandmother in my class who is not my grandmother; to have a 
grandmother in my class it is enough for me to have someone in my 
class who is a grandmother. Likewise, I can have an accident in me 
which is therefore a subject-dependent being, even though I am not the 
subject the accident could not exist separately from.
48  
The notion of accreditation at work here is somewhat strange. Matthews and Frede 
seem to hold that the universal color is an accident of me and is also an accident of 
body. Nevertheless, I do not accredit the universal color as an accident. But why not? 
It makes perfect sense to say that I do not accredit a woman in my class as a 
grandmother, because she is not my grandmother. On the other hand, it would be odd 
to claim that I do not accredit my grandmother as a grandmother. But this is what 
Frede and Matthews take to be going on in the case of my accidents and me—I don’t 
accredit things that stand in the accident-relation to me as things which stand in the 
accident relation to something.
49 So the grandmother analogy as currently constructed 
turns out to be a misleading analogy. 
A better analogy to the case with accidents might be as follows. Let’s define a 
new relation is a grandmother* of, where x is a grandmother* of y iff y is x’s earliest-
                                                 
48   Matthews (1989), 96. 
49   This despite the fact that ‘λx[∃y(x is y’s accident)]a’ is just the existential generalization of 
‘λx[x is Keith’s accident]a’.   94 
born grandchild. Since everything that has a grandchild has an earliest born 
grandchild, it seems that the following would be a true equivalence: 
(G3) x is a grandmother iff there is a y such that x is the grandmother* 
of y. 
It is clear that all and only those things which are grandmothers are grandmother*s. 
My grandmother is a grandmother*, but I do not accredit her as a grandmother* since 
I am not her earliest born  grandchild. The relation is a grandmother* of is strictly 
stronger that the relation is a grandmother of. In a similar way, the relation defined by 
the right-hand side of (INF3) is strictly stronger than the inherence relation. According 
to the Frede-Matthews account, Aristotle sets out to define an indefinite relational 
property in terms of a relation that is strictly stronger than the constitutive relation of 
that indefinite relational property. Furthermore, he never gives us any characterization 
of the relation that is constitutive of the relation property in question. This practice 
does not seem to be a good one in giving definitions.
50 I, therefore, prefer to take 1a24-
25 to be discussing the relation of inherence.  
  I’ve argued in this section that Frede’s account of 1a24-25, like Owen’s, faces 
substantial interpretative problems. In the next section, I argue that Frede and Owen 
do not provide a plausible alternative to the ontology of nonsubstantial particulars. 
                                                 
50   Might Aristotle be following such a practice nevertheless? I cannot think of any knockdown 
argument against the claim that he is. One question is whether or not Aristotle would use the phrase ‘en 
hupokeinenou de legô…’ in a case where he is simply trying to provide us with a condition that applies 
to all and only the things that are in something, rather than to provide something like a definition. 
Aristotle uses forms of ‘legein’ in many contexts, and a catalog of all of them is beyond the scope of 
this paper, but it seems from a cursory glance at Metaphysics D that Aristotle uses the term (i) to 
indicate commonly accepted definitions of a term, or (ii) to introduce a stipulative definition of a term 
of art. In both these cases, it seems that Aristotle tries to do more than simply to pick out the same 
extension of the term under discussion. Again, however, this is pretty slim evidence on which to base 
much. Furthermore, Matthews and Frede can claim that Ackrill’s alternative saddles Aristotle with an 
inconsistency, and can hold that it is more charitable to attribute an odd definitional practice to Aristotle 
than it is to attribute an inconsistency to him.     95 
Section 4.4: Problems for the Owen-Frede Ontology 
Both Frede and Owen deny that Aristotle accepts NSPs. Instead, they claim 
that Aristotle takes entities which inhere in a subject but which are not said-of a 
subject to be fully determinate types. Owen gives us the example of vink, a fully 
determinate shade of light pink, as an example of the sort of entity the Aristotle calls 
‘to ti leukon’.  Fully determinate types can inhere in more than one subject, but lacking 
sub-types, they are not said-of anything at all.    
In his discussion of what it is for an entity to be a universal in De 
Interpretatione, Aristotle writes, “I call universal that which is by nature predicated of 
a number of things, and particular that which is not.” (17a39-40) In claiming that a 
universal is naturally predicated of a plurality of things (‘epi pleionôn pephuke 
katêgoreisthai’), Aristotle does not necessarily indicate that a universal must be said-
of many things. Rather, he need only be saying that a universal naturally has a 
plurality of subjects.
51 Since to ti leukon (on Owen’s and Frede’s views) inheres in 
many subjects, it will count as a Aristotelian universal.
52  
If entities like this pallor (to ti leukon) are universals, then we would expect 
them to be characterized in a way similar to other universals; they should belong to 
genera and have differentiae. Heinaman points to textual evidence that the universal 
pale, which would be the obvious choice as the genus of this pale, is not taken to be a 
genus by Aristotle.
53 However, let’s assume that to ti leukon is a fully determinate type 
and does have a genus and differentia. If x has a genus and differentia, then it would 
                                                 
51  Irwin (1988) holds that Aristotelian universals must actually be predicated of a plurality of 
subjects. I take up this issue in more detail in chapter 7.  
52   As Wedin (2000) points out, Owen is a bit unclear about what he takes entities like vink to be. 
Owen seems sometimes to deny that vink is predicated of a number of subjects, but I think that Owen 
might be denying only that the strong predication relation (or the said-of relation) holds between vink 
and anything else. Owen seems to be able to allow that a more generic predication relation obtains.  
53   See Heinaman (1981) p303, where he discusses Topics 127a20-25. In some ways, it seems like 
Aristotle is struggling to differentiate genus-species cases from determinable-determinate cases in this 
passage.    96 
seem to be the case that x has a definition.
54 But, if x has a definition, then there will 
be an expression the definition of x, say 
def(x)
 which can be linguistically predicated 
of x. Furthermore, the name of x is trivially linguistically predicable of x. But in that 
case, x seems to pass the linguistic test for being said-of x. The class of things that are 
said-of something seems to be coextensive with the class of things that are definable.
55 
       Another problem with the view that ‘to ti leukon’ does not refer to an NSP has to 
do with Aristotle’s statements about the relation between numerical oneness and 
predication.
56 Frede and Owen maintain that to ti leukon is indivisible and numerically 
one, despite inhering in a number of individuals, because it is not said-of any entity. It 
seems, however, that we can construct an argument from what Aristotle says in the 
Categories against this position. At 1b6-8, Aristotle claims “What is indivisible and 
one in number is unqualifiedly said-of no subject.” Where ‘Ix’ stands for ‘x is 
indivisible’, ‘Nx’ for ‘x is one in number’, and ‘Oxy’ for ‘x is said-of y’, we can 
formalize Aristotle’s claim as follows: 
    (O1) ∀x((Ix &Nx)⊃ ¬∃y(Oxy)) (1b6-8) 
Later in the Categories, Aristotle claims “There is no predicate at all from a primary 
substance, since it is said-of no subject.” (3a36) Aristotle’s inference in this passage 
depends on his acceptance of the following principle (where ‘Px’ stands for ‘x has a 
predicate from it’): 
    (O2) ∀x(¬∃y(Oxy) ⊃ ¬Px) (3a36) 
By contraposition, (O2) yields: 
                                                 
54   Notice that no individual has a differentia in the sense required here. There is no differentia 
said-of Socrates that differentiates him from all the other things in his immediately superordinate kind. 
In the case of vink, we are assuming that there is something that differentiates vink from other pale 
colors.  
55   I don’t think that we should make too much of this complaint. We might hold that Aristotle’s 
linguistic test has an implicit distinctness clause, and holds that x is said-of y only if x≠y.  
    56   After constructing this argument, I found a more detailed and comprehensive version of what is 
essentially the same argument in Wedin (1993). Wedin (2000) has a revised version of the argument from 
his 1993 paper.   97 
    (O3) ∀x(Px ⊃ ∃y(Oxy))  (from (O2)) 
So, if there is a predicate from an entity, then that entity is said-of something. 
However, it seems as though there is a predicate from the entity vink. Here is that 
predicate: ‘__ is vink’. We can be a little more precise. Say that we have two cases of 
linguistic predication of the forms 
α is F
 and 
β is F
, where 
α
 and 
β
 refer to 
distinct entities. Further assume that the truthmaker for 
α is F
 involves the holding of 
a relation between an entity indicated by 
α
 and an entity indicated by 
F
, and that the 
truth-maker for 
β is F
 involves the holding of that relation between the entities 
indicated by 
β
 and 
F
 (where the same entity is indicated by 
F
 in both statements). 
Then 
F
 is a predicate from the entity indicated by 
F
. So if “Socrates is vink” and 
“Coriscus is vink” are made true by vink’s inhering in Socrates and Coriscus 
respectively, then ‘vink’ is a predicate from vink. In any case that we can choose, it 
seems possible for us to come up with a predicate from a most determinate type. If 
there is a predicate from vink, however, it follows from (O3) that there is some entity 
that vink is said-of. But it then follows from (O1) that vink is not indivisible and one in 
number, and we have a contradiction, If on the other hand, ‘to ti leukon’ refers to an 
NSP, we needn’t be led to hold that there is a predicate from that NSP, because no 
other entity is pale by bearing a relation to this very NSP. To be clear, there will be a 
predicate from the most determinate universal, but there will not be any predicate from 
a NSP that a fully determinate universal is said-of.  
  It seems that the only way that the denial of NSPs can be made to work would 
be to introduce a special kind of entity. This entity would have to be in many subjects, 
but it would have to be indefinable. Perhaps there are sub-specific types, which are not 
locatable by specification of a genus and differentia. The model here might be 
something like the determinate-determinable relation. All non-substantial species are 
determinables and the entities picked out using ‘ho tis’ locutions are determinates.   98 
These determinates will inhere in a subject, but, perhaps because they are indefinable, 
will not be said-of anything. There is nothing philosophically incoherent about such a 
view, and we might think that such a view is required, if we think that there can be an 
infinite variety of universals but only a finite number of lowest species.
57  
  However, Frede and Owen will also have to hold that there are no predicates 
from these determinate types. However, even fully determinate and indefinable types 
seem to be entities from which there are predicates. A proponent of the Owen-Frede 
view, therefore, owes us an account of what it is for there to be a predicate from an 
entity which makes plausible ruling out determinates as entities from which there are 
predicates. I do not see how such an account of predication would go. I conclude that 
the ontology offered by Owen and Frede, on which entities that are in a subject but not 
said-of any subject are fully determinate universals, cannot be squared with what 
Aristotle says in the Categories. Furthermore, I have argued that the attempts by Owen 
and Frede to offer an alternative account of the definition of inherence at 1a24-25 fail. 
In the next chapter, I examine independent evidence from the Physics that Aristotle 
accepts the existence of NSPs.   
 
 
 
                                                 
    57   This claim follows from the plausible assumptions that (1) we can reach any species by a finite 
number of genus-differentia divisions, and (2) every genus has a finite number of sub-genera.    99 
CHAPTER 5 
 
NONSUBSTANTIAL PARTICULARS IN THE PHYSICS 
In this chapter, I argue that Aristotle’s analysis of coming to be in Physics I.7 
commits him to just the sort of non-substantial particulars that Frede and Owen find so 
problematic. Furthermore, I posit a single picture of Aristotle's ontology that I take to 
underlie both his thoughts about the truthmakers for substance-accident predication, 
and his thoughts about the nature of change. In the course of outlining this ontology, I 
hope to come to a better understanding of the nature of the inherence relation.   
At  Physics  189b32-190a5,  Aristotle  distinguishes  simple  things  from 
composite things in his analysis of coming-to-be.  
When we say that something comes to be out of something and that 
something comes to be out of something else, we are speaking of either 
the simples or the composites. I mean this as follows. It is possible (i) 
that a man becomes musical, (ii) that the unmusical becomes musical, 
and (iii) that the unmusical man becomes musical man. I call the man 
and the unmusical simple becomers, and the musical a simple thing 
which comes to be. Both the thing which comes to be and the becomer 
are composite, whenever we say that the unmusical man becomes the 
musical man.
1(189b32-190a5) 
In this passage, Aristotle considers a case of alteration in which a man goes from 
being unmusical to being musical. In this case we can distinguish three simple things 
                                                 
1   φαμὲν γὰρ γίγνεσθαι ἐξ ἄλλου ἄλλο καὶ ἐξ ἑτέρου ἕτερον ἢ τὰ ἁπλᾶ λέγοντες ἢ τὰ 
συγκείμενα. λέγω δὲ τοῦτο ὡδί. ἔστι γὰρ γίγνεσθαι ἄνθρωπον μουσικόν, ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὴ μουσικὸν 
γίγνεσθαι μουσικὸν ἢ τὸν μὴ μουσικὸν ἄνθρωπον ἄνθρωπον μουσικόν. ἁπλοῦν μὲν οὖν λέγω 
τὸ  γιγνόμενον  τὸν  ἄνθρωπον  καὶ  τὸ  μὴ  μουσικόν,  καὶ  ὃ  γίγνεται  ἁπλοῦν,  τὸ  μουσικόν· 
συγκείμενον  δὲ  καὶ  ὃ  γίγνεται  καὶ  τὸ  γιγνόμενον,  ὅταν  τὸν  μὴ  μουσικὸν  ἄνθρωπον  φῶμεν 
γίγνεσθαι μουσικὸν ἄνθρωπον. (189b32-190a5) Take the sentence schema, 
X becomes Y
. Aristotle 
wants to distinguish X, the thing that undergoes the process of becoming (the terminus a quo), from Y, 
the end product of the change (the terminus ad quem). I use the awkward phrase ‘simple becomer’ to 
translate ‘to gignomenon haploun’, which is the starting point of the change. I render ‘ho gignetai’  as 
‘that which comes to be’, and this is the end point of the change. At this point in the chapter, Aristotle 
uses ‘to gignomenon’ for the things that undergo the process of becoming and ‘ho gignetai’ for the end 
product which comes to be. However, later in the chapter at 190b11, Aristotle suddenly reverses his use 
of terminology, and uses ‘to gignomenon’ for the end products of change, and ‘ti ho touto gignetai’ for 
the things undergoing the process of change (see Ross (1936), 493).       100 
(ta hapla): the man (ho anthrôpos), the unmusical (to mê mousikon), and the musical 
(to mousikon). I call the first two entities ‘simple becomers’, and these are the things 
that are present before the change has happened. I call the third simple entity ‘a simple 
thing which comes to be’, and this thing is what is present at the end of the change. 
We can also distinguish two composite entities (ta sunkeimena): the unmusical man 
(ho mê mousikos anthrôpos) and the musical man (ho mousikos anthrôpos); these are 
composed from the simple entities mentioned.  Once again, we can distinguish the 
entity from which the change proceeds, the unmusical man, from the entity towards 
which the change proceeds, the musical man.  
Aristotle  takes  the  simples  to  be  entities.  That  ‘ho  anthrôpos’  refers  to  an 
individual man is not a matter for controversy. However, the semantic values of ‘to me 
mousikon’ and ‘to mousikon’ are less clear. Furthermore, we need to figure out the 
nature of the compound entities, and what it is for simple entities to form such a 
compound.
2  
The phrase ‘to mousikon’ consists of the neuter singular form of the definite 
article and the neuter singular form of the adjective ‘mousikos’, the meaning of which 
is broader than the meaning of the English adjective ‘musical’. While ‘mousikos’ can 
be used to ascribe narrowly musical skill to a person, it can also be used to describe 
someone who is more broadly learned or cultured.
3 The combination of the definite 
article and the neuter form of the adjective can generally be understood in two distinct 
                                                 
2   I take Aristotle to use ‘simple’ and ‘composite’ to describe features of entities, rather than to 
describe features of the phrases we use. In other words, Aristotle is not simply making a point that we 
can use three different phrases to refer to a thing, ‘the musical’, ‘the man’ and ‘the musical man’, the 
first  two  of  which  are  grammatically  simple  the  last  of  which  is  grammatically  complex.  Rather, 
Aristotle takes the semantic values of ‘the musical’ and ‘the man’ to be simple, while the semantic 
value of ‘the musical man’ is somehow a compound. In a similar manner, I take Aristotle to distinguish 
three processes in (1)-(3) above, rather than to distinguish three ways of talking about a single process. 
These distinctions will become crucial as our discussion proceeds.  
3   See Charlton (1992), 45. Also see Liddell and Scott’s Lexicon (1991), 520: “mousikos…II. of 
persons,  skilled  in  music,  musical…2.  Generally  a  votary  of  the  Muses,  a  man  of  letters  and 
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ways. First, we might take ‘to mousikon’ to indicate something general like knowledge 
of music, musicality or culturedness. Alternatively, we might take the phrase as a 
singular concrete substantive, meaning something like ‘the musical thing’. Aristotle’s 
claims at 190a9-13, however, seem to rule out the former interpretation. 
Of the becomers, which we call simple becomers, one remains when it 
comes to be, the other does not remain. On the one hand, the man 
coming to be musical remains and is a man, but the not musical (to mê 
mousikon) and the unmusical [to amouson] remain neither simply nor 
as components.
4 (190a9-13) 
There is no reason to think that ignorance of music, taken generally, ceases to exist 
when a particular man comes to know music. Furthermore, it does not seem to be 
correct to say that knowledge of music or musicality in general come into existence 
when a particular man comes to know music. On the other hand, if we take to mê 
mousikon and to mousikon to be particulars, then there is a straightforward sense in 
which  the  former  ceases  to  exist  and  the  latter comes  to  be.  A  particular  case  of 
ignorance of music can plausibly be taken to cease to exist when a man learns music. 
Furthermore, a particular instance of musicality can plausibly be taken to come into 
existence  when  the  change  occurs.  There  seems  to  be  a  good  prima  facie reason, 
                                                 
4   τῶν δὲ γιγνομένων ὡς τὰ ἁπλᾶ λέγομεν γίγνεσθαι, τὸ μὲν ὑπομένον γίγνεται τὸ δ' οὐχ 
ὑπομένον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ὑπομένει μουσικὸς γιγνόμενος ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἔστι, τὸ δὲ μὴ 
μουσικὸν καὶ τὸ ἄμουσον οὔτε ἁπλῶς οὔτε συντεθειμένον ὑπομένει (190a9-13). In my translation 
of “ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ὑπομένει μουσικὸς γιγνόμενος ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἔστι,” I follow Charlton 
(1992) in taking the second ‘anthrôpos’ with ‘esti’. It also seems possible to translate the passage as 
‘The man becoming a musical man remains and exists.’ The problem with the latter translation is that it 
has a simple terminus a quo and a compound terminus ad quem. In his distinguishing three different 
processes of coming to be, Aristotle does not recognize such a case. It seems preferable, therefore, to 
translate  the passage so that both  termini of  the change are simple.  On a related note, we should 
recognize  the  fact  that  Aristotle  here  uses  the  masculine  singular  nominative  adjectival  ‘mousikos’ 
rather  than  the  neuter  substantive  ‘to  mousikon’.  This  shifting  of  gender  seems  to  be  dictated  by 
grammatical  agreement  with  ‘ho  anthrôpos)  and  I  do  not  think  that  it  should  be  taken  to  be 
philosophically significant. We are still looking at the same sort of case discussed at 189b35, where a 
man becomes ‘to mousikon’.   102 
therefore, to hold that ‘to mê mousikon’ and the like refer to particulars rather than to 
anything general.
5  
I want to examine three additional arguments that tell in favor of taking to mê 
mousikon  and  the  like  to  be  particulars.  The  first  two  arguments  are  textual  or 
grammatical. The third argument involves an interpretation of what Aristotle means 
when he claims that things are ‘one in number’.
6  
There is one manuscript tradition according to which Aristotle uses the phrase 
‘to mê mousikon ti’ at 189b35 when he introduces the  simple entities involved in 
coming to be. If this reading is correct, then the use of the indefinite pronoun ‘ti’ gives 
us strong evidence that Aristotle takes such entities to be particulars. Charlton (1992) 
notes this fact in his commentary but says, without telling us why, that he reluctantly 
follows  Ross  (1936)  in  omitting  the    ‘ti’.
7  According  to  Ross,  the  L  family  of 
manuscripts F, I and J include the ‘ti’. On the other hand, manuscript E, the Latin 
translation  of  Book  I  from  the  Arabic,  the  commentaries  of  Philoponus  and 
Simplicius,  and  Themistius’s  paraphrase  have  ‘to  mê  mousikon’  without  the  ‘ti’. 
Bekker  (1831) follows  F  and  I  in  his  edition, while  Ross  (1936)  follows E. Ross 
argues that E is to be accorded special importance, and that where E agrees with the 
commentaries  we  generally  have  good  reason  to  favor  its  reading  over  that  of 
                                                 
5   It might be possible to argue that when Aristotle tells us that to mê mousikon does not remain, 
he means only that it is no longer present in some particular case and not that it ceases to exist. To mê 
mousikon continues to exist, but it ceases to be present in the particular man that changes. If we accept 
such an argument, then we could also hold that to mê mousikon is non-particular. However, I think that 
Aristotle is making the stronger point that the item ceases to exist when he tells us that it remains 
neither simply nor as a component. 
6   As part of a more general argument that forms are concrete particulars rather than abstract 
properties  of  particulars,  Charlton  (1992)  pp.  70-73  examines  several  passages  and  gives  several 
arguments favorable to the claim that to mê mousikon and the like are particulars. Charlton concludes 
that the relation between the form (to mousikon) and the underlying thing (the man) is one of thing 
constituted  to  constituent.  I  largely  agree  with  Charlton  on  this  score,  although  we  seem  to  have 
different understandings of the nature of the constitution relation.   
7   See Charlton (1992) pp70-71.   103 
manuscripts F, I and J.
8 Nevertheless, in some cases Ross holds that the L family of 
manuscripts is sometimes to be preferred to E. Although he does not explicitly present 
an argument in favor of his reading of 189b35, he seems to have something like the 
following in mind. The passage makes perfect sense without the ‘ti’, and we do not 
have  evidence  for  occurrences  of  ‘ti’  in  the  commentaries.  Furthermore,  Aristotle 
doesn’t generally use the indefinite pronoun when talking about the sorts of entities in 
question, as is clear from looking at the remainder of Physics I.7.  Therefore, it makes 
more sense to think that the L folks added something to the text than it does to think 
that the E fellow erased something. 
While this argument is reasonable, it doesn’t strike me as conclusive. It seems 
that we can use the same evidence to argue for the superiority of the L-reading. The 
fact that we don’t find ‘ti’ in any of the parallel passages in Physics I.7 shows that the 
L folks weren’t involved in emending the text. After all, if they were going to emend 
the  text,  they  could  easily  have  put  in  ‘ti’  in  other  places  in  I.7.  We  could  then 
conjecture that E erased the ‘ti’ at 189b35 to make the wording in this passage parallel 
to the wording in the rest of the passage where ‘ti’ is not used. I don’t think that this 
argument is compelling either, and I am not sure that a compelling case can be made 
either way. However, at the very least, the existence of the L tradition clearly shows 
that some earlier scholars took Aristotle to use ‘to mê mousikon’ and the like to talk 
about particular entities.  
Charlton  (1992)  points  to  a  second  piece  of  textual  evidence  that  Aristotle 
takes to mê mousikon and the like to be particulars. In his discussion of when it is 
proper to say that something comes to be out of something else, Aristotle writes: 
In some cases it is said not only that something comes to be, but also 
<that it comes to be> out of this. For example the musical [mousikos] 
                                                 
8   Ross cites with approval Diels’ (1882) claim that the commentaries are based on a manuscript 
tradition largely independent of all the extant manuscripts.    104 
<comes to be> out of the unmusical. But we don’t say this in all cases. 
For the musical [mousikos] doesn’t come to be out of the man, but the 
man becomes musical.
 9 (190a5-8) 
Talking about the same topic later in I.7, Aristotle writes: 
(a) It is said that something comes to be out of something, and not that 
something comes to be something, more in the case of the things that 
don’t remain; for example, that the musical [mousikon] comes to be out 
of the nonmusical, but not out of man…(b) But <what comes to be> 
out of what is opposed and doesn’t remain is spoken of in both ways; 
<we say> both that this <comes to be> out of that, and that this comes 
to be that. For both out of the unmusical and the unmusical comes to be 
the musical [mousikos]. (c) Hence things are the same in the case of the 
composites. For it is said both that out of the unmusical man comes to 
be the musical (man) [mousikos], and that the unmusical man becomes 
the musical [mousikos].
10 (190a21-23…190a26-31) 
In both these passages, Aristotle uses the masculine ‘mousikos’ rather than the neuter 
‘mousikon’ to refer to the thing that comes to  be. The masculine form would not 
normally be used to refer to something like musicality in the abstract. Rather, it seems 
to refer to a concrete particular.  
Normally  the  substantive  use  of  ‘mousikos’  would  mean  something  like 
musical man or musician. If Aristotle means to talk about the musical man by using 
                                                 
9   “τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν οὐ μόνον λέγεται τόδε γίγνεσθαι ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τοῦδε, οἷον ἐκ μὴ 
μουσικοῦ μουσικός, τὸ δ' οὐ λέγεται ἐπὶ πάντων· οὐ γὰρ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου ἐγένετο μουσικός, ἀλλ' 
ἅνθρωπος ἐγένετο μουσικός.”(190a5-8) 
I follow Charlton in translating “οὐ μόνον λέγεται τόδε γίγνεσθαι ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τοῦδε” as 
“…it is not only said that something comes to be but also <that it comes to be> out of this,” and “οἷον 
ἐκ μὴ μουσικοῦ μουσικός” as “the musical <comes to be> out of the unmusical”. Ross, and Hardie 
and Gaye in Barnes (1984) prefer, “We say not only that it becomes this, but <that it becomes this> 
from this,” and “from unmusical <he becomes> musical”. Both translations are grammatically possible. 
‘Gignesthai’ can be treated either as the one-place predicate ‘x comes to be’ and ‘tode’ and ‘mousikos’ 
can be treated as subjects for this one-place predicate. On the other hand we can treat ‘gignesthai’ as a 
two-place  predicate  ‘x  becomes  y’  and  understand  the  ‘x’  place  to  be  occupied  by  an  understood 
subject, taking ‘mousikos’ as a value for ‘y’. A similar issue is involved in the translation of ‘οὐ γὰρ ἐξ 
ἀνθρώπου ἐγένετο μουσικός,’ which I translate as ‘the musical doesn’t come to be out of the man,’ 
rather than as ‘he doesn’t come to be musical from being a man’.    
10   τὸ δ' ἔκ τινος γίγνεσθαί τι, καὶ μὴ τόδε γίγνεσθαί τι, μᾶλλον μὲν λέγεται ἐπὶ τῶν μὴ 
ὑπομενόντων, οἷον ἐξ ἀμούσου μουσικὸν γίγνεσθαι, ἐξ ἀνθρώπου δὲ οὔ… τὸ μέντοι ἐκ τοῦ 
ἀντικειμένου καὶ μὴ ὑπομένοντος ἀμφοτέρως λέγεται, καὶ ἐκ τοῦδε τόδε καὶ τόδε τόδε· καὶ γὰρ 
ἐξ ἀμούσου καὶ ὁ ἄμουσος γίγνεται μουσικός. διὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ συγκειμένου ὡσαύτως· καὶ γὰρ 
ἐξ  ἀμούσου  ἀνθρώπου  καὶ  ὁ  ἄμουσος  ἄνθρωπος  γίγνεσθαι  λέγεται  μουσικός.”  (190a21-
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‘mousikos’  throughout  these  passages,  then  it  seems  that  he  is  talking  about  the 
coming to be of composite entities throughout. However, it seems that Aristotle only 
turns to the discussion of composite entities in part (c) of the second passage. In this 
part it makes some sense to hold that Aristotle is using ‘mousikos’ either adjectivally 
or  to mean  the  musician  or  the  musical  man. However,  in  part (b)  of  the  second 
passage, it seems by contrast that Aristotle is using ‘mousikos’ to talk about a simple 
entity. Furthermore, it seems that Aristotle’s uses ‘mousikon’ in part (a) of the second 
passage,  which  could  be  morphologically  either  masculine  or  neuter,  to refer  to  a 
simple rather than a composite entity. The fact that the other items under discussion in 
part (a), i.e. the man and the unmusical, are simples gives us good reason to think that 
Aristotle  uses  ‘mousikon’  here  to  refer  to  a  simple.  On  similar  grounds,  it  seems 
reasonable to take Aristotle to be using ‘mousikos’ in the first passage to be talking 
about a simple as well. The shift to the masculine gender does not seem to signal any 
difference in the sorts of entities talked about.
11 The simple elements of change still 
seem  to  be  the  unmusical,  the  musical,  and  the  man.  To  sum  up  the  argument: 
Aristotle uses both the masculine and neuter form of ‘mousikos’ to talk about the 
simple entities involved in coming to be. But the masculine form can’t be used to talk 
about something abstract or general. Therefore, it seems that Aristotle takes entities 
like to mousikon to be particulars of some kind.   
I turn now to my final argument that to mê mousikon is a particular. Aristotle 
tells us at 190a12ff that there is an underlying thing in all cases of coming to be, and 
that this is one in number (hen arithmôi) but not one in form or account (hen eidei, 
                                                 
11  I think that the shift to the masculine gender here marks a concession to grammar rather than a 
philosophical distinction. When Aristotle talks about the man becoming musical, ‘anthrôpos egeneto 
mousikos’, ‘mousikos’ is used as an adjective and is masculine to agree with ‘anthrôpos’. ‘anthrôpos 
egeneto mousikon’ would be grammatically bizarre, even if one were to try to use it to assert that the 
man became a musical thing. Perhaps Aristotle uses the masculine substantive adjective to agree with 
the masculine descriptive adjective in this passage. Nevertheless, if we want to talk about the entities 
involved in this case of a simple coming to be a simple, we want to isolate the man and the musical.    106 
hen logôi). As proof for the claim that the underlying thing is not one in form or 
account, Aristotle tells us that being a man is not the same as being ignorant of music. 
Aristotle  tells  us  that  the  simple  factors  from  which  the  change  proceeds,  to  mê 
mousikon  and  ho  anthrôpos,  are  numerically  one.  Since  the  man  is  obviously  a 
particular, this claim makes sense only if to mê mousikon is also a particular. I see no 
way  in  which  ignorance  of  music  in  general  could  be  properly  said  to  be  one  in 
number  with  a  particular  man.  Therefore,  to  mê  mousikon  must  be  some  sort  of 
particular.
12 
But what sort of particulars are to mousikon and to mê mousikon? There are 
three possibilities. First, as Charlton thinks, ‘to mê mousikon’ might simply refer to the 
particular man that undergoes the alteration—the man and the unmusical are identical. 
Second, to mê mousikon might be what Matthews calls an accidental unity or a “kooky 
object”. Kooky objects are entities like musicians, grammarians or pale men, which 
seem  to  be  substance-accident  compounds.  Matthews  argues  that  such  entities  are 
numerically  the  same  as,  or  coincident  with,  particular  substances  without  being 
identical to these substances. Furthermore, kooky objects need not share all properties 
with their coincident substances.
13 Third, to mê mousikon might be something like an 
instance of unmusicality. I favor the third option. Furthermore, I suggest that such 
instances are nothing other than the sorts of entities that Aristotle takes to be in a 
subject, but not said-of any subject, in the Categories.  
                                                 
12   This argument might be a little quick. Someone might try to hold that a general or abstract 
entity like unmusicality can be one in number with a particular man, and that happens whenever the 
man is unmusical. I suppose that the idea here would be that whenever we have an unmusical man, we 
have  a  universal  component  unmusical  and  a  particular  component  the  man—perhaps  these  are 
something  like  what  Armstrong  calls  ‘states  of  affairs’  in  A  World  of  States  of  Affairs  (1997). 
Nevertheless, I don’t think that such a view is Aristotle’s. Aristotle also seems to think that oneness 
with  is  a  transitive  and  symmetrical  relation.  So  things  one  in  number  with  the  same  thing  are 
themselves one in number with each other. But Socrates and Callias are not one in number even in a 
case where both are unmusical. So whatever unmusicality Socrates is one with cannot be one in number 
with that that Callias is one with.  
13   See Matthews, “Accidental Unities” (1982).    107 
According to Charlton, Aristotle takes to mê mousikon and to mousikon to be 
identical  to  the  man  that  undergoes  alteration.  In  his  analysis  of  coming  to  be, 
Aristotle claims that every case of coming to be involves a form, a privation, and an 
underlying  thing.
14  In  the  example  that  we  have  been  considering,  the  man  is  the 
underlying thing, the musical (to mousikon) is the form, and the unmusical (to mê 
mousikon) is the privation. Charlton argues that the form is to be identified not with 
anything abstract, like musicality, but with the concrete musical thing. I agree with 
Charlton that the form must be something particular. However, Charlton goes on to 
identify the form with the individual human being. The concrete musical thing on 
Charlton’s view just is the individual human being.    
It will be helpful to turn our attention for a moment to Charlton’s interpretation 
of Aristotle’s account of the coming to be of substances. With this framework in place, 
we will be able to better assess Charlton’s views about the nature of entities like to 
mousikon. In Physics I.7, Aristotle distinguishes between the generation of substances 
and the alteration of substances.  
Things are said to come to be in many ways. In some cases things are 
said  not  to  come  to  be,  but  to  come  to  be  something,  but  only 
substances are said to come to be without qualification. It is evident in 
the other cases, that it is necessary that some becomer underlie. For a 
quantity, or quality, or relative to another, or time, or place comes to be 
of  some  underlying  thing,  because  substance  alone  is  never  said  of 
another subject, but all the others are said of substance.
15 (190a31-b1)   
Aristotle uses the same verb, ‘gignesthai’ or ‘to come to be’, for both generation and 
alteration. However, he tells us that only in the case of a substance’s coming to be do 
we have ‘coming to be without qualification’ (haplôs gignesthai). In other types of 
                                                 
14   See 191a12ff. 
15   πολλαχῶς  δὲ  λεγομένου  τοῦ  γίγνεσθαι,  καὶ  τῶν  μὲν  οὐ  γίγνεσθαι  ἀλλὰ  τόδε  τι 
γίγνεσθαι,  ἁπλῶς  δὲ  γίγνεσθαι  τῶν  οὐσιῶν  μόνον,  κατὰ  μὲν  τἆλλα  φανερὸν  ὅτι  ἀνάγκη 
ὑποκεῖσθαί τι τὸ γιγνόμενον (καὶ γὰρ ποσὸν καὶ ποιὸν καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον [καὶ ποτὲ] καὶ ποὺ 
γίγνεται  ὑποκειμένου  τινὸς  διὰ  τὸ  μόνην  τὴν  οὐσίαν  μηθενὸς  κατ'  ἄλλου  λέγεσθαι 
ὑποκειμένου, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα κατὰ τῆς οὐσίας)·” (190a31-b1)   108 
change,  something  ‘comes  to  be  something’  (tode  ti  gignesthai).  Furthermore, 
whenever something other than a substance comes to be, a substance underlies the 
change. In cases of unqualified coming to be, or generation, Aristotle also says that 
something underlies the change. For example, bronze underlies the coming to be of a 
statue, or stone the coming to be of a Hermes.  
Charlton first claims that in cases of generation, it is proper to identify the 
matter, or underlying thing involved in a change, with the form. Then by extending the 
analogy between generation and alteration Charlton is able to claim that the form is 
identical to the underlying thing in cases of alteration. So, for example, the musical (to 
mousikon)  is  identical  to  the  man.  However,  Charlton  fails  to  take  into  account  a 
significant difference between generation and alteration, and that difference should 
make us reluctant to apply everything Aristotle says in the case of generation to the 
case of alteration.  
According to Charlton, when Aristotle talks about the coming to be substances 
such as human beings, the form is not to be identified anything abstract like humanity, 
but rather with the concrete human being. When we give a hylomorphic analysis of a 
substance in terms of matter and form, the form is not something that is added to the 
matter to yield the concrete substance. Rather, the form just is the concrete substance, 
and  the  relation  between  the  matter  and  form  is  one  of  constituent  to  thing-
constituted.
16  Furthermore,  on  Charlton’s  view,  this  sort  of  constitution  implies 
identity; the matter of the human being, the form, and the hylomorphic compound are 
identical. We can describe a single substantial entity in various ways—as matter, as 
                                                 
16   Charlton cites Wiggins Identity and Spatiotemporal Continuity (Oxford: 1967) in support of 
his  view  about  the  hylomorphic  analysis  of  substances.  For  criticism  of  Wiggins,  see  Ackrill,  J.L. 
“Aristotle’s Definitions of Psuchê.” (1973). For additional discussion, see Whiting “Living Bodies” 
(1992).  See  also  Wiggins  Sameness  and  Substance  (1980)  and  Sameness  and  Substance  Renewed 
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form,  or  as  compound—but  there  is  a  single  thing  indicated  in  all  these  cases.
17 
Similarly, Charlton claims that we can describe the entity involved in alteration as 
privation, underlying thing, and form. However, we refer to a single entity by means 
of all of these descriptions. When we use ‘the unmusical’ and ‘the man’ we signify a 
single entity in two different ways.  
I am largely sympathetic with the story that Charlton tells about the generation 
of  substances.  However,  there  is  an  important  difference  between  generation  and 
alteration that I think Charlton overlooks. Let’s say Charlton is right about generation. 
Let h be a hylomorphic compound, f be a particular form of that compound, and m be 
the matter of that compound. It seems clear that Aristotle takes h and f to begin to exist 
at a particular point in time. What about m? Did m exist before h and f came to be? 
Aristotle seems to think that the matter in one sense pre-exists the compound, and in 
another sense does not.
18 On the one hand, when an entity comes into existence there 
is stuff that underlies the coming to be, and this stuff is around before the substance 
comes to be.
19 On the other hand, insofar as we take m to be a numerically singular 
                                                 
17   There  are  two  identity  claims  that  should  be  distinguished  here.  One  claim  is  that  the 
hylomorphic compound is identical with the form. The other claim is that the form and hylomorphic 
compound are  identical with  the matter.  Charlton  accepts both claims. It  is unclear  to me whether 
Wiggins would want to accept the latter claim, especially given his views in “On Being in the Same 
Place at the Same Time” (1968). In this work, Wiggins seems determined to distinguish constitution 
from identity. See also Wiggins (1980). 
18   The nature of matter in Aristotle raises a host of difficult problems, and I cannot treat these 
fully in this work. For purposes of my disagreement with Charlton over the right way to construe ‘to 
mousikon’ and the like, all that matters is that in cases of alteration it is not plausible to identify the 
underlying  thing  with  the  privation.  The  former  survives  the  change,  while  the  latter  does  not. 
Therefore, the privation cannot be identical to the form. In fact, I think that we can go further and claim 
that nothing numerically one survives an instance of generation. This is a difficult issue, however.  For 
more  on  Aristotle’s  views  about  matter,  and  the  way  in  which  these  views  relate  to  the  current 
discussion, see Ackrill (1973), Alan Code “The Persistence of Aristotelian Matter” (1976), Jennifer 
Whiting “Living Bodies” (1992), Mary Louise Gill’s Aristotle on Substance (1989), and Kit Fine’s 
“Aristotle on Matter” (1992), “A Puzzle Concerning Matter and Form” (1994) and “The Problem of 
Mixture” (1995).    
19   Aristotle discusses the different ways in which matter underlies the coming to be of substances 
at 190bff. See also De gen et cor (especially I.4), for an attempt by Aristotle to distinguish generation 
from alteration. The distinction seems to come down to whether there is a single this that can be said to 
survive the change. If there is such a this, then the change is a case of alteration.     110 
object that is identical with h and f, to say that m was around before h and f leads to a 
contradiction. After all, identity is a permanent relation and a thing cannot pre-exist 
itself. Whatever the matter is that does pre-exist h and f, therefore, cannot be identical 
to m.
20 I think that this is a plausible result when we consider Aristotle’s thoughts 
about the coming to be of substances. When a substance comes to be, a new this 
comes  into  existence.  It  is  not  the  case  that  an  identifiable  this  persists  through 
substantial  change.
21  In  fact,  when  a  change  does  involve  the  survival  of  an 
                                                 
20   There are various ways around the argument that I outline here, but I don’t think that any of 
them are open to Aristotle. We might adopt a strategy familiar from Quine “Identity, Ostension and 
Hypostasis” (1950) and Word and Object (1960), and David Lewis “Survival and Identity” (1976), and 
On the Plurality of Worlds (1986). We could claim that ‘h’ and ‘f’ refer to a single space-time worm 
and that this worm is a proper part of the worm that ‘m’ refers to. See Code “Aristotle’s Responses to 
Quine’s Objections to Modal Logic” (1976) for a discussion of the way in which this strategy relates to 
Aristotle. In the end, I think that Aristotle is too firmly a three-dimensionalist to adopt such a strategy. 
See  Ted  Sider  Four-Dimensionalism  (2001)  for  a  discussion  of  three-dimensionalism  vs.  four-
dimensionalism.     
We  might  try  to  claim  that  identity  is  temporary,  or  that  all  identity  statements  must  be 
relativized to times. We might then say that m pre-exists h and f, but that m used to be non-identical to h 
and f. For such a treatment of cross-temporal identity claims, see George Myro’s “Identity and Time” 
(1985),  and  Michael  Rea’s  introduction  in  Rea’s  Material  Constitution  (1997).  See  also  Ted  Sider 
Four-Dimensionalim (2001). Sider suggests that we treat claims about the past and present of objects 
counterpart-theoretically, in a way similar to David Lewis’ treatment of modal claims. The idea then 
would be that when we talk about ‘the matter of a thing’, the chosen counterpart relation is such that 
there is a pre-substantial counterpart, while when we talk about the ‘form’ or the ‘compound’, there is 
no such counterpart in the past. However, the very notion of temporary identity strikes me as bizarre, 
and Aristotle seems to hold, at Topics VII.1, that the mere possibility of one thing’s existing without 
another shows that the entities are not unqualifiedly numerically one.  
Alternatively, we could say that h and f really did, despite appearance to the contrary, exist 
before the change in question. We then need to explain why it seems incorrect to say “Bucephalus 
existed before birth”. We might say that when we use the name ‘Bucephalus’ we not only to refer an 
entity that does pre-exist the birth of Buchephalus, but conversationally implicate that the entity was a 
horse which  is false. However, Aristotle does not seem  to think that  it is  merely  inapt to say that 
Bucephalus existed before birth, but that it is flatly false.  
21   At 190a13ff, Aristotle claims that something persists in every case of change. On the other 
hand, Aristotle sometimes denies that matter, considered in itself, is a this (e.g. see Metaphysics Z.3). 
While any extended treatment is beyond the current project, I think that we can distinguish the way in 
which matter survives in generation from the way in which a substance survives in alteration. In the 
latter case a thing actually survives—we can identify a single entity that was there before and after 
change. In the former case, we cannot identify a single entity. For there to even be a single thing that we 
can talk about as surviving, form must be present. Furthermore, sameness of form is a necessary 
condition for sameness in number in the case of substances. SO, we can’t really specify a  single thing 
or entity that survives a change in substantial form. I am even reluctant to say that we can specify a 
single quantity of stuff, in the sense of quantity of stuff. If Aristotle thinks about quantities as 
nonsubstantial, and thinks that nonsubstances must always inhere in substances, then quantities must 
inhere in substances. If Aristotle thinks that the identity of nonsubstances requires the identity of the 
substances in which they inhere, which I think that he does, then we can’t even have a single quantity   111 
identifiable this, Aristotle takes the change in question to be a type of alteration or the 
coming to be of a quantity, quality, or other non-substance, rather than to be a case 
generation or the unqualified coming to be of a substance. The sense in which the 
matter  involved  in  generation  is  the  same  before  and  after  the  change  cannot  be 
captured by holding that there is a single entity that survives.
22   
If  there  is  no  numerically  singular  entity  that  persists  through  substantial 
change, then Aristotle’s comparison of substances with artifacts is misleading. For 
example, there does seem to be an identifiable lump of bronze that survives changes in 
shape, and the stone that a Hermes is made of was there before the sculptor chipped 
away the other stone surrounding it. Perhaps the difference can be located in the fact 
that Aristotle takes a genuine substance to have a single substantial form that both 
makes it a single entity and which makes it the entity that it is. There is no substantial 
form  that  makes  some  organic  matter  a  this,  and  survives  the  destruction  of  one 
organism and the subsequent generation of another. Rather, the substantial form of the 
                                                                                                                                           
survive generation. Nevertheless, Aristotle seems to think that something underlies the change. We 
might try to define a notion of stuff survival that does not require any type of thing survival. However, I 
am no sure how to go about this task. For a view about matter similar to the one that I have in mind, see 
Gill (1989). For an alternative view about matter and mixture, see Fine (1992) and (1995). For more on 
views on quantities, see Helen Cartwright’s “Heraclitus and the Bathwater” (1965) and “Quantities” 
(1970). In the case of nonsubstantial change, the underlying thing is a substance and the numerical 
sameness of many accidental forms can be accounted for by their all having a single underlying 
substance.    
22   There is a big question to answer about what the sameness of the matter through substantial 
change amounts to, and I am not sure that any coherent answer is possible here. What I am suggesting is 
that  a  precondition  for  a  true  identity  claim  is  that  there  be  a  specifiable  individual  that  can  be 
quantified  over—there  must  be  a  this  something  in  Aristotle’s  terminology.  However,  uninformed 
matter is not such a specifiable individual. Furthermore, if a and b have different substantial forms, then 
a≠b. Given that the substantial form comes into existence at the moment of generation, there is no 
specifiable  entity  before  the  change  that  is  identical  to  the  informed  matter  after  the  change. 
Nevertheless, Aristotle does seem to think that the stuff underlying the new substance has always been 
around. Nevertheless, to even attempt to call it ‘that quantity of stuff’ seems to involve the sort of 
individuation that requires a form. But on the assumption that each entity has only one form, there isn’t 
a form that makes the matter a given quantity of stuff that survives the generation of a new thing, and 
another form that makes it a certain substance that fails to survive the generation of a new thing. So we 
cannot even say that a single quantity of matter survives generation. These implications may be strange, 
but I suspect that they would be more natural to someone who has a non-atomistic view about matter, 
and who does not think that there are identifiable bits of matter which have their identity apart from the 
things that they compose.     112 
first organism made the matter a this, and then that this was destroyed and a new this 
with a new substantial form came into being. When we talk about the matter of the 
statue surviving the imposition of shape, we take the lump of bronze to already be a 
thing, and insofar as we take it to be a thing we take it to have a form. When we hold 
that the lump survives change of shape, we are treating the shape as a mere quality. 
Sculpting then can be thought of as altering the shape of a persisting thing, rather than 
as bringing a new substance into existence.
23  
On the other hand, Aristotle tells us that plants and animals come to be out of 
seed. The seed is the matter for the coming to be of the organism. However, the seed 
and the organism that comes to be from it are not identical. Rather the seed ceases to 
be, and the organism comes into existence. Furthermore, there is not some further this 
underlying both the seed and the organism such that it is the same thing before and 
after the organism comes to be.
24 There can, therefore, be no entity that is identical to 
the seed before the generation and to the organism after the generation. If we are to 
follow Charlton in identifying the matter, form, and hylomorphic compound, then we 
must  hold  that  the  matter  in  question  does  not  preexist  the  generation  of  the 
compound.  Such  a  view  might  work  in  the  case  of  generation,  where  we  might 
plausibly hold that the matter of an organism comes into existence with the organism. 
                                                 
23   This is not to deny that Aristotle takes statues to come into existence, but to deny that Aristotle 
takes statues to be substances. Just as a musician can come into existence by an underlying thing’s (a 
man) coming to have an accident (musicality), so a statue comes into existence by an underlying thing’s 
(this bronze) coming to have an accident (statue-shape). What I think is different about the coming to be 
of a true substance, like an organism, is that Aristotle does not take there to be a thing that underlies the 
change.   
24   We should not treat ‘__is a seed’ and ‘__is a tree’ as phase-sortals applying at different times 
to a single subject. On the other hand, it might be true to take ‘__is a shapeless blob’ and ‘__is a statue’ 
as phase-sortals that apply to lumps of bronze. I think that Aristotle would accept both the claim that the 
seed is potentially a tree, and that the blob is potentially a statue. However, on the sort of view that I 
favor, in the latter case we think that there is a single entity that will still be around when the lump 
actually constitutes a statue. In the former case, the thing that is potentially a tree will no longer be 
present when the tree is present.     113 
However,  things  seem  entirely  different  in  the  case  of  alteration.  In  such  cases, 
something does survive to change. 
When Aristotle talks about alteration, he thinks that we can identify a form, a 
privation,  and  an  underlying  substratum.  In  our  example  of  an  entity  becoming 
musical, the man (ho anthrôpos) is the substratum or matter, the unmusical thing (to 
mê mousikon) is the privation, and the musical (to mousikon) is the form.
25 According 
to Charlton, the compound entities, the unmusical man (ho mê mousikos anthrôpos) 
and the musical man (ho mousikos anthrôpos) are akin to hylomorphic compounds. 
According to Charlton constitution is at work here as well. The matter (man) goes 
from constituting the privation (the unmusical) to constituting the form (the musical). 
Furthermore,  Charlton  thinks  that  such  constitution  implies  the  identity  of  the 
underlying thing, the form, and the compound. Aristotle does claim that that privation 
and the underlying thing involved in alteration are ‘one in number’:  
Having made these distinctions, it is possible to grasp (in all cases of 
coming to be if they are examined as we have said) that it is always 
necessary  that  some  becomer  underlie,  and  that  this,  if  it  is  one  in 
number,  is  not  one  in  form.  By  ‘in  form’,  I  mean  the  same  as  ‘in 
account’. For being for a man is not the same as being for an unmusical 
thing. And the one remains, but the other does not remain. The thing 
that  is  not  an  opposite  remains  (for  the  man  remains),  but  the  not-
musical and the unmusical do not remain, nor does the compound of 
the two, for example the unmusical man.
26 (190a13-21) 
 
                                                 
25   On my view Aristotle sometimes refers to this entity with a masculine term  ‘mousikos’. When 
‘mousikos’ is used in such a context it refers to a simple, the musical, and not to the compound of the 
musical with the man.  
26   διωρισμένων  δὲ  τούτων,  ἐξ  ἁπάντων  τῶν  γιγνομένων  τοῦτο  ἔστι  λαβεῖν,  ἐάν  τις 
ἐπιβλέψῃ ὥσπερ λέγομεν,ὅτι δεῖ τι ἀεὶ ὑποκεῖσθαι τὸ γιγνόμενον, καὶ τοῦτο εἰ καὶ ἀριθμῷ ἐστιν 
ἕν, ἀλλ' εἴδει γε οὐχ ἕν· τὸ γὰρ εἴδει λέγω καὶ λόγῳ ταὐτόν· οὐ γὰρ ταὐτὸν τὸ ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τὸ 
ἀμούσῳ εἶναι. καὶ τὸ μὲν ὑπομένει, τὸ δ' οὐχ ὑπομένει· τὸ μὲν μὴ ἀντικείμενον ὑπομένει (ὁ γὰρ 
ἄνθρωπος  ὑπομένει),  τὸ  μὴ  μουσικὸν  δὲ  καὶ  τὸ  ἄμουσον  οὐχ  ὑπομένει,  οὐδὲ  τὸ  ἐξ  ἀμφοῖν 
συγκείμενον, οἷον ὁ ἄμουσος ἄνθρωπος. (190a13-21) 
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According to Charlton, Aristotle’s claims about the numerical oneness entail that the 
man and the musical are identical—‘to mê mousikon’ and ‘ho anthrôpos’ are simply 
different descriptions for a single object.  
However, while Charlton might be right to claim that Socrates, the form of 
Socrates, and the matter of Socrates are identical, it is implausible to make the same 
claim about the man, the musical, and the musical man. While Aristotle tells us that 
the unmusical (to mê mousikon) and the man are one in number (hen arithmôi), he also 
tells  us  that  they  are  not  one  in  form  ‘hen  eidei’  or  one  in  account  ‘hen  logôi’. 
Furthermore, Aristotle tells us that the man survives the change, while the unmusical 
does  not.  It  is  also  clear  that  the  man  cannot  be  identified  with  the  musical  (to 
mousikon).  Aristotle  clearly  takes  it  to  be  the  case  that  the  man  exists  prior  to 
becoming musical. But whatever simple individual Aristotle refers to as ‘to mousikon’ 
does  not  exist  before  the  man  becomes  musical.  In  this  case,  as  in  any  case  of 
alteration, the matter is a specifiable individual that persists through the change. But 
this very individual cannot be identical to anything that exists only when the change is 
completed.  As  far  as  the  composite  goes,  the  musical  man  seems  to  have  two 
components, one of which existed before the change and the other of which did not. 
The whole compound, therefore, seems not to have existed before the alteration.    
I agree with Charlton that we should take the relation between underlying thing 
and form to be a sort of constitution relation both in the case of substances and in the 
case of the products of alteration. However, only in the case of substances does it 
make  sense  to  identify  the  matter  with  the  thing  constituted  by  that  matter. 
Nevertheless, Aristotle does hold that the underlying thing and form in products of 
alteration are one in number, while denying that they are one in form or account. We 
must therefore recognize a variety of oneness in number that is not identity. I have 
argued  elsewhere  that  Aristotle,  in  the  Topics  I.7,  recognizes  three  varieties  of   115 
numerical sameness: accidental, proprial and essential.
27 In cases of accidental and 
proprial numerical sameness, Aristotle holds that things are one in number, but that 
they are not one in form or account. In cases of essential numerical sameness, there is 
oneness both in number and in form. Only essential numerical sameness conforms to 
Leibniz’s Law according to Aristotle.
28 Things that are accidentally numerically the 
same can differ from each other in some respects.
29 However, I take it to be absolutely 
definitive of identity that it  satisfy Leibniz’s Law. Therefore, accidental numerical 
sameness is not identity.
30 Since essential numerical sameness requires sameness in 
form or account, the sort of numerical sameness holding between to mê mousikon and 
the particular man cannot be essential numerical sameness.
31 Furthermore, since we 
are dealing with a case where a thing changes with respect to an attribute, we are not 
dealing with proprial numerical sameness. It seems, therefore, that the man and the 
musical are accidentally one in number but non-identical. 
                                                 
27   “Sameness and Oneness in Aristotle”. 
28   Aristotle states a particularly strong version of Leibniz’s Law in the Topics VII.1. He holds 
that x and y are identical only if all the same things are predicated of x and y, and x and y are predicated 
of all the same things. Furthermore, Aristotle accepts the modally strengthened form of Leibniz’s Law, 
if it is even possible for x and y to differ in any respect, then they will not be unqualifiedly numerically 
one.  For  some  discussion  of  sameness  in  Aristotle:  White,  “Aristotle  on  Sameness  and  Oneness” 
(1971);  Lewis,  “Accidental  Sameness  in  Aristotle”  (1982);  Matthews,  “Accidental  Unities”  (1982); 
Pelletier, “Sameness and Referential Opacity in Aristotle” (1979); Spellman, “Referential Opacity in 
Aristotle” (1990).  
29   In SE 24, Aristotle writes, “For only to things that are indistinguishable and one in being does 
it seem that all the same attributes belong; whereas in the case of a good thing, to be a good thing is not 
the same as to be about to be the subject of a question; nor in the case of a man approaching, or wearing 
a mask, is to be approaching the same as to be Coriscus, so that if I know Coriscus, but do not know the 
man approaching, it still isn’t the case that I both know and do not know the same thing.” (179b36-
180a6) I deal with this passage at length in my chapter on numerical sameness in Aristotle.  
30   This is a compressed version of an argument that I examine in greater detail in another paper, 
“Sameness and Oneness in Aristotle”.  
31   Sameness in form or account plus sameness in number seems necessary for what Aristotle calls 
sameness in substance or being. Charlton, therefore, seems mistaken to hold that oneness in number 
without oneness in form can be construed as identity.    116 
It is deeply philosophically problematic to hold that the man is identical to the 
non-musical.
32  Identity  follows  Leibniz’s  Law,  but  Aristotle  tells  us  that  the  man 
remains while the unmusical does not remain. I think that it is plausible to hold that 
‘___remains’ is a transparent context. It seems that “x remains” is equivalent to “x 
continues to exist”. If ‘___continues to exist’ is not an extensional context, then it is 
hard to see what context would be extensional. Therefore, if Aristotle takes “The man 
remains” to be true, but “The unmusical remains” to be false, then he cannot take ‘the 
man’ and ‘the unmusical’ to indicate the same object.
33 So the unmusical and the man 
are not identical. However, Aristotle does think that these objects are numerically one 
in some sense.
34 I think that Charlton is right to think of the relation between the man 
and the musical as a sort of constitution, but that constitution requires only accidental 
numerical sameness rather than identity. Entities like to mousikon will be accidentally 
numerically the same as the substances which underlie them. Furthermore, any two 
entities with the same underlying substance will be accidentally numerically the same 
as one another.  
Gareth Matthews agrees that the musical (to mousikon) and not-musical (to mê 
mousikon) are accidentally numerically the same as, but not identical to, the man. 
However, Matthews seems to take entities like the musical to be what he calls “kooky 
                                                 
32   The problems that arise in this context are similar to problems that beset any position on which 
constitution is held to be identity. For some defenses of the claim that constitution is not identity, see 
Wiggins (1968), Wiggins (1980), Wiggins (2000), and Johnston “Constitution is Not Identity” (1992).  
33   Once  again,  this  is  a  compressed  version  of  an  argument  that  I  go  into  in  more  detail 
elsewhere.  
34   The relation of accidental numerical sameness is such a relation: if x and y are accidentally 
numerically one then they are coincident without being identical. I think that there is a straightforward 
sense in which spatiotemporally coincident objects can be said to be numerically one, although this 
might involve a loose and popular sense of ‘one’. A statue need not be distinct from the lump of matter 
that constitutes it, even if we do not hold that the statue and the lump are identical. Even if these are 
(strictly speaking) two objects, they seem to be caught up with each other in a certain way, and to go 
through the world as a unit. When we count the number of material things that there are on a table, we 
don’t count both the statue and the lump. However, I do not take this fact to entail that the statue and the 
lump  are  identical.  It  may  be  that  in  the  counting  of  material  objects,  we  break  the  world  into 
equivalence classes using coincidence rather than identity.        117 
objects”.  Furthermore,  kooky  objects  seem  to  be  substance-accident  compounds.
35 
There is a problem with the claim that to mousikon is a kooky object conceived of as a 
compound entity. Aristotle tells us that to mousikon is one of the simple elements of 
change,  but  kooky  objects  seem  to  be  compound  rather  than  simple.  In  fact  the 
compound entity, the musical man (ho mousikos anthrôpos), seems to be a kooky 
object.  However,  Aristotle  tells  us  “The  musical  man  [ho  mousikos  anthrôpos]  is 
composed out of man and musical in some way.”
 36 (190b20-22) ‘To mousikon’ in this 
passage seems to refer to a simple entity that is a component of the musical man.
37  
‘To mousikon’ then refers to a simple individual that is numerically the same 
as, but non-identical to, the substance that underlies the change from non-musical to 
musical. When the man goes from being unmusical to being musical, one and the 
same underlying thing goes from underlying a particular non-musical to underlying a 
particular musical. The particular musical and non-musical, therefore, are both non-
substantial  and  particular.  It  seems,  therefore,  that  Aristotle  accepts  entities  in  his 
discussion  of  alteration  that  are  non-substantial  and  are  not  multiply  instantiable. 
Furthermore, it seems that each of these entities will be a token of a fully determinate 
non-substantial type, where the type in question could have multiple tokens. What 
                                                 
35   To use the container-metaphysics language adopted by Matthews and Cohen, a substance is 
like a  container, while a kooky object  is  like a  container with certain  contents. A container  is not 
identical  to  the  container-cum-contents,  but  neither  are  they  wholly  distinct.  Accidental  sameness 
captures  this  relation.  My  suggestion  is  that  the  comparison  between  the  man  and  the  musical  is 
between the container and the contents of the container. The container-cum-contents is analogous to the 
musical man. Matthews and Cohen “The One and the Many” (1968), and Matthews “The Enigma of 
Categories 1a20ff and Why it Matters” (1989) “Container Metaphysics According to Aristotle’s Greek 
Commentators” (1991). 
36   The Greek in  this passage  is  “σύγκειται γὰρ ὁ μουσικὸς ἄνθρωπος  ἐξ ἀνθρώπου καὶ 
μουσικοῦ τρόπον τινά·” While ‘mousikou’ is morphologically either masculine or neuter. I think that 
the sense of the passage requires, however, that the entity picked out by ‘mousikou’ is the simple entity 
picked out by ‘to mousikon’ rather than something composite.  
37   However, notice that the composition involved here is of a rather interesting sort. While ‘to 
mousikon’ is not a compound, I will argue that it is also not an ontologically independent component of 
the compound. Rather, to mousikon is a nonsubstantial particular, and is ontologically dependent on the 
substance in which it inheres. Therefore, it is not possible for to mousikon to exist without the musical 
man’s  also  existing.  Given  the  ontological  inseparability  of  the  compound  musical  man  from  the 
component musicality, the difference between my view and Matthews’ seems minimal.    118 
should we call the relation between the fully determinate type and the particular token 
of that type that comes into existence as a result of alteration? The relation seems to be 
nothing other than the said-of relation discussed in the Categories. Similar reasoning 
will  apply  in  the  case  of  any  fully  determinate non-substantial  universal.  But  that 
means that fully determinate universals are said-of something. They cannot, therefore, 
be  the  entities  that  Aristotle  takes  to  be  inherent  in  a  subject  but  not  said-of  any 
subject. 
 For comparison, take to mousikon as it has been characterized so far. This 
entity is clearly not said-of anything. Furthermore, it makes good sense to say that this 
entity inheres in the particular man with which it is numerically one. To mousikon then 
seems to be a better candidate for being an entity that is in a subject, but not said-of 
any subject. To mousikon is an NSP in the sense at issue in the Categories.  
Aristotle takes the simple entities involved in alteration, the non-musical and 
musical, to be NSPs. But what are such entities like, and how should we understand 
the relation that such entities stand in to substances? Are NSPs, for example, concrete 
or abstract? I think that the abstract-concrete distinction can be pretty hard to get a 
handle on.
38 NSPs seem to be abstract in the way that Donald Williams and Keith 
Campbell take tropes to be abstract.
39 In order to focus on the NSP-musicality, we 
must abstract from all the other attributes that are coincident with that NSP. We need 
to ignore certain entities to concentrate on the NSP. Notice, however, that on this way 
of  understanding  what  it  is  to  be  abstract,  substances  will  turn  out  to  be  equally 
                                                 
38   Rather, it seems that there are several different distinctions that get lumped together under the 
‘abstract-concrete’ label. For example, there is the distinction between what is in space-time and what is 
not, the distinction between what can enter into causal relations and what can’t, the distinction between 
what is immediately present to the observer and what can be conceptualized only after a process of 
abstraction, the distinction between what is general and what is particular, and probably a bunch of 
other distinctions that I am omitting.  
39   Donald  Williams  “The  Elements  of  Being”  (1953).  Keith  Campbell  “The  Metaphysic  of 
Abstract Particulars” (1981) and Abstract Particulars (1990).   119 
abstract.  To  think  about  the  primary  substance,  this  human,  we  abstract  from  the 
qualities, quantities, relations that inhere in this human.  
Aristotle seems to take both substantial and non-substantial particulars to be 
involved in causal interactions, which is often taken as a hallmark of concreteness.
40 
As far as location in space and time goes, Aristotle seems to conceive of both place 
and time as non-substantial categories. On the account that I am giving, this means 
that there will be non-substantial particular places and times that inhere in individual 
substances. The truthmaker for the claim that a substance is in a place will be the fact 
that a place-NSP inheres in that substance. The truthmaker for the claim that another 
NSP, say an instance of pallor, is in a place will be the fact that the pallor inheres in a 
substance in which a certain place-NSP also inheres. The same goes for time. It seems 
that the accidents of concrete substances have a good claim to being located where 
those substances are located, and thus count as in space and time if the substances do.  
I think that it is best to think of both NSPs and particular substances as slim 
particulars.
41 Both this musical and this human being are individual things, and each 
has an intrinsic nature. However, very little is included in the intrinsic nature of each 
particular. Considered just in itself, a human being is a rational thing, an animal, a 
living being, and perhaps a body. Similarly, considered just in itself, to mousikon is an 
                                                 
40   For example, in Physics II.3 Aristotle seems to hold that the sculptor rather than Polyclitus is 
the cause of the sculpture, and the sculptor seems to be a simple entity contrasted with the compound, 
Polyclitus the sculptor. 
41   The term “slim particular” is inspired by Armstrong’s discussions of thick and thin particulars. 
However, Armstrong seems to think that what are thick and thin are not entities, but ways of conceiving 
of entities. This position is clearest on the account that Armstrong gives in A World of States of Affairs 
(1997), in which he holds that states of affairs are ontologically fundamental, and that both particulars 
and universals are constituents of states of affairs only in the sense that we can abstract both a universal 
element and a particular element from each state of affairs. These elements, however, do not have any 
existence independent of their presence in states of affairs. When we hold that a single particular (or 
universal) is present in many states of affairs, we are grouping the states of affairs into similarity or 
equivalence classes. On my interpretation of Aristotle, each particular is a thing that has a nature, but 
the nature of each particular is exhausted by what is said-of that particular.    120 
instance of a certain kind of knowledge.
42 In general, when we talk about what a thing 
is in itself, we indicate what is said-of that thing. On the other hand, the fact that this 
man is musical consists in the holding of a relation between two things, this man and 
this musical.
43  
I suggest that the relation between the simple entities involved in alteration just 
is the inherence relation discussed in the Categories. So, we can describe our example 
alteration as follows: we begin with an NSP non-musicality inhering in a particular 
man, and end with an NSP musicality inhering in that particular man.
 44  
We know from the Physics that to mousikon and the substance underlying it 
together  compose  the  musical  man.  I  have  also  argued  that  to  mousikon  and  the 
underlying man are accidentally one in number, without being identical, and suggested 
that this sort of coincidence might be described by claiming that the man constitutes to 
mousikon. We also know from the Categories that this instance of musicality could 
                                                 
42   I try to make more precise what it means to consider something just in itself in chapter 10. 
Roughly speaking, I argue that Aristotle supports a view on which, when we claim that Socrates is a 
human, the truthmaker does not involve Socrates’ standing in a relation to any other entity. Rather, the 
truthmaker is Socrates himself. On the other hand, whenever we predicate anything nonessential of 
Socrates, including his propria, the truthmaker does involve the inherence of something in Socrates. 
Furthermore, I argue that nonsubstantial particulars are relational entities, in that part of their identity 
consists in their standing in the inherence relation to the substances in which they inhere. I do not think 
that this view conflicts with the claim that the said-of relation is fundamental. The said-of relation is 
fundamental as a relation between universals and particulars. However, the fact that Socrates is human, 
and the fact that human is said-of Socrates are different facts. The first is a purely nonrelational fact, 
while the second consists in a relation between a whole and one of its parts.    
43   We might also say that the truthmaker for the claim that the man is musical is the composite 
entity, ho mousikos anthrôpos. I do not think that Aristotle distinguishes between states-of-affairs like 
the man’s being musical (which we might take to be abstract), and composites like the musical man 
(which we might be more apt to be concrete).  
44   The nature of an NSP non-musicality is a bit tricky to explicate. I do not think that Aristotle 
accepts the existence of negative entities. Rather, when we have a non-musicality, we have an entity 
which has an intrinsic nature of its own. This entity is located in a contrariety class with musicality (two 
NSPs will be in the same contrariety class iff the universals immediately said-of the NSPs are such that 
they are members of the same genera). Where we have a change from non-white to white, the non-white 
is  an  NSP  of  a  certain  determinate  dark  color.  Aristotle  holds  that  all  changes  occur  within  such 
contrariety classes, and involve a substance’s going from underlying one such contrary to its underlying 
another  such  contrary.  I  think  that  the  account  of  contrariety  involved  will  also  allow  us  to  give 
truthmakers for a large class of Aristotelian denials. “Socrates is not pale” is made true by the fact that a 
certain NSP that is in Socrates is such that a contrary of pale is said-of it.     121 
not have existed independently of the substance in which it inheres. Furthermore, if 
the  existence  of  this  musicality  implies  the  existence  of  the  man,  then  it  equally 
implies the existence of the musical man. Therefore, we cannot take the instance of 
musicality and the substance in which it inheres to be two independent components of 
the musical man. While the substance could exist without the instance of musicality, 
the converse is not the case. 
We can draw, therefore, a distinction between the substance and the entities 
with which is accidentally numerically the same. The substance underlies the instance 
of musicality, and the musicality seems to count as the entity that it is only because of 
the substance in which it inheres. Numerical sameness between various accidents is 
explained by the fact that they all inhere in a single substance. The numerical unity of 
the  substance  itself  is  not  explained  by  is  relation  to  its  accidents.  A  substance, 
therefore, is ontologically prior to the NSP by being a cause of being for the NSP in a 
way that the NSP is not a cause of being for the substance. Furthermore, I will argue 
that an NSP is a relational entity in that it is essential to it that it bear a relation to the 
substance in which it inheres. I return to these issues in chapters 9 and 10.  
I have argued that Aristotle is committed to the existence of non-substantial 
particulars  by  his  analysis  of  alteration  in  the  Physics.  I  have  also  argued  that, 
according  to  Aristotle’s  definition  of  inherence  at  1a24-25,  inherence  requires 
ontological dependence. However, the fact remains that Aristotle seems to hold that 
nonsubstantial universals can inhere in particular substances  at 2a34ff. In the next 
chapter, I turn to two suggestions for reconciling Aristotle’s seemingly contradictory 
remarks  about  inherence.  These  suggestions  differ  from  both  Frede’s  and  Owen’s 
interpretations in that they accept an interpretation of Categories 1a24-25 on which 
inherence implies ontological dependence.  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
OTHER ATTEMPTS TO RECONCILE ARISTOTLE’S CLAIMS ABOUT 
INHERENCE 
Section 6.1: Overview of Chapter 
For the reasons that I have discussed in the preceding chapters, I think that 
Aristotle accepts the existence of non-substantial particulars, and takes these entities to 
inhere in particular or primary substances. I have further argued that we should reject 
interpretations of the definition of inherence at 1a24-25 on which an entity can inhere 
in something on which it does not ontologically depend. Inherence implies ontological 
dependence. It is, therefore, troubling that Aristotle seems to tell us at 2a34ff that non-
substantial universals can inhere in particular substances. I have claimed that we 
cannot eliminate the conflict between 2a34ff and 1a24-25 by reinterpreting the latter 
passage. In this chapter, I examine two other ways in which we might try to rescue 
Aristotle from contradiction. In section 6.2, I examine an attempt by Terence Irwin to 
offer an alternative interpretation of 2a34ff on which Aristotle does not say anything 
there that contradicts the definition of inherence at 1a24-25 taken as Ackrill takes it. In 
sections 6.3 and 6.4, I examine two attempts to reconcile Aristotle’s claims in the two 
passages which hold that Aristotle takes ‘is in’ to be ambiguous.
1 In section 6.3, I 
examine Michael Wedin’s interpretation according to which Aristotle thinks that 
nonsubstantial individuals and nonsubstantial universals can both inhere in substantial 
particulars, but that only the former need be ontologically dependent on the substantial 
particulars in which they inhere. In section 6.4, I turn to a suggestion by James 
Duerlinger that Aristotle is using ‘is in’ with different senses in the conflicting 
                                                 
1   Technically we will see that Wedin holds that ‘is in’ has a single sense, but that this single 
sense is disjunctive. I do not think that there is a great deal of difference between holding that a phrase 
has a plurality of senses, and holding that a phrase has one disjunctive sense.   123 
passages. I argue that none of the suggested alternative solutions works, and that we 
are committed to holding that Aristotle makes a mistake in his claim at 2a34ff that a 
universal nonsubstance inheres in a particular substance. I examine the source of this 
mistake further in subsequent chapters.   
Section 6.2: Irwin’s Reinterpretation of 2a34ff 
Terence Irwin suggests an alternative interpretation of 2a34ff according to 
which Aristotle does not claim in that passage that a universal inheres in a particular 
substance. In this section, I examine some ways of trying to flesh out Irwin’s 
suggestion and conclude that each faces significant difficulties.  
Irwin suggests that we reinterpret what Aristotle means by the claim that the 
color is ‘in some body’ (en tini sômati) at 2b1.
2 It might be helpful to have the passage 
in front of us.  
Again, color is in body therefore also in an individual body. For if it 
were not in some individual body it would not be in body at all. (2b1-2; 
Ackrill’s translation) 
πάλιν τὸ χρῶμα ἐν σώματι, οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τινὶ σώματι· εἰ γὰρ μὴ 
ἐν τινὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα, οὐδὲ ἐν σώματι ὅλως·  
Palin to chrôma en sômati, oukoun kai en tini sômati; ei gar mê en tini 
tôn kath’ hekasta, oude en sômati holôs. 
Ackrill renders ‘en tini sômati’ as ‘in an individual body’, and ‘en tini tôn kath’ 
hekasta’ as ‘in some individual body’. On Ackrill’s way of construing the passage, 
‘Color is en tini sômati,’ will be true if and only if there is a particular body (a primary 
substance), and the universal color inheres in it. The following interpretation of the 
argument at 2b1-3 is suggested by Ackrill’s view:  
 
 
                                                 
2   The initial suggestion for reinterpreting ‘en tini sômati’ in this way can be found in a footnote 
in Terence Irwin’s Aristotle’s First Principles (1988), pp502-503.    124 
(A1) Inheres(color, body)
3  
(A2) (¬∃x(x is an individual body & Inheres(color,x)) ⊃ ¬Inheres(color, 
body)) 
∴(A3) ∃x(x is an individual body & Inheres(color, x)) 
However, given that for any particular body that you choose, the universal color can 
exist without it, we can’t say that the universal color inheres in any particular body. 
(A3), therefore, conflicts with the traditional interpretation of the definition of 
inherence. Ackrill concludes that Aristotle is being careless when he asserts (A3). 
  The core of Irwin’s interpretation is to claim that (A3) is not an accurate way to 
understand what Aristotle says at (2b1-3). Irwin points out that while indefinite 
pronoun, ‘tis’, can be used to indicate that a particular is being talked about, the same 
pronoun can be used to convey indefiniteness. Instead of following Ackrill and taking 
the phrase, ‘en tini sômati’ to mean ‘in some individual body’, Irwin claims that we 
should take the phrase to mean ‘in some body or other’.
4 Accordingly, Irwin takes the 
argument in 2b1-3 to run as follows: 
  (I1) Inheres(color, body) 
(I2) If color did not inhere in some body or other, then color would not inhere in 
body. 
∴(I3) Color inheres in some body or other.    
Furthermore, Irwin claims that (I3) doesn’t have the problematic implication that there 
is a particular body that color inheres in. As things currently stand, it is not precisely 
clear how we should take (I2) and (I3). What does it mean for color to be in some 
                                                 
3   This is to be read, ‘The universal color inheres in the universal body.’ I use italics when I am 
talking about the universal.   
4   Irwin suggests a similar alternative reading of ‘en tini tôn kath’ hekasta’. Instead of taking this 
to mean ‘in some particular (body)’, we should take it to mean ‘in some or other particular (body)’.    125 
body or other, without color’s being in this or that particular body? In what follows, I 
examine a few different ways of construing such a claim.
5 
  Irwin criticizes Frede’s use of 2a34-b7 to argue that inherence does not entail 
ontological dependence, saying “[Frede’s] argument requires colour to be inherent in 
each particular body  (e.g. this cube) rather than simply in some body or other (this 
cube or that sphere or…). [The latter] is how we must take ‘the individual man’ in 
2a36-b1.”
6 J.L. Ackrill translates the latter passage as follows:  
All the other things are either said of the primary substances as subjects 
or in them as subjects. This is clear from an examination of cases. For 
example, animal is predicated of man and therefore also of the 
individual man (kata tou tinos anthrôpou); for were it predicated of 
none of the individual men (kata mêdenos tôn tinôn anthrôpôn), it 
would not be predicated of man at all.
7 (2a34-b1)  
Irwin points out that in 2a34-b1 Aristotle does not take the fact that animal is said-of 
man to require the existence of any particular individual man. Rather the fact that 
animal is said-of man requires only that there be some man or other, such that man is 
said of him. What is at issue here can be expressed as a difference in scope. 
(i) ∃x⟡ (O(animal, human) → (Hx & O(animal,x))). 
(ii) ⟡(O(animal,human) → ∃x(Mx & O(animal,x))).
8 
Irwin claims that Aristotle commits himself only to (ii) and not to the stronger (i).
9 
Irwin is clearly right about 2a34-b1. At first glance, it seems that Irwin suggests we 
                                                 
5   Irwin (1988) does not go into more detail about how we are to take the claim that color is in 
some body or other without there being a particular body that color is in. What follows is a development 
of a few things that Irwin might mean, which have been suggested in conversation.  
6   Irwin (1988), p503. 
7   “τὰ  δ'  ἄλλα  πάντα  ἤτοι  καθ'  ὑποκειμένων  λέγεται  τῶν  πρώτων  οὐσιῶν  ἢ  ἐν 
ὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς ἐστίν. τοῦτο δὲ φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα προχειριζομένων· οἷον τὸ 
ζῷον κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατηγορεῖται, οὐκοῦν καὶ κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου,  – εἰ γὰρ κατὰ 
μηδενὸς τῶν τινῶν  ἀνθρώπων, οὐδὲ κατὰ ἀνθρώπου ὅλως·” (2a34-b1) 
8   ‘⟡’ is to be taken as ‘necessarily’, ‘O(a,b)’ is to be taken as ‘a is said-of b’, and ‘Ma’ as ‘a is 
an individual man’. I use ‘⟡’ to capture the counterfactual flavor of Ackrill’s translation which I take to 
accurately represent Aristotle’s intent.  
9   Furthermore, in Aristotle’s claims about the existential dependence of everything on primary 
substances, it makes sense to take him to hold, not that there is some particular primary substance such 
that nothing could exist without it, but that the existence of anything other requires the existence of   126 
apply the same type of treatment to the claim that the universal color is en tini sômati. 
However, we will not be able to make Aristotle’s statements at 2b1ff consistent with 
his definition of inherence by following the same strategy that we did with his 
statements about the said-of relation. To see why not, look at (v) and (vi) below.  
(v) ∃x⟡(I(color,body) → (Bx & I(color,x))). 
  (vi) ⟡(I(color,body) → ∃x(Bx & I(color,x))).
10 
(vi) is certainly more plausible than (v), but (vi) is still not consistent with the 
definition of inherence. Say that (vi) is true, and that color does inhere in body. Then 
there is a particular body such that color inheres in it, and we have the same problem 
that we began with. Simply reading (I2) as (vi), therefore, will not make 2b1ff 
consistent with the claim that inherence entails ontological dependence. If Irwin’s 
suggestion that we interpret ‘en tini sômati’ as ‘in some body or other’ is to do any 
work, then it needs to do more than get us to (vi). 
  Take the following sentence: 
  (C1) Color is en tini sômati. 
We need a way of reading (C1), which does not entail that there is a particular body, 
such that color is in it. On such a reading, ‘is in’ will exhibit some of the behavior of 
an intensional transitive verb like ‘seeks’. Take the following sentences for the 
purpose of comparison. 
(D1) Diogenes finds an honest man.  
(D2) Diogenes seeks an honest man.  
(D1) does entail that there is a particular honest man such that Diogenes finds him. 
The only possible reading of (D1) is what Quine calls a relational reading and others 
                                                                                                                                           
some primary substance or other. In other words, (iii) is the correct way to take Aristotle’s claims about 
the existential dependence of things on primary substance. 
(iii) ⟡∀y(y exists ⊃ ∃x(x is a primary substance & x exists)). 
(iv) ∀y(∃x(x is a primary substance) & ⟡(y exists ⊃ x exists)). 
10   Read ‘⟡’ as ‘necessarily’, ‘I(a,b)’ as ‘a inheres in b’, and ‘Ba’ as ‘a is an individual body’.    127 
have called a specific reading. (D1) asserts that the finding relation holds between 
Diogenes and a specific honest man. By contrast, (D2) is not naturally taken to entail 
that there is some particular honest man such that Diogenes is looking for him.
11 
Rather, Diogenes will be successful in his search if he finds any honest man at all. 
Quine calls this reading of (D2) notional, and others have called it unspecific or non-
specific.
12 On the non-specific reading, (D2) does not assert that there is some 
particular man such that the seeking relation holds between Diogenes and him. One 
sign that a transitive verb is intensional is that a sentence in which the verb takes a 
quantifier-phrase as its object admits of a notional or non-specific reading.  
  On Irwin’s suggestion (C1) is supposed be interpreted along the same lines as 
the non-specific reading of (D2).  In this way ‘is in’ acts like an intensional transitive 
verb. Color is in some body or other, but it is not the case that there is any particular 
body in which color inheres. It is interesting to point out that ‘is in’ does not exhibit 
some of the other behavior typical of intensional transitive verbs. For example, where 
β
 is a singular referring expression, 
α is in β.
 does entail that a referent of 
β
 exists.
 
On the other hand, ‘Diogenes seeks Pegasus,’ does not entail that Pegasus exists. 
Furthermore, while co-referring expressions can be substituted salva veritate for one 
another after ‘is in’, they will not always be substitutable after ‘seeks’.  
A better analogy with (C1) might, therefore, be:  
  (O1) The garbage must be taken out by someone.
13  
                                                 
11   Notice that (D2) could be used to express that there is a particular honest man that Diogenes is 
looking for. The important point for our purposes is that the notional or non-specific reading of (D2) is 
possible.   
12   See Quine’s “Quantifiers and Propositional Attitudes” (1956) and Word and Object (1960). 
For  the  use  of  ‘unspecific’  see  Graeme  Forbes’  “Intensional  Transitive  Verbs”  in  the  Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online (2004). ‘Non-specific’ is used by Montague in “On the Nature of 
Certain  Philosophical  Entities”  (1960)  and  “The  Proper  Treatment  of  Quantification  in  Ordinary 
English” (1973). See also Dowty, Wall and Peters Introduction to Montague Semantics (1981). 
13   I  recall  that  Terry  Irwin  suggested  this  analogy  in  conversation.  However,  the  specific 
treatment of ‘is in’ that I take to follow from this analogy was not suggested by Irwin and I am not 
certain that he would advocate this treatment of ‘is in’.      128 
(O1) is naturally construed non-specifically. Rather than asserting that any particular 
person has the obligation to take out the garbage, it seems to say that it is obligatory 
that the garbage be removed but that anyone can discharge this obligation. Compare 
(O1) with (O2).   
  (O2) The garbage must be taken out by Bob.
14 
It is possible to see (O2) as asserting that a relation, say the obliged to perform 
relation, holds between something, say an action type, and Bob.
15 Furthermore,  on 
this reading “The garbage must be taken out by Bob,” does seem to entail that Bob 
exists, and this sentence seems to admit of a reading on which co-referring expressions 
can be substituted salva veritate for ‘Bob’.
16 On the other hand, notice that we cannot 
read (O1) as saying that there is some thing that stands in the obliged to perform 
relation to the action type in question.   
When Aristotle claims that color inheres in body, he is asserting that the 
inherence relation holds between two entities. However, if Aristotle intends (C1) to 
                                                 
14   The analogy to the case of inherence would be closer if we could replace (O1) and (O2) with 
(O1’) and (O2’). 
  (O1’) Someone is obliged to take out the garbage.  
  (O2’) Bob is obliged to take out the garbage.  
I have hesitated to use (O1’) in my example, however, because it doesn’t seem that the notional or 
nonspecific  reading  of  (O1’)  is  possible.  My  intuitions  here  are  muddy,  however.  In  the  more 
colloquial, ‘Someone’s gotta take out the garbage,’ I am more inclined to think that both a notional and 
a relational reading are possible. It is similarly difficult for me to hear the notional reading in the Greek 
sentence,  ‘Chrôma  en  tini  sômati  esti.’  In  other  sentences  using  ‘en  tini  +  einai,’  I  find  it  almost 
impossible to hear a notional reading. For example, it is as difficult for me to hear the non-specific 
reading of ‘Sôkratês en tini kapêleïô esti,’ as it is to hear the non-specific reading of ‘Socrates is in 
some  tavern.’  However,  because  my  linguistic  intuitions  about  Greek  are  even  muddier  than  my 
intuitions about English, and since Aristotle is using ‘en tini + einai’ as a bit of technical jargon, I won’t 
base very much on these intuitions.    
15   I do not know whether this is ultimately a plausible analysis of (O2). It is much more natural to 
take  (O2)  as  involving  a  modal  operator  and  a  proposition—it  is  obligatory  that  Bob  take  out  the 
garbage. However, I use (O2) more for the sake of the analogy with inherence  than as a plausible 
interpretation of obligation statements.  
16   Provided that the sentences resulting from the substitution are read de re. So, “The garbage 
must be taken out by the tallest person in the room,” has to be read as “There is a thing that is the tallest 
thing in the room and the garbage must be taken out by it.” The de dicto reading “It must be the case 
that the garbage is taken out by whoever is the tallest person in the room,” will be quite a different 
matter. We will look as this example more closely below.    129 
have a non-specific reading, then he cannot take the sentence to assert that the 
inherence relation holds between color and a particular body. We should then ask 
what Aristotle does mean to assert with (C1). In broad outline, there are two possible 
ways to go.  
First of all, Aristotle might deny that the sentence (C1) asserts the holding of 
the inherence relation between color and anything at all. (C1)’s surface form is 
misleading and (C1) is an elliptical way of saying something more complex. If this 
line of interpretation is right, then we should be able to reveal the true logical form of 
(C1) more clearly.  
On the other hand, Aristotle might hold that (C1) does assert that inherence 
holds between color and something, but that this thing is not a particular body. If we 
endorse this line of interpretation, then we need to specify the sort of object in which 
(C1) says color inheres. In the remainder of this section, I examine each of these ways 
of fleshing out Irwin’s interpretation of Aristotle. I will proceed by looking at some 
ways in which we might interpret clearly non-specific cases such as (D2) and (O1), 
and argue that these strategies cannot be adapted to fit (C1). In the end, I do not think 
that 2a34ff can be construed non-specifically. But if there isn’t a plausible way to give 
this passage a non-specific reading, then we cannot save Aristotle from the charge of 
contradiction by Irwin’s suggested way of reinterpreting 2a34ff.  
  I will start by examining a few attempts to paraphrase (C1) so that it does not 
require the holding of the inherence relation between entities. It will help us to think 
about some ways in which philosophers of language have suggested that we 
paraphrase (D2) or (O1). I will begin with (D2). Perhaps (D2) should be read, not as 
containing the two-place predicate ‘__seeks__’, but as containing a one-place 
predicate as in ‘Diogenes is honest-man-seeking.’ The sentence then claims, not that 
Diogenes stands in a relation to something, but that Diogenes has a certain property,   130 
which we can call the honest-man-seeking-property.
17 If we adopt this sort of strategy 
for (D2), then we have to hold that there is a different property being ascribed to 
Diogenes for each sentence reporting that he seeks something.  
How could we adapt this sort of paraphrase to (C1)? We would need to say that 
(C1) ascribes the body-inhering property to color. So (C2) better reveals what is being 
asserted by (C1).  
(C2) Color has the body-inhering property.  
Similarly, when we say that knowledge is in some soul, we will be ascribing the soul-
inhering property to knowledge, as in (C3). 
  (C3) Knowledge has the soul-inhering property.  
What sort of ontological analysis are we supposed to give of (C2) or (C3)? At first 
glance, we might say that (C2) and (C3) are just roundabout ways of saying that color 
or knowledge stand in the inherence relation to something. If this something is 
supposed to be a particular body or soul, then we are back where we started. If this 
something is the universal body or soul, then Aristotle is really saying only that one 
universal inheres in another. This sort of line will be discussed when I look at 
alternative relational readings of (C1); it violates the spirit of the current strategy of 
paraphrase.  
  If (C2) and (C3) are not simply odd ways of saying that color or knowledge 
bear the inherence relation to something, then they must be thought of as really 
ascribing a monadic property to color and knowledge. What sort of ontological 
                                                 
17   See Quine (1960) especially §44, where Quine tells us that the form of a belief-sentence should 
not  be  represented  as  ‘Rab’  but  rather  as  ‘Fa’  where  ‘F’  is  a  complex  general  term.  Propositional 
attitude verbs are not to be represented as relations, but  as operators which given a  sentence yield 
complex general terms. The logical form of a sentence like ‘Diogenes believes that there are no honest 
men’ becomes Believe[“There are no honest men.”]Diogenes. We could treat ‘seeks’ as a similar operator, 
which is basically the line that I am currently talking about. Instead of operating on sentences, the 
‘seeks’-operator will yield a complex term given a term as input.  Alternatively we can follow Quine in 
first paraphrasing ‘seeks’ in terms of the propositional attitude ‘endeavors that’, which can then be 
treated as an operator. Montegue (1960) criticizes Quine’s approach, claiming that a language with as 
many primitive one-place predicates as this would be unlearnable. See also Dowty et. al. (1981).      131 
analysis are we to give of (C2) and (C3) if they are monadic property ascriptions? 
Notice that we will not be able to analyze (C2) and (C3) in terms of the inherence of 
an entity corresponding to ‘body-inhering’ in color. First of all, doing so would force 
us to hold that a non-substantial universal was the subject of the inherence relation. 
Second, Aristotle doesn’t seem to recognize the existence of an entity corresponding 
to ‘body-inhering’ in any of the categories.  
However, if ‘body-inhering’ doesn’t correspond to any entity, then we are 
forced to say that ‘body-inhering’ is a fundamental predicate, along with a host of 
similar fundamental predicates. Things get even worse once we allow that individual 
substances are sometimes subjects of inherence. For example, take (C4). 
(C4) This pallor is in Socrates. 
Unless ‘is in’ means something different in (C4) than it does in (C1), we will 
have to say that the latter sentence ascribes the Socrates-inhering property to this 
pallor. Again Socrates-inhering will have to be a fundamental property not susceptible 
of further analysis. We will end up with a complex series of fundamental properties 
that cannot be analyzed in terms of the scheme outlined in the Categories. We might 
be able to make such an interpretation work, but we could do so only at the expense of 
attributing an ontological framework to Aristotle in addition to the one outlined in the 
Categories. I conclude that we can’t paraphrase (C1) as predicating a monadic 
property of color.  
  We might analyze (C1) as asserting that a relation holds between entities, but 
that this is not the inherence relation. For example, Quine suggests an analysis of (D2) 
as: 
  (D2*) Diogenes endeavors that there is an honest man found by Diogenes.   132 
We can take (D2*) to attribute a propositional attitude to Diogenes, and think about 
this as a matter of Diogenes standing in a relation to a proposition.
18 (D2*) offers us an 
analysis of seeking in terms of endeavoring and propositions about finding. If we want 
all of our claims about seeking to be analyzed in the same way, we would also say that 
“Diogenes seeks Plato,” asserts that the endeavoring relation holds between Diogenes 
and the proposition that Diogenes finds Plato. Notice that on this line, we are 
effectively attempting to analyze away the seeking relation. Once we have the 
relations of finding and endeavoring in our ontology, we gain nothing useful by 
adding the seeking relation.  
  However, I do not see how this strategy can be adapted to provide an analysis 
of (C1). It seems at least prima facie plausible to hold that uses of ‘seeks’ can be 
analyzed in terms of propositional attitudes, because seeking is connected to various 
intentional states of agents. Inherence on the other hand doesn’t seem to have anything 
to do with relations to propositions or intentional states of agents. Any attempt to 
reinterpret (C1) in a way similar to the suggested reinterpretation of (D2) in terms of 
propositional attitudes seems doomed to failure.   
 Therefore, I don’t think that either of the suggested analyses of (D2) provides 
any guidance in finding a non-specific reading of (C1). Perhaps we will do better by 
thinking about (O1). We might analyze (O1) as (O1*): 
  (O1*) It is obligatory that there is someone who takes out the garbage.  
(O1*) does not assert a relation between things at all. Rather, it is natural to see ‘it is 
obligatory that’ in (O1*) as a kind of modal operator on the proposition that there is 
someone who takes out the garbage. (O1*) can be seen as ascribing a property to a 
proposition. In other words, (O1*) is most naturally construed as a de dicto deontic 
                                                 
18   As I mention above, it does not seem that Quine would want to rest easy with this view. He 
will go further and eliminate reference to propositions.    133 
claim. We can contrast (O1*) with the following de re deontic claim, which can be 
seen as the existential generalization of (O2) above. 
  (O3) There is someone such that it is obligatory that he take out the garbage.  
The difference between (O1*) and (O3) can be represented as a difference in the scope 
of the ‘it is obligatory that’ operator and the existential quantifier. Where ‘O’ is the 
obligatory operator, ‘Txy’ means ‘x takes out y’ and ‘g’ names the garbage.   
  (O1*) O(∃x(Txg))  
  (O3) ∃x(O(Txg))  
If we accept this sort of analysis of (O1), then we hold that the truth of (O1) can be 
analyzed in terms of  quantification, the taking-out relation, and whatever is involved 
in the truth of an application of the ‘O’ operator to an arbitrary sentence. We might 
say, for example, that 
Oϕ
 is true if and only if  
ϕ
 is true in every obligation world, 
where an obligation world is a possible world accessible from the actual world in 
which everything that is supposed to be done is done.
19 Notice that whereas (O1*) 
contains separate expressions for the obligatoriness operator and the taking out 
relation, (C1) contains only the phrase ‘is in’. If we want to treat (C1) along the same 
lines as (O1*), we will need to say that the phrase ‘is in’ can be analyzed into an 
operator and a relation. If this is the case, then we might render (C1) as (C1*). I will 
assume in what follows that the most plausible candidate for a modal operator will be 
something like ‘It is essential to __ that’ or ‘It is necessary that’, the most plausible 
candidate for the relation will be a generic metaphysical predication relation. Let’s use 
‘⟡’ for the operator and ‘R’ for the relation.  
(C1*) ⟡∃x(x is a particular body and color bears R to x.) 
                                                 
19   I don’t know whether this sort of analysis has any plausibility, but it will serve for the sake of 
analogy.    134 
 (C1*) is a de dicto claim with which we can contrast the de re (C5). (C5) corresponds 
to the specific reading of (C1): 
  (C5) ∃x (x is a particular body and ⟡(color bears R to x.))    
If we accept a line like this, then we will be able to give an analysis of the truth 
conditions for claims about inherence in terms of quantification, the truth-conditions 
for the holding of the R relation, and truth conditions for the application of the ‘⟡’ 
operator to an arbitrary proposition. For example, (C1*) would be true if and only it 
every possible world in which color exists is world in which it bears R to some 
particular body. On the other hand, (C5) would be true only if there were a particular 
body such that in every possible world in which color exists it bears R to that very 
body. It would be open to Aristotle to accept (C1*) and to deny (C5). On the other 
hand, a sentence like (C4) will demand a de re reading.  
  (C4) This pallor is in Socrates. 
(C4) is to be understood as: 
  (C4*) ⟡(This pallor bears R to Socrates.)
20 
(C4*) is true iff in every world in which this pallor exists is a world in which it bears 
R to Socrates. 
It is important to note that, on the proposed analysis, inherence turns out not to 
be a fundamental relation. Rather inherence is analyzable in terms of necessity and the 
R relation, which is best construed as some kind of predication relation. However, I do 
not think that this interpretation accurately captures the order of analysis intended by 
Aristotle. On my view, Aristotle takes predication to by analyzable in terms of 
inherence and the said-of relation. He does not attempt to give an analysis of inherence 
and the said-of relation in terms of a single basic predication relation and some kind of 
                                                 
20   The existential generalization of (C4) will be ‘This pallor is in some person’, which can be 
read specifically as ‘∃x(x is a person & $(Rps)).    135 
modal operator.
21 However, if Aristotle is attempting to analyze predication in terms 
of inherence rather than vice versa, then inherence seems to be more fundamental than 
any possible candidate for the R-relation in the above analysis. Furthermore, even if 
we were to come up with some way of justifying a non-specific reading of (C1), we 
would still have to face the fact that, at 2b4-5, Aristotle claims that everything is either 
said-of or is in primary substance.
22 It is hard to see how we could find a reading of ‘is 
in’ that will eliminate the seeming implication that universal nonsubstance is here said 
to inhere in primary substance. In short, I do not think that the attempt to find a 
nonspecific reading of (C1) has much hope of succeeding  
I turn now to the second way in which we might try to give an account of (C1) 
so that it admits of a non-specific reading. On this view, (C1) does assert that the 
inherence relation holds between color and an entity, but that entity is not an 
individual body. For the sake of comparison, think about (D2). We have already noted 
that (D2) cannot be taken to assert the holding of the seeking relation between 
Diogenes and a particular honest man. But perhaps it still asserts the holding of the 
seeking relation between Diogenes and something else. Perhaps the sentence asserts 
that the seeking relation holds between Diogenes and the complex property of honest 
humanity, and Diogenes will be successful in finding the property if and only if he 
                                                 
21   An  extensive  treatment  of  Aristotle’s  views  about  modality  is  beyond  my  current  project. 
However, I agree with Patterson, Aristotle’s Modal Logic (1995), that Aristotle formally takes necessity 
to act as a copula operator rather than as a predicate or proposition operator. In other words, when 
Aristotle claims that necessarily x is y, he means neither that the proposition that x is y is necessary, nor 
that x has the property of being necessarily-y. Rather, he means that x is-necessarily y, by which he 
means to indicate that the copula-joining x to y is of a different sort than the copula-joining x to y in a 
contingent case. I think that Aristotle wants to explain necessity in terms of the nature of the relations 
that join actual entities. Furthermore, I think that the inherence and said-of relations will play a role in 
explaining the nature of the necessary copula. On my interpretation of Aristotle, it is because of the fact 
that color inheres in body that we can’t have colored things that are not bodies.    
22    ὥστε τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἤτοι καθ' ὑποκειμένων τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν λέγεται ἢ ἐν 
ὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς ἐστίν. “So that all the other things are said of primary substances as subjects or 
are in these subjects. (2b4-5) It is hard to see how we can deny that this passage implies that everything 
that is not said-of a primary substance inheres in primary substances.    136 
finds an instantiation of it.
23 In a similar way we might allow that ‘tini sômati’ in (C1) 
does function to signify an object to which color bears the inherence relation, but this 
object is not any particular body.  
What would the object signified by ‘tini sômati’ have to be like in order to 
serve as the proper sort of relatum for the inherence relation? It would have to be 
something that color was in (in some colloquial sense), which color was not a part of, 
and which is such that color could not exist and fail to be in it. Imagine an object that 
is not identical to any particular body, and which exists in any possible situation where 
any particular body exists. Let’s call this object ‘indefinite body’ or ‘bodyind’. Further, 
let’s say that bodyind maintains its identity through changes in which particular bodies 
exist. Assume for the sake of argument that color can be said to be in bodyind in a 
colloquial sense of ‘in’.  We can now claim that ‘tini sômati’ in (C1) functions as a 
singular term signifying bodyind. On this interpretation, (C1) isn’t a quantified 
sentence at all, but is a sentence asserting the holding of the inherence relation 
between a universal and an indefinite object. Furthermore, on this interpretation (C1) 
says something true.
24 Color is in bodyind in the non-technical sense, color is not a part 
of bodyind, and there is no possible situation in which color exists and fails to be in 
bodyind. 
  On the condition that Aristotle would accept indefinite entities like bodyind, the 
interpretation under discussion would render 2a34ff compatible with the claim that 
                                                 
23   Two points should be made here. First, I am not endorsing this analysis of ‘seeks’-sentences. 
But something like it would be needed if we insisted on taking (D2) to assert that the seeking relation 
holds  between  Diogenes  and  some  entity.  Compare  the  attempt  to  give  a  propositional  analysis  of 
intensional  transitives—where  we  say  that  (D2)  asserts  a  relation  (maybe  the  trying-to-make-true 
relation between Diogenes and the proposition that Diogenes finds an honest man. Or take Montague’s 
suggested analysis on which we take (D2) to assert the holding of a relation between Diogenes and the 
property of being a property of some honest man. Second, if we are going to go through with this sort of 
analysis, we should allow that the properties in question exist even in worlds where nothing instantiates 
them. This way, Diogenes can seek things that do not exist, like unicorns (or, in his view, honest men).     
24   Remember that ‘tini sômati’ on this interpretation functions as a singular term. Furthermore, it 
designates  rigidly—it  designates  the  very  same  indefinite  object,  bodyind,  in  every  world  where  it 
designates anything.    137 
inherence entails ontological dependence. I think that Aristotle does accept entities 
that have the existence conditions of bodyind. As I discuss in chapter 7, I think that 
Aristotelian universals have the same existence and identity conditions as these 
indefinite objects. However, I do not think that we can take ‘tini sômati’ at 2b1 to be a 
singular term that designates the universal body.  
There are a few textual for my uneasiness. First of all, I think that it is a stretch 
to think that ‘tini’ can ever have the sort of grammatical function that it would need to 
have for the current analysis to work. I can think of no other context in which adding 
an indefinite adjective to a noun would yield a referential expression. It would be akin 
to adding ‘a/an’ or ‘some’ to an English noun, and having the resulting complex act as 
a singular term.  Second, in the next sentence Aristotle writes, “For if it is not in some 
of the particulars, neither is it in body at all.”
25 This sentence is most naturally taken to 
draw a contrast between color’s being in some particular body and color’s being in the 
universal body. Aristotle’s use of ‘mê en tini tôn kath’ hekasta’ suggests that we are 
considering a case where color is not in at least one of a plurality of particulars, since 
‘tôn kath’ hekasta’ is plural. It would be a serious stretch to take this as an expression 
denoting a single indefinite entity. Furthermore, Aristotle’s argument would look 
bizarre. He would be saying that if color was not in bodyind then color would not be in 
body. But it is hard to see what being in bodyind could amount to other than being in 
the universal body. Finally, there is the fact that Aristotle seems to take what he is 
saying about inherence to be parallel to what he has just said about said-of relation. 
But in the argument that animal is said-of man only if it is said-of some particular 
man, Aristotle writes, “If it is said-of none of the particular men, neither is it said-of 
man at all.”
26 Again it seems to be the case that Aristotle is drawing a contrast between 
                                                 
25   eﬁ går µØ §n tin‹ t«n kay' ßkasta, oÈd¢ §n s≈µati ˜lvw. 
26   εἰ γὰρ κατὰ μηδενὸς τῶν τινῶν ἀνθρώπων, οὐδὲ κατὰ ἀνθρώπου ὅλως.   138 
being said-of one or more particulars and being said-of a universal. It seems that 
Aristotle takes ‘If it is not said-of some of the particular [bodies]…’ (‘ei gar mê en tini 
tôn kath’ hekasta…’) to be parallel to ‘If it is said of none of the men…’ (‘ei gar kata 
mêdenos tôn tinôn anthrôpôn…’). Compare ‘If x bears R to none of the ys,’ to ‘If x 
does not bear R to some of the ys’. However, ‘tôn tinôn anthrôpôn’ is a plural 
expression, and could not plausibly be taken to refer to a single indefinite object. It 
seems unlikely, therefore, that Aristotle intends “Color is en tini sômati” to say that 
color inheres in a single indefinite object.  
  In short, I think that there are a two ways to analyze (C1) so that it admits of a 
non-specific reading. We can take ‘is in’ as shorthand for a pair consisting of a modal 
operator and a relation other than the inherence. Alternatively we could try to take the 
phrase ‘tini sômati’ as a singular term that refers to something other than a particular 
body. Furthermore, I think each of these analyses might be further developed in 
philosophically plausible ways. Nevertheless, I do not think that either of these 
analyses can be made to fit a system on which Aristotle takes inherence to be a 
fundamental relation holding between categorial entities. I turn now to two attempts to 
reconcile Aristotle’s conflicting claims about inherence by holding that he uses ‘is in’ 
ambiguously.  
Section 6.3: Wedin’s Proposed Disjunctive Definition of Inherence 
  In his book Aristotle’s Theory of Substance (2000), Michael Wedin attempts to 
sort out Aristotle’s seemingly conflicting claims about the inherence relation.
 27 Wedin 
hopes to extricate Aristotle from difficulties by offering a disjunctive reading of the 
definition of inherence. Strictly speaking, Wedin does not want to claim that there are 
multiple senses of ‘in’, as does Duerlinger whose view we will examine later in this 
                                                 
27  Chapter II in Wedin’s book, in which these issues are discussed, is a reworking of his 1993 
paper “Nonsubstantial Individuals”.    139 
section. Rather, on Wedin’s view, Aristotle accepts a single definition of inherence 
according to which there is one set of conditions for the inherence of a nonsubstantial 
particular in something, and a different set of conditions for the inherence of a 
nonsubstantial universal in something.  
  There are several formal difficulties with Wedin’s development of his 
interpretation, which I discuss in some detail below. After discussing these problems, I 
offer a version of Wedin’s interpretation that avoids these formal difficulties. I then 
turn to the question of whether we can offer the revised version as an interpretation of 
what Aristotle actually says at 1a24-25, and argue that, like Wedin’s original 
formulations of a definition of inherence, the revised definition is far too syntactically 
complicated to serve as an accurate rendering of what Aristotle says in the Categories. 
We might, nevertheless, think that Wedin’s suggestion is useful as an account of how 
Aristotle should have defined the inherence relation. I end this section with a 
discussion of the merits of Wedin’s account as a revisionist account of Aristotle’s 
thoughts about inherence.     
  Wedin begins his discussion of Aristotle’s account of inherence by laying out 
the interpretations of 1a24-25 given by Ackrill and Owen. Wedin offers number of 
powerful criticisms of Owen’s reading of the passage, and points out that on Ackrill’s 
interpretation Aristotle must be taken to contradict himself when he claims that a 
nonsubstantial universal can inhere in an individual substance.  Wedin then turns to 
Frede’s interpretation of 1a24-25 from which he begins to develop his own account. 
Beginning with Frede’s interpretation, Wedin successively criticizes and revises a 
number of formulations of the definition of inherence at 1a24-25, before finally 
arriving at a formulation that he endorses and calls “The New Revised Standard 
Version” (NRSV) of Aristotle’s definition of inherence. The New Revised Standard 
Version is supposed to avoid the problems of all of its major competitors. On the one   140 
hand, the NRSV is supposed to entail that particular nonsubstances are ontologically 
dependent on the particular substances in which they inhere. On the other hand, the 
NRSV is supposed to allow that universal nonsubstances can inhere in particular 
substances without being ontologically dependent on these particular substances. If 
Wedin’s interpretation works, then it seems to give us everything that we are looking 
for. It will be useful, therefore, to look at this interpretation in some detail.  
  As I mention above, Wedin begins the development of the NRSV by 
examining and criticizing Frede’s interpretation of 1a24-25. We begin with Frede’s 
presentation of his own view. 
  (F)  x is in something as its subject, if there is a subject y such that  
      (a) x is not a part of y & 
      (b) x cannot exist independently of y.  
Wedin notes both that (F) isn’t properly speaking a definition since it gives only 
sufficient conditions, and that Frede needs to say something to ensure that y will not 
only be a subject, but will be a subject for x.
28 Accordingly, Wedin presents the 
following as an improvement on F, which he claims is a slightly modified 
formalization of Frede’s view:   
  (F**)   x is in something, z, as its subject ≡ there is a subject y such that 
      (a) x is in y & 
      (b) x is not a part of y & 
      (c) x cannot exist independently of y.
29  
As it stands, F** is ambiguous. (F**) contains three variables. It is clear that we are to 
understand ‘x’ to be bound by a universal quantifier, and that we are to understand ‘y’ 
as bound by an existential quantifier that falls within the scope of the ‘≡’. However, it 
                                                 
28   As I note in my discussion of Frede above, Frede’s condition will be satisfied by any object 
provided we can find some subject such that the object could not exist without that subject. However, it 
will then follow that any substance which could not exist without a second substance will count as 
inhering  in  something.  Wedin  criticizes  Frede  on  similar  grounds.  We  can  avoid  this  problem  by 
allowing that Aristotle does have a nontechnical sense of ‘in’ in play at 1a24-25, and that an item is in 
something in the nontechnical sense only if the second is a subject for the first.   
29   See Wedin 2000 p53.   141 
isn’t completely obvious what sort of quantifier Wedin takes to bind ‘z’ or what scope 
that quantifier is supposed to have with respect to ‘≡’.  
  What sort of quantifier is supposed to bind ‘z’? It seems to be natural to take 
the English phrase, ‘x is in something, z, as its subject’ as existentially quantifying 
over z.
30 Furthermore, this seems the only way to construe (F**) so that it will serve as 
an accurate representation of Frede’s view. Remember that, according to Frede, 
Aristotle wants to give conditions under which a thing has the relational property of 
being in something, rather than to give conditions under which any two arbitrarily 
specified objects stand in the relation of inherence.  
(F**) will give something equivalent to what Frede wants, if  and only if we 
take ‘z’ to be bound by an existential quantifier which has a narrower scope than the 
biconditional ‘≡’.
31 Taken this way, we will end up with the following: 
  (F**∃nar) ∀x[∃z(x is in z as its subject) ≡ ∃y(y is a subject & 
      (a) x is in y & 
      (b) x is not a part of y & 
      (c) x cannot exist independently of y)].
32 
Despite the fact that there are good grounds for taking (F**∃nar) as the best way 
to understand (F**), I am not entirely certain that this is what Wedin intends. Wedin 
later tells us that he wants to give a definition of the relation of inherence rather than 
                                                 
30   I’m not quite sure that natural language intuitions are much help in the present context.  It isn’t 
clear to me that it is natural to take ‘x is in something, z, as its subject’ as involving quantification at all. 
Rather, it seems most natural to take ‘x’ and ‘z’ as something like names. Nevertheless, it is obvious 
that Wedin wants to take ‘x’ as bound by a universal quantifier. Furthermore, in a different context, 
Wedin indicates that he understands ‘x is in something, z, as its subject ≡…’ to mean ‘∀x∃z[x is in z as 
its subject ≡…]’. See Wedin (2000) pg. 49 note 20.   
31   Take the following as a formal version of F** understood to have ‘z’ bound by an existential 
quantifier: (i) ∀x(∃zIxz ≡ ∃yRxy). ‘Ixy’ is the relation ‘x inheres in y’, and ‘R’ is a complex relation 
that holds between two objects iff those objects satisfy the RHS of F**. (i) is equivalent to (ii) ∀x 
(λu[∃v(Iuv)]x ≡ ∃y(Rxy)). ‘λu[∃v(Iuv)]x’ is an example of lambda-abstraction and  can be read as 
saying ‘x has the property of being a thing such that there is something in which it inheres.’ (ii) is, 
therefore, a good way to render what Frede claims to be after. And (i) which is (F**∃nar) is equivalent to 
(ii).  
32   I assume that this is more plausible than a version of the condition where the quantifier has 
wide scope with respect to the biconditional. The resulting proposition, call it F**∃wide is strictly weaker 
than F**∃nar, and doesn’t seem to be what Aristotle is looking for.    142 
of the relational property of being an inherer by providing a suitable way of filling in 
the blank in “x is in something, z, as its subject ≡ ______.”
 33 We would expect the 
definition of a relation to give us conditions under which any two objects stand in that 
relation. However, we will have such a definition only if both ‘x’ and ‘z’ are bound by 
universal quantifiers. Since  (F**∃aar) does not specify such conditions, it is not even of 
the right form to serve as the definition of the relation of inherence.  
However, were we to try to construe (F**) as providing a definition of the 
relation of inherence, we would end up with something bizarre. We would have 
something like:  
(F**∀wide)  ∀x∀z [x is in z as its subject ≡ ∃y (y is a subject & 
        (a) x is innt y & 
        (b) x is not a part of y & 
        (c) x cannot exist independently of y)].
34 
There are two major problems with (F**∀wide) as a definition of the relation of 
inherence. First of all, if we are trying to define the conditions under which x inheres 
in z, we expect the conditions to crucially involve x and z. In (F**∀wide), however, ‘z’ 
occurs only on the left-hand side of the definition. The second problem concerns the 
results that we get from accepting (F**∀wide), which tells us that if there is any object 
that x is innt, isn’t a part of, and cannot exist independently of, then x inheres in every 
object in the universe. Presumably nobody intends to say that. (F**∀wide) seems to be a 
disastrous way to take (F**).  In short, therefore, (F**∃nar) seems to be the most 
                                                 
33   There are several places where Wedin suggests that we take F** as a definition of the relation 
rather than of the relational property. Especially see Wedin (2000) pp48-49, and p65-66.   
34   I assume that this is more plausible than an alternative on which the ‘∀z’ has narrower scope 
than  the  biconditional;  call  the  latter  F**∀nar..  F**∀wide  specifies  conditions  under  which  for  two 
arbitrarily specified objects, the first inheres in the second. The weaker F**∀nar specifies conditions 
under which an arbitrarily specified object inheres in every object. Let ‘Rab’ abbreviate b is a subject 
and <a,b> satisfies conditions (a)-(c) on the RHS of F**. (F**∀nar) could be true in a model where I can 
specify an object that inheres in some things but which bears R to nothing at all, provided there is at 
least one  thing  in which  that object does not  inhere.  This fact  makes F**∀nar a poor candidate for 
defining anything in terms of R. Here is a simple model that makes (F**∀nar) true, but (F**∀wide) false: 
D={a,b} ext(‘I’)={a,b} ext(‘R’)={}.    143 
plausible way to take (F**), but does not have the right form to be a definition of the 
relation of inherence.
35   
  (F**∃nar) does not entail that an object is ontologically dependent on every 
thing in which it inheres, and accordingly does not entail that whatever inheres in a 
particular substance is ontologically dependent on that substance. Wedin tells us that 
by adding a clause to (F**), we end up with an interpretation of 1a24-25, which 
requires that nonsubstantial particulars be ontologically dependent on particular 
substances, and which does not rule out the possibility that universal non-substances 
can inhere in particular substances. Wedin says tells us that we can obtain the 
“Revised Standard View” by conjoining the following condition to F**: 
  (F+)  y=z ⊃  (d) x is an individual ≡ y is an individual ∨ 
      (e) x is general ≡ y is general.
36 
Strictly speaking, we can’t simply conjoin the open formula (F+) to (F**) and end up 
with a sentence at all. Presumably, therefore, Wedin intends all the variables in (F+) to 
end up being bound by the quantifiers in (F**). As a first pass we get the following:  
  (F**+):  x is in something, z, as its subject ≡ there is a subject y such that 
        (a-c) Rxy
37 & 
(d,e) (y=z ⊃   (x is individual ≡ y is individual) ∨  
(x is general ≡ y is general)) 
Notice, however, that (F**+) is not a conjunction of (F**) and (F+); (F**+) is not a 
conjunction containing (F**) or (F+). Moreover and more importantly, (F**+) and 
(F**) differ in that the former contains an occurrence of ‘z’ on the right-hand side of 
the initial ‘≡’. This occurrence of ‘z’, however, makes it impossible for the quantifier 
binding ‘z’ to have a narrower scope than the biconditional ‘≡’. Therefore, 
                                                 
35   Notice on the other hand that we can alter (F**∀wide) by replacing all occurrences of ‘y’ with 
‘z’, and removing the existential quantifier binding ‘y’. We then get: 
∀x∀z [x is in z as its subject ≡ (a) x is in z & (b) x is not a part of z & (c) x cannot exist independently of 
z)]. This condition does have the logical form of a definition of the relation of inherence, and is in fact, 
Ackrill’s (1963) reading of 1a24-25.  
36   See Wedin (2000) pg. 53.  
37   Where ‘Rxy’ abbreviates ‘(x is in y & x is not a part of y & x cannot exist independently of y)’   144 
“conjoining” (F+) to (F**) changes the scope of the quantifier binding ‘z’, if that 
quantifier has narrow scope in (F**). Therefore, while the most plausible construal of 
(F**), (F**∃nar), had the quantifier binding ‘z’ take narrow scope with respect to the 
‘≡’, in (F**+) the quantifier binding ‘z’ must have wider scope than the ‘≡’. Fully 
spelled out, and assuming that (F**∃nar) was the correct reading of (F**), Wedin’s 
(F**+) seems to be the following: 
  (F**+∃) ∀x∃z [x is in z as its subject ≡ ∃y(y is a subject & 
        (a) x is in y & 
        (b) x is not a part of y & 
        (c) x cannot exist independently of y & 
(d,e) (y=z ⊃   ((x is individual ≡ y is individual) ∨  
(x is general ≡ y is general)))].  
(F**+∃) seems to be an analysis neither of the relational property being in something 
nor of the relation __ is in __.  In fact, (F**+∃) doesn’t seem to be a definition or 
analysis of anything at all. Rather (F**+∃) tells us that for every object in the universe, 
we will be able to find at least one object such that either the first is in the second and 
a certain complicated condition holds, or the first is not in the second that complicated 
condition does not hold.
 38  
                                                 
38   To put matters a bit more precisely, assume here that ‘general’ and ‘individual’ are mutually 
exclusive and jointly exhaustive predicates, and let ‘Rxy’ abbreviate ‘(x is in y &x is not a part of y & x 
cannot exist without y)’. Then (F**+∃) will be true just in case for every object in the universe x, there 
is at least one object z such that: 
Either   (i)  [x is not in z as a subject &  
For every object in the universe, y, [¬Rxy ∨ (y=z & (x is individual ≡ y is general))]] 
Or   (ii)   [x is in z as a subject and 
There  is  at  least  one  object,  y,  such  that  [Rxy  &  (y≠z  ∨  (x  is  individual  ≡  y  is 
individual))]]. 
For what it is worth, (F**+) seems to be true. For every substance, we can specify something that it 
does not inhere in, and that substance won’t bear R to anything in the universe (remember that ‘Rxy’ 
just claims that x stands in the relation to y that any things stance in which satisfy Ackrill’s definition of 
inherence). Furthermore, assume that x is a non-substance. Let x be a non-substantial individual. It 
follows that there is some individual substance that that x inheres in, say z. Now let y=z, since x and y 
are both individuals the second condition is satisfied. Similar reasoning will hold for a case where x is a 
universal  non-substance,  and  it  inheres  in  a  universal  substance.  However,  while  (F**+)  is  true,  it 
doesn’t seem to be a definition of anything. Furthermore, it is compatible with the claim that substances 
do  inhere  in  things.  It  demands  only  that  for  each  substance  we  can  specify  something  that  the 
substance fails to inhere in, and that the substance not bear R to anything. However, there is nothing in 
(F**+) to guarantee that whenever x inheres in y, x also bears R to y.      145 
Understood in this way,  (F**+∃) fails to split the world into the class of things 
that do inhere in something, and the class of things that do not inhere in anything. 
(F**+∃) thus crucially differs from (F**∃nar), which does so divide the world. While 
(F**∃nar) can be taken as a definition of the indefinite relational property of being a 
thing that inheres in something, (F**+∃) cannot be so taken.  
Furthermore, (F**+∃) is clearly inadequate as an explication of what Aristotle 
says at 1a24-25, because it does not even rule out the possibility that primary 
substances inhere in something. Aristotle seems to take whatever he says at 1a24-25 
and the fact that substances and differentia are not in anything in the non-technical 
sense to entail that substances and differentia do not inhere in anything. However, if 
we interpret 1a24-25 as (F**+∃), this entailment will not hold. Socrates is not in 
anything in the non-technical sense. Therefore, provided we can find a single entity 
that Socrates fails to inhere in, the substitution instance of (F**+∃) with ‘Socrates’ for 
‘x’ will be true. And it will be true whether or not Socrates inheres in every other 
object in the universe. I take this to be a truly disastrous result for the suggestion that 
(F**+∃) is an explication of what Aristotle means at 1a24-25.   
It is clear that (F**+∃) cannot be taken as a definition of the relational property 
inhering in something. Is there any way to take (F**+) as a definition of the relation of 
inherence? In order to be a definition of the relation, (F**+) would have to give 
conditions under which arbitrarily chosen entities will stand in that relation. We would 
then expect the occurrences of ‘z’ in (F**+) to be bound by a universal quantifier. 
Therefore, if (F**+) is to supposed to give us a definition of the relation of inherence, 
then (F**+∃) cannot be the correct way to take it.   
However, if we try to construe (F**+) as having a universal quantifier binding 
z, then matters get worse. We get:   146 
(F**+∀) ∀x∀z [x is in z as its subject ≡ there is a subject y such that 
        (a-c) Rxy & 
(d,e) y=z ⊃   ((x is individual ≡ y is individual) ∨  
(x is general ≡ y is general))]. 
 
(F**+∀) seems to have a consequence that Aristotle would take to be absurd. Say that 
a is innt b, a isn’t a part of b, and a can’t exist separately from b. Let c be any entity 
where c≠b. It follows that a inheres in c as its subject. This result seems to be fatal for 
(F**+∀). But (F**+∃) and (F**+∀) seem to be the only ways to take (F**+). Therefore, 
I can find no possible way of taking (F**+) on which it is a plausible elucidation of 
anything that Aristotle says about inherence.  
I turn now to Wedin’s final definition of inherence, “The New Revised 
Standard Version” or (F++).
39   
(F++): x is in something z as its subject ≡ there is a subject y such that  
    (a) x is in y & 
    (b) x is not a part of y & 
    (c) x cannot exist independently of something u & 
    (d) y=u ≡ x is non-recurrent & z is particular.  
For reasons similar to those I brought forward in my discussion of (F**+), the fact that 
‘z’ occurs on the RHS of the first ‘≡’ in this definition means that the quantifier 
binding ‘z’ to have wide scope with respect to the first ‘≡’. We still have to figure out 
what sort of quantifier Wedin takes to bind ‘z’. I assume that ‘u’ is bound by an 
existential quantifier the scope of which is indicated below. First, say that we take ‘z’ 
to be bound with a universal quantifier.   
  (F++∀)  ∀x ∀z (x is in something z as its subject ≡ ∃y [y is a subject & 
    (a) x is in y & 
    (b) x is not a part of y & 
    (c) ∃u (x cannot exist independently of u & 
    (d) y=u ≡ x is non-recurrent & z is particular)]).  
                                                 
39   See Wedin (2000) p65. It should be noted here that the principle that bears the name ‘(F++)’ in 
Wedin (1993) suffers from the same confusions that I talk about below.    147 
(F++∀) suffers from the same defects as those pointed out for (F**∀wide) and (F**+∀). 
If there is any suitable value for ‘y’ for which we can find a suitable value for ‘u’ (pick 
any thing other than y that x depends on), then x will inhere in every object in the 
universe. So the universally quantified version of (F++) won’t do. What about the 
existentially quantified version? 
(F++∃)  ∀x∃z (x is in something z as its subject ≡ ∃y [y is a subject & 
    (a) x is in y & 
    (b) x is not a part of y & 
    (c) ∃u (x cannot exist independently of u & 
    (d) y=u ≡ x is non-recurrent & z is particular)]).  
Like (F**+∃), this proposition defines neither a relation nor a relational property.  
Rather (F++∃) tells us that for every object in the universe we can specify at least one 
object such that one of two very complicated conditions holds.
40 It is difficult to see 
how (F++∃) helps us understand either the relation of inherence or the relational 
property of being an inherer. 
Furthermore, like (F**+∃) above, (F++∃) has a very unwelcome consequence in 
the case of substances. For all (F++∃) tells us, primary substances do inhere in all 
kinds of objects. On the assumption that no primary substance is in anything in the 
non-technical sense, (F++∃) will be true taking Socrates as a value for ‘x’ provided we 
can find a single object such that Socrates fails to inhere in it. Specifically, (F++∃) will 
                                                 
40   For every object in the universe a you can find at least one object b such that: 
 either (C++1) a does not inhere in b & for every object, c 
    a is not in c or 
    a is a part of c or 
    for every object d (either a can exist independently of d 
        or c=d & either a is recurrent or b is universal 
        or c≠d & a is non-recurrent and b is particular). 
  or  (C++2) a does inhere in b & there is an object, c, such that 
    a is in c & 
    a is not a part of c & 
    for some object d (a cannot exist independently of d & 
either (c=d & a is non-recurrent & b is particular) 
or (c≠d & (a is recurrent or b is universal))). 
   148 
be true even if Socrates inheres in every other object in the universe. (F++∃) doesn’t 
entail that Socrates inheres in anything, but it does not rule this possibility out either. I 
take it to be a minimal condition on any acceptable interpretation of Aristotle’s claims 
about inherence at 1a24-25 that the interpretation plus the claim that Socrates is not in 
anything in the non-technical sense entails that Socrates does not inhere in anything. 
(F++∃) is, therefore, a non-starter as an attempt either to define inherence or to define 
even the conditions under which something is an inherer.     
None of Wedin’s proposed principles do what he wants them to do. 
Furthermore, the fact that his exposition of his position makes frequent reference to 
these flawed principles makes it somewhat difficult to see exactly what position he 
wants to endorse. I think that Wedin wants to lay out a revisionary definition of 
inherence, which will require that non-substantial particulars are non-recurrent and 
that non-substantial universals can inhere in particulars. I propose the following: 
(W1):  ∀x∀z [x is in z ≡  x is innt z & 
  x is not part of z & 
∃y((y=z ∨ y is said-of z) & x can’t exist 
without y)
41 & 
(¬∃w(x is said-of w) ⊃ x can’t exist without z).] 
(W1) seems to satisfy the desiderata that Wedin sets out. It is a definition of a relation, 
rather than of a relational property. It shows that entities which are in something, but 
which aren’t said of anything are dependent on each thing that they are in—most 
importantly that they depend on the particulars in which they inhere. However, (W1) 
also allows for non-substantial universals—entities which are both in something and 
are said-of something—to inhere in a particular without being existentially dependent 
                                                 
41   The first disjunct in the first conjunct is included to deal with highest substance universals. 
Since nothing is said-of these whatever inheres in them will have to be existentially dependent on them.     149 
on that particular. Such entities need only be dependent on something said-of that 
particular. Finally, it seems to be something that Aristotle could accept.
42 
(W1) might very well be something that Aristotle should have accepted as a 
definition of inherence, and is a relatively straightforward characterization of a 
relation. In these respects, (W1) is superior to any of the characterizations of inherence 
that Wedin puts forward. Nevertheless, (W1) is not a good rendering of what Aristotle 
does say at 1a24-25. I can see no way of construing the text at 1a24-25 in a way that is 
as syntactically complex as (W1), (F**+), or (F++). (W1) seems to be a non-starter as 
an interpretation of the actual text of the Categories. Perhaps Aristotle should have 
given something like (W1) as a definition. However, we need to know not only what 
Aristotle should have said but also what he does say. Ackrill’s way of construing 
Aristotle’s statements at 1a24-25 is the most natural prima facie reading of the 
passage, and I have argued that none of its competitors is plausible as a replacement. I 
turn now to a second sort of ambiguity solution, suggested by James Duerlinger. 
Section 6.4: Duerlinger’s Ambiguity Interpretation 
  James Duerlinger (1970) offers a different sort of ambiguity solution than 
Wedin.
43 Duerlinger takes Ackrill’s characterization of 1a24-25 to be largely correct, 
but claims that the ‘in’ defined at 1a24-25 is not the same ‘in’ that we find in the 
statement ‘Color is in an individual body.’  Rather the definition of inherence gives us 
a primary sense of ‘in’, and the uses of ‘in’ at 2b1-2 are derivative ones. Duerlinger 
takes the primary sense of ‘in’ to be definable as follows: 
  (D1) In-1: ∀x∀y (x is in-1 y iff  (∀z(x is not said-of z & y is not said-of z) & 
(x is not a part of y) & Necessarily(x exists ⊃ y exists)).  
 
                                                 
42   Notice that (W1) is strictly weaker than the Ackrillian reading of the passage, and is stronger 
than either Owen’s or Frede’s definition. If we get rid of the last conjunct, then (W1) seems to be 
something that Owen and Frede could both accept.  
43   James Duerlinger "Predication and Inherence in Aristotle's Categories" (1970).   150 
The derivative inherence relations will be defined in terms of In-1, the said-of relation 
and quantification: 
  (D2) In-2: ∀x∀y (x is in-2 y iff (∃z (x is said of z) & (z is in-1 y)). 
  (D3) In-3: ∀x∀y (x is in-3 y iff (∃z (y is said of z) & (x is in-1 z)). 
  (D4) In-4 ∀x∀y  (x is in-4 y iff (∃w∃z (x is said of w) & (y is said of z) 
& (w is in-1 z)). 
  We can now reinterpret Aristotle's statements at 2b1-3. Aristotle writes 
“Again, color is in body, and therefore in an individual body; for were it not in some 
individual body it would not be in body at all.” We should take Aristotle to mean the 
following according to this line of interpretation: color is in-4 body, and therefore it is 
in-2 an individual body. Thus construed, 2b1-3 follows from the definitions D1-D4. 
For color to be in body, requires that there is an NSP-color that is in-1 a particular 
body. But then the universal color is in-2 that body.    
  On Duerlinger’s interpretation, there is no reason to think that Aristotle says 
anything inconsistent with his definition of inherence when he claims that color is in 
an individual body. For color to be in-2 a particular body does not require that color 
be ontologically dependent on that body.  
  Furthermore, Duerlinger’s interpretation offers us an elegant way of 
characterizing the truth of instances of linguistic predication. 
α
  is truly linguistically 
predicated of 
β
 iff either the entity indicated by 
α
 is in the entity indicated by 
β
 (in 
one of the senses of the senses of ‘in’ given in (D1)-(D4)), or the entity indicated by 
α
 is said-of the entity indicated by 
β
. Furthermore, we can see that adopting 
Duerlinger’s strategy does not require us to add any additional fundamental relations 
beyond the primary inherence relation (In-1) and the said-of relation to Aristotle’s 
ontology. Facts concerning the holding of all inherence relations will be logically 
entailed by the facts concerning the holding of in-1 relations between particulars, and   151 
on the facts concerning the holding of the said-of relation. Furthermore, each of the 
derivative inherence relations is defined in terms of in-1.   
  Nevertheless, Duerlinger’s interpretation is not without problems. First of all, 
there is the fact that it forces us to hold that Aristotle means to signify four different 
relations by ‘in’ without ever signaling that he is talking about four different relations. 
Aristotle is generally pretty good about making such distinctions between different 
senses of terms, and we might be wary about attributing such ambiguity to him. To 
make matters worse, we have to hold that Aristotle uses a term with two different 
senses in the course of a single sentence. Perhaps we can say that Aristotle failed to 
realize that he was using ‘in’ ambiguously, and offer him (D1)-(D4) as the best way of 
salvaging his overall theory. I will explain below that I think something like this latter 
strategy is correct. 
  There are a couple of things that we should note about (D1). First of all, 
according to (D1) only particulars, entities which are not said-of anything, can stand in 
the in-1 relation to a subject. Second, Duerlinger holds that we can eliminate reference 
to the non-technical sense of ‘in’ as it occurs in the definition at 1a24-25. I disagree 
with Duerlinger on both counts. Aristotle says nothing at 1a24-25 to restrict our focus 
to particulars. Furthermore, it seems that there are plenty of cases in which universals 
meet the conditions laid down in Aristotle’s definition. For example, the universal 
color seems to be ontologically dependent on the universal body in precisely the way 
required by the definition at 1a24-25. So, we cannot deny that nonsubstantial 
universals can inhere in substance universals in the primary sense of inherence. In 
addition, without some amendment, (D1) will require us to say that every substance is 
in-1 any entity that exists in every possible world where it does. This result is   152 
unacceptable, and can be avoided by leaving the non-technical sense of ‘in’ in the 
definition.
44 If we make the two amendments that I suggest we get: 
  (D1*) In-1: ∀x∀y (x is in-1 y if and only if x is innt y & x is not a part 
of y & Necessarily(x exists ⊃ y exists)).
45 
However, (D1*) just is the rendering of 1a24-25 suggested by Ackrill. The 
result of replacing (D1) with (D1*), and keeping (D2)-(D4) unchanged will be an 
interpretation that takes Aristotle to define a primary sense of inherence which does 
require ontological dependence, but then to use the same term to indicate a relation 
that does not require ontological dependence later in the Categories. I find it 
implausible to think that Aristotle would shift the meaning of a term that is central to 
the theory he is outlining in the Categories, without signaling that he is doing so. It is 
more plausible to hold that Aristotle intends the same sense of ‘in’ in the two 
passages, and that he is wrong to say that color is in a particular body at 2a34.  
Nevertheless, Duerlinger’s interpretation is extremely valuable in that it 
suggests that Aristotle needs to tell a more complicated story about the conditions 
under which one thing will be a subject for another. Take a case where Socrates is 
pale. It is true that Socrates is a subject for an NSP-pallor. However, it is also true that 
Socrates is a subject for the universal pallor. Aristotle tells us that primary substances 
are subjects for everything else. In addition, he seems to think that the following 
condition on subjecthood obtains: 
(Subj) x is a subject for y if and only if either y is said-of x or y is in x.
46 
                                                 
44   There  are  other  ways  to  avoid  this  problem.  We  might  qualify  the  sort  of  dependence 
expressed in the last conjunct of the definition. Some qualification of (D1) is needed, however, if we are 
to have even an extensionally adequate definition. 
45   Notice that by accepting (D1*) in place of (D1) as the definition of In-1, we no longer have 
‘Color is in-4 body’ entail ‘Color is in-2 a particular body’, since we have no guarantee that the entities 
that we can plug in for ‘z’ and ‘w’ will be particulars. 
We need to accept a further general principle that whenever one universal inheres in another, there are 
particulars which the first is said-of which inhere in particulars which the second is said-of. 
46   (Subj) obviously follows from Aristotle’s claim that “...all the other things are either said of 
the primary substances as subjects or in them as subjects.”(2b3-5), and the fact that he takes primary   153 
But if primary substances are subjects for non-substantial universals and (Subj) is true, 
then Aristotle must think that nonsubstantial universals are in primary substances, 
since a non-substantial universal cannot be said-of a substance. Aristotle can be 
correct to hold (Subj) only if ‘in’ does not have the same sense in (Subj) that it has in 
1a24-25. The only alternative to a view like Duerlinger’s, then, is to hold that Aristotle 
is mistaken in subscribing to (Subj), and that more careful consideration of the nature 
of inherence would lead him to see not only that nonsubstantial universals cannot be in 
primary substances, but also that a more complicated story needs to be told about 
subjecthood. Furthermore, the story that Aristotle has to tell about subjecthood will be 
structurally similar to Duerlinger’s suggestions about how to disambiguate ‘in’. We 
replace (Subj) with (Subj*). 
  (Subj*) x is a subject for y if and only if 
    (i) y inheres in x, or 
    (ii) y is said-of x, or 
    (iii) there is a z, such that y is said-of z, and z inheres in x, or 
    (iv) there is a z, such that y inheres in z, and x is said-of z, or     
(v) there are w and z, such that y is said-of w, and x is said-of z, 
and w inheres in z. 
  I think that Aristotle should have accepted (Subj*) in place of (Subj), if pushed 
on the issue. I also think that, if pressed, he would deny that nonsubstantial universals 
inhere in primary substances. Nevertheless, I think that he does endorse (Subj) in the 
Categories rather than (Subj*), and that he claims that non-substantial universals do 
inhere in primary substances in the single sense recognized at 1a24-25.
47 Like Ackrill, 
I take Aristotle to be mistaken in making these claims. However, I do not think that 
Aristotle is simply being careless. Rather, I think that he is led to make these errors by 
                                                                                                                                           
substances to be subjects for everything(2b37-3a1). I am suggesting that Aristotle takes his claim at 
2b3-5 to follow from (Subj) and the claim that primary substances are subjects for everything. I will 
suggest that when push comes to shove, Aristotle would continue to hold that primary substances are 
subjects for everything, would abandon (Subj) in favor of (Subj*) below, and would take (2b3-5) to be 
false.    
47   While Duerlinger’s interpretation is more charitable, I find it hard to accept that Aristotle 
intended to use ‘in’ ambiguously without ever signaling that he was doing so.   154 
a confusion in the way that he understands the said-of relation between universals and 
particulars. I turn now to a discussion of the nature of Aristotelian universals in 
chapter 7, after which we will be in a better position to examine why Aristotle is led to 
these errors in the Categories. In chapter 8, I return to 2a34ff and attempt to figure out 
what might have led Aristotle to the mistaken assertion that color inheres in an 
individual body.   155 
CHAPTER 7 
 
ARISTOTLE ON UNIVERSALS 
Section 7.1: Introduction 
Aristotle accepts the existence of particulars both in the category of substance 
and in each of the non-substantial categories. Whenever we predicate an accident of a 
particular substance, Aristotle thinks that the truthmaker for such predication is the 
inherence of a non-substantial particular (NSP) in a particular substance. For example, 
“Socrates is pale” is true because an individual pallor, an NSP, inheres in Socrates.
1 
Many of the facts recognized by Aristotle contain only particular entities as 
constituents, and he might have been able to construct a reasonable ontology that 
included only particulars. However, he did not attempt to do so. In addition to 
particulars, Aristotle countenances universals, and these universals play several 
important roles in his philosophy. The species and genera of particular substances are 
universals, and are said to be secondary substances. Universals both in the substantial 
and non-substantial categories are the objects of Aristotelian science, and he takes the 
long-term stability and comprehensibility of the world to be underwritten by relations 
among universals.  
Aristotle takes universals to be real mind-independent entities, and thus differs 
from the nominalist or conceptualist about universals.
2 However, he also disagrees 
                                                 
1   At Categories 1a27, Aristotle uses the phrase ‘to ti leukon’ which I translate as ‘the individual 
pallor’.  
2   The best defense of a conceptualist position can be found in Lloyd Form and Universal in 
Aristotle (1981), which is discussed in Tweedale “Aristotle’s Universals” (1987). The best defense of a 
(predicate) nominalist position can be found in Cresswell (1975), which is treated (and I think 
undermined) by Tweedale (1987). For the time being, I use “nominalist” narrowly, to refer to the sort of 
position that Armstrong (1978) and (1989) calls “predicate nominalism” or “concept nominalism”. I 
will consider the positions that Armstrong terms “class nominalism” and “mereological nominalism” 
shortly. For nominalist or conceptualist interpretations of Aristotle see Jones “An Introduction to the 
First Five Chapters of Aristotle’s Categories” (1975), Hartman Substance, Body, and Soul: Aristotelian 
Investigations (1977). For some discussion, see Irwin (1988) sections 41-42, 63, Barnes (1994) 144-
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with the Platonist by holding that universals are not separate from particulars nor are 
they something beyond (para) the particulars.
3 In the words of his Latin 
commentators, Aristotle accepts universalia in rebus (universals in things) but rejects 
universalia ante res (universals before things).
4 But what exactly is it for Aristotle to 
hold that universals exist ‘in’ but not ‘beyond’ or ‘before’ things?    
                                                 
3   See Posterior Analytics I.24 (85b15-22). Gail Fine has maintained out that Aristotle sometimes 
does claim that universals are something para particulars; for example in the Peri Ideôn. However, I am 
not sure that Aristotle assents to the claim that anything para the particulars exists in that text. Rather, 
he seems to be rehearsing some arguments that the Ideas must exist para the particulars if we are to 
have sciences. However, in the Posterior Analytics I.24, Aristotle seems to want to establish that the 
sciences can be possible even if the universals are not something para particulars. I take the claim that 
universals are nothing para particulars to be equivalent to the claim that universals are not separated or 
separable (chôriston) from particulars. While the claim that Plato thought of universals as separable 
from particulars is controversial, Aristotle seems to have take Plato to take universals to be separable. 
Perhaps the clearest passage in which Aristotle makes this point is in Metaphysics H.4: “For two things 
may be fairly ascribed by Socrates—inductive arguments and universal definition, both of which are 
concerned with the starting point of science. But Socrates did not make the universals (τὰ καθόλου) or 
the definitions exist apart (χωριςτὰ); his successors, however, gave them separate existence (χωρίζω), 
and this was the kind of thing they called Ideas.” (1078b27-31 trans. Ross) It seems clear that Aristotle 
takes Plato to think that Forms or Ideas are chôriston, by which he means at a minimum that the Form is 
capable of existing without any particular instances. For more on separation and arguments about 
whether or not Plato took Forms to be separable, see Fine (1984). I discuss these issues in chapters 9 
and 10.          
4   The source of much of the Medieval discussion of universals is Porphyry’s Isagoge, and 
Boethius’ two commentaries on the Isagoge. At the outset of the Isagoge, Porphyry raises three 
questions about universals such as species and genera only to ignore them, “For now concerning the 
genera and species—whether they subsist, whether they lie in bare thought alone, whether if they 
subsist they are corporeal or incorporeal,  and whether they exist separately or are in sensible things and 
subsist in connection with these—I will decline to say anything, since these are deep matters requiring 
further investigation.” (4,1.1.9-4,1.1.14) (αὐτίκα περὶ τῶν γενῶν τε καὶ εἰδῶν τὸ μὲν εἴτε 
ὑφέστηκεν εἴτε καὶ ἐν μόναις ψιλαῖς ἐπινοίαις κεῖται εἴτε καὶ ὑφεστηκότα σώματά ἐστιν ἢ 
ἀσώματα καὶ πότερον χωριστὰ ἢ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς καὶ περὶ ταῦτα ὑφεστῶτα, παραιτήσομαι 
λέγειν βαθυτάτης οὔσης τῆς τοιαύτης πραγματείας καὶ ἄλλης μείζονος δεομένης ἐξετάσεως·) 
In his second commentary, Boethius identifies the Aristotelian position with one that takes species and 
genera to exist as incorporeal features of things that cannot exist independently of bodies. For more on 
Porphyry, see Barnes Porphyry Introduction (2003), and Spade Five Texts on the Medieval Problem of 
Universals (1994).   For more on Boethius, see Carre (1946) pp38-40, McInerny (1970), Spade (1994). 
From Boethius onwards, Porphyry’s questions were of great interest to metaphysicians. Spade (1994) 
traces some alternative medieval views about universals. See also Gyula Klima’s entry “The Medieval 
Problem of Universals” (2008) in the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Klima cites two sources of 
the ‘in rebus’, ‘ante rem’ distinction. First, in his commentary of the sentences, Giles of Rome writes: 
“And perhaps this is whence the distinction originated that there are three kinds of universals: before 
the thing, in the thing, and after the thing. For a universal in the first way is before the thing, because it 
causes things. In the second way it is in the thing, because it is the same essence as the things. In the 
third way it is after the thing, because it is a species abstracted from the things and caused by them.” 
(Giles of Rome, In Primum Librum Sententiarum 1SN, d. 19, pars. 2, q.1; cited by Klima (2008)). 
Second, in John Wyclif’s Tractatus De Universalibus, ed. Mueller (1985), he distinguishes between 
three sorts of universals: those in things, thost before things, and those after things. See also Anthony   157 
In this chapter, I offer an interpretation of Aristotle’s views about the nature of 
universals, and about the nature of the relation between universals and particulars. I 
first argue that Aristotle takes universals to be wholes of which particulars are parts. 
After establishing that the relation between universal and particular—the said-of 
relation—is some sort of whole-part relation, I turn to the task of trying to further 
elucidate the nature of the relation. I hold that the said-of relation should be 
understood neither as a set-theoretic relation nor in terms of the part-whole relation 
discussed in classical mereology. The sense in which particulars are parts of universals 
must be different from the sense in which members or subsets are parts of sets, and 
from the way in which parts are parts of mereological fusions.  
Aristotle denies that universals are identical to extensions of particulars. An 
extensional understanding of the said-of relation would make good sense out of 
Aristotle’s claims that universals are nothing para particulars, and would allow us to 
claim that non-substantial universals are existentially dependent on (and can thus 
inhere in) substantial particulars. Nevertheless, the fact that Aristotle takes universals 
to endure through destruction of their particular parts implies that universals are not 
just extensions of those parts. Aristotle seems to think that one and the same universal 
can be composed out of different parts at different times, but he still wants to claim 
that universals are nothing para these particulars. I suggest that Aristotle takes the 
said-of relation to be something like the relation by which complex enduring material 
objects are constituted by material parts the destruction of which they can survive. I 
argue that this interpretation fits the relevant texts, satisfies Aristotle’s desiderata, and 
ultimately gives real concrete universals that are neither reducible to nor beyond 
particulars.  
                                                                                                                                           
Kenny’s translation John Wyclif: On Universals (1985). It is clear that these later medieval thinkers are 
referring to a long tradition.    158 
The sense in which a universal is nothing beyond the particulars it is said-of is 
weaker than the sense in which a mereological fusion is nothing beyond the parts in 
the fusion.
5 Nevertheless, I think that Aristotle has real sympathy toward the position 
that universals are extensions of particulars, and therefore nothing para those 
particulars in the stronger sense. I continue this discussion in the next chapter, and 
suggest that some of Aristotle’s problematic statements about inherence in the 
Categories could result from a failure to be clear about the precise nature of the 
parthood relation holding between particulars and universals.  
Section7.2: Aristotelian Universals as Wholes 
  It is generally accepted that Aristotle recognizes universals at the very outset of 
the Categories. At 1a20ff, Aristotle introduces two relations that an entity may bear to 
a subject. An entity can inhere in a subject, or an entity can be said-of a subject.
6 
Entities that inhere in a subject are accidents, while those, which do not inhere in any 
subject, are substances. Entities that are said-of a subject are universal, while those not 
said-of any subject are particular. Universals are said-of particulars, and are also said-
of subordinate universals. For example, animal is said-of the universal human, and 
                                                 
5   I spell this claim out more fully below. Roughly speaking, I think that we can separate four 
different claims. First, we might say that seeming singular quantification over universals can be 
replaced with plural quantification over particulars. This strikes me as an eliminativist position about 
universals. Second, we might hold that universals are sums that are identical to pluralities of particulars. 
On this view, commitment to sums involves nothing beyond commitment to the parts. However, this 
view seems to involve us in a problematic claim that  one thing can be identical to many. Third, we 
might take universals to be sums of particulars, where the commitment to sums is a commitment to 
something other than the parts. We might nevertheless think that this commitment is particularly 
minimal, especially if we believe in mereological universalism. The sum is something, the existence of 
which is wholly determined by the existence of the parts, and the existence of which suffices for the 
existence of the parts. Fourth, we might think that a universal cannot be identified with any sum of 
particulars, but that various sums of particulars could suffice for the existence of the universal. 
However, it is  essential to the universal that some sum of the relevant particulars exists. I think that 
Aristotelian universals should be thought of in the fourth way.  
6   I use, ‘…is said-of a subject’ to translate ‘kath’ hupokeimenou tinos legetai’, which is a bit of 
Aristotle’s technical vocabulary. Aristotle sometimes uses ‘kath’ hupokeimenou’ and a form of the verb 
‘katêgorein’ to indicate the said-of relation. The roundabout use of an object plus ‘kath’ hupokeimenou’ 
indicates the use of the technical notion. The less prolix ‘katêgorein’ + epi + object indicates the less 
technical notion ‘is predicated of’. I use ‘said-of’ with the hyphen to indicate that the technical relation 
is indicated.   159 
both animal and human are said-of Socrates. Color is said-of the universal pale, and 
both color and pale are said-of the individual pallor that inheres in Socrates.  
Aristotle tells us a few more facts about said-of relation in the Categories. At 
1b10ff, Aristotle tells us that the relation is transitive: “Whenever something is 
predicated of something else as a subject, everything said-of what is predicated will 
also be said-of the subject.” Aristotle also thinks that, since each particular is located 
in a single infimae species, there is exactly one universal immediately said-of each 
individual. With universals the story is a bit more complex. Each universal, with the 
exception of the highest genera, is defined in terms of a genus and differentia. Both its 
immediate genus and immediate differentia will be immediately said-of a universal. In 
this chapter, I will largely ignore complications arising from Aristotle’s treatment of 
differentia, and will generally assume that every entity (with the exception of the 
highest genera) has exactly one universal immediately said-of it.
7 The said-of relation 
is antisymmetric—no two non-identical objects are such that each is said-of the other.
8 
Among the universals accepted by Aristotle are the species and genera of substances, 
which Aristotle calls secondary substances. He tells us that the secondary substances 
are the species and genera in which the substantial particulars (primary substances) 
belong.
9 The same relation that obtains between secondary and primary substances, 
viz., the said-of relation, also obtains between non-substantial universals and non-
                                                 
7  In the Categories, Aristotle holds that the differentia of an entity can be located in a different 
category than the entity itself. Since both the differentia and genus are said-of the species, this allows 
for the possibility that entities will constitute more than one distinct universal—for example rationality 
and humanity will turn out to be distinct entities which are constituted by all the same objects, but 
which end up in different categories. I argue in chapter 2 that Aristotle’s treatment of differentiae in the 
Categories is ultimately untenable. Given Aristotle’s views in the middle books of the Metaphysics on 
the unity of definition, I argue that we should hold that at each stage of division the very same universal 
entity corresponds to both the species-term and the differentia-term. The universal rational is identical 
to the universal human.  
8   Whether we take the said-of relation to be asymmetric depends on whether we take it to be 
reflexive. For further discussion, see chapter 2. The decision here will matter in figuring out whether we 
should take the said-of relation to be more like the converse of parthood or the converse of proper 
parthood.  
9   See Categories 2a11-19.   160 
substantial particulars. Both non-substantial particulars and primary substances belong 
to their appropriate species and genera. 
Although Aristotle accepts the existence of universals in the Categories, he 
does not there talk about them by name.
10 However, in chapter 7 of the De 
Interpretatione Aristotle writes: 
Among things, some are universal and others particular. I call universal 
that which is of a nature to be predicated of a plurality of things, and 
particular that which is not. For example, man is a universal, Callias a 
particular.
 11 (17a38-b1)  
A few points about this passage are in order. Aristotle locates both universals and 
particulars among the things (pragmata), indicating that universals are to be thought of 
as things rather than as linguistic or conceptual entities.
12 In a similar way, Aristotle 
locates the things said-of a subject among the beings (onta), rather than among the 
things that are said (legomena). When Aristotle goes on to claim that universals are 
naturally predicated of a number of things, we must keep in mind that Aristotle often 
uses the word ‘katêgorein’ (‘to predicate’) to indicate a relation between entities.
13 
Human is a universal because it is by nature metaphysically-predicated of a number of 
things. A sign that human is metaphysically-predicated of a number of things is the 
fact that its name, ‘human’, is by nature properly linguistically-predicated of a number 
of things. A sign that the particular Callias is not metaphysically-predicated of a 
number of things is the fact that the name ‘Callias’ is not predicated (univocally) of a 
number of objects.  
                                                 
10   The one use of ‘katholou’ in the Categories at 12a27 is non-technical and doesn’t seem to have 
anything to do with universals.   
11   “Ἐπεὶ δέ ἐστι τὰ μὲν καθόλου τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ δὲ καθ' ἕκαστον,  – λέγω δὲ 
καθόλου μὲν ὃ ἐπὶ πλειόνων πέφυκε κατηγορεῖσθαι, καθ' ἕκαστον δὲ ὃ μή, οἷον ἄνθρωπος μὲν 
τῶν καθόλου Καλλίας δὲ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστον…” (17a38-b1)  
12   I do not mean to suggest that Aristotle always uses ‘pragma’ to indicate things or states of 
affairs rather than linguistic or propositional entities, but I take him to be doing so in this passage.   
13   In support of this claim, see e.g. Ackrill (1963), Owen (1965), Irwin (1988). Against this claim 
see Apostle Aristotle's Categories and Propositions (De Interpretatione) (1980).    161 
  As Terence Irwin (1988) notes, the phrase ‘that which is of a nature to be 
predicated of a plurality of things’ (‘ho epi pleionôn pephuke katêgoreisthai’) is 
ambiguous.
14 In using ‘pephuke katêgoreisthai’ Aristotle can mean either that 
something is naturally disposed to be predicated (whether or not it is actually 
predicated) of a plurality, or that it is by nature actually predicated (i.e. must be 
predicated) of a number of things. Irwin argues for the latter reading, which requires 
that a universal be predicated of more than one thing whenever it exists. As evidence 
for his reading, Irwin points to Categories 14a7-9, where Aristotle says, “If everyone 
were healthy, health would exist but not sickness; and if everything were white 
whiteness would exist but not blackness.”
15 It is clear from this passage that Aristotle 
takes instantiation by at least one thing to be necessary for the existence of a universal. 
Furthermore, it seems clear that Aristotle allows universals to go out of existence. On 
the reasonable assumption that an individual living in a world where everyone is 
healthy could become sick, Aristotle would also allow universals to come into 
existence.  
Irwin argues that a reading of De Interpretatione 17a38-b1, which requires 
only possible plural instantiation of universals, conflicts with the Categories 14a6-10 
demand that universals actually be instantiated.
16 However, it is not immediately clear 
that these requirements conflict. It seems perfectly consistent for Aristotle to demand 
in one place that a universal be instantiated to exist, and for him to maintain in another 
place that only universals are the sorts of things that can be predicated of a plurality of 
objects. 
                                                 
14   See Irwin (1988), pp. 78-82, and the corresponding endnotes. 
15   ὑγιαινόντων γὰρ ἁπάντων ὑγίεια μὲν ἔσται, νόσος δὲ οὔ· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ λευκῶν ὄντων 
ἁπάντων λευκότης μὲν ἔσται, μελανία δὲ οὔ. (14a7-9) 
16   I talk about a particular’s “instantiating” a universal. However, we should keep in mind that all 
such talk will be analyzed by Aristotle in terms of his own fundamental relations, inherence and the 
said-of relation.    162 
  Irwin does not present an argument for his claim that the possible plural 
instantiation reading conflicts with the demand for actual instantiation in the 
Categories. However, perhaps he has something like the following argument in mind. 
Take these two principles:  
(PPI) Something is a universal if and only if it is possible that it be plurally 
instantiated.  
(NI) There are no uninstantiated universals.  
(PPI) and (NI) are not inconsistent in themselves. However, they are mutually 
inconsistent with:  
(INT) There is an object that is both uninstantiated and possibly plurally 
instantiated.  
The existence of such an object would be a counterexample to one of our principles—
it would be a universal according to (PPI) but couldn’t be a universal according to 
(NI). Notice, we need (INT), which is an existential claim, if we are going to argue 
that (PPI) and (NI) cannot both be true. It is not enough for it to be the case that, e.g., 
there are situations where nobody is sick but where it is still true to say ‘It is possible 
that sickness belongs to more than one person.’ The proponent of (PPI) and (NI) could 
accept that the latter claim is true, but deny that this involves any commitment to the 
actual existence of the universal sickness. We can represent the distinction here as a 
matter of scope. “There is an x, such that x is not instantiated by anything, and it is 
possible that x is instantiated by many things,” is incompatible with (PPI) and (NI). 
Nevertheless, Aristotle could accept both of the following claims along with (PPI) and 
(NI): “It is not the case that anything is sick,” and “It is possible that sickness belong 
to many things.” He must require that the latter claim be taken as a de dicto and not as 
a de re possibility claim, so that it does not commit us to the existence of an object, 
sickness, which satisfies the open formula ‘x possibly belongs to many things.’    163 
It seems to me that the right response for the proponent of (PPI) and (NI) 
would be simply to deny (INT). I see no compelling non-theoretical reason for holding 
(INT). Rather, it seems that whether we accept or reject (INT) will depend on what 
theory of universals we end up endorsing. So it is open to an interpreter to accept both 
(PPI) as an interpretation of the De Interpretatione passage, and to accept (NI) on the 
basis of Categories 14a6-10.
17 
  Furthermore, as a result of taking the De Interpretatione passage to require 
actual plural instantiation of universals, Irwin is led to some problematic conclusions. 
For example, he tells us that Aristotle needs to recognize a class of entities called 
‘properties’, which will be particular at some times and universal at others. For 
example, the property of being sick will exist and be a universal whenever there is 
more than one sick person, and will continue to exist when there is only one sick 
person but will cease to be universal and will become a particular. I have two worries 
about these sorts of entities. First of all, I have an intuition that universality and 
particularity are essential attributes of things. I don’t see how we could say of a 
particular thing that it might have existed without being a particular, and I don’t see 
how a thing can remain the very same entity when it goes from being a particular to 
being a universal.
18 Second, while Aristotle clearly accepts particulars and universals, 
there is no textual evidence that Aristotle accepts properties as a class of beings apart 
                                                 
17   In fact, it might be too much to require even possible plural instantiation. Aristotle seems to 
recognize a universal being-the-universe, and holds that there could never be more than one universe. 
See the distinction between this universe (hode ho ouranos) and universe in general (ho ouranos 
haplos) in De Caelo (278a13ff). I discuss this case further below. Accordingly ‘pephuke’ should not be 
taken to require metaphysical possibility, but only tells us what something’s own nature is like. I might 
be of a nature to do something, even though external circumstances make it impossible for me to ever 
do x. This might even be true if the external circumstances exist of necessity.  
18   There might be an argument here from the necessity of identity. This particular thing could not 
have existed without being this thing. When we consider any non-particular, however, it is unclear that 
we are considering an entity that is numerically the same as this particular.    164 
from particulars and universals.
19 So, I think that there are both textual and 
philosophical reasons to deny that Aristotle accepts anything like properties in Irwin’s 
sense. However, we seem to be able to hold that actual plural instantiation is necessary 
only by accepting properties.
20 Therefore, we should require only possible plural 
instantiation. Aristotle holds that universals are the sorts of things that can be 
predicated of a plurality of subjects, and he also holds that a universal cannot exist 
unless it has at least one instance. I now turn to some texts showing that Aristotle takes 
universals to be wholes containing particulars as parts.  
  The word Aristotle uses for universal, ‘katholou’, is a technical term derived 
from the preposition ‘kata’ (concerning), and the word for whole, ‘holos’. Aristotle’s 
most common phrase for particular is ‘to kath’ hekaston’ (‘the as concerns each’), but 
he sometimes uses ‘kata meros’ (‘as concerns part’) as a synonym for ‘kath’ 
hekaston’.
21 There is some reason to think that universals are wholes of which 
particulars are parts just on the basis of the words that he uses in talking about each. 
Furthermore, there is evidence in Metaphysics D that Aristotle is not using whole-part 
terminology non-standardly, but rather fully intends us to think of universals and 
particulars as wholes and parts.  
                                                 
19   Irwin pg. 83, agrees that “Aristotle does not recognize such a thing as being a man, distinct 
from the particular and the universal; but he seems to need it…” If I am right, however, there is no need 
for Aristotle to countenance such an entity.   
20   In the discussion of ontological priority in chapters 9 and 10, we will see that rejection of the 
actual plural instantiation view comes with a certain cost. Irwin is able to hold that an individual is not 
existentially dependent on its species. Socrates could exist independently of the universal human, since 
if Socrates were the only human, the universal would not exist. If we accept the view that I adopt here, 
that human would exist if Socrates were the only human, then Socrates seems to be existentially 
dependent on the species.   
21   One nice example is at Physics 189a5-10, where Aristotle in the course of a single sentence 
switches from use of ‘kath’ hekaston’ to ‘kata meros’, clearly intending the two as synonyms. For other 
examples, see Bonitz Index Aristotelicus pp.455-456. Aristotle also uses ‘epi merous’ as a synonym for 
‘kath’ hekaston’. See Nicomachean Ethics 1107a30ff, and Bonitz op.cit.   165 
In D.25, for example, Aristotle tells us that the species is both a portion 
(‘morion’) and a part (‘meros’) of its superordinate genus.
22 We should note that both 
species and genera are universals, and genera are said-of their species according to the 
Categories. Aristotle also tells us in D.26 that the universal is a sort of whole in the 
course of a general discussion of what it is for something to be a whole:  
That is called whole (1) which is a thing from which no part is missing 
out of which it in naturally said to be a whole, or (2) that which 
encompasses the things encompassed so that the latter are some one 
thing. And this (i.e. the encompassment) is two-fold. For either as (2a) 
each (of the things encompassed) are one, or as (2b) one thing from 
these (many things encompassed).  (2a) For, on the one hand, the 
universal and what is said wholly as being some whole is universal in 
this sense: as a thing encompassing many by being predicated of each 
and by all of their being one taken individually. For example, man, 
horse, god, because all are living things.
23 (1023b26-32) 
Aristotle first points out two main senses of ‘whole’, (1) and (2). The first sense of 
‘whole’ belongs to things that are missing none of their parts (1). The second sense of 
‘whole’ is the one that we need to focus on here. Aristotle tells us that a whole is 
something that encompasses things in a way that makes the things encompassed some 
one thing (2). Aristotle next distinguishes two ways in which something can 
                                                 
22   1023b17ff: “Further, that into which a species might be divided without being quantity, are 
said to be portions of it, which is why they say that the species is a portion of the genus.” (“ἔστι δ' ὡς 
οὔ. ἔτι εἰς ἃ τὸ εἶδος διαιρεθείη ἂν ἄνευ τοῦ ποσοῦ, καὶ ταῦτα μόρια λέγεται τούτου· διὸ τὰ 
εἴδη τοῦ γένους φασὶν εἶναι μόρια.”) 
1023b22-25: “Further, the things which are in the formula making clear what each thing is [are 
parts]. Which is why the genus is part of the species, but in another way the species is part of the 
genus.” (“ἔτι τὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ δηλοῦντι ἕκαστον, καὶ ταῦτα μόρια τοῦ ὅλου· διὸ τὸ γένος τοῦ 
εἴδους καὶ μέρος λέγεται, ἄλλως δὲ τὸ εἶδος τοῦ γένους μέρος.” 
23   “Ὅλον λέγεται οὗ τε (1) μηθὲν ἄπεστι μέρος ἐξ ὧν λέγεται ὅλον φύσει, καὶ (2) τὸ 
περιέχον τὰ περιεχόμενα ὥστε ἕν τι εἶναι ἐκεῖνα· τοῦτο δὲ διχῶς· (2a) ἢ γὰρ ὡς ἕκαστον ἓν ἢ 
(2b) ὡς ἐκ τούτων τὸ ἕν. (2a) τὸ μὲν γὰρ καθόλου, καὶ τὸ ὅλως λεγόμενον ὡς ὅλον τι ὄν, οὕτως 
ἐστὶ καθόλου ὡς πολλὰ περιέχον τῷ κατηγορεῖσθαι καθ' ἑκάστου καὶ ἓν ἅπαντα εἶναι ὡς 
ἕκαστον, οἷον ἄνθρωπον ἵππον θεόν, διότι ἅπαντα ζῷα·”(1023b26-32, reference numbers added) 
The point of Aristotle’s example at 1023b32 is a bit unclear. He might be saying that animal (to zôon) is 
a universal, because it encompasses human, horse, and god, where each of these is one taken 
individually. Ross (1924) and Kirwan (1971) both take the passage in this way. As an alternative, we 
might take the example as saying that human, horse, and god are universals, because they each 
encompass things that are single living things (zôon), human so encompasses the individual humans, 
and so on.   
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encompass things in the way definitive of a whole. First, a thing might be a whole by 
encompassing things each of which is one taken individually (2a). Second, a thing 
might encompass several things that together make up a single whole (2b). As an 
example of the second case (2b), we might have a human body. The various parts of 
the human body make up one human body, but the hand and the leg are not single 
human bodies taken individually. Universals are wholes of the first type (2a). A 
universal encompasses many things by being predicated of each of them, where each 
of these things taken individually is one thing. For example, the universal human is a 
whole by being predicated of each of the many individual humans, each of which 
taken individually is one thing. The contrast between wholes of type (2a) and wholes 
of type (2b) is that the former are what we might call ‘distributive wholes’, while the 
latter are ‘collective wholes’.  
  Universals are distributive rather than collective wholes. To get clearer on the 
distinction here, think about the universal human, and its relation to each of the 
particular humans. And contrast this with the relation that a human body bears to its 
parts. Each of the individual humans is one single human being. It is not the case, 
however, that each of the organs of a human body is a single human body. The various 
organs of a body form a pretty diverse collection of things, and these things must be 
integrated in a certain way to form one body. The various individual human beings, 
considered apart from their various accidents, form a homogeneous collection of 
things, and the existence of the universal does not require that they be integrated with 
one another in any way. At any given time, the species universal that encompasses the 
individual members of the species seems like a collection of perfectly similar atoms.   
  When we get to the higher genera, the story is a bit more complicated, since 
the various individual animals of different species are not perfectly similar to each 
other. However, animal resolves into parts, each of which resolves into perfectly   167 
similar parts. Furthermore, the immediate parts of animal, the various animal species, 
are presumably more similar to each other than any of them is to something outside 
the genus of animal. Furthermore, it seems that animal is a distributive whole in that 
each of the animal species count as a single animal-type, and each of the individual 
animals counts as a single animal-token.   
  While I think that we have seen some reason to think that Aristotle takes the 
relation between particulars and universals to be some sort of part-whole relation, it is 
still not clear exactly what the nature of this relation is. In the sections that follow, I 
try to get clearer about the nature of this part-whole relation.  
Section 7.3: Are Aristotelian Universals Classes? 
  In his commentary on Metaphysics D.26, Christopher Kirwan (1993) tells us 
that Aristotle takes universals to be wholes in the way that the class of all living things 
is a whole. The class of living things has particular men, horses, gods, etc., as 
members. On such a view, the said-of relation is a class-membership relation. Kirwan 
also analyzes the claim that species are parts of genera in D.25 in terms of classes, and 
understands parthood in that chapter in terms of class-inclusion.  
  Irwin (1988) considers whether, when Aristotle tells us in the Categories that 
particulars belong in species and genera, he intends us to think of the relation between 
primary and secondary substances as class-membership.
24 Irwin argues that Aristotle 
cannot take universals simply to be classes, because classes are purely extensional 
with respect to their members while universals are not. For example, Irwin claims that 
the class of grammarians is identical to the class of human beings, since Aristotle takes 
all and only humans to be capable of grammar. However, Aristotle does not take the 
universal grammarian to be identical to the universal human. Universals cannot, 
                                                 
24   For other suggestions that Aristotle takes the universal-particular relation to be class-
membership, see Lloyd (1966), Ackrill (1963).   168 
according to this argument, be identical to classes. The argument in question mirrors 
what David Armstrong calls the “Coextension Problem” for class nominalism.
25  
  However, even on the assumption that Aristotle regards universals as classes, I 
do not think that Aristotle’s account of universals will fall victim to this objection. If 
Aristotle were to hold that universals are classes, he would be likely to hold that they 
are classes of the things that they are said-of. So, non-substantial universals would be 
classes of non-substantial particulars rather than classes of substances. Grammatical is 
not said-of Socrates, but rather of the NSP-grammaticality that inheres in Socrates. On 
the other hand, human is said-of Socrates. The full story here is a bit more complex. 
Take the sentence, “Socrates is grammatical”. The truthmaker for this sentence is the 
inherence of an NSP-grammaticality in Socrates. There will be a universal in the 
category of quality said-of this NSP-grammaticality, the universal grammaticality. 
There will also be a universal in the category of Substance said-of Socrates, human. In 
addition to the simple particulars, Socrates and the NSP-grammaticality, there will 
exist what Aristotle calls a compound (sunkeimenon), the grammatical man (or 
grammarian).
26 Aristotle might accept that there is a class of grammarians, where this 
is a class of compound entities, but this will be identical neither to the class of humans 
nor to the class of NSP-grammaticalities.
27 An interpretation of universals as classes 
                                                 
25   See Armstrong (1978) 25-36, (1989) 25-26.  
26   Aristotle most clearly lays out this ontology in the course of his discussion of change in 
Physics I.7. I argue that the same ontology underlies Aristotle’s thoughts in the Categories, and that the 
Physics gives conclusive evidence of Aristotle’s acceptance of non-substantial particulars. The 
compounds in question are similar to what Gareth Matthews (1982) calls “kooky objects”, but 
Matthews does not seem committed to the claim that these kooky objects are compounds of particulars. 
See chapter 4 for additional discussion of some of these issues.   
27   I doubt that Aristotle will take there to be a genuine universal corresponding to this class, if we 
think of grammarians as compounds of grammaticality and a substance. Since I doubt that 
‘grammarian’ refers to a single thing that is, unless it refers to the individual human being that is 
grammatical, I doubt that Aristotle will hold that there is a genuine species of grammarians. I think that 
Aristotle will have, in Armstrong’s terminology, a sparse view about universals, on which not every 
general term will correspond to a real universal.    169 
need not, therefore, fall to the co-extension problem.
28 Furthermore, we have not yet 
been given a reason to deny that universals are extensional. 
  This is not to say that there are no problems with taking universals to be 
classes of particulars. In the Categories, Aristotle asserts that the said-of relation is 
transitive. But class-membership is not transitive. Ackrill (1963) criticizes Aristotle on 
this score. Ackrill argues that “[Aristotle] does not distinguish between the relation of 
an individual to its species and that of a species to its genus.” Kirwan also accuses 
Aristotle of failing to distinguish between class-membership and class-inclusion in his 
discussion of part and whole in Metaphysics D.25-26. However, to accuse Aristotle of 
such an oversight makes sense only if we think that he takes universals to be classes. It 
is equally plausible, and more charitable, to take Aristotle’s assertion that the said-of 
relation is transitive to signal that he does not take universals to be classes of 
particulars.
29 Furthermore, as we will see below, universals seem to be said-of 
different things at different times, and could be said-of different things than they are 
actually said-of, while classes seem to contain their members essentially.  
Section 7.4: Are Aristotelian Universals Mereological Fusions? 
                                                 
28   On the interpretation that I put forward, Aristotle’s universals are more similar to classes of 
tropes than to classes of thick particulars. See Armstrong (1989) for a discussion of the advantages of 
such a view over traditional class nominalism.  
29   Notice that it will be equally problematic to take the said-of relation to be a class-inclusion 
relation. Inclusion is transitive, but no particular can be included in a class (unless we think that 
particulars are themselves classes, which is implausible). We might attempt to save the class construal 
of universals by holding that the said-of relation is a disjunctive relation: either the converse of class-
inclusion or the converse of class-membership. Alternatively, we could define the said-of relation in 
terms of the ancestral of class-membership, is a member of or is a member of a member of or …. While 
these suggestions might work formally, I do not think that there are good grounds for attributing either 
position to Aristotle. Ultimately I think that the problem with understanding universals to be classes is 
that universals seem to have different identity conditions than classes do. Universals endure through 
time and are said of different particulars at different times. Classes, however, seem to contain exactly 
the members that they do essentially. Nevertheless, the fact that universals are distributive wholes does 
seem to give evidence that they are more akin to sets than to sums. I discuss this issue a bit further in 
chapter 8. Furthermore, the fact that a universal with a single instance can be nonidentical to that 
instance also seems to count as evidence that they are more like sets than sums. There are several issues 
here that merit further treatment.    170 
  As an alternative to the class-theoretic way of understanding the said-of 
relation, we might hold that Aristotle takes the relation between universals and 
particulars to be something like the parthood relation discussed in mereology.
30 
Species will be parts of genera, and will have particulars as parts. Furthermore, 
individuals will themselves be parts of genera. Since parthood is straightforwardly 
transitive, this construal will not run afoul of Aristotle’s claim that the said-of relation 
is transitive. Aristotle does not take the said-of relation to be reflexive, since the 
Categories clearly recognizes entities that are not said-of any subject. As a result, the 
sort of parthood involved in the said-of relation cannot allow that all things are parts of 
themselves. For present purposes, I think that we can go further, and say that Aristotle 
takes the said-of relation to be irreflexive.
31  
  What emerges is a picture of the said-of relation as irreflexive, transitive, and 
asymmetric. Furthermore, there are some entities that are not said-of anything, while 
other things are said-of them. In these respects the said-of relation is formally akin to 
the converse of the proper-parthood relation of classical mereology, in which the 
entities that are said-of nothing act as mereological atoms. Aristotle, in fact, uses the 
term ‘atomos’ (atomic/uncut) to describe entities that are not said-of anything. On this 
view, primary substances and nonsubstantial particulars are atoms, and universals are 
                                                 
30   See Leonard and Goodman “The Calculus of Individuals and its Uses” (1940) for a 
presentation of the classical theory of mereology. See also Part I of Peter Simons Parts (1987), Peter 
van Inwagen, Material Beings (1990), and David Lewis Parts of Classes (1991) for in depth discussions 
of the nature of the part-whole relation. Part of what I want to claim in this chapter relies on my view 
that there is not a single well-characterized relation that deserves to be called the part-whole relation. In 
this view, I follow Simons (1987) and Kit Fine “Compounds and Aggregates” (1994), and “Things and 
Their Parts” (1999). Aristotle takes the relation between universals and particulars to be a different 
relation than the parthood relation talked about in classical mereology. Nevertheless, I think that it is 
legitimate to say that Aristotle takes particulars to be parts of universals.  
31   I am not fully confident about this claim. See chapters 2 and 4 of this work.  Aristotle tells us 
that if both the name of definition of one entity are properly linguistically-predicated of another, then 
the first is said-of the second. Since it seems that every entity that has a definition and a name will be 
such that its name and definition can properly be linguistically-predicated of it, the said-of relation 
would seem to be reflexive on its restriction to entities with definitions. On the other hand, Aristotle 
might really intend that predication involves distinct entities, and I can think of no case where he 
predicates a thing of itself.   171 
wholes, which have these as proper parts. Construing the said-of relation 
mereologically, therefore, allows us to capture some of the logical features of the 
relation. We get the following analyses of the said-of relation and universality. 
(OF1) ∀x∀y (x is said-of y iff y is a proper part of x). 
  (UN1)  ∀x(x is a universal iff ∃y(x is said-of y)). 
It will be helpful to have a more precise formulation of mereology to begin this 
discussion. Following David Lewis in Parts of Classes, we can state the axioms of 
mereology in a language containing both the singular constructions, familiar from 
first-order logic with identity, and plural constructions.
32 We have plural constants, 
e.g. ‘the fs’; plural variables, e.g. ‘xs’, and plural quantifiers ‘there are some xs such 
that….’. We also have a primitive two-place predicate ‘___ is among__’ (Axy(s)) 
which takes a singular term in the first argument place, and either a singular or a plural 
term in the second argument place. We will also take as primitive a two-place 
predicate, which can take only singular terms as arguments, ‘__is part of__’ (Pxy). We 
will then define a the predicates ‘__ overlaps__’ (Oxy) and ‘___ is a fusion of ___’ 
(Fxys) in terms of ‘is among’, ‘is a part of’ and identity. 
x is a proper part of y =def (Pxy & x≠y) 
x overlaps y =def ∃z(Pzx & Pzy) 
x is a fusion of the ys =def ∀z(Azys ⊃ Pzx) & ∀w(Pwx ⊃ ∃u(Auys & Owu)).
33 
                                                 
32   My presentation here closely follows that of Byeong-Uk Yi “Is Mereology Ontologically 
Innocent” (1999). See also Lewis (1991), van Inwagen (1990), and Sider “Parthood” (2007). A whole 
family of formulations of mereology can be found in Simons (1987). Simons is sympathetic to the view 
that there is no one logic of the part-whole relation. Rather there is a family of different relations 
governed by different axioms. For example, Simons thinks that the Principle of Unrestricted 
Composition below is controversial. Van Inwagen and Merricks, for example, deny the principle of 
unrestricted mereological composition. For more on plural quantification, and different ways to 
interpret it, see  George Boolos, “To Be Is To Be a Value of a Variable (or to Be Some Values of Some 
Variables)” (1984), and“Nominalist Platonism” (1985). See also Byeong-Uk Yi “The Logic and 
Meaning of Plurals: Part I” (2005) Yi “The Logic and Meaning of Plurals: Part II” (2006).  
33   Following, Simons (1987) I understand all unbound variables to be bound by universal 
quantifiers taking widest possible scope. As it stands right now the predicate ‘__is a fusion of__’ 
requires a plural term as the second argument. We might want to hold that every object is a fusion of   172 
Lewis takes mereology to be defined by the following axioms.  
  (A1-3) ‘__is a part of__’ is transitive, reflexive, and antisymmetric.
34  
(A4) Unrestricted Mereological Composition: If there are some xs, then there 
is a y such that y is a fusion of the xs.   
 
(A5) Uniqueness of Composition: If there are some xs and y and z are both 
fusions of the xs, then y=z. 
If we accept the conception of parthood defined by these axioms, there are five 
problems with the mereological interpretation of the said-of relation presented by 
(OF1) and (UN1). First, given axiom (A4), we are going to end up with many 
universals that Aristotle would not accept. Second, there seem to be cases where one 
thing is a proper part of another, but where the second is not said-of the first. Third, it 
seems that Aristotle will accept cases where a universal is said-of precisely one thing, 
but even a system as weak as Simons’ Minimal Extensional Mereology will not allow 
a thing to have one proper part. Fourth, the parthood relation defined above is 
extensional, and it is impossible for two distinct objects to have all the same atomic 
parts. On the other hand, Aristotle seems to be able to allow that distinct universals 
can have all the same atomic parts.
35 I take a fifth problem to be closely related to the 
fourth. While the axioms above say nothing about what is possible or necessary of 
mereological fusions, the mereological fusions defined by the above axioms seem to 
be the sorts of entities that have the parts they do essentially. Aristotle, however, does 
                                                                                                                                           
itself. We might express this by introducing a plural term whenever we have a single object, say that 
object and itself. See Yi(1999). 
34   Improper parts are included as parts in the statement of these axioms. Since it is plausible to 
say that every object overlaps itself, and that at least some objects might have no proper parts, the 
definitions of “fusion” and “overlap” above assume that we are including improper parts as parts. If we 
want to eliminate improper parts as parts then we would have to change the definitions of fusion and 
overlap accordingly, and say that parthood is irreflexive and asymmetric. Although I take the said-of 
relation to resemble proper parthood more closely than parthood, I do not think that we lose anything in 
the way of clarity by going with Lewis’ statement of mereology. Furthermore, the added complexity 
involved in stating everything in terms of proper parthood and identity is significant.  
35   Nevertheless, Aristotle can accept the claim that no two universals are said-of all the same 
objects. In this way, he can give non-duplication conditions for universals in terms of the said-of 
relation.    173 
not take it to be essential to universals that they be said-of the particulars of which 
they are actually said. I discuss the first three objections in the remainder of this 
section. In the next section (VII.5), I turn to questions about extensionality and 
essentiality as these apply to the said-of relation.  
I take the combined force of these objections to rule out a conception of the 
said-of relation in terms of the parthood relation defined by (A1)-(A5). Nevertheless, I 
think that Aristotle does understand universals to be wholes of which particulars are 
parts. Therefore, in section VII.6 I suggest that we need to attribute to Aristotle a 
conception of parthood other than that defined by (A1)-(A5).  Furthermore, I think that 
the resulting conception of parthood is a reasonable one, and is closely related to the 
sense in which a composite enduring material objects has different material parts at 
different moments of its existence.  
Any theory that attempts to characterize universals as mereological fusions 
will run into the problem that fusions seem to be too metaphysically cheap. The 
problem in question is familiar from arguments against class-nominalist analyses of 
universals.
36 (A4) requires that there is a fusion corresponding to every plurality. For 
example, there is the fusion (or class) containing every object in this room whose 
ordinary English name begins with the letter ‘A’. Intuitively, however, there does not 
seem to be a genuine universal corresponding to this fusion. Universals, therefore, 
cannot be fusions as defined above.  Furthermore, Aristotle is not going to accept that 
whenever we have a collection of entities, there exists something that is said-of all and 
                                                 
36   See Armstrong (1978) and (1989). There are two responses to this objection against class-
nominalism considered by Armstrong. (1) We can hold that only classes that are primitively natural 
count as universals. The first reply has some similarity with the sort of line taken by Lewis in “New 
Work for a Theory of Universals”. (2) We can hold that only classes where the members perfectly 
resemble one another count as universals. The second reply works nicely in conjunction with the claim 
that universals are classes of tropes rather than of thick particulars.    174 
only those entities.
37 (OF1) and (UN1), therefore, cannot be true, if we understand 
parthood in terms of (A1)-(A5).
38  
There are two lines of reply to the above objection. We might say that 
universals are mereological fusions, but deny unrestricted mereological composition 
(i.e. deny that axiom (A4) is part of the proper characterization of mereology). On the 
other hand, we might accept that unrestricted composition is true when it comes to the 
existence of mereological fusions, but deny that universals are fusions. We might, 
nevertheless, hold that classical mereology as defined by (A1)-(A5) deals with one of 
a variety of types of parthood. So while universals are not fusions of particulars, 
particulars are still parts of universals. I will consider each of these lines of reply, and 
argue that the second is preferable both on philosophical grounds and as an 
interpretation of Aristotle.  
In support of the first sort of reply, we can point out that Aristotle seems to 
require that every whole be a type of unity.
39 In the case of material objects, Aristotle 
denies that every haphazard collection of entities will be unified in the right way to 
constitute a whole. Thus Aristotle thinks that a heap is not the same thing as a whole.
40  
One way of interpreting Aristotle’s thought on heaps and wholes would be to hold that 
he does not really think that heaps exist. Rather, the various entities that we normally 
take to constitute a heap in reality do not constitute anything at all. If we think that 
Aristotle denies unrestricted mereological composition in the case of material objects 
like heaps, then it seems natural for him to deny UMC when it comes to universals. 
Only those collections of particulars that form real unities exist. While Aristotle denies 
                                                 
37   I do not think that Aristotle will accept even the weaker claim that a universal exists that is 
said-of every entity in such a diverse group. It does not seem that Aristotle accepts the existence of a 
universal like entityhood. Whether Aristotle accepts universals corresponding to the categories, 
substance, quality, etc. is a matter of some controversy.   
38   A variety of this problem will also beset any attempt to understand universals as classes.  
39   See Metaphysics D.26. 
40   See Aristotle’s discussion in Metaphysics Z.17.    175 
that universals are one in number, he does want to hold that each universal is unified 
by being one in species or genus.
41 Only collections that exhibit this sort of oneness 
will constitute universals. However, the haphazard collections considered above will 
not exhibit any type of unity, and will therefore not be genuine wholes according to 
Aristotle.
42 In other words, Aristotle will not think that there exists any entity which is 
the fusion of all and only the things in the room that have an English name beginning 
with ‘A’. Since there is no such fusion, we are free to retain (OF1) and (UN1), without 
being committed to the existence of any bizarre universals. 
I think that there are both interpretative and philosophical reasons to be 
uncomfortable with the line of response offered above. First of all, mereology in the 
sense outlined by (A1)-(A5) seems to me to be as close to ontological innocence as we 
can get.  David Lewis (1991) suggests that accepting the existence of the fusion of a 
and b does not carry any further ontological commitment than did accepting the 
existence of a and b in the first place. Lewis claims that composition is (at least in a 
sense) identity. Take the sentence “a and b just are their fusion.” Lewis suggests that 
the ‘are’ in this sentence (which he calls ‘the ‘are’ of composition’) is the plural form 
of the ‘is’ of identity.
43 Just as when c is identical to d, the acceptance of c and d 
                                                 
41   See Aristotle’s discussion of specific and generic sameness and oneness in the Topics, 
especially in I.7. See also, Metaphysics Z.13. On the grounds that universals are not “thises”, Aristotle 
denies that they are substances. I think that we can reconcile what he says in Z.13 with what he says in 
the Categories if we think that Aristotle is only denying that universals can be primary substances in the 
Z.13 passage. But any substantial discussion of the issues raised by Metaphysics Z is beyond the scope 
of this project. 
42   There are some similarities between what I say here and Cresswell’s (1975) view. Cresswell 
suggests that there is a primitive dyadic relation =s, which is the relation of specific sameness. This 
relation divides up the world into equivalence classes corresponding to each of the species. To be a 
given species is then definable in terms of an individual, and the class of things bearing =s to it. On the 
position that I am considering, the said-of relation is the primitive relation by which certain particulars 
constitute certain species and genera. Sameness in species is then defined in terms of two things’ 
belonging to a single whole. I think that these positions are, to an extent, formal variants of one another. 
However, I think that Aristotle clearly takes sameness of species to be definable, and species-hood to be 
primitive.   
43   See Lewis (1991) pages 81ff.    176 
doesn’t go beyond the acceptance of c, when a and b are the fusion ab, the acceptance 
of ab doesn’t go beyond the acceptance of a and b.  
I am not sure that whether it is true to claim that the fusion ab just is a and b.
44 
It seems to me that the fusion is neither of the parts, and that acceptance of the fusion 
requires the acceptance of something that isn’t either of the parts that we accepted.
45 
Nevertheless, as Sider (2007) points out, the relation of composition, like the relation 
of identity, seems to be a particularly ‘intimate’ relation.
46 Even if a mereological 
fusion is not identical to its parts, it still seems to be the case that it isn’t anything 
‘over and above’ or distinct from its parts.
  Fusions don’t seem to be distinct from their 
parts in the way that most non-identical objects are distinct from one another.
47 
Composition seems to be somewhere between complete identity and complete 
distinctness.
48  
Correspondingly, accepting the fusion of some entities doesn’t involve an 
ontological commitment to anything wholly distinct from what I have already 
accepted. Once I accept a plurality of entities, accepting the fusion seems to involve 
                                                 
44   Even stating the position sounds weird. Van Inwagen (1994) argues that the claim that the 
fusion is identical to the things fused is simply incoherent since one thing can’t be identical to many. 
Against van Inwagen, both Byeong-Uk Yi (1999) and Sider (2007) argue that the thesis can be made 
coherent. Sider presents a rigorous analysis of the behavior of a plural identity predicate. Nevertheless, 
both Sider and Yi reject the thesis that y is composed of the xs only if y=the xs. Even Lewis is a bit 
circumspect in his claims. He often hedges, saying composition is ‘analogous to’ identity, or is ‘in a 
sense’ identity. He denies a position that he attributes to Baxter (1988) on which composition is more 
than just analogous to identity but actually is identity. 
45   This sort of argument is rigorously developed by Yi (1999). The person who, nevertheless, 
wants to maintain the thesis that composition is identity needs to say that while the fusion isn’t identical 
to either of the parts, it is identical to all the parts. I am really not decided on how this issue should 
ultimately be resolved.    
46   See Sider (2007). 
47   Lewis (1991) and Sider (2007) attempt to give a precise characterization of the senses in which 
composition is like identity and unlike relations between distinct objects.  
48   I don’t want to commit myself to the claim that composition is something like partial identity. 
Rather I think we might understand composition and what I am calling ‘complete distinctness’ as two 
different ways of being non-identical. See Lewis’s claim that identity and distinctness fall along a 
continuum of relations.     177 
only the acceptance that this plurality is properly treated as a single thing.
49 I have in 
mind something like the following story. I accept the existence of a number of cats. I 
then say that I think that there are a plurality of cats. Furthermore, I tell you that I 
think that this plurality of cats is a different plurality than the plurality of dogs.
50 I am 
now talking about various pluralities—this plurality, that plurality, etc. Now you ask 
me whether I believe that there are pluralities, and I say that I do. Furthermore, I start 
talking about pluralities and using singular terms for them. It seems to me that I have 
now accepted the existence of fusions.
51  
But if this is all that is involved in accepting the existence of a fusion, then it 
seems that whenever there are some things there will also be a fusion of those things. 
However, now we seem to have accepted the principle of unrestricted mereological 
composition.  On the other hand, if we do deny unrestricted composition, then we 
must think that there is more to the existence of a fusion than just the existence of 
some plurality of objects.
52   
                                                 
49   It, nevertheless, seems false to me to say that there is nothing involved in the existence of the 
whole other than the existence of the parts, since it seems wrong to say that many things can be 
identical to one thing. If we accept unrestricted composition, then we are committed to the existence of 
more things than we would have been. However, the addition to our ontology seems to me to be 
harmless. For further discussion of mereology, the principle of unrestricted composition, and related 
issues, see Lewis (1991) and “Noneism or Allism” (1990); Van Inwagen “The Doctrine of Arbitrary 
Undetached Parts” (1981), (1990) and (1994); Simons (1987); and Sider Four-Dimensionalism (2003) 
and “Parthood” (2007).    
50   Notice that this is a crucial step. I have gone from plurally quantifying over individual entities 
to singularly quantifying over pluralities of entities. The question that we need to ask is how much 
additional ontological commitment this step involves. I think that the correct answer to this question is: 
very little.   
51   This sounds something like the reasoning attributed to Baxter by Lewis. However, Baxter 
seems to take the position that composition just is identity. In other words, there is no further 
ontological commitment at all involved in the movement from talking about many things to talking 
about the one composed of that many. Lewis seems to think that mereology is completely innocent even 
though composition is really only analogous to identity. The position that I am trying to endorse here is 
that there is some further ontological commitment involved in taking the many to be one fusion, but that 
the added commitment is minimal. We need to make this commitment if we want to take sentences like 
“There are two different pluralities involved when we consider the dogs and the cats.” 
52   What I have in mind here is an argument from the ontological innocence of mereology to 
unrestricted composition. For some other arguments in favor of unrestricted composition, see Lewis 
(1990) & (1991), Sider (2003) & (2007). The most persuasive argument seems to be the argument from 
the vagueness of possible restrictions on composition and the non-vagueness of existence, to the failure   178 
Furthermore, while Aristotle does think that only certain objects count as 
unities, I do not think that he wants to deny the existence of all objects that are not 
unities. There is a subtle but important distinction to be made between two different 
views here. Take Aristotle’s discussion of the difference between heaps and wholes at 
Metaphysics Z.16 and 17. It is clear that he denies that heaps are really unities. 
However, this claim can amount to very different things depending on whether we 
take Aristotle to think that only unities exist. If Aristotle thinks that everything that 
exists is a unity, then he will deny that heaps actually exist. The various entities that 
make up a heap might exist, but the heap itself does not. We can compare this view 
about heaps with the claims made by Van Inwagen (1990) and Merricks Objects and 
Persons (2003) about ordinary middle-sized inanimate objects like chairs. These 
philosophers are nihilists about things like chairs, and claim that there are atoms 
arranged chair-wise, but that there is no chair composed by these atoms. In a similar 
way, we might take Aristotle to mean that there are things arranged heapwise but no 
heaps. The denial of unrestricted mereological composition seems to entail that we 
talk about heaps in this way.  
However, there are two problems with attributing the nihilist position to 
Aristotle. First of all, Aristotle doesn’t seem to deny that heaps and other non-
substances exist. Rather he seems to think that such things exist, but are somehow 
second-class objects. They are less fully real than substantial unities, but they are still 
real.
53 In Metaphysics Δ.6, Aristotle seems to think that unity is itself a matter of 
                                                                                                                                           
of such restrictions. The only coherent positions left according to this argument are (1) the position that 
there are no composites, or (2) the position that composition is unrestricted. But (1) is crazy, so (2) must 
be true.  
53   I am not really sure how to talk about degrees of reality. Reality seems to me to be an all or 
nothing sort of affair. Say that we take the sentence 
α is real
 to be true if and only if there is some way 
of restricting our quantifiers so that the sentence 
∃x(x=α)
 comes out as true. (If there is such a thing as 
fully unrestricted quantification, then take this as the way of restricting the quantifier in all cases.) I 
think that we should take even the least real things on Aristotle’s account to be real in this sense. Fuller   179 
degree. He tells us that the shin and the thigh are more of a unity than the leg, since the 
former do not bend. Nevertheless, I do not think that Aristotle wants to deny that the 
leg exists. Nor would he want to deny the existence of heaps.  
We now come to an interesting question as to whether Aristotle would accept 
the existence of scattered objects, which many fusions would be. Assume that 
Aristotle accepts the existence of a heap, but denies the existence of scattered objects. 
Then when I take a heap and divide it into two discontinuous smaller heaps, I destroy 
one object and bring into existence two new objects. But to borrow an argument made 
by Peter van Inwagen (1990) with respect to similar cases, it seems odd to say that 
splitting the heap in half has really brought anything into existence that wasn’t there 
already; I seem to have rearranged the world’s furniture, but not to have changed the 
inventory of that furniture.
54 But if I haven’t changed the inventory of the world by 
splitting the heap, then whatever existed before the split exists after the split. The only 
plausible candidate for something that exists both before and after the split is the 
fusion of the parts of the heap. But then fusions can exist in the case of scattered 
objects. 
  There is a further reason to worry about attributing to Aristotle a view on 
which entities arranged heapwise exist but heaps do not exist. Such a view seems to 
presuppose that the things that get arranged into heaps are themselves unities. 
                                                                                                                                           
degrees of reality can then be explained as minimal reality plus various other attributes, e.g. continuity, 
connectedness, functional organization, internal source of movement and change, etc.      
54   Van Inwagen (1990) uses these arguments to show that we cannot restrict composition to cases 
where some objects are in contact with each other. He wants to argue that fusions only exist in the case 
where some atoms are “caught up in a life”. I think that van Inwagen takes the wrong lesson from these 
cases. He seems to me to be right in saying that mere contact cannot bring new entities into existence. 
However, I take this to show that heaps are really nothing but fusions with parts that are in close 
proximity to each other. We can contrast this case with the case of true unities like organisms. In the 
case of an organism, there really is something new. But the new thing is not a fusion. The organism is 
not identical to the fusion of its parts. This seems to me to be the lesson that Aristotle wants us to take 
from these cases. The coming to be and perishing of substances really does change the number of things 
that exist in the world. The “coming to be” and “passing away” of heaps, or rocks, or even artifacts, on 
the other hand, are just rearrangements.    180 
However, Aristotle takes the only full unities to be substances, the paradigmatic case 
of which are living organisms. Grains of sand, while they are more unified than heaps, 
would not be taken to be substances by Aristotle. So Aristotle isn’t free to replace 
heaps with grains of sand arranged heapwise. If he accepted the existence of atoms, 
Aristotle might adopt a Democritean position and hold that these atoms were true 
unities. Heaps would be replaced with atoms arranged heapwise. However, Aristotle 
doesn’t accept the existence of atoms. Rather he thinks that matter is infinitely 
divisible. Therefore, the ‘arranged-heapwise’ line of reasoning is not available to 
Aristotle.  
  It might be helpful to look at another example. Take a situation in which we 
would normally say that there is a puddle of water on the ground. Someone like van 
Inwagen or Merricks will deny that the puddle exists. Nevertheless they think that the 
water molecules (or perhaps only the hydrogen and oxygen atoms making up those 
molecules) do exist. Something or at least some things exist where we normally locate 
the puddle. But Aristotle doesn’t believe that there are any smallest bits of water, and 
therefore will not think that any of the smaller parts of the puddle are any more of a 
unity than the original puddle. So, if Aristotle wants to claim that only substantial 
unities exist, he will have to deny that anything exists where we normally say that the 
puddle is. But this position seems utterly bizarre. Therefore, Aristotle can’t think that 
only substantial unities exist.
55 
Lots of the stuff in Aristotle’s world seems not to be organized into substantial 
unities. If only such unities existed, then we would have to deny the existence of a 
large chunk of the world. It seems unlikely, therefore, that Aristotle will require real 
                                                 
55   Any adequate treatment of how Aristotle treats masses and stuffs is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but I think that it is clear that Aristotle takes non-unities to exist and to be distinct from thises. 
The underlying stuff out of which person is constituted is not a unity in the way that the person is. 
Questions about the survival of stuffs through generation and destruction are particularly tricky.   181 
substantial unity to be a necessary condition for existence. It is more reasonable for 
Aristotle to hold that heaps exist, but that heaps are not real unities. The real unities 
will then be a subset of the entities that exist. On this view, Aristotle can accept 
unrestricted mereological composition—for every collection of entities there is 
something (the mereological fusion of those entities) that has all and only those 
entities as parts. He will not, however, accept unrestricted composition of real unities. 
It is not the case that whenever there is a plurality of objects there is a unity that has all 
and only those objects as parts.  
We can think about universals in a similar way. There might be mereological 
sums of particulars in all sorts of cases. But only in cases where those wholes that 
exhibit the right sort of unity will there be universals, and only in these cases will the 
whole be said-of the parts. We can thus accept unrestricted mereological composition, 
but deny unrestricted composition in the case of universals.
56 It follows, therefore, that 
the said-of relation is not the converse of the proper parthood relation defined in terms 
of (A1)-(A5) and identity.  
There are two different positions compatible with what has been said to this 
point. One position is that universality is fusion plus something else. In other words, 
not every fusion is a universal, but the fusions that meet certain further conditions are 
universals. So, for example, the fusion of all and only the humans is identical to the 
universal human. The other position is that universals are something other than 
fusions, and bear a different relation to their parts than fusions do. So there is the 
fusion of all and only the humans, and there is the universal human, which is not 
identical to the fusion of the humans. To be committed to universals is, therefore, to be 
                                                 
56   In other words it is true that ∀x∀y∃z(x is a proper part of z and y is a proper part of z), but it is 
not true that ∀x∀y∃z(z is said-of x and z is said-of y).    182 
committed to something more than just fusions.
57 I think that an examination to the 
remaining objections to the mereological interpretation of the said-of relation will 
show that Aristotle favors the second sort of view. I turn to those other objections 
now.  
Although Aristotle says that particulars are atomic, he thinks that many of 
them have parts. An individual human being, for example, clearly has arms and legs as 
parts. However, Aristotle will not want to say that the universal human is said-of these 
parts, since a leg is not a human being. As a result, it seems that neither (OF1) nor 
(UN1) can be true, if parthood is understood as the single relation defined by (A1)-
(A5) above. It seems that we can best respond to this objection by holding that 
Aristotle recognizes distinct varieties of parthood, and takes the parthood relation 
involved in (OF1) and (UN1) to be a different relation than the one holding between 
my leg and me. It seems clear that Aristotle recognizes distinct varieties of atomicity. 
Aristotle claims that primary substances and non-substantial particulars are atomic, but 
takes many of the former to have parts. Accordingly, it seems that having parts in one 
sense is compatible with having no parts in another.
58 Let’s call the parthood relation 
which holds between the universal human and Socrates: parthood1. Socrates is atomic1 
in the sense that he has no parts1. And let’s call the relation holding between Socrates’ 
leg and Socrates: parthood2.
59 While Aristotle will hold that each parthood relation is 
transitive, he will deny the validity of the following inference. 
Socrates is a part1 of human.  
                                                 
57   In a similar fashion, I think that cats are not simply a special subset of fusions. Cats are not 
identical to the fusions of their parts. Cats aren’t fusions at all. Nevertheless, my cat is a certain kind of 
whole and has certain atoms as parts. Therefore, there are things other than mereological fusions that 
wholes with atoms as parts.    
58   Michael Frede makes a similar point that Aristotle recognizes different varieties of parthood, 
but takes this point in a very different way than I do. See my discussion of Frede (1972) in chapter 4. 
59   By recognizing distinct varieties of parthood, Aristotle has a position contrary to that endorsed 
by Lewis (1991) and Sider (2007), who claim that there is only one parthood relation.    183 
Socrates’ leg is a part2 of Socrates.  
∴ Socrates’ leg is a part1 of human. 
Being a part2 of something is not sufficient for being a part1 of that thing, and 
universals do not have the parts2 of their particulars as parts1. The kind of parthood 
involved in the said-of relation, parthood1, is a different sort of parthood than that 
holding between Socrates and his leg. We will get clearer on the nature of parthood1 
by examining other objections to the mereological interpretation of the said-of 
relation.  
The third objection to the mereological interpretation of the said-of relation 
arises from the fact that Aristotle seems to recognize cases in which there is precisely 
one particular that a universal is said-of. In De Caelo I.9, Aristotle considers the case 
of the universe. The universe is a particular, and is in the species universe. And 
Aristotle denies that the universe is identical to the species universe.
60 Furthermore, 
Aristotle does not even think that it is possible for there to be more than one member 
of the species universe, since the one universe that there is uses up all available 
matter.
61  
                                                 
60   When Aristotle writes, “therefore this universe and universe generally are different” (“heteron 
ara hode ho ouranos kai ouranos haplôs”), I take ‘ouranos haplôs’ to refer a universal, and ‘hode 
ouranos’ to refer to a particular. Irwin (1988) denies that Aristotle takes the property of being the 
universe to count as a universal, since it is not plurally instantiated. It is a little odd to think of the 
universe as a species, since it cannot have more than one instance. While I think that the cases like this 
one, involving species with exactly one instance of necessity, will be extremely rare, I do not think that 
Aristotle should deny that they are possible. Similarly, in the Topics, Aristotle denies that there can be a 
genus that has exactly one species. However, we might ask what would happen to the universal animal 
if all the animals other than the cockroach were to go extinct. Would Aristotle really want to claim that 
animal ceases to exist? Or would he just claim that animal no longer counts as a genus?  
In addition, on the assumption that the universe is an individual entity, and that every 
individual entity belongs to a category, Aristotle will have to locate the universe in one of the categories 
(probably substance). However, in that case there would seem to be a single entity immediately said-of 
the universe. I suppose that Aristotle might deny that the universe is really an entity, but he seems to 
assume that it is in the De Caelo discussion.  
61   If this is correct, then Aristotle doesn’t even think that possible plural instantiation is necessary 
for universality. I think that this view can be rendered coherent with the definition of universality in the 
De Int provided that we are prepared to offer an alternative interpretation of the phrase ‘ho epi pleionôn 
puphuke katêgoresthai’. Aristotle is not saying that universals are possibly predicated of a number of 
things, but only that universals are of a nature to be predicated of a number of things. In other words,   184 
If we think that the said-of relation can be defined in terms of parthood, then 
the species universe will have the universe as a part and will not be identical to the 
universe. The universe, therefore, will be a proper part of universe.
62 However, there 
will be no part of universe that is wholly distinct from the universe. It seems, however, 
that nothing can have a decomposition into a single proper part. It seems impossible, 
therefore, to hold that the universe is a proper-part of universe in the sense of parthood 
defined by (A1)-(A5). If universe has exactly one part, then that part will be identical 
to the universal universe. However, Aristotle does not think that this universe is 
identical to the species universe, despite the fact that this universe is the only member 
of the species.
63  
It should be noted that this objection to a mereological understanding of the 
said-of relation applies against systems of mereology even weaker than the one 
defined by (A1)-(A5). There are critics both of unrestricted composition and of 
                                                                                                                                           
universals are the sorts of things that are generally predicated of a plurality of things. Universe might 
belong to a type of entity that is normally predicated of a plurality, while being an exception to the 
normal run of things, This interpretation seems to represent a third way of taking ‘ho epi pleionôn 
puphuke katêgoresthai’. Compare this with the claim ‘Dogs are four-legged’ taken as a generic claim. 
Presumably, the truth of a generic claim is consistent with the existence of atypical cases. I see no 
reason to deny that Aristotle often makes such generic statements. 
62   x is a proper-part of y =def x is a part of y & x≠y. Or: x is a proper-part of y =def x is a part of y 
& y is not a part of x.  
63   It is only fair to note that the class interpretation of the said-of relation will not face this 
problem, since {the universe}≠ the universe. Notice how natural it is to say that there is a single 
member of a species, and how odd it sounds to say that there is a single part of a species. Nevertheless, 
I think that we should avoid a class-theoretic interpretation of the said-of relation.  Issues that I look at 
in the next section effectively undermine any treatment of universals as classes, since classes are 
understood extensionally and have their members essentially. Lewis (1991) points out that much of the 
oddness of set theory and all of the ontological baggage of set-theory stems from the distinction 
between an object and its singleton. While the notion of a collection is somewhat intuitive, the notion of 
a collection that contains exactly one thing but which isn’t that one thing seems a little strange. 
Whatever strangeness is involved in set-theory due to the distinction between a singleton and its sole 
member might also be involved in Aristotle’s theory of universals. However, in many cases, we will be 
able to point to modal differences between a universal and a single particular falling under it. The 
universal could have been said-of more things. However, this will not work in the case of the universe 
and universe. It is nevertheless, interesting to note that Aristotle uses the phrase ‘this universe’ (‘hode 
ouranos’) in referring to this particular universe. On the assumption that universe (‘ouranos haplôs’) 
could have been said-of a different particular universe, we will be able to distinguish universe from the 
universe on modal grounds.      185 
uniqueness of composition who still want to claim that there is a single sensible notion 
of parthood. Some of these critics might even allow that there are multiple senses of 
parthood, and that something can be atomic with respect to one and have parts with 
respect to another. However, the notion of a thing’s having a proper part without 
having any other part wholly distinct from the first offends some of our basic 
intuitions about parthood.
64  
In the next section, I turn to the final objections to the mereological 
interpretation of the said-of relation. While mereology in the sense outlined in (A1)-
(A5) forbids the existence of two distinct fusions of a plurality of atoms, Aristotle 
seems to accept the possibility of distinct universals said-of all the same particulars. 
Furthermore, while mereological fusions have their parts essentially, Aristotelian 
universals do not. In the course of examining these objections, I will develop an 
alternative interpretation of Aristotelian universals that avoids the problems that we 
have discussed. Furthermore, I will argue that the relation between universals and 
particulars on this view can legitimately be thought of as a type of parthood.   
Section 7.5: Extensionality, Essentiality and Universals 
  We have looked at some objections to taking Aristotelian universals to be 
classes, and some objections to taking universals to be mereological fusions. In this 
section, I examine an objection that applies equally to mereological and class-theoretic 
theories of universals. Both classes and fusions are extensional and have their 
members or parts essentially. I will argue that we can state an extensionality principle 
                                                 
64   Aristotle’s views about the universe and universe are inconsistent with what Simons (1987) 
calls “minimal extensional mereology”, which we get by combining (A1-3) above with (a) the 
assumption that whenever objects overlap there is a maximal common part to the objects, and (b) the 
weak supplementation principle (WSP): if one object is a proper part of another, then there is a proper 
part of the second that is disjoint from the first. The WSP follows from (A1-5) and the definition of 
‘fusion’, on the assumption that every object is a fusion of itself. Aristotle’s view about the universe and 
universe, therefore, seems to go against the WSP. Nevertheless, I think that we can defend Aristotle’s 
conception of universals as things that have their particulars as parts, and in doing so we recognize a 
variety of parthood that does not conform to the axioms of minimal extensional mereology.   186 
for universals, but that this extensionality principle differs in important ways from the 
sort of extensionality principle that is normally associated with mereology. More 
importantly, universals are, in general, neither permanently nor essentially said-of any 
specific particulars.
65 But, as I will argue, sets and fusions have their members or parts 
essentially.   
  The extensionality of set-theory is expressed in terms of the following 
extensionality principle for sets:   
  (EXTsets) Where A and B are sets, A=B iff ∀x(x∈A ≡ x∈B).
66 
This tells us that we cannot have two distinct sets that have all and only the same 
members.
67 Mereological fusions on the conception of mereology constituted by (A1)-
(A5) are also extensional. The uniqueness of composition axiom, (A5) guarantees that 
no two distinct entities will be a fusion of the same exact things. A statement of the 
extensionality principle for fusions directly in terms of parthood or proper parthood is 
a bit trickier to come by, but we can use the following (‘<’ means ‘is a part of’, ‘<<’ 
means is a proper part of): 
                                                 
65   This is not to deny that universals must be said-of some particular or other whenever they 
exist. All that I am denying here is that a universal can be identified with any specific extension of 
particulars. On the other hand, the set {α} seems to have the specific particular α as a part permanently 
and essentially.     
66   The restriction to sets is necessary here, or the principle will entail the identity of all non-sets.  
67   It is this extensionality principle that leads Irwin (1988, p80) to claim that universals are non-
unit classes intensionally conceived. As I pointed out above, Irwin worries that the set of humans and 
the set of grammarians are identical while the universals human and grammarian are not. As I 
suggested, we can get around Irwin’s worry by taking the constituents of grammarian to be NSPs rather 
than human beings. Furthermore, it is difficult to be a thoroughgoing realist about universals if facts 
about how we conceive of things get into the story of what universals are. Accordingly, I think that 
Irwin should hold that universals just are not sets. It might be better to hold that they something akin to 
what Gabriel Uzquiano “The Supreme Court and the Supreme Court Justices” (2004) calls ‘groups’. 
Uzquiano’s groups are not extensional, do not contain their members essentially, and are a different 
type of entity than sets. There are some important similarities between Aristotle’s view of universals 
and Uzquiano’s groups. However, the individuation conditions for Uzquiano’s groups seem to depend 
on various facts about human intentions, which seems contrary to Aristotle’s realism about universals.     187 
(EXTf)   Where A and B are mereological fusions: 
A=B iff ∀x(¬∃y(y<<x) ⊃ (x<A ≡ x<B)).
68 
(EXTf) tells us that two distinct objects cannot have exactly the same atomic parts.  
  Aristotle accepts that both primary substances and non-substantial particulars 
are atomic with respect to the said-of relation. We might think that we could state an 
extensionality principle for universals in terms of the said-of relation and particulars. 
We might get: 
  (EXTU)Where A and B are universals: 
A=B iff  ∀x(x is a particular ⊃ (A is said-of x ≡ B is said-of x)).
69  
However, I am not sure that Aristotle would accept this principle. Here is the worry. 
Imagine that there are two human beings (Al and Barbara) and one cat (Crusty). 
Furthermore, imagine that these are the only animals in existence. According to 
Aristotle, the universals cat, human and animal exist in addition to the particulars. 
Animal is said-of cat, human, and a, b and c. Now imagine that a and b cease to exist. 
Aristotle seems to think that human goes out of existence as well. It seems, however, 
that cat and animal continue to exist. If (EXTU) is true, then cat and animal must be 
identical in this situation. However, there seems to be good reason for Aristotle to 
deny that these universals are identical. Animal used to have human as a part, but it 
                                                 
68   The restriction to fusions is not needed here on the assumption that everything is a fusion of 
itself. The proper statement of an extensionality principle for mereology is a bit tricky. The following 
principle is true, but seems to be trivial: 
For all fusions A and B, A=B iff ∀x(x<A≡x<B).   
From left to right: Every entity is a part of itself. So if x=y then each is a part of the other. By 
transitivity of parthood it follows that everything that is part of one is part of the other. From right to 
left: if everything that is part of x is part of y, then x is part of y. If everything that is part of y is part of 
x, then y is part of x. But if x is part of y and y is part of x, it follows from the anti-symmetry of 
parthood that x=y. If we try to state the extensionality of fusions in terms of proper parts, we run into a 
different problem. We cannot say that A=B iff ∀x(x<<A≡x<<B). The RHS will be true and the left-
hand side false for distinct atoms. See Simons for more on statements of the extensionality of 
mereology. The (EXTfusions) principle above is like Simon’s formulation of an extensionality principle in 
terms of atoms. A=B iff A and B have all the same atomic parts. Notice that this principle will only be 
true on the assumption that the world is completely resolvable into atoms, since otherwise we could 
have two entities that overlap with respect to all their atomic parts even though each has different bits of 
gunk as parts. When it comes to the said-of relation, however, I think that Aristotle accepts this 
assumption   
69   The restriction to universals is needed, or the principle will entail the identity of all particulars.    188 
seems false to say that cat used to have human as a part.
70 So cat and animal are not 
identical despite being said-of all the same particulars at a given time.  
   Notice, however, that we can formulate a different extensionality principle for 
universals that avoids the counterexample outlined above:  
(EXTU*) Where A and B are universals, 
A=B iff ∀x(A is said-of x ≡ B is said-of x).
71  
If the said-of relation is irreflexive, then cat is not said-of cat, but animal is said-of 
cat. If the said-of relation is reflexive, then animal is said-of animal but cat is not. So 
the non-identity of cat and animal does not give us a counterexample to (EXTU*). 
However, the following case might pose a problem for (EXTU*). Take the universals 
human and rational. Both are said-of all and only the particular human beings. 
According to both extensionality principles these universals cannot be distinct.
72 
Whether Aristotle can accept (EXTU) will depend on whether he is willing to identify 
a species with its final differentia. While I’m not sure how Aristotle would go on this 
issue, I think that he should identify these universals.
73 If so, then he could accept 
(EXTU*).
74  
                                                 
70  While some philosophers might be inclined to maintain (EXTU) of universals by holding that 
universals are wholes consisting of all past, present, and future individuals, I do not think that this 
position can be Aristotle’s. I take Aristotle to be a presentist rather than an eternalist, and to hold that 
universals endure rather than perdure. When things endure, it is by being wholly present at distinct 
times. Furthermore, Aristotle takes  universals to be things that really can come into and go out of 
existence. As Sider (2003) would put it, Aristotle takes the sentence (or the proposition expressed by 
the sentence) “Dinosaurs exist,” to be false, even when this is construed as an existentially quantified 
statement with the least restrictive existential quantifier possible. This very same proposition used to be 
true. In other words, Aristotle would not accept that two different propositions were expressed by 
utterances of tokens of the same sentence-type at different times. The eternalist gloss on the situation 
here might be: it is timelessly true that dinosaurs exist at t1, timelessly false that dinosaurs exist at t2, 
and the sentence “Dinosaurs exist” expresses in any context of utterance the proposition that dinosaurs 
exist at tn, where tn=the moment of utterance. This does not seem to be Aristotle’s way of thinking, 
although further treatment of the issue is beyond the scope of this paper.     
71   The restriction to universals here is necessary, or else the principle will entail that all 
particulars are identical.  
72   Unless human is said-of human and not rational.  
73   See my discussion of the said-of relation and differentiae in chapter 2.  
74   In a mereological system defined by (A1-5) above with atoms and no “gunk” (atomless stuff), 
(EXTfusions) will entail:   
(EXTF*) For all complex things A and B,    189 
I take the (EXT) principles proposed above to give us non-duplication 
conditions for certain kinds of entity. Each of these principles tells us that there cannot 
be two things of a given type each of which meets a certain condition. There is a 
difference, however, between giving non-duplication conditions for entities of a 
certain sort, and saying what the nature of those entities consists in. In giving non-
duplication conditions it is enough for me to identify a property that no two objects of 
the same sort share. This may be a contingent property. For example, take the 
following non-duplication condition for electrons (where ‘E’=‘is an electron’ and 
‘s(x)’ is a function from entities to spatiotemporal extensions): 
  (NDPe) ∀x∀y((Ex & Ey) ⊃ (x=y ≡ s(x)=s(y)). 
On the assumption that no two electrons can have one and the same spatiotemporal 
extension, this is a true non-duplication principle. (NDPe) has no modal force, and tells 
us nothing about whether an electron could have had a different location. It seems 
clear to me that an electron could have had a different location. So (NDPe) gives non-
duplication conditions in terms of an accidental property of electrons.  
  In a similar way, none of the principles of extensionality has any modal force. 
We can accept the principles above, but hold that a given set, fusion, or universal 
could have stood in the constitutive relation in question to different entities. However, 
I think that both sets and sums are extensional in a stronger sense than is expressed by 
the principles above, in that these entities have the extensions that they do essentially. 
To be the set {a} just is to be the set containing only a. Nothing could be that very set 
                                                                                                                                           
A=B iff ∀x(x<<A ≡ x<<B).  
In other words, no two complex entities share all the same proper parts. This entailment holds because 
(A1)-(A5) entail the weak supplementation principle:  
(WSP) ∀x∀y(x<<y ⊃ ∃z(z<<y & ~∃u(u<<z & u<<x))).  
We noticed above that the corresponding supplementation principle fails in the case of universals and 
the said-of relation. Just as a universal said-of a single particular is not identical to that particular, two 
universals said-of precisely the same particulars can be distinct, provided that one is said of the other. 
What needs to be ruled out, if Aristotle accepts (EXTU*) is the possibility that two distinct universals 
neither of which is said-of the other can be said-of precisely the same particulars. I take it that Aristotle 
would accept this principle, modulo worries about differentiae.    190 
and have different members. Furthermore, nothing else could have exactly the 
members that this set has.
75 Notice that these claims don’t follow from the normal set-
theoretic axioms, but from intuitions about what sorts of things sets are. If these claims 
are right, then we are in a position to say something stronger than merely that no two 
sets actually have all the same members. We can say that sets are defined by their 
members.
76  
(DEFsets) Necessarily, if A is a set and the fs are all and only the 
elements of A, then A=def the set having as elements all and only the fs.  
The use of ‘=def’ in the (DEFsets) has modal force. I take it to follow from a sentence of 
the form 
α =def the ϕ
 that anything which is the ϕ in any world is identical to α, and 
that nothing which fails to be the ϕ in any world is identical to α.
77 The (EXTsets) 
principle, therefore, follows from (DEFsets).
78  
In a similar way, the axioms of mereology (A1)-(A5) do not tell us anything 
about the essences of fusions. Nevertheless, while more controversial than the 
                                                 
75   See Sharvy (1968) for some discussion of the claim that sets can’t change their members. I 
think that related considerations show that sets don’t have different members in different possible 
situations. Lewis (1991) seems to disagree with this intuition. He allows that there could be counterpart 
relations such that the counterpart of a is not a member of the counterpart of {a}. Part of what is going 
on here involves Lewis’ rejection of de re modality (or at least of de re essentiality) in favor of 
counterpart theory, but this gets beyond the scope of this paper. I will assume that there are facts about 
the essences of objects that are not context-relative or dependent on our theoretical concerns.    
76   I have in mind here something like real definition—the essence of this set is that it is the set of 
precisely these members. The notion of real definition that I have in mind here is the one suggested by 
Kit Fine’s treatment of essentiality. See chapter 10 for some discussion.   
77   I do not know what to say about the existence of sets in worlds where one of their elements 
fails to exist. In any case, if the sentence 
α = the ϕ
 is false at a world because nothing is the ϕ in that 
world, this must be compatible with the truth at this world of 
α =def the ϕ
. There are a number of tricky 
issues involved in trying to give a modal characterization of essentiality, and I’m not sure that it is 
possible. 
78   Tweedale (1987) p425 suggests that Aristotelian universals are classes, but that “…one must 
be careful to mean by a class something which can survive changes in its membership roll, and not the 
sets of modern set theory.” I think that any entity that can survive a change in its membership roll is not 
a class at all. Tweedale also compares Aristotle’s notion of a universal to Russell’s notion of a class as a 
numerical conjunction. However, it seems to me that Russell’s numerical conjunctions are like the sets 
of modern set theory in that the conjunction essentially contains each of its conjuncts. One possibility 
would be for Tweedale to take Aristotelian universals as groups in the sense discussed by Uzquiano 
(2004). Groups, however, are not classes at all. They are entities of a new sort that coincide with classes 
at various times and in various possible situations, without being identical to the classes with which 
they coincide.      191 
corresponding claim about sets, the claim that mereological fusions have their parts 
essentially strikes me as quite plausible.
79 This intuition strikes me as the flip-side of 
intuitions about the ontological innocence of mereology which lead to the acceptance 
(A4) and (A5) above. If there is little or nothing involved in the existence of a fusion 
beyond the existence of its parts, then it seems that the existence of the fusion is 
tightly connected to the existence of the plurality. The closer the relation between a 
fusion and a plurality of parts is to identity the stronger become intuitions in favor of 
mereological essentialism. On the other hand, the more we are willing to hold that an 
entity could have had different parts, the less likely we are to think that this entity is 
nothing distinct from the plurality of its actual constituents. If this reasoning is correct, 
then mereological essentialism about mereological fusions in the sense defined above 
seems to be warranted.
80 Both (A4) and (A5) follow from the idea that a given 
mereological fusion is essentially a fusion of its parts. We can state a principle for 
fusions similar to (DEFsets). The extensionality principle for fusions, (EXTf), follows 
from (DEFf). 
(DEFf) Necessarily, if A is the fusion of the fs,  then A=def the fusion of the fs. 
  While the (EXTU*) principle listed above might give non-duplication 
conditions for universals, it doesn’t seem to be essential to a universal that it be said-of 
precisely the objects that it is actually said-of. In fact, Aristotle thinks that one and the 
same universal is typically said-of different objects at different times. Therefore, a 
universal can be neither a set nor a fusion of particulars.  
Nevertheless, Aristotle does seem to think that particulars are parts of the 
universals that are said-of them. We should conclude that Aristotle has in mind a type 
of parthood other than that defined by (A1)-(A5). In the next section, I suggest that the 
                                                 
79   Both ‘fusion’ and ‘part’ here are to be understood as they are defined in (A1-5) above.  
80   For the opposite view, see van Inwagen “Can Mereological Sums Change Their Parts” (2007).    192 
sort of relation that Aristotle has in mind bears some similarities to the sort of 
parthood relation that holds between a complex material object that can survive 
changes in its parts, and the parts that constitute the object at a given time.  
Section 7.6: Universals, Particulars and Constitution  
I will begin this section by telling a familiar story about the relation between 
me and the atoms out of which I am composed. I like this story, and think that it is, for 
the most part, a true one. Nevertheless, almost every claim made is controversial and 
has been denied. It is not my aim here to defend this story about material constitution. 
Rather, I want to use the story about material constitution to elucidate what I take to be 
Aristotle’s view about the relation between universals and particulars, which I think is 
analogous in many respects to the relation between me and my atoms on this story.  
I take myself to be a concrete material object that exists right now. All of me 
exists right now, not just a part of me. I also existed a few months ago when I wrote an 
earlier version of this chapter, and all of me was around then as well. Right now, I am 
wholly constituted by some atoms (call these ‘the fs’); in other words, right now each 
of the fs is a part of me and I do not have any parts that fail to overlap with at least one 
of the fs. A few months ago I was wholly constituted by some other atoms (call these 
the gs’). A few months ago, there was an object that was the fusion of the gs (call it 
the g-fusion). Let’s assume that none of the gs has been annihilated over the past few 
months. Given (A5) above, the g-fusion still exists. If, as I have argued, it is essential 
to the g-fusion to have each of the gs as parts, then the g-fusion has each of the gs as a 
proper part right now. However, I do not have each of the gs as a proper part right 
now. Leibniz’s Law is true, and no object that has each of the gs as a proper part is 
identical to any object that fails to have any of the gs as a proper part. Therefore, I am 
not now identical to the g-fusion. Identity is a relation that holds between a thing and 
itself at all times at which a thing exists, and in all possible situations in which a thing   193 
exists. Identity is neither temporary nor contingent, and is neither sortal-relative nor 
relative to anything else. It follows that I am not now, nor have I ever been, identical 
to the g-fusion. Similar reasoning shows that I am not identical to the f-fusion. I don’t 
seem to be identical to any fusion of atoms at all. It seems that then that my 
commitment to my own existence requires me to accept something other than atoms 
and fusions of atoms. Nevertheless, at any time that I exist, I seem to be wholly 
composed out of some atoms. I don’t seem to have any other parts.
81 These atoms are 
each parts of me at that time, and that I am a whole constituted by them at that time. 
Therefore, there is a sense in which, at any given time, I am nothing beyond the atoms 
that compose me at that time.
82  
I take Aristotle’s position on universals to be similar in several respects to the 
position on things like me outlined in the preceding paragraphs. I take Aristotle to be a 
presentist and to be endurantist about universals. Aristotle’s presentism should also be 
contrasted with the position that D. M. Armstrong (1978) calls an “Aristotelian” view 
about universals. Armstrong’s view is eternalist, in that existence claims range over all 
of space-time. For Armstrong if a universal is ever instantiated, then it is always true 
to claim that the universal exists. So, the universal Human existed before the earth 
formed, and will exist after all individual humans are gone. Aristotle, on the other 
hand, seems to hold that it is false to claim that a universal exists at any time when 
                                                 
81   On the story that I am considering, my hands, fingernails, and even the electrons in the atoms 
of my fingernails count as parts of me, but my sense of humor and height do not. Perhaps there are 
different senses of ‘part’, and my properties are parts of me in some other sense, but I am ignoring this 
other sense for now. See Williams (1953) for a view on which particulars have tropes as parts.  
82   I am wholly composed by a plurality of atoms, but I am identical neither to that plurality nor to 
the fusion of the atoms in that plurality. For more on the view that constitution is not identity, see Mark 
Johnston’s aptly titled “Constitution is not Identity” (1992). See also David Wiggins Sameness and 
Substance (1980) and Sameness and Substance Renewed (2000). I think that the relation between me 
and this particular collection of atoms organized in this way is a variety of realization, and various facts 
about me are realized in facts about this organized collection of atoms. Similarly, I think that various 
facts about Aristotelian universals are realized in facts about their constituent particulars.   194 
there are no particulars that it is said-of. A claim that a universal exists (made at a 
certain time) will be true only if the right sorts of particulars exist at that very time.  
I also think that Aristotle takes universals to persist by enduring—a universal 
exists at different times by being wholly present at each of those times.
83 One and the 
same object is composed of different particulars at different times. Aristotle’s position 
is to be contrasted with a position on which universals perdure, according to which a 
universal exists at different times by having distinct temporal parts present at each 
time.
84  
Aristotle thinks that the universal human that existed in the past is identical to 
the universal human that exists now. Many individual human beings that used to be 
part of the universal human, however, have ceased to exist. Human has different 
individual human beings as parts now than it did in the past. It follows that human is 
not identical to any fusion of individual human beings. Nevertheless, Aristotle takes 
each individual human being that now exists to be a part of the universal human, and 
claims that human is not something beyond the particulars that make it up. Given the 
similarity between Aristotle’s views on the relation between universals and particulars 
and the views outlined above about the relation between human beings and their 
                                                 
83   By “wholly present” in this context, I mean simply that every part of a thing exists and is a part 
of the thing at the time in question. A universal does not at this time have anything as a part that does 
not exist at this time.  I take Aristotle to be a presentist, and to think that a present-tense claim like 
‘α is 
a part of β’ to be false when α used to be, but is no longer a part of β. To say that a thing was wholly 
present at an earlier time, will be only to say that everything that was a part of a thing existed and was a 
part of the thing in the past. There are a number of tricky issues involved in stating any of these 
positions. For a careful analysis, see Sider (2003).  
84   The idea behind perdurance is that an entity is extended in time as well as in space. Just as I 
occupy different regions of space at a time by having spatial parts that occupy each of these regions, so 
I am present at different times by having distinct temporal parts at each of those times. For a discussion 
of this distinction, and some arguments that ordinary objects like human beings persist by perduring, 
see David Lewis “Survival and Identity” (1983). We also need to contrast Aristotle’s position with the 
claim that universals timelessly contain all past, present, and future particulars of a certain sort as parts, 
or that they timelessly and necessarily contain all actual and possible particulars of a certain sort as 
parts.    195 
atoms, I think that it can be somewhat useful to think of the relation between 
universals and particulars as a kind of constitution.  
Nevertheless, there are some striking differences between the two sorts of 
constitution relations under discussion, and these should be noted. In one way, 
universals are a good deal more compositionally plastic than human beings are. For a 
human being to exist, a huge number of atoms of various types have to be arranged in 
a particular way. For an Aristotelian universal to exist, it suffices that particulars of a 
certain sort exist. These parts do not need to be arranged in any particular way, nor do 
they need to perform some sort of coordinated function. I even think that Aristotle will 
allow a universal to be constituted by a single particular.
85 However, a universal 
cannot exist without being constituted by at least one particular, which is why sickness 
does not exist when everyone is healthy. On the other hand, there are strict limits on 
what sorts of things can be parts of a universal. Only humans will be parts of human, 
while an organism might have all kinds of atomic parts.   
The existence and identity conditions of universals, therefore, seem to be 
different than those of ordinary complex concrete particulars, and the analogy between 
universals and organisms cannot be pushed too far. It is, in fact, quite difficult to think 
of any precise analogue for Aristotelian universals, but the following may be a step in 
the right direction.  
Imagine that the universe contains a number of atoms, each of which must be 
in one of four states at any given time: earth, air, fire or water. Furthermore, imagine 
that atoms change state over time. Say that we identify an entity, call it Walter. At any 
given time, Walter is entirely composed out of all the atoms that are in the water state 
                                                 
85   Generally, the universal in question existed before the particular that is currently its only part 
and will continue to exist when that particular perishes (provided other particulars of the right sort 
exist). Nevertheless, if what was said above about the universe and Universe is right, then Aristotle can 
take a universal to be non-identical to a single particular which constitutes it at every time at which it 
exists.    196 
at that time. It is necessary and sufficient for an atom’s being a part of Walter at a time 
that the atom is in the water state. Walter is composed out of different atoms at 
different times, but doesn’t exist unless at least one atom is in the water state.  
Walter seems to be something like a scattered particular or a mass of stuff in 
that it lacks any interesting structural properties. However, Walter can have different 
parts at different times. On the assumption that masses, like fusions, have their parts 
essentially, Walter can’t simply be identified with the mass of water existent at any 
time. If we were to accept the existence of Walter, therefore, we would accept 
something other than atoms and fusions of atoms.
86  
My point here is not to say that we are forced to accept the existence of 
something like Walter in the world under consideration. It might, in fact, be more 
reasonable to reduce all talk about Walter to talk about atoms, scattered masses and 
fusions of atoms. Under what sorts of circumstances would it be reasonable to posit 
the existence of something like Walter in addition to atoms and fusions of atoms? 
While I have no precise answer to this question, we might be tempted to accept the 
existence of such a thing if there were stable facts about the totality of water through 
the various changes in the atomic composition of the totality of water. Furthermore, 
were we to explain certain facts about the current totality of water by talking about 
past facts about the totality of water, we might be inclined to accept something like 
Walter as an enduring entity.  
As an example, let’s take seriously Anaximander’s claim that the elements pay 
restitution to each other for past injustice.
87 If the wet oversteps its boundaries, then 
the dry will obtain redress by extending into the domain of the wet. The dry is taking 
                                                 
86   Notice that we are adding to our ontology only if we take Walter to be an entity. If we only 
think that we have a term ‘Walter’ that means something like ‘the current mass of water’, we will not 
yet have any additional entity.  
87   See Theophrastus Dox. 477.   197 
back something from the wet, i.e. from the same entity that overstepped its bounds 
previously. It makes some sense to think of the wet of Anaximander as something like 
Walter (or perhaps like a non-atomic gunky version of Walter) in the story above.
88 
  My suggestion is that Aristotelian universals are something like Walter in the 
story above. Whether a given particular is part of a universal depends only on the 
intrinsic character of that particular. To be a universal is to be the thing that is said-of 
all the entities of a certain sort. For example, human is the thing that is said-of all and 
only the particular humans.
89 However, there are certain stable facts about this 
universal that remain true through constant changes in the particulars that compose it. 
For example, color always inheres in body, and animal is always said-of human.  
I would like to conclude this section by examining a passage from the 
Posterior Analytics in light of the theory of universals that I am attributing to 
Aristotle. In the course of discussing the superiority of universal demonstrations to 
particular demonstrations, Aristotle writes: 
Further, if there is a single account of the universal and it is not 
homonymous, then it [the universal] will be something no less than 
the particulars, but rather [will be something] more so, insofar as 
the imperishable things are in these while indeed the particulars are 
                                                 
88   For the sake of comparison, take the fact that I owe someone ten dollars because I lost a bet. I 
am not sure that it is impossible to translate talk of personal obligation into talk about the histories of 
atoms and fusions of atoms. However, I have a hard time seeing how the story would go. It is certainly 
simpler to take talk of obligation at face value, and to hold that there are enduring and variably 
constituted persons who have certain obligations because of their own past actions. The latter story is 
nonreductive, in that it accepts something other than atoms and sums of atoms. 
89   Two things should be noted here. First of all, as it is possible for there to be different totalities 
of entities of a given sort at different times and in different possible situations, a universal can be made 
of different things at different times and in different possible situations. Second, on pain of circularity, 
we cannot both define universals as the wholes made of certain sorts of particulars, and define what it is 
to be a particular of a certain sort in terms of being part of a universal. In chapter 10, I will suggest that 
particulars are not the sorts of things that they are because universals are said-of them, but that 
universals are said-of them because they have the natures that they do. We will see that this view 
requires us to have a different account of what it is for a particular to have the nature that it does. I 
argue in chapter 10 that Aristotle does not think that the individual humans are human because they 
bear a relation to the universal. Rather the particulars have the natures that they do primitively. I take 
this to be a crucial difference between Aristotle and Plato. For Plato, what it is to be a particular of a 
certain sort just is to be a reflection of a certain Form; for Aristotle, what it is to be a universal is to be 
the thing said-of such and such particulars.    198 
perishable. Still it is not necessary to lay down that this [the 
universal] is something beyond (para) these [the particulars], just 
because it makes evident one thing, any more than [it is necessary] 
in the case of other things which signify not a substance but a 
quantity, relative, or action. (85b15-22)   
 
Aristotle thinks that particulars are generally rather short-lived objects. An individual 
cat like Josh perishes after a short time. Further, when Josh perishes all the facts of 
which Josh was a constituent perish as well.
90 However, there are some facts about the 
world that Aristotle does not take to be perishable; these facts are the concern of 
science. The constituents of these facts must be imperishable.
91 These universals count 
as “something” (ti). Furthermore, insofar as universals are eternal they appear to have 
a better claim than particulars to thing-hood or substantiality. 
Aristotle has now come dangerously close to endorsing a Platonic theory on 
which universals are separate forms and primary substances. In the next sentence, he 
strongly repudiates such a Platonic view, telling us that nothing he has said requires 
that universals are anything beyond the particulars. In my view, Aristotle takes the fact 
that universals are constituted by particulars as sufficient for claiming that universals 
are nothing beyond those particulars. At the same time, Aristotle is able to claim that 
universals are real things, neither identical to nor reducible to the particulars or 
collections of particulars out of which they are constituted. Viewing the said-of 
                                                 
90   This follows if we take Aristotle to be a presentist. The only entities that exist are the entities 
that exist now, and facts exist only when the constituents of those facts exist.    
91   There is a question about whether Aristotle takes all universals or only some to be 
imperishable. In the Categories, Aristotle tells us that sickness ceases to exist when everyone is well. 
However, he here seems to suggest that universals cannot perish. Part of the question turns on what it is 
to be for a thing to perish. If the last sick person becomes healthy, then sickness ceases to exist. When a 
new person becomes sick, Sickness comes into being. Are the two sicknesses identical? If so, is it 
correct to say that sickness ever perishes? Given Aristotle’s general thoughts on the eternality and 
regularity of the world, it is doubtful that he thinks that any universals suffer final and ultimate 
perishing. Also, Aristotle sometimes seems to think that species are eternal, but it seems possible to kill 
all the members of a species. If species are nothing beyond their members, how can they then be 
eternal?   199 
relation  as a kind of constitution relation thus allows Aristotle to escape both 
Platonism and nominalism about universals.  
In the next section, I return to Aristotle’s claim that a universal nonsubstance 
can inhere in a particular substance, on which it is not ontologically dependent. I 
examine some of Aristotle’s views about predication, and the way in which particular 
predication interacts with universal predication. I suggest that Aristotle’s problematic 
statements at 2a34ff results from confusion about how predication interacts with 
parthood.  
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CHAPTER 8 
 
PREDICATION AND INHERENCE 
Section 8.1: Introduction 
I have argued that Aristotle takes inherence in a subject to involve ontological 
dependence on that subject, and I have sketched an account of Aristotelian universals 
on which they are wholes constituted by different particulars at different times. In this 
chapter, I return to Aristotle’s problematic claim at 2a34ff that universal non-
substances inhere in particular substances. Like Ackrill, I take this passage to involve 
a mistake on Aristotle’s part. Unlike Ackrill, however, I do not think that Aristotle is 
simply being careless. Rather I think that Aristotle’s mistake results from indecision or 
confusion over how to deal with some subtle issues in his ontology.  
In this chapter, I examine three possible sources of confusion. First, on the 
interpretation that I have been proposing, Aristotle wants to explain predication in 
terms of the inherence and said-of relations. The problematic assertion at 2a34ff could 
result from an attempt to give too strict an analysis of predication. Second, I argued in 
the last chapter that Aristotle wants to give an account of universals that avoids both 
Platonism and nominalism. The claim at 2a34ff is what we would expect if Aristotle 
were to go farther in the nominalist direction and to identify universals with extensions 
of particulars. 
 A third possible source of confusion is closely related to the first two. 
Aristotle gives one account of predication on which predicating something of a 
universal crucially involves predicating it of the particulars that the universal is said-
of. Let’s call this sort of predication, ‘predication simpliciter’. When we are talking 
about predication simpliciter, universals inherit the predicates of their particulars, 
because something’s being predicated of some particulars is both necessary and     201 
 
sufficient for its being predicated of a universal. Furthermore, particulars inherit the 
predicates universally predicated of their superordinate universals. If something is 
predicated simpliciter of the whole of a universal, then it is also predicated simpliciter 
of every particular that the universal is said-of. We can give necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a thing’s being predicated simpliciter of a universal in terms of whether 
it is predicated of some or all of a collection of particulars. If predication simpliciter 
were sufficient for inherence, then Aristotle’s claims at 2a34ff would follow.  
However, in the Posterior Analytics I.4 Aristotle carefully describes a few 
types of predication that are of special importance to science, kath’ hauto and 
katholou predication. Neither katholou nor kath’ hauto predication of a universal 
subject can be reduced to predication of particular subjects—and particulars do not 
inherit the kath’ hauto predicates of their universals as kath’ hauto predicates. I will 
argue below that there is a close connection between inherence and kath’ hauto 
predication. Aristotle’s mistake at 2a34ff might result from a failure to carefully 
distinguish predication simpliciter from kath’ hauto or katholou predication.  
Furthermore, the sort of mistake that Aristotle makes in holding that inherence 
behaves like predication simpliciter rather than like kath’ hauto predication is closely 
related to a mistake about the way in which constitution interacts with modality.  
I am not in a position to say for certain what led Aristotle to make the mistake 
that he makes in claiming that universals inhere in particulars, but I hope that, in the 
course of examining some possible sources of this mistake, we will come to a better 
understanding of some fundamental issues in Aristotle’s ontology. I end this chapter 
with my own suggestion about what Aristotle should have said at 2a34ff and suggest 
that the revised version is enough to secure what Aristotle really wants in that 
passage—namely the primacy of primary substance.  
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Section 8.2: Direct Versus Ultimate Subjecthood 
It will be useful to begin by taking another look at the problematic passage at 
Categories 2a34-b6.  
All the other things are either said-of the primary substances as subjects 
or are in these subjects. This is clear from an examination of each case. 
For example, animal is predicated of human, and therefore also of the 
particular human; for if it were predicated of none of the particular 
humans, neither would it be predicated be human at all. Again, color is 
in body, and therefore also in the individual body; for if it were not in 
some of the particulars, neither it would not be in body at all. 
Therefore, all the other things are either said-of the primary substances 
as subjects or are in these subjects. Accordingly if the primary 
substances did not exist, it would be impossible for any of the other 
things to exist. [For all the other things are either said-of these or are in 
these as subjects, so that if the primary substances did not exist, it 
would be impossible for any of the others to exist.]
1(2a34-b6) 
Aristotle’s main point in this passage is to emphasize the ontological primacy of 
primary substances. Primary substances are ontologically primary because they are 
subjects for all other things, and as a result no other things could exist without primary 
substances.   
Prior to this passage, Aristotle has already mentioned two ways in which one 
thing can be a subject for another: the second can inhere in the first or the second can 
be said-of the first. It therefore seems natural for Aristotle to try to establish the 
primacy of primary substances by showing that they are subjects for all other entities 
                                                 
1   τὰ δ' ἄλλα πάντα ἤτοι καθ' ὑποκειμένων λέγεται τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἢ ἐν 
ὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς ἐστίν. τοῦτo δὲ φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα προχειριζομένων· οἷον τὸ 
ζῷον κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατηγορεῖται, οὐκοῦν καὶ κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου,  – εἰ γὰρ κατὰ 
μηδενὸς τῶν τινῶν ἀνθρώπων, οὐδὲ κατὰ ἀνθρώπου ὅλως· –  πάλιν τὸ χρῶμα ἐν σώματι, 
οὐκοῦν καὶ ἐν τινὶ σώματι· εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐν τινὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα, οὐδὲ ἐν σώματι ὅλως· ὥστε τὰ 
ἄλλα πάντα ἤτοι καθ' ὑποκειμένων τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν λέγεται ἢ ἐν ὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς 
ἐστίν. μὴ οὐσῶν οὖν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀδύνατον τῶν ἄλλων τι εἶναι· [πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἄλλα 
ἤτοι καθ' ὑποκειμένων τούτων λέγεται ἢ ἐνὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς ἐστίν· ὥστε μὴ οὐσῶν τῶν 
πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀδύνατον τῶν ἄλλων τι εἶναι.] (2a34-b6c) 
Ackrill (1963) suggests that the bracketed portion of this passage, which is included in the 
Oxford text edited by Minio-Paluello, be deleted from the text. The disputed selection does seem to be 
repetitive. However, it is also included in many of the manuscript traditions. If the repeated passage is 
genuine, then it lends further support to my claim that Aristotle is quite deliberate in his problematic 
claim that everything either inheres in or is said-of primary substances.      203 
 
by showing that “…the other things are either said-of the primary substances as 
subjects or are in these as subjects.” We can represent Aristotle’s claim as follows:   
Direct Subject (DS): For all x, if x is not a primary substance then 
either x inheres in a primary substance or x is said-of a primary 
substance.  
In the course of trying to establish (DS), Aristotle infers that the universal color 
inheres in some particular body from the fact that it inheres in the universal body. 
However, as we have seen, given the definition of inherence, the universal color 
cannot inhere in any particular body.  
What is going on in this passage? While the passage is certainly compressed, I 
don’t think that we can hold, with Ackrill, that Aristotle is simply being careless.
2 He 
claims three times that everything that is not a primary substance either inheres in or is 
said-of a primary substance. Furthermore, Aristotle does not make the offending 
remark in passing but has it as the conclusion of an argument. However, in setting out 
to demonstrate (DS), Aristotle seems to have set out to show too much. The primacy 
of primary substance would seem to be adequately secured by the claim that they are 
ultimate rather than direct subjects for all things. In other words, it seems to be enough 
for Aristotle’s purposes that there is a chain of subject relations beginning from any 
entity, and ending with primary substances.   
Ultimate Subject (US): For all x, if x is not a primary substance then x 
either inheres in or is said-of something that either inheres in or is said-
of something…that either inheres in or is said-of a primary substance.
3  
In asserting (DS) rather than the weaker (US), Aristotle has committed himself 
to both of the following claims about one thing’s being a subject for another.  
                                                 
2   See Ackrill (1963), p83. 
3   In practice, we need a maximum of two steps to get from any entity to a primary substance. 
Non-substantial particulars inhere in primary substances. Secondary substances, as well as their 
superordinate genera, are said-of primary substances. Non-substantial universals are said-of non-
substantial particulars, which inhere in primary substances. Furthermore, non-substantial universals 
inhere in substantial universals, which in turn are said-of primary substances.      204 
 
  (Trans) If x is a subject for y and y is a subject for z, then x is a subject for z. 
  (Analysis) x is a subject for y if and only if y inheres in x or y is said-of x.   
I assume that Aristotle really does want to hold (Trans), since he does think that 
primary substances are subjects for all things. Therefore, Aristotle’s mistake seems to 
be in holding (Analysis). Some things, e.g. universal non-substances, have primary 
substances as subjects without either being said-of or inhering in primary substances. 
Nevertheless, Aristotle does introduce inherence and the said-of relation to give an 
analysis of the relations between metaphysical predicates and their subjects. While 
(Analysis) is false, there is a closely related principle which Aristotle takes to be both 
true and important. Let’s say that x is a direct subject for y if and only if x is a subject 
for y, and it is not the case that there is any z such that x is a subject for z and z is a 
subject for y. Then the following principle holds: 
(Analysis*) x is a direct subject for y if and only if y inheres in x or y is 
said-of x. 
In holding (Analysis*), however, Aristotle need not be committed to the problematic 
claim that universal non-substances inhere in primary substances. Furthermore, on the 
plausible further assumption that subjecthood is the ancestral of direct-subjecthood, 
(US) follows from (Analysis*) and the claim that all other things have primary 
substances as subjects. Perhaps one explanation for Aristotle’s going wrong in this 
passage is that he thinks that he must hold the stronger (Analysis) when he need only 
hold (Analysis*). 
Section 8.3: Aristotle’s Argument for (DS) 
While Aristotle might be mistaken to hold (DS) and (Analysis), he gives an 
argument for (DS), and it will be helpful to look at the structure of this argument in 
some detail. Aristotle gives us an argument from cases. He first sets out to show that 
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(2a36-b1). Next he sets out to show that anything that inheres in a substance universal 
must inhere in a primary substance (2b1-3). In taking himself to establish his two sub-
claims, Aristotle takes himself to have established (DS) (2b3ff).
4  
In each of the sub-arguments given, Aristotle’s reasoning is extremely 
compressed. At 2a36-38, Aristotle offers the following: “Animal is said of man, 
therefore of the particular man.” I think that it is best to take this sentence as 
expressing an argument with a suppressed premise.
5 
Argument I: 
(I.1) Animal is said-of human. 
(I.2)  
∴(I.3) Animal is said-of some particular man.    
What is missing at (I.2) seems to be a claim to the effect that whatever is said-
of human must also be said of some particular human, or a more general principle that 
entails this claim. At 2a38-b1, Aristotle offers support for this missing premise, “For if 
it were said-of none of the particular men, neither would it be said-of man at all.”
6 It is 
                                                 
4   Technically Aristotle is missing the case of substantial species and non-substantial particulars, 
but these omissions are understandable given the triviality of the claims that the first is said-of and the 
second in primary substances. Fully laid out, Aristotle’s argument seems to run as follows:  
(1) Everything that is not a primary substance is either a substantial species, is said-of 
a substantial species, is a non-substantial particular, or inheres in a substance 
universal. 
(2) Substantial species are said-of primary substance. [Trivial] 
(3) NSPs inhere in primary substances. [Trivial] 
(3) Anything said-of a substantial species is said-of a primary substance. [Argument I 
below] 
(4) Anything that inheres in a substance universal inheres in a primary substance. 
[Argument II below].  
∴(5) Everything that is not a primary substance either inheres in or is said-of a 
primary substance. [(1)-(4)] 
5   The Greek sentence reads as follows: “τὸ ζῷον κατὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατηγορεῖται, οὐκοῦν 
καὶ κατὰ τοῦ τινὸς ἀνθρώπου…” I take the use of “οὐκοῦν” to indicate that an inference is being 
made, although only one premise has been expressed. I take the lines immediately following (2a36-38) 
as an argument in favor of the suppressed premise.  
6   “εἰ γὰρ κατὰ μηδενὸς τῶν τινῶν ἀνθρώpων, οὐδὲ κατὰ ἀνθρώpου ˜lvw.” In translating 
this passage, I have followed Ackrill in translating “οὐδὲ...˜lvw” as “neither…at all”, taking the use of 
negation plus ‘˜lvw’ to be an emphatic negation. However, I think that another more metaphysically 
loaded reading of the phrase might be possible. We might take ‘˜lvw’ to mean something like “as a     206 
 
natural to ask why Aristotle feels justified in making this assertion. I think that there 
are two ways that we might take Aristotle’s reasoning.  
First of all, we might take the argument simply to rely on the transitivity of the 
said-of relation. If we add as premises two claims that Aristotle commits himself to 
elsewhere in the Categories, we end up with an argument that he would be justified in 
taking to be sound. First, human is said-of every individual human being. Second, the 
said-of relation is transitive. Therefore, anything that is said-of human must be said-of 
every individual human being. While I think that Aristotle could argue in this way, I 
do not think that this is, in fact, the argument that he has in mind in this passage. To 
see why not, we should look at his second argument.  
Immediately after offering Argument I, Aristotle offers an argument with the 
same form to establish that universal non-substances inhere in primary substances.  
The argument at 2b1-2 runs as follows: 
Argument II: 
(I.1) Color is in body. 
(II.2)  
∴(II.3) Color is in some particular body.  
Once again, Aristotle needs a premise to the effect that whatever is in the universal 
body is also in some particular body. At 2b2-3 Aristotle continues as follows, “For if it 
were not in some of the particulars, neither would it be in body at all.”
7  
                                                                                                                                           
whole”, and to be making even stronger the contrast between something’s being said-of a particular and 
its being said-of a universal. If we look at 2b3, we see that Aristotle is drawing a contrast between 
something’s being “ἐν τινὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα” and its being “ἐν σώματι ὅλως”. If we take the use of 
“ὅλως” as marking that we are talking about body as a whole, i.e. of the universal body, then I think 
that my case in what follows might be somewhat stronger. Despite my choosing to go with the less 
tendentious translation, it is clear that Aristotle is drawing a contrast in this passage between universals 
and particulars.  
7   “εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐν τινὶ τῶν καθ' ἕκαστα, οὐδὲ ἐν σώματι ὅλως.” Once again, I think that 
Aristotle is making an explicit comparison between something’s being in some of the particulars, and 
something’s being in a universal. If it is possible to take ‘ἐν σώματι ὅλως’ as meaning ‘in the universal 
body,’ I would suggest doing so.      207 
 
Arguments I and II seem to have the same surface form. In each case, we need 
a premise that lets us move from the claim that something stands in a relation to a 
universal to the claim that it stands in that same relation to some particulars falling 
under that universal. This similarity in surface form suggests that Aristotle is 
suppressing similar premises in each of the arguments. While Aristotle might rely on 
of the transitivity of the said-of relation along with the fact that human is said-of 
individual human beings in completing Argument I, there is no corresponding 
principle to do the required work in Argument II. Therefore, I think that Aristotle has 
something different in mind when he puts forward both Arguments I and II.  
In the context of these arguments, Aristotle seems to be assuming that nothing 
can bear a relation to a universal without bearing that very relation to (at least some 
of) the particulars constituting that universal. Aristotle’s assumption here would seem 
to be based on a general view about the nature of the relationship between universals 
and particulars. While it might be overly speculative to do so, I offer the following 
reconstruction of Aristotle’s line of thought in these arguments. Animal is said-of the 
universal human. But the universal human isn’t anything beyond the particular 
humans. So the only way to stand in a relation to a universal is by standing in a 
relation to the particulars constituting it. If you don’t bear the said-of relation to any of 
the particulars, then you can’t bear it to the universal because the universal isn’t some 
separate entity. So animal must be said-of at least some of the individual humans. 
Similarly, color is in body. But body isn’t anything beyond the particular bodies, and 
you can bear a relation to body only by bearing it to the particular bodies. If you don’t 
inhere in any of the particulars, then you can’t inhere in the universal.      208 
 
This line of reasoning is deeply flawed.
8 However, I think that we can 
understand why Aristotle makes this sort of mistake if we see him as concerned to 
emphasize the primacy of particulars in the passage that we are currently considering. 
In attempting to establish that everything in the universe is ultimately dependent on 
primary substances, Aristotle commits himself to a view on which relations between 
universals can be completely reduced to relations between particulars.  
In the previous chapter, I argued that Aristotle takes universals to be 
constituted by particulars, without holding that a universal is identical to any 
extensional construction of these particulars. This view stands as a sort of compromise 
between a Platonic view on which universals enjoy separate and independent 
existence, and some kind of class-theoretic or mereological nominalism.
9 Aristotle’s 
anti-platonist tendencies can be summarized by his claim that universals are nothing 
separate from (chôriston) or beyond (para) particulars.
10 His antinominalist tendencies 
can be seen in his refusal to identify universals with any extensional construction of 
particulars. However, there is a tension in Aristotle’s position. The more sharply he 
emphasizes that universals are nothing beyond particulars, the more pressure there is 
                                                 
8   There is one flaw in this reasoning that I will not discuss until later in this chapter. We might 
note that the reasoning here threatens to commit a fallacy of decomposition. The fact that something 
stands in a relation to a whole does not generally entail that it stands in that relation to any of the parts 
of that whole. While this is a fair point about relations in general, there are some relations where such 
reasoning is not fallacious. Take, for example, the naively conceived relation of physical contact 
between two objects. I can be in contact with an object only by being in contact with a part of that 
object. I will argue below that Aristotle takes predication simpliciter to be a relation according to  which 
something can be predicated of a universal only by being predicated of an appropriate particular.  
9   In calling the former view “Platonic”, I side with a traditionally dominant line in Plato 
interpretation according to which forms are both transcendent and separate from, i.e. ontologically 
independent of, the particulars participating in them. For discussion and criticism of the traditional 
view, see Gail Fine’s “Separation” (1984), “Immanence” (1986), and On Ideas (1993) .   
10   When Aristotle denies that universals are anything separate from (chôriston) particulars (see 
Metaphysics H.4), or beyond (para) particulars (see Posterior Analytics I.24), he takes himself to be 
opposing Plato. On the question of whether Aristotle is right in taking Plato as holding that universals 
are something para particulars and the question of what Plato might mean in claiming that forms are 
something para particulars, see Fine (1984), and Morrison “Choristos in Aristotle” (1985a), 
“Separation in Aristotle’s Metaphysics” (1985b), ‘Separation: A Reply to Fine” (1985c). Also see Fine 
“Separation: A Reply to Morrison” (1985).       209 
 
on him to identify universals with collections of particulars.
11 Perhaps one way to read 
2a34ff is as a case where Aristotle’s antiplatonist commitments lead him too far in the 
direction of nominalism. Aristotle’s claim that color is in a particular body will be 
false on the picture of universals that I offered in Chapter 7. However, as I have 
argued previously, Aristotle’s claim at 2a34ff will be true if he takes universals to be 
sets or sums of the particulars that they are said-of.
12 Color is in body, but color just is 
the sum of the particular colors, and body is just the sum of the particular bodies. 
Color will then count as inhering in each particular colored body according to 
Aristotle’s definition of inherence. Color is in the particular body in the non-technical 
sense of ‘in’, and, if mereological sums have their parts essentially, then color cannot 
exist without the particular color inherent in that particular body. However, no 
particular color can exist apart from the particular body in which it inheres. So, the 
universal color cannot exist without each of the particular bodies in which NSP colors 
inhere. While I take there to be ample evidence that Aristotle does not want to accept 
the identification of universals with sums of particulars, his reasoning at 2a34ff makes 
sense if he does accept such an identification. Perhaps Aristotle’s problematic 
assertions at 2a34 show him to be temporarily in the grips of an extreme form of 
nominalism. 
Section 8.4: A Third Possible Source of Confusion 
I have suggested two possible sources of confusion that might underlie 
Aristotle’s assertion that all things other than primary substances either inhere in or are 
                                                 
11   As I allude to in Chapter 7, there may be an even stronger reading of the “nothing beyond 
particulars” view, on which universals stand in a relation of plural identity to some particulars. The 
universal human just is the humans, and commitment to the universal involves no ontological 
commitment beyond commitment to the particulars. I think that this view is both philosophically 
problematic, and hard to attribute to Aristotle. However, if Aristotle is thinking that universals just are 
particulars then the inherence of color in body just is the inherence of body in the particulars, and 
Aristotle’s claim at 2b2 follows immediately.   
12   See chapter 3.      210 
 
said-of primary substances, and particularly his assertion that non-substantial 
universals inhere in particular substances. In the remainder of this chapter, I want to 
examine Aristotle’s theory of predication in the De Interpretatione and the Analytics. 
In the De Interpretatione and Prior Analytics, Aristotle suggests a view on which 
universals inherit the predicates of the particulars that they are said-of, and on which 
something can be predicated of a universal only if it is predicated of appropriate 
particulars. What Aristotle says about inherence at 2b1-3, therefore, seems to be 
something that he affirms about predication as least as he conceives of it in the Prior 
Analytics and De Interpretatione. Furthermore, on the view of predication that 
Aristotle puts forward in those works, call it predication simpliciter, we seem to be 
able to give necessary and sufficient conditions for properly predicating something of 
a universal subject solely in terms of what is properly predicated of the particulars that 
the universal is said-of.
13 Whether we can go further and claim that Aristotle thinks 
that predicating something of a universal reduces to predicating something of the right 
sorts of particulars is a difficult question, but much of what Aristotle says in these 
works is consistent with the reductive view.  
In his discussion of katholou and kath’ hauto predication in the Posterior 
Analytics, however, Aristotle denies that everything that can be predicated kath’ hauto 
of a universal can also be predicated kath’ hauto of particular instances of the 
universal. Furthermore, kath’ hauto predication of a universal cannot be reduced to 
                                                 
13   In what follows, unless I explicitly qualify an occurrence of ‘predication’ as ‘kath’ hauto’, I 
am talking about predication simpliciter. However, predication simpliciter admits of qualification. As 
we will see, Aristotle thinks that something can be predicated simpliciter of a universal or of a 
particular. Furthermore, in the De Interpretatione,  when something is predicated simpliciter of a 
universal, it can be predicated of that universal either universally (katholou) or non-universally. 
Furthermore, in the Prior Analytics, Aristotle draws a strong equivalence between predicating 
something universally (katholou) and predicating it of every instance of a universal (kata pantos). 
However, in the Posterior Analytics, Aristotle distinguishes katholou predication from kata pantos 
predication, and claims that something can be predicated of something katholou only if it is also 
predicated of that thing kath’ hauto. This change in Aristotle’s use of the term ‘katholou’ greatly 
complicates the exposition of his view.        211 
 
predicating something simpliciter of a universal or to predicating something 
simpliciter of particulars. On closer examination of Aristotle’s different sorts of 
predication, we see that the relation of inherence is more akin to kath’ hauto 
predication than to the more purely extensional predication simpliciter discussed in the 
Prior Analytics and De Interpretatione. We might attribute Aristotle’s mistake at 
2a34ff to his thinking about inherence in terms of predication simpliciter rather than in 
terms of kath’ hauto predication.   
The distinction between predication simpliciter and predication kath’ hauto is 
also closely related to the distinction between a purely extensional view of universals 
and a view according to which universals are something other than extensions of 
particulars. Furthermore, the conflation of kath’ hauto predication and predication 
simpliciter is closely related to a mistake about the way in which constitution interacts 
with modality.  
Section 8.5: Predication in the De Interpretatione  
  In chapter 7 of the De Interpretatione, Aristotle distinguishes between stating 
something of a particular, and stating something of a universal. In cases where we 
state something of a universal, we can do so either universally or non-universally. We 
therefore have three types of statement, and it might be helpful to look at examples of 
each type. 
  Stating something of a particular: 
  (P1)     ¶sti Svkrãthw leukÒw.    (Socrates is pale.) 
      Esti Sôkratês leukos. 
  (P2)    oÈk ¶sti Svkrãthw leukÒw.    (Socrates is not pale.) 
      Ouk esti Sôkratês leukos. 
  Stating something of a universal universally: 
  (UU1)   pçw ênyrvpow leukÒw [¶sti].    (All/every man is pale.) 
      Pas anthrôpos leukos [esti].     212 
 
  (UU2)   oÈde‹˚ ênyrvpow leukÒw [¶sti].  (No man is pale.) 
      Oudeis anthrôpos leukos [esti]. 
  Stating something of a universal non-universally: 
  (UN1)   ¶sti leukÒw ênyrvpow.     ([A] man is pale.) 
      Esti leukos anthrôpos. 
  (UN2)   oÈk ¶sti leukÒw ênyrvpow.    ([A] man is not pale.) 
      Ouk esti leukos anthrôpos.  
 
(P1) and (P2) are pretty straightforward—we are affirming or denying something of 
the particular Socrates. In both of the other pairs of statements, Aristotle holds that the 
statement is about the universal human. In (UU1) and (UU2), Aristotle claims that we 
are stating something of human universally. In (UN1) and (UN2), he tells us that the 
subject is still the universal, but that we are stating something about that subject non-
universally.
14  
  The most straightforward way of rendering (UU1)-(UN2) into colloquial 
English and first-order logic would be as follows:
15 
  (UU1e) Every man is pale.   
  (UU2e) No man is pale.  
  (UN1e) A man is pale.  
  (UN2e) A man is not pale. 
  (UU1fo) ∀x(Mx ⊃ Px) 
  (UU2fo) ¬∃x(Mx & Px) 
                                                 
14   Aristotle uses the phrase “§p‹ toË kayÒlou épofa€nesyai kayÒlou” to indicate that the 
subject is a universal and that it is being taken universally, and “µØ kayÒlou épofa€nesyai §p‹ t«n 
kayÒlou” to indicate that we are stating something of the subject non-universally. In the sentence 
“pçw ênyrvpow leukÒw [¶sti],” Aristotle tells us that ‘ênyrvpow’ signifies a universal, and that 
the function of ‘pçw’ is to indicate that we are stating something of Human universally. In “¶sti 
leukÒw ênyrvpow” the use of ‘ênyrvpow’ still indicates that the subject is the universal human. 
However, the lack of ‘pçw’ indicates that we are stating something of human non-universally.  
15   Ackrill (1963), and Irwin and Fine (1995) translate the relevant sentences in the way that 
follows. It isn’t clear whether they are wed to the first-order versions of these sentences that I give. 
Edgehill (1928) renders (UU1) as (UU1e) but chooses “Man is pale” as a translation of (UN1). One 
possible alternative would be to take ‘pçw’ plus the grammatically singular ‘ênyrvpow’ as ‘the whole 
man’. See the entry on ‘pçw’ in LSJ. (UU1) then says that the whole universal human is pale. I am 
hesitant to put too much weight on this suggestion, because the standard translation does strike me as 
more natural. Nevertheless, it is interesting that ‘pçw’ exhibits this subtle ambiguity.      213 
 
  (UN1fo) ∃x(Mx & Px) 
  (UN2fo) ∃x(Mx & ¬Px) 
(UU1e)-(UN2e) represent a natural way to take the corresponding Greek sentences. 
However, this way of rendering Aristotle’s Greek can be misleading, if (UU1e)-
(UN2e) are taken to be equivalent to (UU1fo)-(UN2fo).  
  Aristotle takes (UU1), like (P1), to be sentence consisting of a subject and a 
predicate joined by a copula. In (UU1) the subject is the universal human. However, 
the corresponding first-order sentence (UU1fo) does not have the universal as a 
subject. It is, in fact, difficult to say what counts as the subject of (UU1fo), since it 
doesn’t even have the subject-copula-predicate form. Rather, (UU1fo) tells us that 
every entity in the universe meets one of two conditions, either it is something other 
than a human being or it is pale. (UU1fo) seems to be about the particulars in the 
universe and the function of the quantifier is to indicate that we are talking about every 
particular. Aristotle, however, takes (UU1) to be about human, and the function of the 
term ‘pas’ seems to be to indicate how much of the subject the predicate belongs to, or 
to what extent the predicate belongs to the subject. Pallor is being said to belong to all 
of human.
16 To see whether this difference between (UU1) and (UU1fo) amounts to 
anything, it will be helpful to examine some of Aristotle’s statements about katholou 
predication in the Prior Analytics.   
   First, however, I want to take a look at (UN1)-(UN2) and the English and 
first-order translations given for them above. Greek has no indefinite article, but it is 
often natural to translate uses of a noun with no article by using the indefinite article in 
the translation. So (UN1e) and (UN2e) are perfectly natural English translations of 
Aristotle’s Greek. However, Aristotle explicitly tells us that the subject of (UN1) and 
                                                 
16   Notice, that on this way of construing universal statements, the Aristotelian treatment of 
sentences containing empty general terms is well motivated. Take the sentence “Every unicorn is 
magical.” When I claim that everything in the universe either fails to be a unicorn or is magical, I say 
something true. However, when I say that magicality belongs to the entirety of the entity unicorn, which 
contains all the currently existing unicorns as parts, it is reasonable to hold that I say something false.      214 
 
(UN2) is the universal human, and it is difficult to see how the subject of the English 
sentence,  “A man is pale”, can be thought to be a universal.  
  Furthermore, Aristotle tells us that (UN1) and (UN2) are contradictory 
opposites, and that contradictory opposites must affirm and deny the same thing of the 
same thing. Thus, Aristotle must take ‘anthrôpos’ in (UN1) and (UN2) to be a 
univocal referring expression—it refers to the universal human in both sentences. 
These sentences are genuinely contradictory for Aristotle, one affirms and the other 
denies something of a single universal subject. In fact, Aristotle seems to take the fact 
that both these sentences can be true to represent an exception to the Principle of Non-
Contradiction.
17 
  (UN1e) and (UN2e), however, do not seem to be contradictory opposites. The 
phrase ‘a man’, as it occurs in the English sentences, is not functioning as a univocal 
referential expression at all. It also seems obvious that (UN1fo) and (UN2fo) do not 
affirm and deny the same thing of the same thing. (UN1fo) tells us that something is 
both a man and a pale thing, and (UN2fo) tells us that something is a man and is not a 
pale thing. While Aristotle does take (UN1) and (UN2) to be contradictory, there is 
little temptation to take (UN1e) and (UN2e) or (UN1fo) and (UN2fo) as genuinely 
contradictory. There is some reason, therefore, to resist taking  (UN1) and (UN2) to 
have the same meaning as (UN1fo) and (UN2fo).  
  In addition, Aristotle gives us another sentence that seems to have a better 
claim on being the Greek way of rendering (UN1fo). In giving the contradictory 
opposite of ‘No man is pale,’ (‘Oudeis anthrôpos leukos [esti].’), Aristotle provides 
‘Some man is pale.’ (‘Tis anthrôpos leukos [esti].’). In the latter sentence, Aristotle 
explicitly uses the indefinite pronoun ‘tis’ (some). Furthermore, while the 
                                                 
17   For more on the discussion of universal predication and the principle of non-contradiction, see 
Whitaker Aristotle’s De Interpretatione: Contradiction and Dialectic (1996). My general take on this 
passage owes a lot to Whittaker’s discussion.     215 
 
contradictory of ‘All man is pale,’ is said at De Interpretatione 7 to be ‘Not all man is 
pale,’ (‘Ou pas anthrôpos leukos,’), Aristotle generally also takes the particular 
negative sentence, ‘Some man is not pale,’ (‘Ou leukos tis anthrôpos [esti].’) to be the 
contradictory opposite of a universal affirmative.
18 Therefore, it seems that (UN1fo) 
and (UN2fo) would be better taken as translations of sentences in which Aristotle 
explicitly uses a form of the indefinite pronoun.  
(UP1)  Some man is pale.     (t‹w ênyrvpow leukÒw [¶sti].) 
  (UP2)  Some man is not pale.   (oÁ leukÒw t‹w ênyrvpow.)
19 
  Although (UN1) and (UN2) differ syntactically from (UP1) and (UP2), we 
might, nevertheless, take the relevant pairs of sentences to be semantically equivalent, 
in the way that we normally take the English sentences ‘A man is pale,’ and ‘Some 
man is pale,’ to be equivalent. At least in the De Interpretatione, however, Aristotle 
does not take ‘tis anthrôpos leukos esti,’ to mean the same thing as ‘esti leukos 
anthrôpos.’ Aristotle insists at 17a37 that every sentence has exactly one contradictory 
opposite. (UN1) has (UN2) as its contradictory opposite. The contradictory opposite of 
(UP1) is (UU2) (‘No man is pale’). Aristotle explicitly denies that ‘Man is not pale,’ 
has the same meaning as ‘No man is pale.’ Therefore, on the assumption that 
semantically equivalent  statements have semantically equivalent contradictories, 
Aristotle doesn’t take (UN1) and (UP1) to be semantically equivalent.
20 We have 
                                                 
18   Aristotle does not give an example of a particular negative using ‘tis’ in the De Interpretatione. 
However, see APr I.2 25a22-25: “tÚ ênyrvpow tin‹ t“ z–ƒ µØ Ípãrxei.” (Man doesn’t belong to 
some animal.) is given as meaning the same thing as “tÚ ênyrvpow oÈ pant‹ z–ƒ [Ípãrxei].” 
(Man does not belong to every animal.) 
19   Aristotle never tells us whether (UP1) and (UP2) should be taken as claims about universals or 
about particulars. If we do think that (UP1) is equivalent to (UN1fo), then it seems that (UP1) doesn’t 
really have a universal subject. However, in the Prior Analytics, Aristotle claims that in statements like 
(UP1) and (UP2) we affirm or deny something of something ‘in part’ (en merei). He might then take the 
subjects of such sentences to be  universals, and hold that we are stating something about the universal 
in a certain way, partially. On this suggestion, we are taking ‘tis’ to have adverbial force. Nevertheless, 
‘tis’ seems to function grammatically as a modifier of ‘anthrôpos’.  
20   For a similar argument, see Whitaker (1996) chapter 7.      216 
 
reason, therefore, to deny that the first-order sentences offered as translations above 
accurately capture what Aristotle is talking about in the De Interpretatione. The story 
might be somewhat different, however, when we turn to the Prior Analytics.  
Section 7.6: Predication in the Prior Analytics 
  In Prior Analytics I.1 and I.2, Aristotle talks about three ways in which one 
thing can be stated of another: universally (katholou), partially (en merei), or 
indefinitely (adioristos). In each of these cases, Aristotle is considering sentences in 
which the subject term is a universal, and he doesn’t deal with assertions about 
particulars like (P1)-(P2) in Prior Analytics I.1-2.
21 The sentences that Aristotle 
typically uses in the Prior Analytics have a different grammatical form than the 
example sentences in the De Interpretatione that we looked at above.  
  Universal (katholou)    Pale belongs to all human. 
          Pale belongs to no human. 
  Partial (en merei)     Pale belongs to some human. 
          Pale does not belong to some human 
  Indefinite (adioristos)   Pale belongs to human. 
          Pale does not belong to human.
22 
There is a strong temptation to take the universal sentences to correspond to (UU1)-
(UU2), the indefinite sentences to correspond to (UN1)-(UN2), and the partial 
sentences to correspond to (UP1)-(UP2). If we do so, however, then the Prior 
Analytics seems to conflict with the De Interpretatione. 
  In Prior Analytics Book I chapter 7, Aristotle claims that substituting a 
positive indefinite premise for a positive particular (en merei) premise in any 
                                                 
21   Aristotle does talk a bit about predicating things of sensible particulars later in the Prior 
Analytics.  
22   Compare these three sentences to “All man is pale,” “Some man is pale,” and “Man is pale.” 
Generally if we have a sentence of the form “Quantifier-word subject is predicate,”  the corresponding 
sentence in the Analytics typically has the form “Predicate belongs to quantifier-word subject.” 
‘Belongs to’ translates the verb ‘huparchein’ which takes a dative complement.     217 
 
syllogism will not change the deduction being made.
23 As an example, take the 
following valid syllogism: 
  (S1)  Rational belongs to all man. 
  (S2)  Pale belongs to some man.  
  ∴(S3)  Rational belongs to some pale.  
In (S2), we have a partial assertion formally equivalent to (UP1) above. Aristotle tells 
us that we can freely substitute the indefinite assertion (S2*) to get the following valid 
syllogism: 
  (S1)  Rational belongs to all man. 
  (S2*)  Pale belongs to man.  
  ∴(S3)  Rational belongs to some pale.  
(S2*) is formally equivalent to (UN1). Furthermore, while Aristotle doesn’t explicitly 
tell us that the converse holds in all cases, it seems that he would also hold that the 
substitution of (S2) for (S2*) in any syllogism preserves validity. Let’s call sentences 
that can be substituted for each other in any syllogistic context in a way that preserves 
validity “syllogistically equivalent”. We are left with the question of whether Aristotle 
takes all syllogistically equivalent pairs of sentences to have the same meaning.  
According to Ackrill, Aristotle’s claims in the Prior Analytics indicate that he 
eventually came to identify indefinite and partial statements and to hold that the 
former are disposable.
24 Whitaker, on the other hand, argues that the mere syllogistic 
                                                 
23   See 29a27. 
24   See Ackrill (1963). Ackrill holds that the view in the Prior Analytics represents a development 
and correction of the view in the De Interpretatione, and seems committed to the claim that the former 
is a later work. While I have an intuition that Ackrill is right on this score, I have little confidence in my 
intuitions about the relative chronology of Aristotle’s works. For my purposes in this chapter, the 
differences between the Prior Analytics and the De Interpretatione are less important than the similarity 
of these works when compared to the Posterior Analytics. Given the fact that Aristotle seems to refer to 
and presuppose the Prior Analytics in the Posterior Analytics, there is some reason to think that the 
latter is a later work. However, it is possible that Aristotle continually updated both works through the 
course of his career, which would complicate any claims about relative dates considerably.         218 
 
equivalence is not enough to argue for sameness of meaning. According to Whitaker, 
Aristotle takes indefinite statements have no special role in deductive logic and to be 
eliminable in that context, but he takes indefinite statements to be essential and 
ineliminable in dialectical arguments.
25  
  I think that Whittaker is right to distinguish syllogistic equivalence from full-
blown semantic equivalence. Two sentences could entail each other, and behave the 
same way in syllogisms without meaning exactly the same thing. Figuring out what 
Aristotle means in claiming that partial and indefinite assertions are syllogistically 
equivalent in the Prior Analytics depends crucially on how we construe partial 
assertions.  
Section 8.7: Two Interpretations of Partial Assertion 
  There are two different ways in which we might think about partial assertions 
and it is not entirely clear which Aristotle intends. It will be helpful to formalize the 
alternatives. Let ‘Cxy’ mean ‘y belongs to x,’ and let ‘x’ and ‘y’ range over both 
particulars and universals.
26 Let ‘P’ be one-place operator representing an adverbial 
modifier such that  ‘PCxy’ means: y partially belongs to x. Let h be the universal 
human, and r be the universal rational. The indefinite assertion, “Rational belongs to 
human,” would be represented as
27: 
  (IA)   Chr 
Here are two possible ways of representing the partial assertion, “Rational belongs to 
some human.” 
                                                 
25   Whitaker (1996). 
26   The idea here is that both universals and particulars can be referents of first-order terms. 
Ordinary first-order logic would have a predicate (‘M’=is a man) and represent the sentence “Socrates 
is a man,” as ‘Ms’. The system under consideration has an individual constant for the universal man 
(‘m’), and a first-order relation corresponding to Aristotle’s copula (‘C_ _’). This system then 
represents “Socrates is a man,” as ‘Csm’. 
27   I choose (IA) as the proper way to represent an indefinite assertion on the ground that it better 
captures Aristotle’s claim that the subject of the sentence is a universal.     219 
 
  (PA1)  ∃x(Cxh & Cxr) 
  (PA2)  PChr   
If we want to translate sentences like (UP1) into first-order sentences like (UN1fo), 
then (PA1) seems to be the proper way to take partial assertions. On the other hand, if 
partial claims are taken to be claims with universal subjects, then (PA2) seems to be a 
better choice. The issue here is complicated by the fact that Aristotle sometimes talks 
about partial assertions in a way that naturally inclines us to (PA1), and sometimes in 
a way that inclines us to (PA2). Aristotle describes partial assertions as cases where 
one thing is said to belong to another ‘in part’, where ‘in part’ seems to function as an 
adverbial modifier of ‘belong to’, in which case (PA2) is a more natural way to go. 
However, in his examples of partial assertions Aristotle generally uses a form of 
‘tis/ti’ to modify the subject of the assertion. So a standard example might be 
“Rational belongs to tis human.” This sentence would best be translated as “Rational 
belongs to some human,” which seems akin to (PA1), rather than as “P partially 
belongs to S,” which seems akin to (PA2).
28 The way that we construe partial 
assertions will influence our interpretation of syllogistic equivalence.  
Indefinite assertions are best construed as (IA), and tell us that one universal 
belongs to another without specifying how (i.e. wholly or partially) the first belongs to 
the second. If Aristotle is taking partial assertions as (PA2), then we have a case where 
a sentence with an explicit adverbial modifier is said to be equivalent to a sentence 
with no adverbial modifier. Assume that there are only two sorts of adverbial 
modifiers that are proper in these sorts of cases, ‘partially’ and ‘wholly’, and that 
every case in which one thing belongs to another is either a case where it belongs to it 
                                                 
28   It might be possible for Aristotle to use a form of tis/ti as an adverbial modifier, and express 
something like (PA2). However, he would need to use a neuter form (‘ti’) to be justified in taking ‘tis/ti’ 
adverbially. Aristotle invariably uses a form of ‘tis/ti’ that agrees with the subject, indicating that he 
isn’t using the term adverbially.         220 
 
partially or where it belongs to it wholly. Any case in which (PA2) is true, is then a 
case in which (IA) is also true. Make the further assumption that whenever one thing 
wholly belongs to another, the first also belongs to the second in part. Then any case 
in which (IA) is true is also a case in which (PA2) is true.
29 If (PA2) is the correct way 
to take partial assertions, then partial assertions will be syllogistically equivalent to 
(IA). Furthermore, I would be tempted to say that (PA2) and (IA) are semantically 
equivalent.
30  
The situation is a bit more complicated if we construe partial assertions as 
(PA1). (IA) is a sentence that has a universal as its subject. (PA1) doesn’t have a 
subject, strictly speaking. If the semantic equivalence of two sentences is a matter of 
their meaning the very same thing, then a sentence that has a subject can be 
semantically equivalent to another sentence only if the second has the same subject as 
the first. We would then deny that (IA) is semantically equivalent to (PA1), since the 
first sentence is about a universal while the second is equivalent to the claim the 
conjunction of two sentences with the same particular subject is true.
31  
                                                 
29   The fact that Aristotle’s syllogistic logic takes A-claims to entail the corresponding I-claims 
makes this assumption plausible. The adverbial modifier ‘partially’ seems best taken to mean something 
like ‘at least in part’ rather than as ‘partially but not wholly’.  
30   We have a case here where partially belonging to something constitutes the minimal threshold 
for belonging to something at all. Whether the equivalence of (PA2) and (IA) is a formal equivalence 
will depend on whether we take ‘P’ and ‘C’ to be a logical constants or not. If it is a logical constant, it 
is reasonable to think that 
PCαβ ≡ Cαβ
 will be a logically valid schema. If ‘P’ is not a logical 
constant, then the equivalence of (PA2) and (IA) will depend on the intended interpretation of ‘P’ and 
‘C’, which will in turn depend on substantive views about what it is for something to belong to a 
universal.    
31   It is difficult to figure out exactly how exactly to reconcile the choice of (PA1) as the correct 
way to take partial assertions with Aristotle’s general thought that sentences have logical subjects. It is 
unclear that Aristotle ever directly conceives of anything like a contemporary treatment of existential 
quantification involving objectual satisfaction. (Note, however, that sometimes takes universally 
predicating something of a universal as equivalent to saying that everything to which one predicate 
belongs is something to which the other predicate belongs. This way of taking universal statements is 
very close to the way that they are taken by a theory with objectual quantification. See note 37.) The 
issues that I am examining at present, therefore, might involve going well beyond Aristotle’s own 
formal resources. 
Nevertheless, the questions raised seem essential to understanding fully Aristotle’s theory of 
predication. Perhaps the best way to take (PA1) is as a claim involving substitutional quantification—as     221 
 
 
Section 8.8: Predicational Inheritance and Partial and Indefinite Statements 
I am uncertain whether Aristotle would be more inclined to accept (PA1) or 
(PA2) as closest to his way of understanding partial assertions. However, I think that 
we can raise a more fundamental question. If presented with (PA1) and (PA2), what 
would Aristotle say about each of these sentences? In the first we have a statement that 
there are some particulars to which certain predicates belong, while in the second we 
are told that a predicate partially belongs to a universal. Understood in this way, would 
Aristotle take (PA1) and (PA2) have the same meaning? Or to put the question in the 
material mode, would Aristotle take these sentences to report the very same 
underlying fact? At the very least, I think that Aristotle would hold that as a matter of 
necessity each sentence is true if and only if the other sentence is true.
32 A sentence 
partially (or indefinitely) predicating something of a universal will be true if and only 
if there is a true sentence predicating it of some appropriate particular. Aristotle, 
therefore, accepts the following principles of predicational inheritance.  
(PI1) For all universals, x, and all predicates, y, y is partially predicated 
of x if and only if there is some particular z such that x is said-of z and 
y is predicated of x.  
                                                                                                                                           
elliptically claiming that there is at least one true sentence claiming that rational belongs to a particular 
human. Alternatively, we might take (PA1) as expressing elliptically some disjunction of sentences with 
particular subjects. In part because neither of these alternatives seems particularly attractive, I have 
some hesitation about whether or not (PA1) can be the right way to take partial assertions. I don’t think 
that I can solve this problem in the present work, however. So I am content to outline some alternatives 
here. See note 37 for additional discussion of what it means to reduce claims about universals to 
quantificational claims and claims about particulars.  
32   There is good reason to think that Aristotle will distinguish sameness of meaning from mere 
intensional equivalence, where this is taken as sameness of truth-value in all possible worlds. For 
example, while Aristotle would take “human” to mean the same thing as “rational animal”, he would 
not take “human” to mean the same thing as “grammatical animal”. However, the sentence “Human 
beings are rational,” is true in all and only those worlds in which “Human beings are grammatical,” is 
true. These sentences are intensionally equivalent, but differ in meaning.       222 
 
(PI2) For all particulars, x, and all predicates, y, y is predicated of x if 
and only if there is a universal, z, such that z is said-of x and y is 
partially predicated of z.
33  
 
Aristotle will also hold principles corresponding to (PI1) and (PI2) without the 
qualification, ‘partially’. Something’s being predicated of a universal will also require 
its being predicated of at least one appropriate particular, and anything predicated of a 
particular will be predicated of all the universals said-of that particular. A closer 
examination of Aristotle’s claims about universally predicating something of a 
universal reveals some further facts about the relation between particular and universal 
predication.  
Section 8.9: Universal Predication in the Prior Analytics 
At the outset of the Prior Analytics, Aristotle distinguishes various types of 
proposition: 
A proposition is a statement affirming or denying (something) of 
something, and this either universal, partial or indefinite. By universal I 
mean what belongs to all or to none, by partial what belongs to some or 
not to some or not to all, by indefinite what belongs or does not belong 
without (an indication) of universal or partial…
34 (24a16-20)  
Aristotle tells us here that one thing is predicated of another katholou 
whenever the first belongs to all or to none of the second. At the end of APr I.1, 
Aristotle gives a further explanation of what it is for one thing to be ‘in another as a 
whole’.  
For one thing to be in another as a whole is the same as for the second 
to be predicated of all of the first. And we say that something is 
                                                 
33   We could do away with (PI2) if we assume that all particulars have some universal said-of 
them.  
34   “Πρότασις μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ λόγος καταφατικὸς ἢ ἀποφατικόςτινος κατά τινος· οὗτος δὲ ἢ 
καθόλου ἢ ἐν μέρει ἢ ἀδιόριστος. λέγω δὲ καθόλου μὲν τὸ παντὶ ἢ μηδενὶ ὑπάρχειν, ἐν μέρει δὲ 
τὸ τινὶ ἢ μὴ τινὶ ἢ μὴ παντὶ ὑπάρχειν, ἀδιόριστον δὲ τὸ ὑπάρχειν ἢ μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἄνευ τοῦ 
καθόλου ἢ κατὰ μέρος…” (24a16-20)     223 
 
predicated of all of something whenever nothing [of the second] can be 
found which is such that the first can’t be asserted of it (24b26-30).
35 
 
Aristotle’s discussion at 24b26-30 picks up his discussion of predicating something of 
something universally (katholou) at 24a18. Being in something as a whole is the 
converse of being affirmed or denied of something as a whole. Aristotle’s discussion 
of being in something as a whole calls to mind the use of Euler circles in modeling 
syllogistic logic. The circle representing the term A is wholly inside the circle 
representing term B when B belongs to all A, and is wholly outside the B-circle when 
B belongs to no A.  
  In telling us that one thing belongs to all of another whenever nothing of the 
second can be found such that the first fails to be asserted of it, I take Aristotle to be 
making a claim about particulars. A is in B as a whole if and only if B is predicated of 
all A, and B is predicated of all A if and only if there is no particular to which A 
belongs and  B fails to belong.
36  
                                                 
35   “τὸ δὲ ἐν ὅλῳ εἶναι ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ καὶ τὸ κατὰ παντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι θατέρου θάτερον 
ταὐτόν ἐστιν. λέγομεν δὲ τὸ κατὰ παντὸς κατηγορεῖσθαι ὅταν μηδὲν ᾖ λαβεῖν [τοῦ 
ὑποκειμένου] καθ' οὗ θάτερον οὐ λεχθήσεται.” (24b26-30).  
I follow Ross’s suggestion is Aristotle’s Prior and Posterior Analytics (1949), p292, in taking 
the passage to say that one thing is in another as a whole only when the second is predicated of all of 
the first. The use of ‘en holô’ in this passage, therefore, isn’t exactly coordinate with the use of ‘en 
merei’ in the discussion of being predicated in part at 24a18.  
36   I suggest that we take “…μηδὲν ᾖ λαβεῖν [τοῦ ὑποκειμένου] καθ' οὗ θάτερον οὐ 
λεχθήσεται,” as meaning “…nothing [of the subject] is to be found of which the other is not asserted,” 
where this is seen as a claim quantifying over particulars rather than as a claim about a universal.  
I agree with Ross (1949) that ‘τοῦ ὑποκειμένου’ most likely represents a gloss by Alexander 
and should be omitted. It might be somewhat more natural to take the ‘μηδὲν’ in the way that I suggest 
with this omission, although it still strikes me as possible to take “μηδὲν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου” as 
something like “no example of the subject”. I am intrigued by an alternative reading from Urbinus 
manuscript recorded in Ross (1949), “μηδὲν ᾖ λαβεῖν τῶν τοῦ ὑποκειμένου…” The use of the plural 
‘τῶν’ in ‘μηδὲν τῶν’ suggests ‘not one of many (particulars)…’. However, the fact that we get no 
noun for the article ‘τῶν’ to modify presents a serious grammatical obstacle to accepting this reading. 
What is at issue here is whether Aristotle conceives of κατὰ παντὸς predication as involving 
quantification over particulars or rather takes ‘κατὰ παντὸς’ to modify the way in which a predicate 
belongs to a universal subject. A third possibility is that Aristotle equates these ways of looking at κατὰ 
παντὸς predication.      224 
 
At the very least then, Aristotle holds that (UU1) and (UU1fo) are true in all the 
same possible worlds. So, the following predicational inheritance principle also holds.  
(PI3) For all universals, x, and all predicates, y, y is universally 
predicated of x if and only if for every particular, z, such that x is said-
of z, y is predicated of z.  
 
Whether Aristotle goes further in the De Interpretatione and Prior Analytics, to 
identify universally predicating something of a universal with predicating it of every 
appropriate particular, is a difficult issue to resolve. We face the same issues that we 
faced in the case of indefinite and partial predication. On the one hand, in universally 
predicating something of a universal we say something about a universal subject, 
while in saying that something is predicated of all of a collection of particulars we 
seem to say something about many particulars.
37 On the other hand, we might think 
                                                 
37   We should be careful here to distinguish two different views. On one view, a universal claim is 
intensionally equivalent to a specific conjunction of particular claims. On the second view, the universal 
claim is intensionally equivalent only to a quantificational claim. Say that in the actual world, a and b 
are the only particular As. On the first view, (i) “B belongs universally to A,” is intensionally equivalent 
to  (ii) “B belongs to a & B belongs to b.’ This first view seems incorrect since we intuitively think that 
the truth-values of the two sentences could diverge. On the second (and more plausible) view, (i) is 
intensionally equivalent to (iii) “Each particular thing that is an A is also a B.” The truthmaker for (iii) 
will involve different entities in different worlds.  
Here is a difficult question: what is the relation between the actual world truthmaker for (ii) 
and that of (iii)? We might think that the truthmaker of (ii) consists solely in the truthmakers of each of 
its conjuncts. But we could have a world in which each conjunct of (ii) was true, but in which (iii) was 
false. So what else is involved in the truth of (iii)? On one possible account, the truthmaker for (iii) 
would be a relation between the universals A and B. If we account for the truth of (iii) in this way, then I 
think that we have a non-reductive view even if we claim that (i) and (iii) have the same meaning.  
On another account, we do not need to include relations between universals among the 
fundamental facts constituting our truthmakers, but we do need to add something to the truthmaker for 
(ii). We might have some sort of ‘totality fact’, which makes true the claim that A belongs to nothing 
other than a and b. The idea here is that we will have the fact that a is A and the fact that b is A, as well 
as the fact that there are no other A-facts. The truthmaker for (iii) in any world will be of the form: x1 is 
A &...& xn is A & that’s all the A-facts & x1 is B&…&xn is B. Alternatively, we might have all the 
atomic facts plus the fact that these are all the facts, a la Wittgenstein. First, we have the conjunction of 
all the particular atomic facts along with the fact that these are all the facts (a global totality fact). The 
truth maker for a particular assertion will be an atomic fact. The truthmaker for a particular negation 
will be the fact that no truthmaker for the corresponding assertion is included in the totality of atomic 
facts. The truthmaker for a universal claim like “All As are Bs,” will be the fact that every object in the 
universe is either a thing that is an element of an atomic A-fact, or it is not one of the things that is an 
element of an atomic B-fact.      225 
 
that Aristotle intends something very strong when he claims at 24b26-30 that A’s 
being in B as a whole is the same as there being no particular A of which B fails to be 
predicated. If he means that these two claims are alternative ways of stating a single 
fact, then he would seem to have the stronger reductive view in mind.  
Section 8.10: Predicational Inheritance and Particulars as Parts of Universals 
Aristotle’s accepting (PI1)-(PI3) goes along with the view that universals are 
wholes with particulars as parts. His thinking seems to be analogous to the line of 
thought in the following case. Think of a chessboard with black and white squares. We 
would accept that the board is partially white and that it is partially black. In some 
contexts we would accept the claim that the board is white, even without the 
qualification ‘partially’.
38 
Calling the chessboard white without qualification is akin to non-universally 
predicating something of a universal. Notice that, in the same contexts, we would be 
equally willing to call the chessboard black. In the analogous case about non-
universally predicating something of a universal in the De Interpretatione, Aristotle 
claims that we accept contradictory statements. He gives the following argument, 
“Man is noble and man is not noble (for if base then not noble…).” As I have already 
argued, Aristotle is talking about predicating something of a universal in this passage. 
He claims that nobility and its opposite baseness can both be predicated of the 
                                                                                                                                           
Armstrong, A World of States of Affairs (1997) and Truth and Truthmakers (2004), discusses 
and advocates the use of totality facts in specifying truthmakers for negative and universal claims. If we 
give an account of the truthmaker for (iii) in the second way, and hold that (i) and (iii) have the same 
meaning, then we will have a reductive view. However, the view will be considerable weaker than a 
view on which (i) has the same meaning as (ii). If we give the second account of the truthmaker of (iii) 
but claim that the truthmaker for (i) involves an additional relation between universals, then we will 
have a non-reductive view.         
38   In many ordinary cases, the claim that something has a certain color seems naturally taken as a 
claim that it is solely (or at least predominantly) that color. However, in other cases, from the claim that 
the chessboard is both white and black, I would be inclined to infer both that it is white and that it is 
black. However, in such cases, I would not take the claim that something is black to entail that it is 
wholly or predominantly black.     226 
 
universal human. From the fact that baseness can be predicated of human, and the fact 
that whatever is base is not noble, Aristotle concludes, “Man is not noble.” 
Furthermore, he claims that “Man is not noble,” is the contradictory opposite of “Man 
is noble.” The problem with Aristotle’s argument becomes clear if we think about the 
analogous argument in the chessboard example. 
  Chessboard Argument (CBA): 
(i)  The chessboard is white. 
  (ii)   The chessboard is black. 
  (iii)   Whatever is black is not white. 
  ∴(iv)  The chessboard is not white.  
There are two ways to think about what is going wrong with (CBA). First, we 
might claim that the claim that the chessboard has a color is really just shorthand for 
the claim that some part of the chessboard has that color. Of course from the fact that 
one part is white while another part is black, it does not follow that we have anything 
that is both white and black. The (CBA), on this interpretation, fails to derive 
contradictory claims, because despite superficial appearances (i) and (iv) are not really 
claims about the same subject. Rather (i) is a claim that a part of the chessboard is 
white, and (iv) is a claim that a (presumably  different) part is not white.
39 
Alternatively, we might take the claim that a chessboard has a color as a claim 
that the color partially belongs to the chessboard, where this is thought about as a 
claim about the way in which one thing belongs to another. The first two premises can 
then be put as follows: 
(i*)  The chessboard is partially white (i.e. White partially belongs to 
the chessboard.)  
(ii*)  The chessboard is partially black. (i.e. Black partially belongs to 
the chessboard.) 
It is natural, on this interpretation, to take (iii) as (iii*): 
                                                 
39   This way of taking the chessboard argument is analogous to reading Aristotle’s claim, “Leukos 
anthrôpos esti,” as “A man is white.”      227 
 
  (iii*)  Anything which is partially black is partially not white.  
But all that follows from (i*)-(iii*) is: 
  (iv*)   The chessboard is partially not white. 
The argument to (iv*) is valid, and (i*)-(iii*) are true, but it seems wrong to say that 
(i*) and (iv*) are contradictory opposites. Rather (i*) seems to have (iv**) as a 
contradictory opposite.  
(iv**)  It is not the case that the chessboard is partially white.  
To validly conclude (iv**) we would need (iii**). 
(iii**)  If a thing is partially black, then it is not the case that it is 
partially white.  
But (iii**) just doesn’t seem to be something that we should accept. Similar reasoning 
applies to Aristotle’s examples in the De Interpretatione. Aristotle seems mistaken in 
claiming that ‘Man is base,’ and ‘Man is noble,’ count as contradictory. However, on 
my analysis, Aristotle’s mistake isn’t a matter of the two sentences having different 
subjects, as would be the case is we translated the relevant sentences as ‘A man is 
noble,’ and ‘A man is base.’ Rather Aristotle makes a mistake in not properly paying 
attention to the way in which predication must be qualified in thinking about each 
claim.  
Aristotle generally requires that contradictory statements say that the same 
thing both does and does not belong to a thing at the same time and in the same 
respect.
40  However, in the cases under consideration, it appears that (i) and (iv) are 
contradictory opposites only because we ignore the respect in which black and white 
belong to the chessboard, viz. partially. When we do consider the respect in which one 
thing belongs to another, we can see that we don’t have an argument that commits us 
to affirming and denying something of something in the same respect.  
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  The chessboard inherits the color predicates of its squares. Additionally, no 
object can have a color without having at least some parts that have that color. Finally, 
we will be inclined to say that a thing is wholly of a certain color if and only if all its 
parts are of that color.
41 On this picture, facts about the colors of composites are fixed 
once we fix the colors of all their simple parts. Whether facts about the colors of the 
composites can be reduced to facts about the colors of simples is a difficult question. 
But at the very least, we can give necessary and sufficient conditions for a composite’s 
possessing a color in terms of the colors of its parts. 
  In the same way, on the account of predication simpliciter that we have been 
examining, Aristotle holds that what can be predicated of universals is wholly fixed by 
what can be predicated of particulars. Thinking of the relation between universals and 
particulars as analogous to the relation between a chessboard and its squares might go 
some way to helping us see why Aristotle has some of the views that he does about 
predication. There are, however, some serious questions about the analogy between 
universals and concrete particulars that need to be addressed.  
Section 8.11: Universal Predication and Distributive Wholes 
    While the chessboard in our example does inherit the color properties of its 
squares, there are many other properties that the chessboard does not inherit from its 
squares. For example, from the fact that every square on the board is a one-inch 
square, it does not follow that the chessboard is a one-inch square. Conversely, it 
seems that the chessboard has certain properties that do not belong to any of the 
                                                 
41   Examples with colors often don’t stand up to close inspection, and this case is no different. The 
claims made here are false about the colors of things and their parts in the real world. For example, the 
individual atoms of which things are composed don’t seem to have any color. For purposes of the 
example, let’s confine ourselves to a pixilated world. Let’s say that the smallest objects in the world are 
monochromatic pixels. Furthermore, even if something looks wholly grey to us because its surface 
consists of closely arranged black and white pixels, we will insist that this is not a case in which a thing 
is wholly grey but is a case where we are misperceiving a thing that is partially black and partially 
white.       229 
 
squares on the board. For example, it is a chessboard and an eight-inch square. To 
apply the inheritance principles holding in the case of color to other cases would be to 
commit a grave error. Nevertheless, Aristotle’s claims about predication in the case of 
universals and particulars seem to be fully general. Aristotle thinks that universals and 
particulars inherit all of each other’s predicates. Aristotle, therefore, needs to say that 
predication always behaves in the way that color-predicates behave in the chessboard 
example.  
  We might now worry, however, that Aristotle is mistaken to hold such a view. 
Imagine that we have three human beings: Arnold is six-feet tall, Barbara is five-feet 
tall, and Catherine is four-feet tall. Aristotle must then hold that human has (at least in 
part) each of these heights. In addition, both being-a-thing-shorter-than-Barbara and 
being-a-thing-taller-than-Barbara will belong (at least in part) to human. Furthermore, 
say that each human being on the planet weighs less than Darla the elephant. It follows 
that weighing-less-than-Darla will belong universally to human. 
  If we think that predicating something of a universal reduces to predicating 
something of some or all of its particulars, there needn’t be anything strange about 
Aristotle’s making these claims. The real subjects of predication will be the particulars 
and in claiming that a predicate belongs to some or all of universal we are simply 
claiming that a predicate belongs to some or all of the particulars that the universal is 
said-of.
42    
                                                 
42   The story on this view is remarkably similar to the story that we would tell if we took 
universals to be sets. Consider claims of the following form: 
π belongs to α
 where 
π
 is the name of a 
predicate, and 
α
 can be replaced by the name of a universal or the name of a particular, and say that 
universals are sets. In cases where 
α
 names a particular  the claim made is that a predicate belongs to 
that particular. However, in cases where 
α
 names a universal, the claim made is not usually that a 
predicate belongs to the set but that a predicate belongs to some member of that set. When we add an 
explicit quantifier, like ‘all’ or ‘some’, we make a claim about some or all of the particulars in the set. 
In ordinary cases, when we claim that a predicate to belong to a set, we understand this as a claim that 
the predicate belong to members of that set. Sometimes, however, we want to make a claim not about a 
member of a set but about a set itself, ‘Sethood belongs to human.’ In English we can mark the 
difference by using or not using the indefinite article: consider ‘Sethood belongs to human,’ vs.     230 
 
   Aristotle’s view looks a bit more peculiar if we take claims about universals as 
intensionally equivalent to, but distinct in meaning from, claims in which we quantify 
over particulars. What does it mean to claim that four-footedness, five-footedness, or 
six-footedness each partially belong to the universal human? When I make a claim that 
six-footedness belongs to Arnold, I assume that I can go and measure Arnold. Can I 
also measure the universal? According to my view that particulars are parts of 
universals, in measuring Arnold we literally measure a part of the universal. However, 
it is odd to claim that the universal has a height, where this is supposed to mean 
something other than the claim that a part of the universal has that height. Similarly, it 
seems odd to say that the weight of the whole universal is the sum of the weights of 
the particulars. Furthermore, the inheritance principle (PI3), and the fact that every 
human weighs less than Darla, together entail that weighing-less-than-Darla belongs to 
the universal human universally. However, the collective weight of all human beings 
is greater than the weight of Darla. 
  It is clear from these examples that Aristotle needs to say that when we 
universally predicate something of a universal, the predicate has to be taken to 
distribute over the particulars that the universal is said-of. When we predicate 
something universally of a universal, we do not predicate it of the instances of the 
universal taken collectively. However, the claim that the predicate should be taken to 
distribute over the individual instances of the universal seems very close to the claim 
that universally predicating something of a universal simply reduces to predicating it 
of the relevant particulars.
43 It is difficult to come up with an interpretation on which 
                                                                                                                                           
‘Sethood belongs to a human’. Greek, however, seems to allow for a real ambiguity. “Sethood anthropô 
huparchei,” seems genuinely ambiguous between saying that sethood belongs to the set of humans, and 
saying that sethood belongs to a member of the set. In claiming that universals inherit the predicates of 
their particulars on the reductive or set-theoretic view, I mean that they inherit predicates in the second 
sense.    
43   See section 8.9 for a more careful discussion of the sort of reduction at issue.     231 
 
Aristotle takes the predicates of universals to distribute over particulars, but on which 
predicating something of a universal is not to be identified with predicating it of some 
or all of the relevant particulars.
44 The nature of the relation between predicating 
simpliciter something of a universal and predicating simpliciter that thing of the 
relevant particulars gives us some evidence that Aristotle reduces the first to the 
second. At the very least, I think that the account of predication simpliciter given to 
this point is consistent with the reductive view. As we will see in a moment, however, 
the situation is very different when it comes to kath’ hauto and katholou predication as 
these are understood in the Posterior Analytics. 
Section 8.12: Predicational Inheritance and Inherence    
  Whatever we decide on the question of reduction, Aristotle’s view of 
predication simpliciter, as outlined so far, commits him to the inheritance claims 
(PI1)-(PI3). This commitment entails that we can provide purely extensional truth-
conditions for any claim in which something is predicated of a universal subject. 
Aristotle’s claim at 2b1-3 that color inheres in body only if it inheres in a particular 
body amounts to an inheritance claim about inherence. I can think of two arguments 
by which we might get from an inheritance claim about predication to an inheritance 
                                                 
44   An additional problem for my general view that Aristotelian universals are understood as 
wholes comes about when we consider the fact that predicates of universal subjects should be taken to 
distribute over individuals. Aristotle’s claim that predicates distribute over the instances of universals is 
closely related to the fact that he takes universals to be what we might call ‘distributive’ rather than 
‘collective’ wholes. Aristotle makes this distinction in Metaphysics Δ.26 (1023b26-32). A universal, 
like human, is one and is said to be a whole and a universal in the sense that it is encompasses many 
things by being predicated of each of them, and by their each being one human being. Human is 
therefore a distributive whole. A collective whole, by contrast, is one thing made out of a plurality of 
things where none of the things in the plurality is itself a whole of the same sort as the collective whole. 
For example, a human body is a single thing containing many organs where none of these organs is, 
itself, a human body. When I predicate things of distributive wholes, it is natural to take me to say 
something about some or all of the parts of the thing (although think about cases where I say that human 
is a universal). On the other hand, when I say something about a collective whole, I do not generally 
take the predicate to distribute over the parts. It seems that the wholes of mereology are best thought as 
collective wholes, while distributive wholes are better thought of as sets. My own position, that 
Aristotle takes universals to be distributive wholes, and that he thinks of the relation between universals 
and particulars mereologically rather than set-theoretically, is therefore somewhat problematic.           232 
 
claim about inherence. One of these arguments was in the background in sections 2 
and 3. If Aristotle accepts the principle (Analysis), and holds that all instances of 
predication simpliciter must either be instances of inherence or instances of the said-of 
relation, there is the following argument to Aristotle’s claim at 2b1-3:
45 
  (Argument III)  
(i)   Color is in body. [Assumption] 
  ∴(ii)   Color is predicated of body. [(i) by (Analysis)] 
∴(iii)  There is a particular body, such that color is predicated of it. 
[(ii) by (PI1)]  
(iv)   Color is not said-of any particular body. [One thing is a 
substance, the other a quality.] 
  ∴(v)   Color inheres in a particular body. [(iii), (iv) by (Analysis)]. 
  The second argument by which we might get from (PI1)-(PI3) to the claim at 
2b1-3 requires us to give a nonstandard analysis of the claim that color is in body. 
Instead of taking the claim that color inheres in body as a claim in which color is 
predicated of body, imagine that we take it as a claim predicating the property of being 
a thing in which color inheres of the universal body. Call this property, I. If we were 
to take the claim that color in body as equivalent to I is predicated of body, we could 
construct the following argument for the claim that color inheres  in some particular 
body.  
  (Argument IV) 
  (i)   Color is in body. [Assumption] 
  ∴(ii)   I is predicated of body. [(i) by logical equivalence] 
  ∴(iii)  I is predicated of some particular body. [(ii) by (PI1)] 
  ∴(iv)  Color is in some particular body. [(iii) by logical equivalence]  
                                                 
45  (Analysis) x is a subject for y if and only if y inheres in x or y is said-of x.  
I take this principle to be equivalent to: y is predicated simpliciter of x if and only if y inheres in x or y 
is said-of x.      233 
 
  I do not think that Aristotle would accept (Argument IV), because I do not 
think that he would take (i) and (ii), or (iii) and (iv) to be logically equivalent. In fact, I 
do not think that Aristotle would hold that any proper predicate is indicated by “is a 
thing that color inheres in.” Predication is a relation that holds between categorial 
entities, and inherence is not an entity in any category. Rather, inherence is a 
fundamental relation by which things in categories are related to one another.
46 So, if 
Aristotle has an argument from (PI1)-(PI3) to the claim that color is in a particular 
body, it will have to be something like (Argument III).  
   Aristotle would be inclined to accept (Argument III), and the (Analysis) 
principle that is crucial to it, if he had accepted that the inherence and said-of relations 
were both types of predication simpliciter and that they were the only types of 
predication simpliciter. Given (Analysis) and  (PI1)-(PI3), we would then be able to 
establish  the following inherence inheritance principle (II1). 
(II1) For all universals, x and y, x inheres in y if and only if there is some 
particular, z, such that y is said-of z and x inheres in z.
47   
In accepting (Argument III), therefore, Aristotle commits himself to the view that we 
can give necessary and sufficient conditions for the inherence of something in a 
universal in terms of its inherence in particulars. Inherence then behaves precisely like 
predication simpliciter.   
                                                 
46   For a similar reason, I do not think that we can argue against (PI1)-(PI3) by claiming that 
universality is predicated of human, while it can’t be predicated of any particular human. ‘Universal’ 
and ‘particular’ do not name categorial entities. Rather for a thing to be universal is for it to be a thing 
that is said-of something, and to be a particular is to be a thing that is not said-of anything else. This is 
not how Aristotle defines universality and particularity in the De Interpretatione, but I take his views 
about universals (see chapter 7)  to allow us to offer these glosses on the meaning of ‘__ is a universal’. 
Michael Wedin (2000) coins the term “metaontological” to talk about terminology that has a role in 
Aristotle’s metaphysics, but which cannot be taken to refer to any of the things that Aristotle takes to 
exist, i.e. categorial entities.   
47   We also need the claim that no accident can be said-of any substance, and the claim that only 
accidents inhere in anything. (Argument I) establishes the left to right direction of (II1). For the right to 
left direction we have the following argument. Assume that there is some z such that y is said-of z and x 
inheres in z. By (Analysis), x is predicated of z. By (PI1), x is predicated of y. But, x is not said-of y, 
since one is an accident and the other a substance. So, by (Analysis) x inheres in y.         234 
 
  In the next section of this chapter, I will argue both that Aristotle recognizes a 
different kind of predication for which he uses the term ‘katholou’, and that inherence 
should be understood in terms of this second sort of katholou predication. This other 
variety of katholou predication is not a type of predication simpliciter and does not 
conform to (PI1)-(PI3). Furthermore, the new conception of predication corresponds 
to a more nuanced understanding of the relation between particulars and universals on 
which Aristotle’s claim at 2b1-3 is false.  
Section 8.13: Kath’ Hauto Predication in the Posterior Analytics 
  In the discussion of predication simpliciter in sections 5-12, I argued that 
Aristotle either identifies predicating simpliciter something of a universal universally, 
for which he uses the term ‘katholou’ in the De Interpretatione, with predicating 
something of each and every particular instance of a universal. However, in Posterior 
Analytics I.4, Aristotle distinguishes something’s holding in every case (kata pantos) 
from its holding universally (katholou). His use of ‘katholou’ in the Posterior 
Analytics, therefore, differs from his use of the same term in the De Interpretatione 
and Prior Analytics.   
  Aristotle says that something holds kata pantos if it holds in every case and at 
all times (78a28-33).
48 In filling out what it means to say that one thing holds of 
                                                 
48   The fact that kata pantos predication requires that the predicate always be said of the subject is 
difficult for me to reconcile with my view that Aristotle is a presentist. I can give only a brief comment 
of how I think things might go. If the truth of a claim relies on something other than the present state of 
the world, then presentism is false. In the Prior Analytics (34b7ff) Aristotle recognizes a use of the 
present tense in talking about logical matters that is something like an eternal present. In such cases, the 
use of ‘all’ is justified only if something holds of all past present and future instances of a universal. 
Furthermore, unlike in the Posterior Analytics, in the Prior Analytics, Aristotle claims that predication 
in all cases and always suffices for katholou predication. We might be able to reconcile the claim that 
Aristotle is a presentist with his treatment of kata pantos predication, if we claim that the truthmakers 
for kata pantos are present facts about universals, rather than past and future facts about particulars.  
In fact, given Aristotle’s thoughts about future contingent propositions, it seems that a kata 
pantos claim will be determinately true only in cases where it is non-contingent that the predicate will 
apply to future particulars. But it is non-contingent that the predicate applies to future particulars only in 
cases where the predicate applies not only kata pantos but also katholou. There is no present truthmaker 
for a future contingent proposition. There are, however, present truthmakers for non-contingent future     235 
 
another kata pantos, Aristotle is content to quantify over particulars, “If animal holds 
of man kata pantos, then if it is true to call this here a man, it is also true to call it an 
animal (73a29-31).”
49 On the account of katholou predication embodied in (PI1)-
(PI3), any case in which we have kata pantos predication ought to also be a case in 
which we have katholou predication—in which we are predicating something 
universally of a universal.  
  However, later in Posterior Analytics I.4, Aristotle claims that one thing 
belongs to another katholou only if some additional requirements are met: 
I say that [one thing] belongs universally [to another], when it both belongs in 
every case and belongs to a thing in its [i.e. the second thing’s] own right and 
qua itself (73b26-27).
50   
I am using ‘in its own right’ to translate Aristotle’s use of ‘kath’ hauto’, for which we 
often see the Latin equivalent ‘per se’. ‘Qua itself’ is my way of rendering Aristotle’s 
‘hê auto’. The sense of ‘hê auto’ is that the predicate must belong to subject insofar as 
the subject is itself. In other words it does not belong to the subject only insofar as the 
subject has a certain coincident.
51 Aristotle tells us at 73b28ff that ‘in its own right’ 
and ‘qua itself’ are synonymous.    
At 73a34-b25, Aristotle discusses what it means to claim that something 
belongs to a thing kath’ hauto. Aristotle distinguishes two ways in which one thing 
can belong to another kath hauto.  
                                                                                                                                           
propositions. However, these truthmakers are composed of universals that exist in the present, and not 
of particulars that exist in the future. For example, the sentence ‘Every human born after 2010 will be 
rational,’ is true because of the relationship between the universals human and rational. The truth of a 
future claim that is underwritten by the state of currently existing universal is compatible with 
presentism.  
49   Aristotle is using ‘this here’ (hode) to stand for any arbitrary case. For further claims about 
katholou predication and proof in an arbitrary case, see 73b32ff. 
50   “καθόλου δὲ λέγω ὃ ἂν κατὰ παντός τε ὑπάρχῃ καὶ καθ' αὑτὸ καὶ ᾗ αὐτό.”  
51   Aristotle draws the contrast between accidental and per se predication at 73b6-16. Aristotle 
usually contrasts belonging to something accidentally (kata sumbebekos or per accidens) with 
belonging to something kath’ hauto. Aristotle seems to take ‘because of itself’ (di’ hauto), ‘qua itself’, 
and ‘in its own right’ as meaning the same thing throughout APo I.4.       236 
 
Those things belong to something kath’ hauto which belong to it in the 
what it is—for example, line belongs to triangle or point to line (for the 
being (ousia) of these [triangle and line] is out of those [line and point], 
and they [line and point] belong in the definition saying what these 
[triangle and line] are). [Those things also belong to something kath’ 
hauto] for which the things to which they belong themselves belong in 
the account which makes clear what they are—for example, straight 
belongs [kath’ hauto] to line as does curved, and odd and even, prime 
and composite, square and oblong belong [kath’ hauto] to number. In 
all these cases, they (e.g. line in one case, number in the other) belong 
in the account saying what it is.  (73a34-b1)
52    
In explicating the first sort of kath’ hauto belonging, Aristotle gives us two 
criteria which he subsequently seems to equate. 
(KA1a) For all x and y, x belongs kath’ hauto1 to y iff the being (ousia) 
of y is from x. 
(KA1b) x belongs kath’ hauto1 to y iff x is in the account of what y is.  
(KA1b) tells us that the elements of a thing’s definition, its genus and differentia, 
belong to it kath hauto1. Aristotle goes on to say that line belongs in the definition of 
what a triangle is, perhaps because he takes the definition of triangle to be something 
like ‘three-lined planar figure’.
53   
There are two slightly different ways to take (KA1a), depending on how we 
take ‘the being of y is from x’ (‘ousia autôn ek toutôn’) at 73a35. We might take 
Aristotle to mean that x is part of the essence of y, in which case the (KA1a) has the 
same meaning as (KA1b). However, Aristotle might also mean that x is part of the 
substance of y, in the sense that xs are component parts of ys. The example with the 
triangle would then be telling us that triangles are made out of lines. While the latter 
                                                 
52   Καθ' αὑτὰ δ' ὅσα ὑπάρχει τε ἐν τῷ τί ἐστιν, οἷον τριγώνῳ γραμμὴ καὶ γραμμῇ στιγμή (ἡ 
γὰρ οὐσία αὐτῶν ἐκ τούτων ἐστί, καὶ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ λέγοντι τί ἐστιν ἐνυπάρχει), καὶ ὅσοις τῶν 
ὑπαρχόντων αὐτοῖς αὐτὰ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ἐνυπάρχουσι τῷ τί ἐστι δηλοῦντι, οἷον τὸ εὐθὺ ὑπάρχει 
γραμμῇ καὶ τὸ περιφερές, καὶ τὸ περιττὸν καὶ ἄρτιον ἀριθμῷ, καὶ τὸ πρῶτον καὶ σύνθετον, καὶ 
ἰσόπλευρον καὶ ἑτερόμηκες· καὶ πᾶσι τούτοις ἐνυπάρχουσιν ἐν τῷ λόγῳ τῷ τί ἐστι λέγοντι ἔνθα 
μὲν γραμμὴ ἔνθα δ' ἀριθμός.” (73a34-b1) 
53   I am not sure whether Aristotle counts this as a definition by genus and differentia. Perhaps 
‘planar figure’ picks out a genus and ‘three-lined’ picks out a differentia. In any case, I assume that 
Aristotle is telling us that there is essential reference to line in the definition of triangles, just as there is 
essential reference to rational and animal in the definition of human.      237 
 
way of construing (KA1a) might yield the same facts about kath’ hauto1 predication as 
(KA1b) in the case of triangles, it is unclear that the two will always go together. The 
sorts of parts out of which an object of a given kind is composed might not be referred 
to in giving a definition of that kind of object. Instead, we might point to the genus 
and differentia of an entity in giving its definition.  
Whatever we decide about the correct way to take (KA1a), it is reasonable to 
hold that the genus and differentia of an object belong to it kath’ hauto1 on the 
grounds of (KA1b). Therefore, when I talk about what is predicated kath’ hauto1 of a 
thing in the following, I will confine myself to those things that are belong kath’ 
hauto1 to a thing of a thing according to (KA1b).
54 We predicate the elements of a 
thing’s definition of it kath’ hauto1.
55
 I would also include predicating its species of an 
individual as an instance of kath’ hauto1 predication. Although individuals do not have 
proper definitions, when we predicate human of Socrates, we are saying what Socrates 
is just as we are saying what a species is in giving its definition. There is a particularly 
close relation between x’s being kath’ hauto1 predicated of y, and x’s being said-of y. 
It is obvious that whatever immediately said-of y can be kath’ hauto1 predicated of y. I 
think that we can go further and claim that Aristotle would identify kath’ hauto1 
predication with the said-of relation. In specifying the genus animal of Socrates, 
Aristotle thinks that I tell you what Socrates is. Similarly,  in telling you that 
corporeal belongs to cat, I tell you what cat is. In each of these cases, the predication 
involved seems to be of the same type as kath’ hauto1 predication.  
                                                 
54   Ross (1949) p 519 points out that, in claiming that one thing ‘belongs’ (huparchein) to another, 
Aristotle could be conceiving of a relation of which predication is only one kind. If this were the case, 
then arm could belong kath’ hauto1 to human without being a thing that is predicated of human. While 
Ross might be right, I am presently concerned only with cases in which one thing is predicated kath’ 
hauto1 of another, and I think that this relation is identical to the said-of relation.  
55   I am assuming that we predicate both the genus and the differentia of a species of that species 
kath’ hauto1. There is some question about whether I strictly speaking specify what a species or an 
individual is when I give its differentia.       238 
 
  If kath’ hauto1 predication can be understood in terms of the said-of relation, 
then kath’ hauto2 predication is closely related to inherence. Aristotle explicates the 
second sort of kath’ hauto belonging as follows:    
(KA2) For all x and y, x belongs kath’ hauto2 to y if and only if y must 
be referred to in giving the account of what x is.   
Aristotle gives several examples of one thing’s belonging kath’ hauto2 to another. 
Straight and curved are said to belong to line in this way. Odd, even, prime, 
composite, equilateral and oblong are said to belong to number kath’ hauto2. Any 
account of what it is to be curved or straight will need to mention lines—for a thing to 
be curved is for the thing to be a curved line. Similarly, any account of even and odd 
will have to talk about numbers—for a thing to be odd is for the thing to be an odd 
number.  
In each of these cases, what is predicated kath’ hauto2 of a subject also inheres 
in that subject. Say that we are dealing with two universals, A and B. A is predicated 
kath’ hauto2 of B only if we need to specify B in saying what A is. However, in such a 
case it is clear that A could not exist without B. A is obviously in B, in some non-
technical sense of ‘in’, and A is not a part of B. Therefore, A is a kath’ hauto2 predicate 
of B, only if A inheres in B. Whether Aristotle takes the converse to be true is a 
difficult question to which I will return shortly.  
Section 8.14: Kath’ Hauto Predication and Three Types of Necessary Predication 
  Aristotle equates belonging to something kath’ hauto with belonging to 
something because of itself and of necessity. 
The things that are said kath’ hauto in the case of what is unqualifiedly 
known, either as belonging in the subjects of predication or as things 
that the subjects belong in, are said both through themselves (di’ hauto) 
and of necessity. For it is not possible for these not to belong either 
simply or as regards the opposites; for example either straight or curved 
must belong to line and either odd or even must belong to number. For 
the privation or contradictory in the same genus is the contrary, for 
example what is not odd in the case of numbers is even, insofar as this     239 
 
follows. So that if is necessary to affirm or deny [that an attribute 
belongs to a subject], it is also necessary that these belong kath’ hauto. 
(73b16-24)
56 
 
The things that belong in (enhuparchein) a subject of predication are the things 
that are said kath’ hauto2 of that subject, while the things that the subject belongs in 
(enhuparchesthai) are said of the subject kath’ hauto1.
57 Aristotle further tells us that 
what is predicated of something kath’ hauto belongs to that thing of necessity, and 
                                                 
56   “τὰ ἄρα λεγόμενα ἐπὶ τῶν ἁπλῶς ἐπιστητῶν καθ' αὑτὰ οὕτως ὡς ἐνυπάρχειν τοῖς 
κατηγορουμένοις ἢ ἐνυπάρχεσθαι δι' αὑτά τέ ἐστι καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται μὴ 
ὑπάρχειν ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ τὰ ἀντικείμενα, οἷον γραμμῇ τὸ εὐθὺ ἢ τὸ καμπύλον καὶ ἀριθμῷ τὸ 
περιττὸν ἢ τὸ ἄρτιον. ἔστι γὰρ τὸ ἐναντίον ἢ στέρησις ἢ ἀντίφασις ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει, οἷον 
ἄρτιον τὸ μὴ περιττὸν ἐν ἀριθμοῖς ᾗ ἕπεται. ὥστ' εἰ ἀνάγκη φάναι ἢ ἀποφάναι, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ 
καθ' αὑτὰ ὑπάρχειν (73b16-24).” Following Ross (1949), Mignucci (1979) as cited in Barnes (1994), 
the commentary in Barnes (1994), and Irwin and Fine (1995), I take ‘τοῖς κατηγορουμένοις’ to refer 
(somewhat atypically) to the subjects of predication. Barnes (1975) as found in Barnes Revised Oxford 
Translation (1984), and the translation in Barnes (1994) take ‘τοῖς κατηγορουμένοις’ to refer to the 
things that are predicated. The underlying meaning of the passage remains the same on both readings, 
but the order of the claims is reversed. If we take the passage in the latter way, then the things that 
belong in the things predicated are such that the predicates are said kath’ hauto1 of them, and the things 
that the predicates belong in are things that the predicates belong to kath’ hauto2.  
57   Barnes chooses to translate ‘enhuparchein’ and ‘enhuparchesthai’, which are formed out of 
the prefix for ‘in’ (en) and the active and passive infinitives of the verb ‘to belong to’ (huparchein), ‘to 
inhere in’ and ‘to be inhered in’. I am reluctant to follow this practice, because it might suggest that 
things inhere in their species or genera in the technical sense of ‘inheres’ familiar from our discussion 
of the Categories. ‘Inherence’, in the technical sense of the Categories, properly applies only to the first 
case above. For a predicate to belong kath’ hauto2 is for the predicate to belong in that subject as a thing 
that inheres in that subject. For a predicate to belong kath hauto2 to a subject is for the predicate to be 
said-of the subject, which Aristotle describes as a case where the subject belongs in the predicate. 
Aristotle does sometimes claim that a species is in a genus, and he might be claiming that the subjects 
of predication ‘belong in’ the genera predicated of them in this sense of ‘belonging in’.  We would 
seem, therefore, to have two different senses of ‘belonging in’ at issue here. Nevertheless, Aristotle is 
using the active and passive form of the same verb to talk about these two cases of kath’ hauto 
predication, and it would be preferable to find a single sense for the two terms. One suggestion is that 
we take Aristotle to be thinking spatially in terms of a pictorial model of syllogistic logic (like Euler 
circles). On this view, we will say that one thing ‘belongs in’ another when the Euler circle representing 
the first thing/term is properly drawn inside that representing the second. Cases of kath’ hauto 
predication, in which the subject-circle is to be drawn inside the predicate-circle, will be cases in which 
we predicate kath’ hauto1 a thing of something that it is said-of; for example, when we predicate a 
genus of a species. Cases in which the predicate circle is properly drawn within the subject circle, will 
be cases in which a predicate belongs kath hauto2 to a subject in which it inheres. The case where we 
predicate one thing of another kath’ hauto, and in which the subject and the predicate pick out the very 
same circle will be problematic. This might be the case with a species and the differentia in its 
definition. As I have pointed out in previous chapters, differentiae are tough to deal with. I think that we 
should respond (and that Aristotle might have responded) to this problem by identifying species and 
their final differentia, and denying that we have a proper case of predication here.             240 
 
distinguishes two sorts of necessity. One thing can belong to another of necessity 
unqualifiedly, or it can belong to another of necessity ‘as regards the opposites’.  
A predicate belongs to a subject of unqualified necessity, when it is not 
possible for the predicate to fail to belong to the subject. Aristotle doesn’t provide us 
with examples, but animal belongs of unqualified necessity to human. While Ross 
(1949) and Barnes (1994) take all and only cases in which something belongs of 
unqualified necessity to a subject to be cases where the thing is predicated of the 
subject kath hauto1, I think that a kath hauto2 predicate might also belong to a subject 
of unqualified necessity. We might, for example, hold that color belongs to body of 
unqualified necessity.
58 I am somewhat reluctant, therefore, to think that the two types 
of necessity map neatly onto the two sorts of kath’ hauto predication.   
Aristotle gives us two examples of things that belong to a subject of necessity 
‘as regards the opposites’. Every number must be either even or odd, and every line 
must be either crooked or straight. So even belongs to number of necessity as regards 
the opposites, as does odd. Straight belongs to line of necessity as regards the 
opposites, as does curved. In the examples that he discusses, Aristotle talks only about 
pairs of opposites. However, we might extend the use of ‘opposites’ (‘ta antikeimena’) 
to cases is which there are several mutually inconsistent items. I suggest that black, 
white and the myriad specific shades of other colors will count as opposites for 
Aristotle’s purposes here. For predicates to be opposites will be for them to belong to 
the same contrary class. Contraries belong to the same contrary class and will be the 
most extremely opposed members of the class. In addition, if there are any 
intermediates between these contraries, these will belong to the same contrary class as 
                                                 
58   We should do so, if we hold that every body has a color. If we take clear bodies to lack color, 
then it will not be unqualifiedly necessary that color belong to body. However, if clear things are not 
colored, then being clear and being colored seem to be exhaustive alternatives for bodies.  Furthermore, 
clarity and coloredness would also seem to be contrary species of a single genus. This genus then seems 
both to belong to body of unqualified necessity and to be predicated of it kath’ hauto2.     241 
 
the contraries themselves. Aristotle takes members of a contrary class to exclude one 
another, in the sense that nothing can possess more than one distinct member of a 
contrary class at the same time and in the same respect.
59  
With these points in mind, we can define what it is for a predicate to belong to 
a subject of necessity as regards the opposites. A predicate will belong to a subject in 
this way if and only if the predicate is a member of a contrary class such that it is 
necessary that the subject possess one of the properties in that contrary class.
60  
Aristotle tells us that, whenever a predicate belongs kath’ hauto2 to a universal 
subject, it is necessary that every instance of the subject possess either that predicate 
or one of the predicates in the contrary class of that predicate. However, Aristotle 
                                                 
59   Aristotle’s views about the many different sorts of opposition are difficult to sort out, and I 
cannot treat this issue fully at present. In Categories 10 Aristotle uses forms of ‘antikeisthai’ as a 
general term for opposition, and lists four types of opposition: relativity , contrariety (the sort of 
opposition holding between ta enantia),  privation (sterêsis) vs. possession, and affirmation vs. negation 
or contradiction (antiphasis). Among contraries, Aristotle distinguishes pairs of contraries where there 
is no state intermediate between the two—like sickness and health or odd and even—from pairs where 
there are intermediates—black and white or good and bad. In the latter case, Aristotle tells us that it is 
not necessary for one or the other of the pair of contraries to belong to the things of the contraries are 
naturally predicated, while in the former case one or the other contrary must belong to the relevant sort 
of thing. For example, either even or odd must belong to number. However, it is not the case that a body 
has to be black or white. Aristotle seems to base the latter claim on the fact that a body might have an 
intermediate color. Aristotle never tells us, however, whether a thing to which color naturally belongs 
must either be black, be white, or be of an intermediate color. However, it is hard to see why he would 
not this to be true (modulo the problem noted in note 58).  
In the Physics, Aristotle claims that all coming to be and perishing is a matter of going from 
one contrary or intermediate state to another contrary or intermediate state. Furthermore, Aristotle tells 
us that the intermediates are ‘out of’ (ek) the contraries. Intermediate colors, for example, are ‘out of’ 
black and white. Aristotle seems to picture the intermediates as mixtures of contraries, each of which is 
present to some extent. If this is the right way to take intermediates, then we can see a thing’s having 
any intermediate attribute in a contrary class as its having both contraries to some extent.    
60   In some cases there will be something immediately said-of every member of a contrary class 
that belongs to a subject of necessity as regards the opposites. In such a case, the superordinate kind 
will belong to the subject of necessity without qualification. For example, color is said-of black, white, 
and all the intermediate colors. And each of these belongs to body of necessity as regards the opposites. 
Color therefore seems to belong to body of unqualified necessity. In other cases, the immediate genera 
of the members of the contrary class will not be the same but will themselves be contrary (see 
Categories 14a19ff). In these cases, it seems that each of the contrary genera will belong to a thing of 
necessity as regards the opposites. For example, justice and injustice are members of a contrary class 
along with whatever intermediates are between these, and each of these predicates seems to belong 
kath’ hauto to moral persons. Justice belongs the genus virtue and injustice to the genus vice, and each 
of these seems to belong to person of necessity as regards the opposites.       242 
 
seems to overlook another possible meaning of ‘x belongs of necessity to y’, and 
neglects to mention another way in which a kath’ hauto2 predicate must belong to its 
subject.
61 When we say that x belongs of necessity to y, we might mean either that x 
can’t exist without belonging to y, or that y cannot exist without having x belong to it. 
For example, when I say that color belongs of necessity to body, I mean that color 
cannot belong to anything other than body. However, when I say that animal belongs 
of necessity to human beings, I mean that there can’t be any human beings to which 
animal fails to apply.  
When something is predicated kath’ hauto2 of a subject, it cannot belong to any 
subject wholly distinct from that subject. For example, odd and even can’t belong to 
anything other than the universal number, universals subordinate to number, and 
individual numbers. Let’s say that a predicate belongs of necessity* to a subject when 
the predicate couldn’t belong to anything wholly distinct from that subject. It seems 
that belonging of necessity*, rather than the sort of necessary belonging discussed by 
Aristotle, follows directly from the definition of kath hauto2 predication. In fact, as I 
discuss later, some of Aristotle’s examples of kath’ hauto predication make more 
sense if we go so far as to define kath’ hauto2 predication as predication of necessity*. 
On the other hand, belonging to something of necessity as regards the opposites, 
which is the relation that Aristotle discusses in this passage, does not seem essential to 
explicating kath’ hauto predication.  
It is also important to point out that while all kath’ hauto predicates belong of 
necessity to their subjects, it is not the case that whatever belongs of necessity to a 
subject is a kath’ hauto predicate.
62 For example, odd and even belong to number both 
kath’ hauto and of necessity as regards the opposites. Since oblong (i.e. not square) 
                                                 
61   See Barnes (1994) p 118, and Sorabji (1980) for similar observations.  
62   This claim seems true whether we take ‘of necessity’ in the way that Aristotle discusses or on 
the alternative meaning that I mention in the previous paragraph.     243 
 
numbers are a type of number, every oblong number is either even or odd. It seems 
then that odd and even belong to oblong of necessity as regards the opposites. 
However, odd and even will not belong kath’ hauto to oblong, since oblong does not 
occur in any account of what odd and even are.   
Section 8.15: Katholou Predication in the Posterior Analytics 
After telling us about belonging to something kata pantos and kath’ hauto, 
Aristotle turns to katholou predication. He tells us that what belongs to something 
katholou belongs to it kata pantos, kath’ hauto, and qua itself (hê auto). The example 
of katholou predication that Aristotle gives us, however, is problematic. He tells us 
that having interior angles equal to two right angles belongs katholou to triangle. 
Furthermore, he tells us that having angles equal to two right angles belongs to a 
triangle kath’ hauto (73b30-32). However, neither of the senses of kath’ hauto 
belonging discussed above seems to fit this case, since neither of these terms seems to 
appear in the definition of the other. I will return to this problem in a moment. First, 
however, I want to turn to Aristotle’s discussion of the relation between katholou 
predication and proof.   
At 73b32, Aristotle tells us that what belongs to a subject katholou can be 
primitively proven to belong to a chance instance of the subject.
63 On the basis of this 
criterion, Aristotle denies that having two right angles belongs katholou to isosceles. 
We can prove that having two right angles belongs to a chance isosceles triangle, since 
                                                 
63   “τὸ καθόλου δὲ ὑπάρχει τότε, ὅταν ἐπὶ τοῦ τυχόντος καὶ πρώτου δεικνύηται (73b32-
33).” It is most natural to take a phrase of the form ‘δεικνύηται + ἐπὶ + x (genitive adjective)’ as 
something like ‘is proved in the case of an x instance.’ We can prove something of a chance (τυχόντος) 
instance when we can prove it of any arbitrary case. The fact that ‘πρώτου’ is in the genitive case as an 
object of the preposition ‘ἐπὶ’ would lead us to take primitiveness to belong to the instance of which 
something is proved. However, in what follows, it makes more sense to take primitiveness to be an 
attribute of proofs rather than of instances. I take ‘πρώτου’ adverbially, although this isn’t 
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we can prove this of all isosceles triangles. This proof will not be primitive, however, 
because having two right angles can also be proven of a chance triangle. 
It will be helpful to give a more precise characterization of proving something 
of a chance instance of a universal, and primitively proving something of a chance 
instance of a universal.  When Aristotle talks about proving something of a chance 
instance of a universal, he means that we can prove it of any possible instance qua that 
universal. For example, say that t is a triangle. Since t is a triangle, it is also a figure. 
Since we can prove of t that it has two right angles, we can prove of something that is 
an instance of figure that having two right angles belongs to it. However, we should 
note two facts. First, we could not prove that having two right angles belongs to any 
chance instance of figure. Second, our proof that t has two right angles will need to 
proceed from facts about t other than t’s being a figure. For example, we need to take 
into account t’s being a triangle. We can distinguish proving something of a thing that 
happens to be an instance of a universal from proving something of a thing insofar as 
it is an instance of that universal. We can distinguish these two sorts of proof as 
follows.  
(PIU weak) Where P is a predicate, and U is a universal, we can weakly 
prove P of an instance of U if and only if, there is an instance of U, u, 
and there is a demonstration concluding that that P belongs to u.   
(PIU strong) Where P is a predicate, and U is a universal, we can 
strongly prove P of an instance of U if and only if, there is an instance 
of U, u, and there is a demonstration which essentially contains the 
premise that U belongs to u and which concludes that P belongs to u.
64 
The latter notion is significantly stronger, and requires that the proof proceed 
from the fact that something is an instance of the given universal. When Aristotle talks 
about proving something of an instance of a universal, I take him to have the stronger 
                                                 
64   A demonstration will contain a premise essentially if we cannot remove the premise without 
rendering the demonstration invalid. The idea is to prevent addition of superfluous premises.      245 
 
notion in mind. Furthermore, we can strongly prove something of any chance instance 
of a universal only if we can prove it of any possible instance of that universal.  
(PCIU) Where P is a predicate, and U is a universal, we can strongly prove P 
of any chance instance of a U, if and only if for any possible instance of U, u, 
there is a demonstration which essentially contains the premise that U belongs 
to u and which concludes that P belongs to u. 
Sometimes we will be able to strongly prove something of any chance instance 
of a universal, but it will also be possible to strongly prove the same thing of a more 
general universal. For example, Aristotle considers a case where we have a series of 
proofs in which we separately prove that having two right angles belongs to instances 
of scalene, equilateral, and isosceles triangles. He seems to be considering a case in 
which we have a proof proceeding from the fact that something is an isosceles triangle 
to the conclusion that it has two right angles, where this proof crucially involves the 
fact that the thing in question is isosceles. These proofs might all count as cases of 
strongly proving something of a chance instance of the universal isosceles, but they 
will not count as cases of primitively proving something of an instance of a universal. 
We can primitively prove something of an instance of a universal, only if we can 
strongly prove it of an instance of universal, and we cannot strongly prove the same 
thing of an instance of a more general universal.  
(PPCIU) Where P is a predicate, and U is a universal, we can 
primitively prove P of any chance instance of a U, if and only if for any 
possible instance of U, u, there is a demonstration which essentially 
contains the premise that U belongs to u and which concludes that P 
belongs to u, and for all universals superordinate to U, U*, it is not the 
case that we can strongly prove P of any chance instance of U*.  
 We cannot primitively prove that having two right angles belongs to isosceles, 
because we can strongly prove that it belongs to triangle and triangle is superordinate 
to isosceles. To express what is essentially the same point in a typically Aristotelian 
way, having two-right angles belongs to isosceles not qua isosceles but qua triangle.     246 
 
Having two right angles, therefore, does not belong to isosceles qua itself (hê auto). 
Therefore, having two right angles does not belong katholou to isosceles, but belongs 
to more things than isosceles.  
From the foregoing facts, and the fact that having two right angles will belong 
to isosceles kata pantos, it follows that Aristotle doesn’t accept an inheritance 
principle akin to (PI3) for his present conception of katholou predication. If belonging 
to all the particular instances of a universal were both necessary and sufficient for 
belonging to that universal katholou, then Aristotle would have to hold that having 
two-right angles belonged katholou to isosceles. Since he denies the latter claim, 
Aristotle must deny the corresponding inheritance principle. 
Section 8.16: A Problem with Aristotle’s Conception of Kath’ Hauto Predication 
Since having two right angles belongs to isosceles kata pantos, by the 
definition of katholou, Aristotle must deny that triangle belongs to isosceles kath’ 
hauto and qua isosceles. Furthermore, Aristotle equates belonging to something kath 
hauto with belonging to it qua itself. So he must deny both that having two-right 
angles belongs to isosceles kath’ hauto and that having two right angles belongs to 
isosceles qua itself. We have already seen why Aristotle denies the latter claim. 
However, it is unclear whether he can deny the former claim without also being forced 
to deny that having two right angles belongs kath’ hauto to triangle.   
Aristotle would presumably hold that having two right angles belongs to 
isosceles of (unqualified) necessity, since it is impossible for something to be an 
isosceles triangle without having two right angles. However, it is clear that having two 
right angles belongs to isosceles in neither of the senses of ‘kath’ hauto’ defined 
earlier. Having two right angles is not an element of the definition of isosceles, nor is 
isosceles an element in the definition of having two-right angles. However, the same     247 
 
seems to be true in the case of triangle. Having two right angles is not an element in 
the definition of triangle, nor is triangle an element in the definition of triangle. 
We have a conflict, therefore, between Aristotle’s claim that every case of 
katholou predication must also be a case of kath’ hauto predication, his definition of 
kath’ hauto predication, and the fact that one of his examples of katholou predication 
seems to violate the definition of kath’ hauto predication. In addition, we have the fact 
Aristotle equates kath’ hauto and hê auto predication, while the example of having 
two right angles and triangle renders this equation problematic. The example of having 
two right angles and triangle is typical of a large class of cases. Whenever we have a 
proprium of a kind, a property that is necessarily coextensive with, but which is not 
essential to the kind, Aristotle will hold that the proprium belongs katholou to the 
subject. Claims predicating propria of their subjects play an important role in 
Aristotelian science. In addition, it is interesting to note in this regard that Aristotle 
will take propria to inhere in their subjects, in the sense of inherence defined in the 
Categories.    
There are a few ways in which we could handle this conflict. First, we could 
insist that the account of what any proprium is will contain essential reference to the 
subject and that propria really are kath hauto2 predicates of their subjects, despite 
appearances to the contrary. Second, we could drop the claim that what belongs to 
something katholou must belong to it kath’ hauto. Third, we could hold that the 
Aristotle’s definition of kath’ hauto at 73a35ff is too narrow.  
The first option is the most conservative, and would be preferable to the other 
two were we able to make it work. Furthermore, we might think that Aristotle will 
take the definition of having two right angles to involve reference to triangle, given his     248 
 
claim at 73b31-32 that “…triangle is equal to two right angles kath’ hauto.”
65 
However, I can’t think of any plausible account of what it is to have two right angles 
that contains essential reference to triangles.
66 Therefore, having two right angles 
cannot belong kath’ hauto2 to triangles on the definition of kath’ hauto2 predication 
that we have been working with. Furthermore, Aristotle draws a sharp distinction 
between necessary accidents of a thing, and components of a thing’s essence. He takes 
it to be inappropriate to define triangle as a planar figure with interior angles equal to 
two right angles. Therefore, having two right angles cannot belong kath’ hauto1 to 
triangle. Therefore, I think that the first option for reconciling Aristotle’s claims about 
kath’ hauto predication is out.  
The second option seems like the most radical, and also seems to be a non-
starter. It seems central to Aristotle’s understanding of katholou predication in the 
Posterior Analytics that katholou predicates are also kath’ hauto predicates.  
So I will go with the third option, and hold that Aristotle’s definition of kath’ 
hauto predication, specifically of the kath’ hauto2 predication, is too narrow. We want 
to extend Aristotle’s definition of kath’ hauto in such a way that he is correct to equate  
kath’ hauto and hê auto claims, and in such a way that whatever belongs to a thing 
katholou will belong to it kath’ hauto. We can get what we are after by replacing our 
initial definition of kath’ hauto2 predication, with a definition in terms of belonging to 
something of necessity*. As suggested earlier, x belongs of necessity* to y if and only 
if x belongs to y and it is impossible for x to belong to anything wholly distinct from y. 
Let’s define a new type of belonging, belonging kath’ hauto2* as follows: 
                                                 
65   “καὶ γὰρ καθ' αὑτὸ τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθαῖς ἴσον (73b31-32).” The use of ‘kath’ 
hauto…isos’ suggests a strong equivalence.  
66   It seems more plausible that we will define having interior angles equal to two right angles in 
terms of something general about having internal angles, and some sort of  quantitative differentia. 
Notice that on this view, it does seem to be the that the genus of having interior angles does belong to 
the genus of planar figures kath’ hauto2. To have interior angles is to be a planar figure with interior 
angles.      249 
 
(KA2*) For all x and y, x belongs to y kath’ hauto2* if and only x 
belongs of necessity* to y.  
  However, given the definition of belonging of necessity* to something above, 
belonging of necessity* to a thing is equivalent to inhering in that thing. What belongs 
to a subject of necessity* is in it (in a non-technical sense of ‘in’) and is not a part of 
the subject. Furthermore on the Aristotelian assumption that no predicate can exist 
without belonging to a subject, what belongs to something of necessity* could not 
exist apart from that subject. (KA2*) is , therefore, equivalent to: 
(KA2**) For all x and y, x belongs to y kath’ hauto2* if and only x 
belongs of necessity* to y. 
We can also make a corresponding change to that definition of kath’ hauto, as 
follows:  
(KA*) For all x and y, x belongs kath’ hauto to y, if and only if x 
belongs kath’ hauto1 to y, or x belongs kath’ hauto2* to y. 
As we noted earlier, x belongs kath hauto1 to y, if and only if x is said-of y. Therefore,  
(KA*) is equivalent to the claim that whatever belongs kath’ hauto to a subject is 
either said-of that subject, or inheres in that subject. 
(KA**) For all x and y, x belongs kath’ hauto to y, if and only if x is 
said-of y or x inheres in y.  
Whatever is said-of a subject belongs to that subject hê auto. Furthermore, 
whenever a predicate inheres in a universal subject, the predicate will belong to that 
subject hê auto. A general proof of the latter claim is hard to come by, but it is helpful 
to consider some examples. Having two right angles inheres in triangle, but does not 
inhere in isosceles. Color inheres in body, but not in polar bear. In each case the 
predicate belongs to whatever it belongs to qua the more general universal, but not 
qua the less general universal. I also take it to be the case that when a predicate 
belongs to a subject hê auto, any predicate subordinate to it also belongs to a that 
subject hê auto. For example, various color-universals like pallor are inherent in and     250 
 
belong hê auto to body. Furthermore, I can’t think of any cases of one thing’s 
belonging hê auto to another in which the first isn’t said-of or inherent in the second.
67 
So belonging to something kath’ hauto, as defined in (KA*) and (KA**), is equivalent 
to belonging hê auto to that thing.  
It also seems to be the case that whatever belongs to a thing katholou, also 
belongs to it kath’ hauto according to (KA*). As examples of katholou predication, 
Aristotle seems to confine himself to things that either belong to the definition of a 
subject or that are propria of the subject. But the things that belong in the definition of 
a subject are kath’ hauto1 predicates which are said-of that subject, and propria inhere 
in and are, therefore, kath’ hauto2* predicates their subjects. So whatever belongs to a 
thing katholou also belongs to it kath’ hauto.   
The converse, however, is not the case. While whatever belongs to a subject 
kath’ hauto1 also belongs to it katholou, some kath’ hauto2* predicates of a subject 
will not belong to it katholou. For example, pallor will belong kath’ hauto2* to body, 
but will not belong to it katholou, since it does not belong kata pantos to body.   
As we saw earlier, whatever is said-of a thing belongs to it of unqualified 
necessity, and whatever inheres in a thing belongs to it either of unqualified necessity 
or of necessity as regards the opposites. The universal having two right angles belongs 
to triangle of unqualified necessity, while pallor belongs to body of necessity as 
regards the opposites. However, there will be cases in which one thing belongs to 
                                                 
67   The case with pallor and body is actually a bit problematic. It is interesting to ask whether 
pallor belongs hê auto to polar bear, and whether it belongs hê auto to body. Presumably, the fact that 
something is a polar bear will often play a role in explaining why it is pale. Furthermore, while the fact 
that something is a body might play a role in its being colored, it isn’t clear that it has the particular 
determinate color that it does because it is a body. We might wonder then whether it is true to say that 
pallor belongs hê auto to body and not to polar bear. Aristotle also suggests in the Topics that the 
universal pale inheres in snow, although this seems to violate his definition of inherence. I will bite the 
bullet here, and hold that Aristotle takes pallor both to belong hê auto and to inhere in body, and neither 
to belong hê auto nor to inhere in polar bear. I have to take the claim that pale inheres in snow as a 
mistake, akin to the mistake made in holding that color inheres in a particular body.      251 
 
another of necessity, but in which the first thing is neither said-of nor in the second. 
For example, having two right angles will belong to isosceles of unqualified necessity, 
and red will belong to bird of necessity as regards the opposites. Therefore, belonging 
to something of necessity has a wider extension than does belonging to something 
kath’ hauto.  
  On my suggested revision, the initial definition of kath’ hauto2 predication 
(KA2) defines only one sub-kind of kath’ hauto2* predication. However, this sub-kind 
is extremely important. We can see kath hauto2 predication as a kind of central case of 
kath’ hauto2* predication. Any case which something is a kath’ hauto2* predicate of a 
subject without being a kath’ hauto2 predicate of that subject, is a case in which the 
predicate inheres in the subject without occurring in the account of what the predicate 
is does not involve reference to the subject. This will happen only happen in two sorts 
of case that I can think of.  
First, we have the case in which the account of what the predicate is does not 
make reference to the subject, but in which the account of what something said-of the 
predicate is does refer to the subject. For example, we might not need to refer to body 
in specifying what pallor is, but we will refer to body in saying what color is. Second, 
we have the case where we will need to refer to something said-of the subject in 
giving an account of what something said-of the predicate is. For example, in the case 
of triangle and having interior angles equal to two right angles, we will need to refer 
to figure in giving an account of what it is to have interior angles. So whenever P is a 
kath’ hauto2* predicate of a S, either P or something said-of P is a kath’ hauto2 
predicate either of S or of something said-of S. In giving his definitions of kath’ hauto 
predication at 73a34ff, I think that Aristotle focuses exclusively on the central case of 
kath’ hauto2 predication, and ends up giving too strict a definition.     
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Section 8.16: Kath’ Hauto Predication and Inheritance 
On the revisionary interpretation of Posterior Analytics I.4 that I have 
suggested, whatever inheres in a subject is predicated of that subject both kath’ hauto 
and hê auto. We have already seen that the predicational inheritance principles to 
which Aristotle seems to subscribe in the De Interpretatione and the Prior Analytics 
fail for katholou predication as understood in the Posterior Analytics. These principles 
fail in the case of katholou predication because what belongs to a universal subject 
kath’ hauto and hê auto is not determined by what belongs to the particular instances 
of that universal subject. While having two right angles belongs kath’ hauto and hê 
auto to triangle, it does not belong in this way to isosceles. It is also clear that having 
two right angles belongs neither kath’ hauto nor hê auto to any individual triangle. 
Once we see that inherence is a type of kath’ hauto predication, we also see that 
something can inhere in a universal without inhering in any of the particulars that the 
universal is said-of. Aristotle’s claim to the contrary at 2b1-3 seems to involve 
mistakenly treating inherence as a type of predication simpliciter of the type discussed 
in the De Interpretatione and Prior Analytics rather than as a type of kath’ hauto 
predication of the kind discussed in the Posterior Analytics.  
If something inheres in a universal or is predicated kath’ hauto2* of a 
universal, then it could not have existed without belonging to that universal. Inherence 
and kath’ hauto2* predication involve a kind of necessity. I have argued that 
universals are wholes with their instances as parts, and I tried to paint a picture above 
on which it is plausible to say that universals and particulars inherit each others 
predicates (at least where we have in mind predication simpliciter.) However, when 
we turn to kath’ hauto predication, these sorts of inheritance fail. Inherence, however, 
is a type of kath’ hauto predication, particulars do not inherit the kath’ hauto 
predicates of the universals said-of them.      253 
 
Section VIII.17: Inherence, Constitution, and Modality 
If we think about the way that constitution interacts with modality, especially 
in the case of composite things that can survive a change in parts, we can make a 
couple of observations. In the following discussion about attributes belonging to parts 
and wholes, I mean to confine our attention to attributes that belong to a composite 
only by belonging to at least one of its parts. These are attributes for which the 
following whole-part principle is true: 
(WP) It is necessary that for all x and y, if y is composite then x belongs 
to y if and only if there is some z such that z is a part of y and x belongs 
to z.
68   
In what follows, I will once again talk about one thing’s belonging to another of 
necessity*. It will be helpful to have a definition of this type of necessary belonging 
before us: 
(NB) For all x and y, x belongs of necessity* to y, if and only if x 
belongs to y, and it is necessary that for all z, x belongs to z only if 
either z=y or z is a part of y.
69  
Notice, that on this account, there can be cases in which an attribute belongs of 
necessity* to a composite, without there being any part of the composite to which the 
attribute belongs of necessity*. While the attribute in question will never exist without 
belonging to some part of the composite, it might belong to different parts of the 
composite in different situations. The situation with predication simpliciter and 
predication kath’ hauto2* will be formally identical to the situation outlined. For 
something to be predicated kath’ hauto2* of a universal, it must be predicated 
simpliciter of at least one appropriate particular in any possible situation in which it 
                                                 
68   Where ‘Bxy’ means ‘x belongs to y’, ‘Cy’ means ‘y is composite’, and ‘Pzy’ means ‘z is a part 
of y’, ⟡∀x∀y(Cy ⊃ (Bxy ≡ ∃z(Pzy & Bxz)). As I note above, I think that by confining ourselves to 
attributes for which (WP) is true, we have a stronger analogy to Aristotle’s claims about predication 
simpliciter. 
69   Where ‘B*xy’ means ‘x belongs of necessity to y’, and ‘Bxy’ means ‘x belongs to y’: 
∀x∀y(B*xy ≡  ∀z(Bxz ⊃ (Bxy & (z=y ∨ Pzy))). I am also assuming that whatever belongs to 
anything cannot exist without belonging to something.     254 
 
belongs to anything. Furthermore, what is predicated kath’ hauto2* of a universal is 
never predicated simpliciter of anything other than that universal, a universal 
superordinate or subordinate to that universal, or a particular instance of that universal. 
However, it does not follow that the predicate belongs kath’ hauto2* either to the 
subordinate universals or to any of the particulars. We might, therefore, take 
Aristotle’s claim that color inheres in body only if it inheres in a particular body to 
involve a mistake about the way that constitution interacts with modality. 
  The things that are predicated kath’ hauto2* of substantial universals are 
nonsubstantial universals.
70 Just as the substantial universals have primary substances 
as parts, the nonsubstantial universals have nonsubstantial particulars as parts. 
Furthermore, what is true of the nonsubstantial universals predicated of subjects is 
related to what is true of the non-substantial instances of these universals. No 
nonsubstantial universal can be predicated simpliciter of anything unless an 
appropriate nonsubstantial particular inheres in an appropriate particular substance. 
The universal pallor can be predicated human, if and only if at least some instance of 
pallor inheres in some particular human. The universal pallor can be predicated kata 
pantos of the universal polar bear, if and only if every polar bear has an instance of 
pallor inhering in it. On my view, it is also the case that the nonsubstantial universals 
are predicated simpliciter of their subjects because of the inherence relations that hold 
between particulars. Once we have specified all of the inherence relations between 
non-substantial and substantial particulars, the facts about predication simpliciter are 
fixed. However, not all the facts about inherence and kath’ hauto2* predication 
between universals are fixed.  
                                                 
70   While I take non-substantial particulars to inhere in things and to belong to them kath’ hauto, I 
am wary about saying that a particular is ‘predicated’ of anything.      255 
 
For example, we can imagine a situation where the situation where all and only 
human beings have been, are, or ever will be pale. Pallor will belong kata pantos to 
human. Every particular instance of pallor will inhere in an individual human being. 
However, this will not be enough for pallor to inhere in human, because pallor will 
not belong of necessity to human.
71  
Inherence relations between universals cannot be reduced to inherence 
relations between the particulars composing those universals. The fact that one 
universal inheres in another is not identical to any fact about particulars.
72 
Furthermore, we cannot give necessary and sufficient conditions for the holding of 
inherence relations between universals solely in terms of particulars.
73  
                                                 
71   Furthermore, while each instance of pallor will belong kath’ hauto to an instance of human, 
pallor will not belong kath’ hauto to human. I take this to be the import of Aristotle’s example at 
74a16-17, “If there were no triangle besides isosceles, one might think that [having two right angles] 
belonged to it qua isosceles.” Aristotle thinks that one would be incorrect to think this way.     
72   I do not even think that we can reduce claims about inherence relations between universals to 
claims about all actual and possible individuals. Even if we think that it is acceptable to use 
contemporary modal logic, and the corresponding possible worlds semantics, in talking about Aristotle, 
we should not be misled in trying to reduce Aristotle’s modal talk into talk about possibilia in some 
kind of Lewisian way. Rather than thinking that possible worlds talk reveals the underlying structure of 
the truthmakers for claims about inherence and said-of relations between universals, Aristotle will take 
possible worlds claims to be made true by the holding of inherence and said of relations between 
particulars and universals. Inherence and said-of talk reveals the underlying structure of Aristotle’s 
world more clearly than possible worlds talk. On the view that I endorse, the reason that it is true to say 
that it is impossible for any color to belong to something that is not a body, is because color inheres in 
body. The reason it is true to say that any possible human being is an animal is the fact that animal is 
said-of human.  
Similarly the attempt to decompose kath’ hauto predication into a non-modal predication 
relation (like predication simpliciter) and a modal operator should not mislead us into thinking that 
Aristotle takes there to be truthmakers for predication simpliciter claims other than the ones consisting 
in the holding of said-of and inherence relations between various universals and particulars. Aristotle 
wants to analyze predication simpliciter in terms of inherence and the said-of relation, rather than vice 
versa.   
73   We need to be careful here. What we cannot do is give a general formula like: for any 
universals x and y, x inheres in y if and only if there are certain particulars such that ___. This is not to 
say that the fact that an instance of color inheres in an instance of body fails to be logically sufficient 
for color’s inhering in body. Aristotle takes it to be necessary that if color exists, then color inheres in 
body, and any fact at all about particulars is sufficient for a necessary fact. The fact that an instance of 
color inheres in anything entails that an instance of color exists. The fact that an instance of color exists 
entails that color exists, which in turn entails that color inheres in body. So the inherence of a particular 
color inheres in a particular body is sufficient for color’s inhering in body.  Nevertheless, Aristotle takes 
the fact that (if it exists, then) color inheres in body to be a fact in addition to facts about particulars,     256 
 
Nevertheless, I take the inherence of one universal in another in any possible 
situation to require realization by the holding of inherence relations between 
appropriate particulars in that situation. For example, for it to be true at any time to 
claim that color inheres in body, it must also be true at that time that there is at least 
one particular body, that there is at least one nonsubstantial particular instance of 
color, and that all the nonsubstantial particular colors inhere in particular bodies. 
Aristotle’s mistake at 2b1-3 is to hold that color cannot inhere in body without itself 
inhering in body. However, he would have been correct to hold that color cannot 
inhere in body without having all of its instances inhere in instances of body. 
  Furthermore, the latter claim seems to be enough to secure what Aristotle 
seems to want to conclude in 2a34ff. Primary substances will be the ultimate subjects 
for all other entities. Furthermore, from the claim that any other entity exists, we will 
be able to infer that a primary substance exists. It follows that if primary substances 
did not exist, then none of the other things would exist.   
In claiming that primary substances are primary, however, Aristotle seems to 
intend more than simply that the existence of any other sort of entity entails the 
existence of at least one primary substance. For it seems equally true to claim that the 
existence of any sort of entity entails the existence of at least one secondary substance, 
and entails the existence of both universal and particular accidents. It is, however, 
difficult to state precisely the way in which Aristotle takes primary substances to be 
prior to these other sorts of things. I turn to this issue in the next chapter. I argue that 
Aristotle takes primary substances to be primary by being “causes of being” for all 
other entities. Furthermore, Aristotle takes primary substances to be the only entities 
                                                                                                                                           
even if it is a necessary fact. We might be able to capture the distinction here by specifying sufficiency 
using a version of relevance logic.      257 
 
that are non-relational, while he takes other entities to be essentially relational. I turn 
to this latter issue in chapter 10. 
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CHAPTER 9 
 
PRIMARY SUBSTANCES AND ONTOLOGICAL PRIORITY 
Section 9.1: Introduction 
In Chapter 8, I argued that, even without his problematic claim that all entities 
are either said-of or inherent in primary substances, Aristotle is justified in claiming 
that primary substances are ultimate subjects for all other things. He is also justified in 
his claim at 2b5-6 that “If the primary substances did not exist, then it would be 
impossible for any of the other things to exist.” Whether Aristotle is justified in taking 
the truth of this claim to ensure the “primacy” of primary substances, however, is open 
to question. For primary substances to count as primary would require that they be 
prior to other sorts of entity. However, Aristotle doesn’t clearly explain what sort of 
priority primary substances are supposed to have to other types of entity. To make 
matters worse, on the explicit characterizations of priority given in the Categories, 
primary substances seem to be as best simultaneous with and, at worse, posterior to 
other sorts of entity.  
In this chapter, I first examine some of Aristotle’s statements about substance 
in Categories 5 (Section 9.2). I argue that Aristotle implicitly recognizes a kind of 
priority—we can call it “priority in substance”—that primary substances have with 
respect to secondary substances, and that substances have with respect to non-
substances. Aristotle closely connects being prior in substance to a thing with being a 
subject for that thing. Furthermore, Aristotle takes the fact that primary substances are 
subjects for other things to entail that nothing else could exist, if primary substances 
did not exist.  
It is tempting to think that Aristotle equates priority in substance with this kind 
of existential dependence. Succumbing to this temptation, however, turns out to be  
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problematic, since primary substances seem to be existentially dependent on the very 
things to which they are prior in substance.   
I next turn to Aristotle’s discussion of priority in Categories 12-13 (Section 
9.3). Here I will focus primarily on two varieties of priority recognized by Aristotle. 
At 14a29-35, Aristotle defines priority with respect to implication of existence. One 
entity is prior to another in this way if and only if the existence of the second entails 
the existence of the first, but the existence of the first does not entail the existence of 
the second. This notion of priority conflicts with the sort of priority in substance 
recognized in Categories 5. First of all, primary substance as a type seems to be 
simultaneous with secondary substance and with both particular and universal 
nonsubstance as types. If we take primary substances individually, matters are worse. 
The existence of any primary substance implies the existence of its species, while the 
converse is not true. Species, which are secondary substances, turn out to be prior in 
implication of existence to primary substances. Similarly, species are posterior to their 
genera with respect to implication of existence, but prior to their genera in substance.  
At 14b9-23, Aristotle recognizes an additional type of priority. He notes that 
things sometimes reciprocate with respect to the implication of existence, but we take 
one to be prior to the other because the first is a cause of being for the second. Given 
this observation, Aristotle, in the course of his discussion of simultaneity by nature in 
Categories 13, defines a type of priority that we can call “priority in nature”. One 
thing is prior in nature to another if and only if either the first is prior in implication to 
the second, or the first and the second reciprocate with respect to implication of 
existence but the is a cause of being for the second while the converse is not the case. 
I argue that Aristotle’s notion of priority in nature gets right the case in which 
primary substance and other sorts of entities are compared as types, since primary 
substances are causes of being for other things while the converse is not the case.  
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However, this modification still yields the wrong priority result when individual 
primary substances are compared to their species, or individual species are compared 
to their genera.       
In the last section of the chapter (Section 9.4), I observe that one thing can be a 
cause of being for another even in a case where the second is prior in implication of 
existence to the first. Aristotle, therefore, has room for a sort of priority defined solely 
in terms of being a cause of being for a thing—a kind of priority that I will call 
“ontocausal priority”. I argue that individual primary substances are ontocausally prior 
to their species and genera, and that the ontocausal priority of primary substances is 
closely related to their being subjects for other things. Furthermore, I argue that 
ontocausal priority gives us a better model of ontological priority than the other sorts 
of priority defined by Aristotle. I end the chapter with a brief discussion of possible 
reasons for Aristotle’s failure to recognize ontocausal priority, and briefly compare 
some of Aristotle’s views about ontological priority with Plato’s. 
Section 9.2:  Priority in Substance in Categories 5 
  Aristotle’s central task in Categories 5 is to describe the nature of substance 
and to differentiate substance from other entities. Aristotle recognizes two types of 
substance: primary substances (prôtai ousiai) and secondary substances (deuterai 
ousiai). Primary substances, of which individual living things are the paradigmatic 
cases, are neither said-of nor inherent in any other entity. Furthermore, primary 
substances are subjects for all other things.
1  Secondary substances, of which the 
species and genera of primary substances are paradigmatic examples, are said-of 
primary substances but are not inherent in any entities.  
                                                 
1  As we observed in the last chapter, Aristotle takes this claim to mean that primary substances 
are directly the subjects for all other things. Taking the claim in this way turns out to be problematic. 
However, Aristotle need accept only the weaker claim that primary substances are ultimate subjects for 
other things. I will often call one entity a subject for another when it is an ultimate rather than a direct 
subject.    
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  At 2a11ff, Aristotle tells us that primary substances are “substances most 
strictly, primarily and most of all.”
2 In addition at 2b7ff, Aristotle twice claims that 
primary substances are substances ‘most of all’ or ‘most strictly’, and that the species 
is said to be ‘more a substance’ than the genus. Three observations are in order. First,
 
Aristotle calls some substances ‘primary’ and others ‘secondary’, and this terminology 
implies some ordering in respect of degree of substantiality. Second, he uses the 
superlatives ‘most strictly’ (kuriôtata), ‘primarily’ (prôtôs), and ‘most of all’ 
(malista), to talk about the way in which primary substances are said to be substances. 
Finally he uses comparatives in claiming that species is ‘more a substance’ than the 
genus, and that it is closer to the primary substance. These facts all suggest that 
Aristotle has in mind an ordering of degree of substantiality, and a corresponding 
notion of priority which we might call “priority in substance”.
3  
Aristotle strongly connects primacy in respect of substance with being a 
subject for other things. At 2a34, 2b4, 2b15 and 2b39, primary substances are said to 
                                                 
2   “…κυριώτατά τε καὶ πρώτως καὶ μάλιστα…” 
3   Morrison, “The Evidence for Degrees of Being in Aristotle” (1987), points to similar evidence 
to show that Aristotle accepts degrees of being in the Categories. I agree with Morrison’s claim that 
Aristotle accepts degrees of being. However, I think that Aristotle subscribes only to what Morrison 
calls the ‘ordering interpretation’ rather than to the ‘intensity interpretation’ of degrees of being. 
Furthermore, I will argue later that priority in being can be understood causally. Priority in substance or 
being is a matter of being some kind of cause of being for another thing. 
Aristotle does not use a phrase, such as ‘proteros kata ousian’ or ‘proteros tê ousiê’, which 
would be rendered ‘priority in substance’ in the Categories.  However, I think that there is ample 
evidence for reading this relation into the discussion in chapter 5. In addition to the evidence mentioned 
above, we can observe that Aristotle says that the species is nearer the primary substance, and is 
therefore more a substance, he is speaking in a way that suggests his analysis of priority in Metaphysics 
Δ.11. Aristotle there analyzes priority in terms of distance from a point of origin. It is natural to take the 
strictest substance, i.e. primary substance, as a point of origin in terms of which a priority ordering is 
given, and to see Categories 5 as describing such a priority ordering.  
In Metaphysics Δ, Aristotle does use the phrase ‘prior in nature and substance’ (‘proteros kata 
phusin kai ousian’) (1019a2). Furthermore, he seems to equate priority according to substance with 
priority according to nature in that passage, and also claims that the subject and substance are prior in 
this way. However, we will see that Aristotle’s characterization of priority by nature (proteros phusei) 
in Cat 12-13 differs in crucial ways from his characterization of proteros kata phusin in D. A central 
question, which is beyond the scope of this work, is how we ought to treat Aristotle’s different 
treatments of priority in different texts. For an overview of the central texts, and a discussion of the 
assorted notions of priority in Aristotle see John Cleary, Aristotle on the Many Senses of Priority 
(1988).  
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be subjects for all other things. Aristotle argues from the fact that primary substances 
are subjects for everything to the conclusion that they are substances most of all:  
Furthermore, the primary substances are said to be substances most of all, 
because they are subjects for all other things, and all other things are either 
said-of them or are in them (2b15-17).
4  
Aristotle also argues that the species and genera are the only substances 
besides primary substances based on the fact that they are subjects for all things other 
than primary substances and themselves: 
It is fitting that after the primary substances, among other things only 
the species and genera are called secondary substances…Further, the 
primary substances are said to be substance most strictly because they 
are the subjects for all other things. But just as primary substances hold 
toward all the other things, so the species and genera of primary 
substances hold toward all the remaining things. For all the remaining 
things are predicated of these. For if you call some particular man 
grammatical, you also call man and animal grammatical. And similarly 
in other cases. (2b26-27…2b37-3a6).
5    
  Finally, from the fact that the species is a subject for the genus while the 
converse is not true, Aristotle infers that the species is more of a substance than the 
genus:  
As the primary substances hold to the other things, so also the species 
holds toward the genus. For the species is a subject for the genus. For 
the genera are predicated concerning the species, but the species are not 
reciprocally predicated of the genera. So that, among these, the species 
is more a substance than the genus (2b17-22).
6  
                                                 
4   “ἔτι αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι διὰ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ὑποκεῖσθαι καὶ πάντα τὰ ἄλλα κατὰ 
τούτων κατηγορεῖσθαι ἢν ταύταις εἶναι διὰ τοῦτο μάλιστα οὐσίαι λέγονται (2b15-17).” Note that 
this is yet another passage where Aristotle explicitly claims that primary substances are direct subjects 
for all other things.  
5   “Εἰκότως δὲ μετὰ τὰς πρώτας οὐσίας μόνα τῶν ἄλλων τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ γένη δεύτεραι 
οὐσίαι λέγονται…ἔτι αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι διὰ τὸ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν ὑποκεῖσθαι κυριώτατα οὐσίαι 
λέγονται· ὡς δέ γε αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἔχουσιν, οὕτω τὰ εἴδη καὶ τὰ γένη τῶν 
πρώτων οὐσιῶν πρὸς τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα ἔχει· κατὰ τούτων γὰρ πάντα τὰ λοιπὰ κατηγορεῖται· τὸν 
γὰρ τινὰ ἄνθρωπον ἐρεῖς γραμματικόν, οὐκοῦν καὶ ἄνθρωπον καὶ ζῷον γραμματικὸν ἐρεῖς· 
ὡσαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων (2b26-27…2b37-3a6).”  
6   “ὡς δέ γε αἱ πρῶται οὐσίαι πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα ἔχουσιν, οὕτω καὶ τὸ εἶδος πρὸς τὸ γένος 
ἔχει·  – ὑπόκειται γὰρ τὸ εἶδος τῷ γένει· τὰ μὲν γὰρ γένη κατὰ τῶν εἰδῶν κατηγορεῖται, τὰ δὲ 
εἴδη κατὰ τῶν γενῶν οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει· –  ὥστε καὶ ἐκτούτων τὸ εἶδος τοῦ γένους μᾶλλον οὐσία 
(2b17-22).” A more literal translation of lines 20-21 might be, “ For the genera are predicated of the  
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  While Aristotle never uses the phrase “priority in substance” in the Categories, 
it is reasonable on the basis of the passages above to attribute to him a concept of 
priority in substance. Furthermore, he conceives of priority in substance in terms of 
one thing’s being a subject for another. As a first pass, we might define priority in 
substance as follows: 
(PS) For all entities, x and y, x is prior in substance to y if and only if x 
is a subject for y, and y is not a subject for x.
7 
The variables in (PS) should be taken to range over primary substances, secondary 
substances, nonsubstantial particulars and nonsubstantial universals. We should 
understand priority in substance defined in (PS) as a strict partial ordering, a relation 
which is transitive, irreflexive and asymmetrical. (PS) allows us to make pair-wise 
comparisons between entities as follows. Each primary substance will be prior in 
substance to its species and genera, to the nonsubstantial particulars inhering in it, and 
to the nonsubstantial universals said-of those nonsubstantial particulars. Each 
substantial species will be prior in substance to its genera, and to any of the 
nonsubstantial entities posterior in substance to any primary substance in the species. 
Each substantial genus will be posterior in substance to each of its species, and prior in 
substance to any of the nonsubstantial entities posterior to any of its species.  
  The priority relation defined by (PS) has a shortcoming that needs to be 
addressed. (PS) only allows the priority in substance relation to hold between two 
entities in cases where one of those entities is a subject for the other. However, 
Aristotle claims that two primary substances, for example a man and an ox, are 
                                                                                                                                           
species, but the species do not reciprocate concerning the genera.” It is clear, however, that Aristotle is 
claiming that the species are do not reciprocate in respect of being predicated of the genera.  
7   By ‘is a subject for’ I intend ultimate subjecthood, on which primary substances are subjects 
for nonsubstantial universals. (PS) has the prima facie odd-sounding result that nonsubstantial 
particulars will be prior in substance to nonsubstantial universals. I will not say much about the priority 
of nonsubstantial particulars to nonsubstantial universals in what follows. We could stipulate that any 
entity prior in substance to any thing at all must be a substance. Nevertheless, I think that Aristotle does 
take nonsubstantial particulars to be ontologically prior to nonsubstantial universals in a way similar to 
the way in which he takes primary substances to be prior to secondary substances.    
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equally substances, and that two species, e.g. human and horse, are equally 
substances.
8 Furthermore, it seems that Aristotle wants to be able to say that those 
secondary substances that are species but not genera are prior in substance to those 
secondary substances that are also genera.
9 
  In order to deal with this problem, we might replace (PS) with the following 
series of principles (PS*)(i)-(v). 
(PS*)   (i) For all entities, x and y, if x is a subject for y and y is not a 
subject for x, then x is prior in substance to y. 
(ii) For all entities, x and y, if x and y are both primary 
substances, then x is simultaneous in substance with y. 
(iii) For all entities, x and y, if x and y are immediately said-of 
entities which are simultaneous in substance with each other, 
then x is simultaneous in substance with y. 
(iv) For all entities, x and y, if y is simultaneous in substance 
with something that is immediately said-of x, then x is prior in 
substance to y. 
(v) For all entities, x and y and z, if x is prior in substance to y, 
and y is simultaneous in substance with z, then x is prior in 
substance to z.   
Given (PS*), every primary substance is prior in substance to every secondary 
substance. Furthermore, immediate species of primary substances are prior in 
substance to any genus of any immediate species, and any lower genus is prior in 
substance to any higher genus.
10 Furthermore, each substance is prior in substance to 
                                                 
8   Strictly speaking, at 2b22ff, Aristotle just denies that either is more of a substance than the 
other. If we allow that one thing is not more a substance than another in cases where the two can’t be 
compared at all with respect to substantial priority, then we could leave (PS) as it stands. However, I 
think that Aristotle wants to count things in each of these cases as comparable in respect of substantial 
priority. They will be simultaneous in substance, just as he later claims, in Categories 13, that we 
should count all coordinate species under the same genus as simultaneous in nature.  
9   I take this to be an implicature of Aristotle’s restricting the claim that one species is no more a 
substance than another to cases where neither is a genus (2b22ff). When one is a genus and the other is 
not, the first will be posterior in substance to the second even when neither is a subject for the other.   
10   We can take the number of times that we have to use the immediately said-of relation to get 
from a secondary substance to a primary substance as a measure of distance from primary substance. 
All species are equally close to primary substance, and are each closer to primary substance than any 
other genus.   
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any non-substance. (PS*) seems to yield the pair-wise priority in substance 
comparisons that Aristotle endorses.    
In the last chapter, we looked at Aristotle’s argument that nothing could exist 
without primary substance:  
So all of the other things are either said-of the primary substances or 
are in them as subjects. Therefore, if the primary substances did not 
exist, it would be impossible for any of the other things to exist (2b5-
6).
11    
Aristotle infers, from the fact that primary substances are subjects for other things, that 
it would be impossible for other things to exist if primary substances did not exist.
12 
As I pointed out in Chapter 8, Aristotle’s claim that all things are either said-of or 
inherent in primary substances is too strong. In what follows, I will take Aristotle to 
argue from the weaker claim that every other entity has a primary substance as an 
ultimate subject.  
Aristotle makes a valid inference in this passage, only if he takes his claim that 
all other things have primary substances as subjects to be a claim that has modal force. 
In other words, he is not simply pointing out that as a matter of fact every entity that is 
not a primary substance actually has at least one primary substance as a subject. 
Rather, he is claiming that as a matter of necessity every entity that is not a primary 
substance must have a primary substance as a subject. If any possible situation in 
which something other than primary substances exists is also a situation in which 
those things have a primary substance as a subject, then any possible situation in 
which there anything other than a primary substance exists is also a situation in which 
                                                 
11   ὥστε τὰ ἄλλα πάντα ἤτοι καθ' ὑποκειμένων τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν λέγεται ἢ ἐν 
ὑποκειμέναις αὐταῖς ἐστίν. μὴ οὐσῶν οὖν τῶν πρώτων οὐσιῶν ἀδύνατον τῶν ἄλλων τι εἶναι· 
(2b5-6) 
12   At 2b5, the particle ‘oun’ marks that an inference is being made. At 2b6b (which is bracketed 
in the Minio-Paluello text), the particle ‘hôste’ marks the inference.   
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a primary substance exists. So, if there were no primary substances there would be 
nothing else either.  
  What we have here is a kind of type-type modal existential dependence. Other 
entities taken as types, secondary substances, nonsubstantial particulars, and 
nonsubstantial universals, are existentially dependent on primary substances as a type. 
No type of entity could have any tokens unless there were tokens of the primary 
substance type. Aristotle takes the fact that primary substances are ultimate subjects to 
explain the type-type existential dependence of other entities on primary substance. 
Furthermore, Aristotle seems to take this type-type modal existential dependence of all 
the other types on primary substance as an indicator of the special ontological status of 
primary substances.
13 I think that the very term that Aristotle uses for primary 
substance indicates that they are take to have a special ontological status. ‘Primary 
substance’ is a translation of Aristotle’s ‘prôta ousia’. ‘Ousia’ is the feminine singular 
form of the present active participle of the verb ‘to be’ (‘einai’), and is often translate 
‘substance’. When Aristotle divides the beings that exist in the universe into four 
classes at 1a20, he uses the neuter plural form of the participle of ‘einai’. 
Nevertheless, in saying that something is a primary ousia, it seems to me that Aristotle 
indicates that it is somehow prior as an entity or being. Substances seem to be 
ontologically prior to other things, and a large part of my task in this chapter is to 
characterize what this ontological priority consists in.      
However, Aristotle seems mistaken to think that the considerations laid out in 
Categories 5 secure any kind of privileged ontological status for primary substance 
taken as a type—for, given some plausible assumptions, every type is modally 
existentially dependent on every other type. Given the fact that every primary 
                                                 
13   At the very least, Aristotle neglects to mention that it is equally true to say that primary 
substance as a type is modally existentially dependent on each of the other types of entity.    
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substance must be a member of some species and genus, if there were no secondary 
substances, there would be no primary substances. Furthermore, given the fact that no 
primary substance could exist without having some accidents, were there to be no 
nonsubstantial particulars or universals, there would be no primary substances. 
Related considerations hold in the other pair-wise comparisons of types of entity.  
As we see when we turn to Aristotle’s discussion of priority in Categories 12-
13, the problem becomes more acute when we consider token primary substances and 
their token species and genera. According to the analyses of priority discussed by 
Aristotle in these chapters, each individual substance turns out to be posterior to its 
species and genus.  
Section 9.2: Priority in Categories 12-13  
Aristotle discusses various types of priority and simultaneity in Categories 12-
13 (14a26-15a12). In Categories 12, Aristotle initially distinguishes four types of 
priority: priority in time, priority in implication of existence, priority according to an 
order, and priority in value. Some of Aristotle’s statements about priority are quite 
straightforward and have little bearing on the present discussion. For example, 
Aristotle claims we talk about priority most strictly in relation to time, and he tells us 
one object is prior to another in time if and only if the first is older than the second. 
The least proper sort of priority is priority in value, where one object is prior in value 
to another for a subject if and only if it more loved and valued by that subject.
14 We 
can take priority in time and value as follows. I will say little more about these types 
of priority. 
                                                 
14   I take Aristotle’s claims here to be a claim about the most and least natural uses of the term 
‘prior’. When told that one thing or event is ‘prior’ to another without any qualification of the type of 
priority, we most naturally assume that temporal priority is at issue. Similarly, it is least natural to take 
such a claim to be a claim about value. I do not think that Aristotle is trying to tell us that priority in 
value is somehow less real than priority in time.   
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(PT) For all entities and events, x and y, x is prior in time to y iff x 
exists/occurs before y. 
(PV) For all entities, x and y, and all agents, z, x is prior in value to y to 
z iff z values x more than z values y.  
It is somewhat less clear what Aristotle intends in talking about ‘priority 
according to an order’ (‘proteros kata tina taxin’). Aristotle illustrates this sort of 
priority by pointing to the examples of the demonstrative sciences and speeches. In the 
demonstrative sciences the elements or fundamental principles (ta stoicheia) are prior 
in order to the derived propositions (ta diagrammata). In grammar the phonemes (ta 
stoicheia) are prior in order to the syllables. And in speeches the introduction is prior 
in order to the statement of the case.  
It is difficult to see what sort of priority Aristotle is talking about in each of 
these examples, or to find one single priority relation common to these three examples. 
Perhaps Aristotle’s idea is that whenever there is a proper way to arrange things, it 
follows that there are priority relations between entities in the arrangement. In the 
sciences, we need the fundamental principles in order to demonstrate the derived 
propositions, and the elements seem to be prior in proof or knowledge to the 
propositions. Aristotle might be referring to the order of deduction or justification 
within a demonstrative science. Certain propositions are elements and the rest of the 
propositions are to be deduced from these. One proposition will be prior to another if 
the first shows up in a correct proof of the second.
15 Perhaps we also need to learn the 
elements in order to learn the propositions, and the elements are prior in the order of 
teaching.  
The phonemes are parts of the syllables, and our ability to speak a syllable 
presupposes our ability to speak the phonemes. Phonemes seem to be prior in order to 
                                                 
15   We might think of an Aristotelian science as a set of theorems that is partially ordered by a 
properly follows from relation, where there are objective facts about which propositions count as 
deductively prior.   
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syllables by being more basic constituents. The introduction of a speech seems to 
come before the laying out of the case in time. Furthermore, in the laying out of the 
case, a speaker might presuppose that the listeners have heard the introduction. This 
might constitute a certain kind of narrative priority of the introduction.     
I suggest that we see priority according to an order as a generic form of 
priority, and that each taxis yields its own priority relation. Whenever there is a taxis, 
there is a proper way to arrange objects, and this proper arrangement yields a priority 
ordering among the objects in the taxis. We might think of a taxis as a partial order 
defined by a domain and a relation. One thing is prior to another according to a given 
taxis, if and only if the first bears the ordering relation to the second in the right way. 
Schematically we get: 
(PKT) For all entities x and y, and all arrangements z, x is prior to y according 
to z, if and only if x and y are in the domain of z, R is the ordering relation 
associated with z, and Rxy.   
On this way of understanding what it is for one thing to be prior to another 
with respect to an arrangement, priority with respect to an arrangement seems to be a 
generic form of priority.
16 All other types of priority outlined in this chapter seem to 
be specific kinds of priority with respect to an arrangement.
17 Furthermore, we can 
                                                 
16   In the Metaphysics Δ.11, Aristotle takes distance from a point of origin as a root sense of 
priority. This root sense seems close to the type of priority that I take Aristotle to be getting at with 
priority according to a taxis in the Categories. For further discussion of some of the connections and 
differences between the Categories and Metaphysics passages, see Cleary (1988).     
17   Take grammar as an example. We might have a domain containing all the letters, syllables, 
words, and sentences, and an partial ordering relation on which x is prior to y iff x is a part of y. Each 
letter is prior to the syllables of which it is a part, and each syllable is prior to the words of which it is a 
part, etc. If we want to hold that every phoneme is prior to every syllable, then we will have to make 
alterations to the ordering relation similar to those suggested in the last section for priority in substance.  
In the case of speeches, the domain will be the parts of a speech, and the ordering relation will be one 
on which what comes earlier in the course of exposition is prior to what comes later.  
See also the discussion of priority kata taxin at Metaphysics D.11 1018b26ff. Aristotle 
obviously thinks that the type of priority involved in his discussion there is very broad. Certain 
members of a chorus are prior to others by virtue of their distance from the chorus-leader. Certain lyre 
strings are prior to others by virtue of their distance from the middle lyre string. In the Metaphysics 
Aristotle further tells us that a taxis will contain a certain fixed item such that priority according to the 
taxis will be a matter of distance from the fixed item. ‘Distance’ here should be understood as applying 
across a number of dimensions. The formal story here is a bit more complicated. We will have a domain  
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take the relation of priority in substance discussed in the previous section as a type of 
priority according to an arrangement. I turn now to Aristotle’s discussions of priority 
in implication of existence, and simultaneity and priority in nature. 
At 14a29, Aristotle defines the second of his four senses of priority. There are 
a number of issues that need to be worked through in figuring out how best to construe 
this passage. I will give a translation that I take to be neutral with respect to these 
issues, though very awkward. I will then turn to some of the issues, and make some 
suggestions about how to understand the passage.  
[T]hat which does not reciprocate concerning the implication of 
existence [is prior]. For example one is prior to two, since there being 
two, it follows straightway that there is one, but there being one it is not 
necessary for two to be, so that the implication of the being of the 
remainder does not reciprocate from the one; and things seem to be 
prior from which the implication of existence does not reciprocate 
(14a29-35).
18     
The word translated as ‘implication’ is ‘akolouthêsis’, which is derived from the verb 
‘akolouthein’ meaning ‘to follow’. The grammatical subjects and objects of   
‘akolouthein’ are usually terms in Aristotle’s logic.
19 For example, ‘animal’ is said to 
follow from ‘human’.
20 At a minimum, where ‘A’ and ‘B’ are terms, ‘A follows from 
B’ is true only if for all terms, ‘C’, ‘C belongs to B’ is true only if ‘C belongs to A’ is 
also true. So far, I am only taking ‘akolouthêsis’ to require the truth of the following 
universally quantified material conditional.  
(IM1) For all predicates, A and B, A follows from B only if ∀x(Bx ⊃ Ax).
21   
                                                                                                                                           
of objects, with one element designated as an origin. Priority is then a matter of distance along some 
dimension from that object.  
18   “δεύτερον δὲ τὸ μὴ ἀντιστρέφον κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν, οἷον τὸ ἓν τῶν δύο 
πρότερον· δυεῖν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων ἀκολουθεῖ εὐθὺς τὸ ἓν εἶναι, ἑνὸς δὲ ὄντος οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δύο 
εἶναι, ὥστε οὐκ ἀντιστρέφει ἀπὸ τοῦ ἑνὸς ἡ ἀκολούθησις τοῦ εἶναι τὸ λοιπόν, πρότερον δὲ 
δοκεῖ τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶναι ἀφ' οὗ μὴ ἀντιστρέφει ἡ τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησις (14a29-35).”  
19   There are numerous uses of ‘akolouthein’ and ‘akolouthêsis’ in the Prior Analytics and Topics. 
See Apr I.27-28 (43a20-45b23), I.46 (52b14ff), and Topics II.8 (133b15ff). 
20   Prior Analytics (43a20ff); Topics II.8 (113b19); Sophistical Refutations 28 (181a24). 
21   Where ‘Ax’ means that the predicate indicated by ‘A’ belongs to the individual x. In what 
follows, I turn Aristotle’s terms into first-order predicates, and take quantifiers to range over individuals  
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However, Aristotle seems to take ‘akolouthêsis’ to have some kind of modal force. 
The truth of ‘Animal follows from human,’ seems to involve the fact that there 
couldn’t be something that was a man unless it was also an animal. So it seems that 
Aristotle will also accept (IM2). 
  (IM2)  For all predicates, A and B, A follows from B, only if  
it is necessary that ∀x(Bx ⊃ Ax).
22 
(IM2) tells us that A follows from B only it is not possible for there to be a thing to 
which B belongs unless it is also a thing to which B belongs. Whether Aristotle would 
accept the strengthening of (IM2) to (IM3) is a difficult question.    
  (IM3)  For all predicates, A and B, A follows from B if and only if  
it is necessary that ∀x(Bx ⊃ Ax). 
The difficulty concerns the possibility of necessary and impossible predicates. If 
(IM3) is true then a predicate that belongs of necessity to all objects follows from any 
predicate at all, and every predicate follows from an impossible predicate. If such 
claims are problematic, then we need to add some sort of relevance constraints to our 
definitions in order to deal with them. While the issue seems to be of little importance 
in dealing with predicate-implication, I think that the issue becomes a bit more 
pressing when we turn to talk about the implication of existence.  
In talking about the ‘implication of existence’ (‘tou einai akolouthêsis’) in the 
Categories, Aristotle is not talking about a relationship between terms or their 
                                                                                                                                           
subjects. Notice that “∀x(Bx ⊃ Ax),” is equivalent to the normal way of translating Aristotle’s 
universal positive claim “A belongs to all B,” into first-order logic. Furthermore, I do not distinguish 
use and mention, unless the context is ambiguous.  
22   Whether “Necessarily ∀x(Bx ⊃ Ax),” is the right way to represent Aristotle’s modal claim “A 
necessarily belongs to all B,” is open to debate. In general, I think that Aristotle conceives of modality 
in terms of copula-operators and takes necessity to modify the way in which one thing belongs to 
another. See Patterson Aristotle’s Modal Logic (1995) for a defense of this view. It seems that 
Aristotle’s modal claim,  “A necessarily belongs to all B,” is closer to the de re claim “(∀x(Bx ⊃ 
Ax)” than to the de dicto “∀x(Bx⊃Ax).” In any case what I am concerned to show in the present case 
is that Aristotle does not take it to be possible to have a thing to which B belongs unless it is also a thing 
to which A belongs. The de dicto claim is closer to what I want, even if it is not a claim that Aristotle 
can express in his own modal syllogistic.   
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referents of the sort discussed in (IM1)-(IM3). Rather, it is easiest to express what 
Aristotle means by ‘tou einai akolouthêsis’ as a relationship between certain types of 
propositions, states of affairs, or facts. The existence of one entity follows from the 
existence of another, if and only if the proposition that the first exists entails the 
proposition the second exists.
23 Given the observation above that following or 
implication are supposed to have some modal force, it seems that Aristotle will accept 
(IB1) 
(IB1) For all entities, x and y, the existence of x follows from the 
existence of y only if it is necessary that if y exists then x exists.  
Whether Aristotle thinks that (IB1) can be strengthened to (IB2) depends on 
whether he takes the sort of implication involved to be subject to relevance 
constraints. 
(IB2) For all entities, x and y, the existence of x follows from the 
existence of y, if and only if it is necessary that if y exists then x exists. 
Aristotle sometimes talks as though his species and genera are eternal and 
necessary existents. However, he also seems to think that the existence of a species 
implies the existence of its genus, but that the converse claim is false. Aristotle could 
not hold that species and genera are necessary existents, hold that they stand in 
asymmetrical implication relations, and hold that (IB2) is true. In what follows, I will 
assume that Aristotle thinks that we can make sense out of talk about possible 
situations in which a species or genus does not exist, but that there is no possible 
situation in which a species exists but its superordinate genera do not.
24 Furthermore, I 
will take Aristotle to accept (IB2), and I will take the implication of existence as a 
relation between states of affairs or facts.  
                                                 
23   I take us to be able to state the same principle in terms of facts or states of affairs. The fact that 
one exists necessitates that the other exists, or the existence of one necessitates the existence of the 
other. 
24   I think that even if Aristotle does think that genera and species are necessary existents, he 
might be able to have a fictionalist account of asymmetrical implication of existence along the lines that 
I suggest.  
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There is still an apparent ambiguity in 14a29-14a35 that needs to be addressed. 
Aristotle’s claims in the example about one and two admit of two different readings.
25 
On the one hand, we might take Aristotle to be talking about the existence of the 
entities named by ‘one’ and ‘two’, where these are numbers. He will then be telling us 
that there are no possible situations in which two exists but one does not, while there 
are situations in which one exists but two does not.
26  
On the other hand we might take Aristotle to be making a claim about the 
implication relations between states of affairs involving the existence of two things 
and states of affairs involving the existence of a single thing. Aristotle will then be 
taken to be pointing out that the fact that there are two things always necessitates that 
there is one thing, while the converse is not the case.  
In fact, I think that the ambiguity here is merely apparent, and that on 
Aristotle’s view the two ways of taking the passage amount to the same thing. 
Considered as terms referring to entities, ‘one’ and ‘two’ will not name some sort of 
substance, but will name accidents in the category of quantity. The state of affairs, 
there being two things, consists in the inherence of the entity indicated by ‘two’ in a 
subject. The existence of a nonsubstantial entity always goes together with the 
obtaining of the state of affairs consisting in that entity’s inhering in some subject. 
                                                 
25   For example, we might translate “δυεῖν μὲν γὰρ ὄντων ἀκολουθεῖ εὐθὺς τὸ ἓν εἶναι, ἑνὸς 
δὲ ὄντος οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον δύο εἶναι…” in two ways. First, “For if two exists, it follows straightway 
that one exists, but if one exists it is not necessary for two to exist…” Second, “For if there are two 
(things), it follows straightway that there is one, but if there is one it is not necessary that there be 
two…” Cleary (1988) seems to prefer the first way of taking the passage, while Ackrill (1963) opts for 
the second. 
26   The sort of implication involved here cannot be adequately captured by (IB2), if we take 
numbers to be necessary existents. Cleary (1988) suggests that we take Aristotle to be making the point 
that the existence of the number two implies a principle of numbering, and that one is this principle of 
numbering. It seems possible to hold that one is principle of the relevant type, even if all the other 
numbers exist in every possible situation where one does. If we do this, however, we will need to 
introduce a different sort of implication relation than modal-existential implication. I discuss some of 
these issues in chapter 10.  
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In light of the above considerations, I translate the passage at 14a29-35 as 
follows: 
Secondly, what does not reciprocate concerning the implication of 
existence is prior. For example, one is prior to two, since if two exists it 
follows straightway that one exists, but if one exists it is not necessary 
for two to exist, so that the implication of the existence of the rest does 
not reciprocate from the one, and things seem to be prior from which 
the implication of existence does not reciprocate. (14a29-35)  
  Furthermore, we can define Aristotle’s relation of priority in implication of 
existence as follows:  
(PI) For all entities, x and y, x is prior concerning the implication of 
existence to y, if and only if it is necessary that if y exists then x exists, 
and it is possible that x exists and y does not exist. 
Furthermore, I take (PI) to be equivalent to the claim that there is no possible situation 
in which y exists but x does not exist, and there is a possible situation in which x exists 
but y does not exist.  
In the example about one and two, Aristotle asserts that it is impossible for two 
to exist unless one also exists, while it is possible for one to exist even if two does not 
exist. A possible argument in support of Aristotle’s claim would proceed in the 
following way.  From the claim that two, a nonsubstantial entity, exists it follows that 
some subject of two exists. However, whatever is a possible subject of two must 
consist of distinct entities, each of which will be a subject for one. So whenever the 
quantity named by ‘two’ exists, so does that named by ‘one’.
27 On the other hand, in a 
possible situation in which there is a single primary substance, there will be a subject 
for one, but there will be no subject for two. In such a world one, but not two, will 
exist.  
                                                 
27   We will see in a moment that, on this way of taking 14a29-35, Aristotle’s statements about the 
truth of a sentence and the existence of a man can be taken in a way similar to the way in which we take 
the example about one and two.    
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Priority in implication of existence initially seems to have a good claim on 
being a type of ontological priority. Furthermore, priority in implication of existence 
seems to be closely related to Aristotle’s claim that if primary substance did not exist, 
nothing else would exist. We might think that priority in implication of existence will 
provide us with an analysis of the way in which primary substances are prior as 
substances or beings to all other things.  
This view finds further support in Metaphysics Δ.11 when Aristotle discusses a 
priority relation, which seems to be just like priority in implication of existence as 
defined in (PI), and he calls this relation “priority according to nature and substance”: 
Things are called prior and posterior in this way [the way previously 
talked about], but those things are prior in nature and substance which 
can exist without other things while the others cannot exist without 
them—Plato used this distinction (1019a1-4).
28  
In this passage, Aristotle defines a type of priority called ‘priority in nature and 
substance’ (proteros kata phusin kai ousian) in terms of asymmetrical existential 
dependence, which is exactly the way that he defines priority in implication of 
existence. Aristotle also goes on to claim that the subject and substance are prior to 
other things in nature and substance. However, Aristotle’s claim that subjects are prior 
in this way is problematic.  Priority in implication turns out to be the wrong place to 
look for an account of priority in substance, if primary substances are supposed to be 
ontologically fundamental.  
  First of all, we should note that ‘primary substance’, ‘secondary substance’, 
‘nonsubstantial particular’, and ‘nonsubstantial universal’ do not name entities. Rather 
‘primary substance’, ‘secondary substance’, ‘nonsubstantial particular’, and 
‘nonsubstantial universal’ allow us to talk about four very general types of entity, 
                                                 
28   τὰ μὲν δὴ οὕτω λέγεται πρότερα καὶ ὕστερα, τὰ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐσίαν, ὅσα 
ἐνδέχεται εἶναι ἄνευ ἄλλων, ἐκεῖνα δὲ ἄνευ ἐκείνων μή· ᾗ διαιρέσει ἐχρήσατο Πλάτων. 
(1019a1-4)  
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while there are no entities corresponding to these general types.
29 Priority in 
implication as defined above, however, only allows pair-wise comparisons between 
entities. 
(PI) is not formulated in a way to handle comparisons of primary substance 
with the other general types of entities taken as general types. However, I think that 
we can define a notion of priority in implication, which allows us to make the sorts of 
comparisons that Aristotle makes in Categories 5. Aristotle can say that the existence 
of at least one primary substance follows from the existence of any entity of one of the 
other three types. Let’s call this sort of implication of existence, type-implication of 
existence.  One type of entity type-implies another if and only if it is impossible for 
there to be any token of the first type unless there is at least one token of the second 
type.  
(TI) For all types of entity, X and Y, X type-implies Y if and only if it 
is impossible for any token of X to exist unless at least one token of Y 
exists.  
We can now define type-priority in implication in the following way: 
(TPI) For all types of entity, X and Y, X, is type-prior to Y, if and only 
if Y type-implies X, and X does not type-imply Y. 
Each of the other types of entity type-implies the existence of primary 
substance. As we saw above, however, it is equally true that primary substance type-
implies the existence of each of the other general types of entity. Primary substance 
fails to be type-prior in implication of existence to any of the other types of entity. 
Rather, each of the four kinds seems to be on a par with each of the others with respect 
to type-implication of existence.  
                                                 
29   We can compare ‘primary substance’ with ‘human’ in this regard. We might take ‘human’ as 
picking out a type of entity, but ‘human’ also refers to an entity, the  universal human. ‘Primary 
substance’ does not refer to any universal. In this regard, ‘primary substance’ doesn’t name any entity.    
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If we look at the situation in terms of individual entities, priority in implication 
is diametrically opposed to priority in substance. Aristotle takes species to be prior in 
substance to their genera, but genera will be prior in implication of existence to their 
species. In any possible world where human exists, animal will also exist. However, it 
is possible for there to be a world in which animal exists, but human does not; imagine 
a world in which only reptiles exist. Human is prior in substance to animal, but animal 
is prior in implication of existence to human.  
The comparison between a primary substance and its species reveals the same 
problem. There is no possible world in which Socrates exists but human fails to exist. 
However, there are possible worlds in which human exists but Socrates does not. 
Human is, therefore, prior in implication of existence to Socrates. However, Aristotle 
seems to think that us that Socrates is somehow prior is substance or being to human, 
by being a primary substance or being while human is only a secondary substance or 
being. In taking Socrates to be prior in substance to human, I take Aristotle to hold 
that Socrates is somehow ontologically prior to human.
30 Furthermore in holding that 
Socrates is a primary substance or a primary being, Aristotle seems to hold that 
Socrates is ontologically fundamental. However, if priority in implication of existence 
is taken as a measure of ontological priority, it is difficult to see how Aristotle can be 
justified in taking Socrates to be ontologically prior to human, let alone in taking 
Socrates to be ontologically fundamental.  
I turn next to Aristotle’s definition of priority in nature as developed in 
Categories 12-13. When we compare primary substance as a type with the other types 
of entity, we will see that primary substance turns out to be prior in nature to the other 
                                                 
30   We still have to figure out what ontological priority amounts to on this view. So far, all we 
have seen is that it cannot simply be priority in implication of existence. I will suggest later in the 
chapter that one thing is ontologically prior to another by being a cause of being for it.    
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types of entity. However, individual primary substances turn out to be posterior in 
nature to their species, and species posterior to their genera.  
At 14b9, Aristotle recognizes a variety of priority other than the four listed 
above: 
So, there are this many ways of speaking of priority. However, there 
would seem to be another type of priority beyond those mentioned. For 
among the things that reciprocate concerning the implication of 
existence, the one which is somehow a cause of being for the other 
would be reasonably called prior by nature. And it is clear that there are 
some cases like this. For there being (a) man reciprocates concerning 
the implication of existence with the true statement concerning it. For if 
(a) man exists, the statement by which we say that (a) man exists is 
true. And indeed it reciprocates, since if the statement by which we say 
a man exists is true, then (a) man exists. But the true statement is in no 
way a cause of the existence of the thing (pragma), while it is clear that 
the thing (pragma) is somehow the cause of the existence of the true 
statement. For a statement is true or false by the thing’s (pragma) 
existing or not. So that one thing might be said to be prior to another in 
five ways (14b9-23).
31  
                                                 
31   Οἱ μὲν οὖν λεγόμενοι τοῦ προτέρου τρόποι τοσοῦτοί εἰσιν. δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ παρὰ τοὺς 
εἰρημένους ἕτερος εἶναι προτέρου τρόπος· τῶν γὰρ ἀντιστρεφόντων κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι 
ἀκολούθησιν τὸ αἴτιον ὁπωσοῦν θατέρῳ τοῦ εἶναι πρότερον εἰκότως φύσει λέγοιτ' ἄν. ὅτι δ' 
ἔστι τινὰ τοιαῦτα, δῆλον· τὸ γὰρ εἶναι ἄνθρωπον ἀντιστρέφει κατὰ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι ἀκολούθησιν 
πρὸς τὸν ἀληθῆ περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγον· εἰ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ᾧ λέγομεν ὅτι ἔστιν 
ἄνθρωπος· καὶ ἀντιστρέφει γε,  – εἰ γὰρ ἀληθὴς ὁ λόγος ᾧ λέγομεν ὅτι ἔστιν ἄνθρωπος, ἔστιν 
ἄνθρωπος· –  ἔστι δὲ ὁ μὲν ἀληθὴς λόγος οὐδαμῶς αἴτιος τοῦ εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα, τὸ μέντοι 
πρᾶγμα φαίνεταί πως αἴτιον τοῦ εἶναι ἀληθῆ τὸν λόγον· τῷ γὰρ εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα ἢ μὴ ἀληθὴς ὁ 
λόγος ἢ ψευδὴς λέγεται. ὥστε κατὰ πέντε τρόπους πρότερον ἕτερον ἑτέρου λέγοιτ' ἄν. (14b9-
23)  
This passage has the appearance of having been tacked on to 14a26-b8 sometime after the first 
passage was written. 14a26-b8 (perhaps including b9-10) looks like a completed discussion of four 
types of priority. Aristotle then adds in a fifth type of priority, which really amounts to a modification 
of the second type of priority that he mentions in 14a26-b8. It is interesting to note that Aristotle 
attributes the unmodified version of priority in implication to Plato in Metaphysics Δ.11 and calls it 
“priority in nature and substance.” The end of Categories 12 and the whole of Categories 13 seem to 
involve rethinking priority in nature to take causal considerations into account. I tentatively suggest that 
the end of Categories 12 and the whole of 13 reflect a more nuanced view than the beginning of 12 and 
Metaphysics Δ.11, and that these passages might represent a later stage in Aristotle’s thought. 
Nevertheless, Aristotle claims in Δ.11 that the subject and the substance are prior in nature and being, 
while in Categories 13 he claims that genera are prior in nature to species even though species are 
subjects for genera. In this way, the view in Δ seems closer to the view in Categories 5 than does the 
view in Categories 12-13. For a more detailed discussion of the relation of Aristotle’s claims about 
priority in his various works, see Cleary (1988).      
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Aristotle points out that there are some cases where things reciprocally imply 
each other’s existence, but in which we think that one of the pair is prior to the 
other. However, priority in implication of existence does not distinguish either 
of the two entities as prior to the other. Aristotle observes that even in cases 
where there is reciprocal implication of existence, there can be an asymmetry 
in the causal relationship between the entities. The existence of one might be a 
cause of the existence of the other, while the converse fails to be the case.
32  
Aristotle tells us that we have a fifth type of priority here, and defines this type 
of priority as follows: 
(P5) For all entities, x and y, x is type-5 prior to y if and only if it is 
impossible for x to exist unless y exists, and it is impossible for y to 
exist unless x exists, and x causes y to exist, and y does not cause x to 
exist.   
Aristotle illustrates this type of priority using the example of the relationship 
between facts and true sentences. In his commentary on Categories 12, Ackrill claims, 
“It is odd to call [the relation between facts and truths] reciprocal implication of 
existence.”
33   However, I think there is a way of reading Aristotle’s example on which 
it is a case of two entities’ reciprocally implying the existence of each other. I take 
Aristotle to be comparing one entity, the universal human, with another, the true 
sentence claiming that human exists. For purposes of the example, I think that we 
should take sentences as subjects for truth and falsity, and should hold that they exist 
                                                 
32   Notice that Aristotle’s distinction also lets us distinguish as prior and posterior two necessary 
existents. It is interesting to look at an example of this sort of reasoning in St. Thomas Aquinas. In his 
third way (Summa Theologica Pars I, a Q2 A3), Aquinas first argues for the existence of at least one 
necessary being. He then argues that every necessary being is either a cause of its own necessity, or has 
its necessity caused by another. On pain of regress, he concludes that there must be a necessary being 
which is the cause of its own necessity. It might follow from God’s nature, that he creates certain 
entities, in which case these entities will be necessary existents. Nevertheless, despite their being 
necessary existents, these things will be posterior to God, because they are caused to exist by God while 
the converse is not the case. In the second part of this chapter, I discuss other cases in which entities 
exist in all the same possible worlds but in which one is ontologically prior to the other.       
33   Ackrill (1963) pg111-112.  
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even when they are not uttered.
34 We should take truth to be an accident of sentences. 
True sentences are, therefore, compounds of an accident and a subject, and a true 
sentence exists in all and only those possible situations where the sentence in question 
is true. The sentence claiming that human exists is true in all and only those possible 
situations in which human exists. So, the true sentence exists in all and only those 
possible situations in which human exists. Human and the true sentence claiming that 
human exists, therefore, reciprocate with respect to the implication of existence. 
However, the sentence is true in any possible situation in which it is true because 
human exists in that situation. The converse is not the case, however. So human is 
type-5 prior to the true sentence.
35  
In his discussion of simultaneity in Categories 13, Aristotle defines a notion of 
priority in nature, in terms of implication of existence and being a cause of 
something’s existence. He defines simultaneity by nature (hama phusei) at 14b27. 
(SN) For all entities, x and y, x and y are simultaneous in nature if and 
only if it is impossible for x to exist unless y exists, and it is impossible 
for y to exist unless x exists, and x is not a cause of the existence of y, 
and y is not a cause of the existence of x.
36    
                                                 
34   Aristotle sometimes seems to think of sentences as things which persist through time, and 
which change in truth-value. See Categories 5, Metaphysics ϑ.10. Also see the commentary on ϑ.10 in 
Makin (2006). However, as we will see later, it is somewhat problematic to hold that sentences are 
subjects which have truth and falsity as attributes. As Aristotle points out in Categories 5 (4a22ff), 
sentences and beliefs are subjects only in an attenuated sense.  
35   I think that we could just as easily run this argument in terms of the states of affairs, human’s 
existing and the sentence’s being true. I think that Aristotle would take the two arguments as identical 
in meaning. I choose to explain things in the body of the text in the way that I do, so that we will be 
talking explicitly about the existence of entities.  
36   See 14b27ff. I am ignoring Aristotle’s use of ‘simultaneous by nature’ to describe the relation 
between coordinate species of the same genus. We could treat this case by extending priority in nature 
in the way that we extended priority in substance in section 9.2. However, this would significantly 
complicate the exposition, and is not of central importance to my project.   
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In illustrating simultaneity by nature, Aristotle talks about pairs of correlative entities, 
like double and half. Each of these implies the existence of the other, but Aristotle tells 
us that neither is a cause of being for the other.
37   
Aristotle does not use the phrase ‘prior by nature’ (proteros phusei) in 
Categories 13, but we can define a notion of priority by nature that naturally goes with 
simultaneity in nature as defined by (SN).  
(PN) For all entities, x and y, x is prior by nature to y, if and only if 
either x is prior in implication of existence to y or x is type-5 prior to y.   
Like priority in implication, and type-5 priority, priority by nature is defined as a 
relation that holds between one entity and another. However, as we did with priority in 
implication, we can extend the definition of priority in nature in a way that allows us 
to make type-type comparisons between primary substance and other most general 
types of entity. We will use the notion of type-implication defined above, and a notion 
of one type of entity’s being a cause of being for another type of entity.  
(TC) One type of entity, X, is a type-cause of being for another type of 
entity, Y, if and only if it is not possible for a token of Y to exist unless 
it has a token of X as a cause of its existence. 
We can now define type-priority in nature as follows: 
(PNT) For all types of entity, X and Y, X is type-prior by nature to Y
    if and only if  
Either  X is type-prior in implication to Y,  
Or   X type-implies Y, and 
Y type-implies X, and 
X is a type-cause of being for Y, and  
Y is not a type-cause of being for X.  
  According to (PNT), primary substance will be type-prior by nature to the 
other general types of entity if primary substances are causes of being for other things 
                                                 
37   A couple of points are in order here. First, as Cleary (1988) points out, p. 105 n. 28, Aristotle 
takes some correlative pairs of entities to involve one prior and one posterior entity—for example the 
thing known is prior to knowledge, and the thing perceived is prior to perception (see Cat 8a9ff). Cleary 
points out that in such examples, one correlative seems both causally and temporally prior to the other. 
In these cases, Cleary claims that one correlative is taken by Aristotle to be prior in nature to the other.     
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while other things are not causes of being for primary substances. It is reasonable to 
hold that Aristotle takes primary substances to count as causes of being for other 
things by being subjects for other things. The existence of each entity that is not a 
primary substance is grounded in the existence of one or more primary substances.
38 
Entities of the other general types will not count as causes or grounds of being for 
primary substances. Therefore, Aristotle is justified in taking primary substance to be 
type-prior in nature to the other general types of entity. 
  However, according to (PN) genera are still prior in nature to their species, and 
species to their instances.
39 The fact that genera are prior in implication to their species 
is enough for them to count as prior by nature. Despite Aristotle’s claims that primary 
substances are the most fundamental beings in Categories 5, individual primary 
substances do not turn out to be primary on any of the definitions of priority found in 
Categories 12-13. Nevertheless, in these passages, Aristotle comes very close to 
recognizing a sort of priority on which primary substances are prior to other entities 
including their species and genera. I discuss this sort of priority in the next section. 
Section 9.4: Ontocausal Priority 
   In his definition of type-5 priority in Categories 12, Aristotle holds that one 
entity can be type-5 prior to another only if the existence of each entity entails the 
existence of the other. It is only when entities are simultaneous with respect to 
implication of existence that causal considerations are brought to bear in order to 
determine which is prior in nature. However, there seem to be instances in which one 
entity is a cause of being for another, but in which the two do not reciprocate 
concerning the implication of existence. While he does not define such a notion of 
                                                 
38   I discuss the nature of this grounding relation in the second part of this chapter, and try to 
make more precise the claim that primary substances are causes of being for other entities.  
 
39   I take Aristotle’s claim about the priority of animal to fish, and about genera to species at 
15a4-7 to be a claim about priority by nature.   
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priority, I find it hard to read Categories 12-13 without thinking of priority with 
respect to causation of existence as a type of priority orthogonal to priority in 
implication. I will call this type of priority ‘ontocausal priority’, and we can define it 
as follows: 
(OCP) For all entities, x and y, x is ontocausally prior to y, if and only 
if x is a cause of existence for y and y is not a cause of existence for x.    
  It will be helpful to begin thinking about the relation between priority in 
implication and ontocausal priority by thinking about some of Aristotle’s examples. In 
Aristotle’s example of the existence of human and the existence of the true statement 
that human exists, the existence of human is a truth-maker for the statement. Aristotle 
thinks of this as a causal relationship. It will be useful to ask what sort of ‘causation’ 
Aristotle takes to be at issue in this case.  
The term ‘cause’ translates Aristotle’s use of ‘aitia’. As has been observed by 
many commentators, Aristotle uses ‘aitia’ more broadly than contemporary 
metaphysicians typically use the term ‘cause’. Any detailed discussion of the nature of 
Aristotelian aitiai is beyond the scope of this project, but I will say a couple of things 
about how I understand aitiai.
40 Let’s use the term aitiation to name the relation or 
family of relations that Aristotle takes to hold between aitiai and the things of which 
they are aitiai. Aristotle takes the relata of aitiation to be entities or states of affairs in 
the world, rather than propositional or linguistic items.
41 He also takes claims about 
aitiation to be referentially transparent rather than referentially opaque.
42 In these 
                                                 
40   For more complete discussion of the nature of aitiai see Annas (1982), Fine (1987), and 
Freeland (1991). 
41   Sometimes, see Physics II.3, Aristotle holds that sentences can be aitiai of other sentences. For 
example, the premises of an argument are said to be an aitia of the conclusion. I do not think that this 
fact affects my main point here.  
42   For a challenge to this claim, see Julius Moravcsik “Aristotle on Adequate Explanations” 
(1974) Julia Annas (1982) claims that Aristotle thinks of aitiai in an explanatory way, but that he fails 
to notice that such contexts are opaque. Charles (1984) and Fine (1987) defend the claim that Aristotle’s 
claims about aitiai are referentially transparent. For a good overview of the above-mentioned views, 
and some doubts that the question of opacity can be sensibly raised for Aristotle, see Freeland (1991). 
On the other hand Freeland “Aristotelian Actions” (1985) seems to combine an extensional  
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ways, aitiation is closer to causation than it is to explanation, as causation and 
explanation are generally understood in contemporary philosophy.
43  
  Aristotle, however, claims that one thing is an aitia of another in cases where, 
while we do think that it is fitting to talk about the first thing in explaining various 
things about the second, we do not think that the first thing is a cause of the second. 
We might, therefore, think about aitiation as the relation in the world that underlies 
good explanations.
44 I take the relation between an Aristotelian aitia and that of which 
it is an aitia to be an objective and interest-independent relation between entities in the 
world.
45  
In many cases, these explanation-grounding relations can be understood in 
terms of causal relevance, where causal relevance can be understood in terms of the 
relation of event causation familiar in contemporary philosophy.
46 In the case of the 
sentence and the entity, however, I am not sure that the causal relevance account will 
work. For example, Aristotle takes the existence of a thing counts as an aitia of the 
truth of a claim, but I somewhat wary of thinking that there is any causation in the 
contemporary sense at play here. Nevertheless, we often use causal language in 
                                                                                                                                           
understanding of aitiai with a theory on which events and entities are extremely fine-grained. The result 
is a view on which many cases of substitution, which might appear to render aitiaition causally opaque, 
turn out to involve the substitution of expressions that do not corefer. I am sympathetic to this 
interpretation of aitia and to the underlying interpretation of Aristotle’s ontology that it implies.    
43   There is a good bit of overgeneralization involved in claiming that there is a general view 
about causation or explanation in contemporary metaphysics. Nevertheless, here are some features of 
causation which I am inclined to accept. Causation is a relation between concrete events (or perhaps 
facts). Causal contexts are referentially transparent, in that substitution of coreferring expressions in 
true causal claims always yield true causal claims. Causes are ontologically distinct from their effects. 
On the other hand, theories seem to serve as relata for explanation. Explanatory contexts often seem to 
be opaque in that substitution of coreferring terms in true explanatory claims do not always yield true 
explanatory claims.  
44   Sorabji (1980) has such a view. For a detailed exposition and defense, see Fine (1987). 
45   For the claim that aitiation is context and interest-dependent, see vanFrassen (1980), and 
Putnam and Nussbaum (1992). The conflict between such a “pragmatic” view and an “explanatory 
realist” view is treated in Freeland (1991). I agree with Freeland that Aristotle is in the realist camp.  
46   Fine (1987) expresses this view.  
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describing the relationship between states-of-affairs and sentences. We claim that 
states of affairs make sentences true, and in this regard we follow Aristotle.  
In Metaphysics ϑ.10, Aristotle expresses a view about statements and facts 
similar to one expressed in Categories 12: 
[Being and not being are spoken of] also [most strictly] in the case of 
the true and the false, since in the case of things this is by their being 
combined and divided, so that he speaks the truth who thinks that what 
is divided is divided and that what is combined is combined, and he 
speaks falsely [who believes] what holds opposite to the things…For it 
is not due to our thinking truly that you are pale that you are pale, but it 
is due to your being pale that we who say this speak truly (1051b1-5, 
b6-9).
47     
Sentences and beliefs are true and false because of the way the world is, while the 
converse is not the case. Aristotle is making the same point in Categories 12 in 
claiming that things are aitiai of true statements. But in what way are things or facts 
aitiai of truths? 
  Aristotle’s discussion of statements and beliefs in Categories 5 points us 
toward an answer to this question. Aristotle has claimed that it is proper to substances 
to be the only sorts of things that can receive contraries while remaining one and the 
same. He considers statements and beliefs to be possible counterexamples to this 
claim. One and the same statement can be true at one time, but false at another. 
Aristotle responds that statements and beliefs do not provide a counterexample to his 
claim about substance. At the very least, Aristotle claims that there is a difference in 
the manner in which statements and beliefs receive contraries: 
For in the case of substances, it is by themselves changing that they are 
capable of receiving contraries—for what has come to be cold from 
                                                 
47   τὸ δὲ [κυριώτατα ὂν] ἀληθὲς ἢ ψεῦδος, τοῦτο δ' ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐστὶ τῷ 
συγκεῖσθαι ἢ διῃρῆσθαι, ὥστε ἀληθεύει μὲν ὁ τὸ διῃρημένον οἰόμενος διῃρῆσθαι καὶ τὸ 
συγκείμενον συγκεῖσθαι, ἔψευσται δὲ ὁ ἐναντίως ἔχων ἢ τὰ πράγματα… οὐ γὰρ διὰ τὸ ἡμᾶς 
οἴεσθαι ἀληθῶς σε λευκὸν εἶναι εἶ σὺ λευκός, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σὲ εἶναι λευκὸν ἡμεῖς οἱ φάντες 
τοῦτο ἀληθεύομεν. 
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hot, or dark from pale, or good from bad, has changed (for it has 
altered). Similarly, in the other cases, each thing, itself admitting 
change, is able to receive the contraries. Statements and beliefs, on the 
other hand, remain themselves completely unchanged in every way, but 
it is because the thing is moved that the opposite comes to be in the 
case of these things. For the statement that someone is sitting remains 
itself the same, but when it comes to be true and it comes to be false, it 
does so because the thing has changed. And similarly in the case of 
beliefs. So that, at the very least, it would be proper in kind to 
substance to be able to receive contraries according to a change in 
itself, even if someone were to grant these things, that a belief or 
statement is able to receive contraries (4a29-b5).
48      
According to the view expressed by Aristotle in this passage, sentences and beliefs 
remain completely unchanged when they go from being true to being false. What 
some people want to count as a change in the sentence does not involve any intrinsic 
alteration of the sentence, but seems to be a mere Cambridge change. A sentence 
comes to have a different truth-value by and only by there being a change in the things 
that the sentence is about. So, even if we do want to hold that sentences receive 
contraries, changes in sentences are wholly constituted by changes in the world.  
However, Aristotle even doubts that, properly speaking, sentences and beliefs 
receive contraries at all. He continues the passage quoted above: 
But this is not true. For the statement and the belief are not said to be 
capable of receiving contraries by themselves receiving something, but 
by some affection having come to be for something else. For it is by 
this, by the thing’s being or not being, that the sentence is said to be 
true or false, and not by its being able itself to receive contraries. For 
strictly speaking neither statement nor belief is ever changed by 
anything. Therefore, they will not be able to receive contraries, because 
nothing comes to in them. But indeed the substance, by itself receiving 
the contraries, is said to be able to receive contraries. For it receives 
                                                 
48   τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν αὐτὰ μεταβάλλοντα δεκτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν,  –  ψυχρὸν 
γὰρ ἐκ θερμοῦ γενόμενον μετέβαλεν (ἠλλοίωται γάρ), καὶ μέλαν ἐκ λευκοῦ καὶ σπουδαῖον ἐκ 
φαύλου, ὡςαύτως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἕκαστον αὐτὸ μεταβολὴν δεχόμενον τῶν ἐναντίων 
δεκτικόν ἐστιν· –  ὁ δὲ λόγος καὶ ἡ δόξα αὐτὰ μὲν ἀκίνητα πάντῃ πάντως διαμένει, τοῦ δὲ 
πράγματος κινουμένου τὸ ἐναντίον περὶ αὐτὰ γίγνεται· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος διαμένει ὁ αὐτὸς τὸ 
καθῆσθαί τινα, τοῦ δὲ πράγματος κινηθέντος ὁτὲ μὲν ἀληθὴς ὁτὲ δὲ ψευδὴς γίγνεται· ὡσαύτως 
δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς δόξης. ὥστε τῷ τρόπῳ γε ἴδιον ἂν εἴη τῆς οὐσίας τὸ κατὰ τὴν αὑτῆς μεταβολὴν 
δεκτικὴν τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι,  – εἰ δή τις καὶ ταῦτα παραδέχοιτο, τὴν δόξαν καὶ τὸν λόγον 
δεκτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων εἶναι. (4a29-b5)  
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sickness and health, and paleness and darkness, and receiving itself 
each of the things of this sort it is said to be bale to receive contraries 
(4b5-16).
49           
In this passage, Aristotle denies not only that sentences and beliefs undergo real 
change with respect to truth and falsity, but he also denies that sentences and beliefs 
even really have truth and falsity as properties. It is not merely the case that changes in 
truth-value are mere Cambridge changes, but a sentence’s possessing truth is mere 
Cambridge possession of a property to begin with. For sentences are true and false by 
and only by things in the world being arranged the way that they are. On the other 
hand, the things in the world are the way that they are by themselves possessing 
properties.  
We are now in a position to state the way in which a thing or fact is a cause of 
being for a true sentence. Things or facts are causes of being for a true sentence, 
because a sentence’s being true is wholly constituted by a thing’s existence or a fact’s 
obtaining.
50 We do not have a causal relation (as causation is typically understood in 
contemporary metaphysics) between two distinct events or facts, but rather a case 
where one fact is constituted by another. We seem to be able to give the following 
sufficient condition for one thing’s being a cause for being for another:  
(CB) For all entities, x and y, if the existence of x is constituted by the 
existence of y, then x is a cause of being for y.  
                                                 
49   οὐκ ἔστι δὲ ἀληθὲς τοῦτο· ὁ γὰρ λόγος καὶ ἡ δόξα οὐ τῷ αὐτὰ δέχεσθαί τι τῶν 
ἐναντίων εἶναι δεκτικὰ λέγεται, ἀλλὰ τῷ περὶ ἕτερόν τι τὸ πάθος γεγενῆσθαι·  – τῷ γὰρ τὸ 
πρᾶγμα εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι, τούτῳ καὶ ὁ λόγος ἀληθὴς ἢ ψευδὴς εἶναι λέγεται, οὐ τῷ αὐτὸν 
δεκτικὸν εἶναι τῶν ἐναντίων· ἁπλῶς γὰρ οὐδὲν ὑπ' οὐδενὸς οὔτε ὁ λόγος κινεῖται οὔτε ἡ δόξα, 
ὥστε οὐκ ἂν εἴη δεκτικὰ τῶν ἐναντίων μηδενὸς ἐν αὐτοῖς γιγνομένου· –  ἡ δέ γε οὐσία τῷ 
αὐτὴν τὰ ἐναντία δέχεσθαι, τούτῳ δεκτικὴ τῶν ἐναντίων λέγεται· νόσον γὰρ καὶ ὑγίειαν 
δέχεται, καὶ λευκότητα καὶ μελανίαν, καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν τοιούτων αὐτὴ δεχομένη τῶν ἐναντίων 
εἶναι δεκτικὴ λέγεται. 
50   As I mention above, I think that fact talk and thing talk are interchangeable for Aristotle. For a 
fact to obtain is for a certain composite object to exist. For example, for the fact that Socrates is pale to 
obtain is for a composite of pallor and Socrates to exist. See Metaphysics ϑ.10 and Makin’s 
commentary, and my discussion of change in chapter 5.   
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Whether we can extend (CB) to give us necessary and sufficient conditions is a 
tricky question. Aristotle certainly recognizes cases where one thing causes another to 
exist. For example, the father is a cause of the existence of the child, and the builder is 
a cause of the existence of the building.
51 We might be perfectly happy to say that the 
father and the builder count as causes of being, and that they are causally prior to the 
child and building respectively. The type of causation at issue in these cases, however, 
seems to differ from the type of causation involved in the case of the fact and the true 
statement. A child does not exist by the father’s existing. Rather the existence of the 
child and that of the father are distinct states-of-affairs related as cause to effect, in 
something like the contemporary sense of ‘cause’. I want to restrict our discussion of 
causation of being to cases of the former sort. We will call one thing or fact an 
ontocause of another when the existence of the second is at least partially constituted 
by the existence of the first.     
(OC) For all entities, x and y, x is an ontocause for y if and only if the 
existence of x is (at least partially) constituted by the existence of y. 
We can amend the definition of ontocausal priority to take into account our 
restriction of causation to ontocausation: 
(OCP*) For all entities, x and y, x is ontocausally prior to y, if and only 
if x is an ontocause of y, and y is not an ontocause of x. 
 Ontocausal priority also seems to be present when we consider the existence 
of one and two. Any instance of the existence of a pair of things will be partially 
constituted by the existence of each single entity in that pair. In this way, each single 
entity (partially) constitutes the pair. Each single entity is, therefore, a (partial) 
ontocause of being for the pair. However, while the existence of the pair is sufficient 
for the existence of each thing, it is not the case that the pair constitutes each single 
                                                 
51   See, for example, Physics II.3, and Metaphysics A.3ff.  
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thing. Therefore, each single thing is ontocausally prior to the pair, or to state things 
more generally that one is ontocausally prior to two.
52  
As we have seen in the examples above, one entity can be ontocausally prior to 
another in cases where the two entities are simultaneous with respect to implication of 
existence, or in cases where the first is prior in implication to the second. In the case of 
the thing and the true statement, the existence of the thing ontocauses the existence of 
the true statement in any possible situation. Therefore, the existence of the thing 
implies the existence of the true statement. Additionally, the true statement has no 
other possible ontocause, since a true statement can only be ontocaused by the 
existence of the relevant thing. However, true statements cannot exist in the absence of 
an ontocause. Therefore, the existence of the true statement in any possible situation 
implies the existence of the relevant thing. The statement and the thing therefore 
reciprocate concerning the implication of existence.  
In the case of one and two, it is impossible for two to exist without having one 
as an ontocause. In any possible situation where an instance of two exists, it must have 
two partial ontocauses, each of which is an instance of one. Therefore, it is impossible 
for two to exist unless one also exists, and the existence of two implies the existence 
of one. However, it is possible for one to exist without ontocausing two. This 
possibility would be realized if exactly one thing existed.
53 The existence of one, 
therefore, does not imply the existence of two.  
                                                 
52   I think that the story might be fleshed out a bit as follows. For this instance of two, taken as a 
nonsubstantial particular, to exist it must inhere in some subject. This subject will be constituted by two 
things each of which is a subject for the nonsubstance quantity one. Each singular thing, where this is 
thought of as a composite of the particular subject and the instance of unity, is a partial ontocause of the 
pair, where this is thought of as a composite of the two concrete subjects and the instance of duality. 
Unity, taken universally, will count as an ontocause of duality, taken universally, because no instance of 
duality can exist without having instances of unity as partial ontocauses.  
53   Aristotle probably would not take this to be a real possibility, since whenever a substance 
exists it will have attributes and belong to kinds. And these attributes and kinds will be entities.     
  290 
If we consider the examples above, we can see that there are two very different 
sorts of case in which the existence of one thing implies the existence of another. It 
might be helpful to think about the way in which we normally talk about necessary 
and sufficient conditions. We sometimes think about necessity and sufficiency 
causally. A necessary condition for an event is something that needs to be present if 
the event is to occur. A sufficient condition for an event is a condition, the obtaining 
of which guarantees the occurrence of the event. On this way of thinking, while it 
seems normal to claim that the presence of oxygen is a necessary condition for the 
lighting of a match, it seems odd to claim that the lighting of a match is sufficient for 
the presence of oxygen. 
On the other hand, we sometimes think about necessary and sufficient 
conditions in purely logical terms, as consisting solely in the truth of a certain 
conditional claim. In the latter case, the claim that x is a necessary condition for y is 
logically equivalent to the claim that y is sufficient for x. Nevertheless we can 
distinguish x’s being sufficient for y because x causes y, from x’s being sufficient for y 
because y is a necessary precondition for the existence of x. A similar observation 
applies to the relation between one thing’s implying the existence of another and one 
thing’s being an ontocause of another.
54    
If one thing ontocauses another in all possible situations where the first exists, 
then the existence of the cause implies the existence of the effect. These will be cases 
in which the existence of the ontocause is wholly sufficient for the existence of the 
effect.
55 However, there are also cases in which the existence of an effect implies the 
                                                 
54   Implication of existence is here thought of purely logically, as consisting wholly in the truth of 
a necessitated conditional.   
55   In cases where the cause is completely sufficient for the effect, the cause will generally be a 
total cause. In cases where the cause can exist without the effect, it will generally be a partial cause or 
one of many overdetermining causes, e.g. consider the failure of the existence of one to imply the 
existence of two.   
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existence of a cause. These will be cases in which there is only one possible cause of a 
given effect. In cases where there is only one possible cause for an effect, and that 
cause is wholly sufficient for that effect, the cause will be simultaneous in implication 
with, but ontocausally prior to, the effect. 
  We can also have a case in which one thing is a completely sufficient 
ontocause of another, but in which it is possible for the second thing to be ontocaused 
by something else. In such a case, the effect will be prior in implication to the effect. 
This seems to be exactly the sort of case that is at issue when we consider a species 
and its superordinate genus. Genera exist by the existence of their species. Consider 
any individual animal, say Sylvester the cat. Sylvester is an animal by being a cat. On 
the other hand, it seems incorrect to say that Sylvester is a cat by being an animal. 
Sylvester’s felinity is an ontocause of his animality, since his animality seems to be 
constituted by his felinity. Furthermore, the species cat is a wholly sufficient 
ontocause of animal, in that animal will be caused to exist in any situation in which 
cat exists. Nevertheless, animal can exist in situations in which cat does not exist, 
since there are other possible entities that could serve as ontocauses of animal. In the 
actual world, animal seems to be ontocausally overdetermined by a wide range of 
species.
56 Nevertheless, each of the existing species of animal, including cat, does 
                                                 
56   Each existing species of animal seems to be a wholly sufficient cause for the existence of 
animal. While in some cases we might worry that the existence of overdetermination undermines a 
putative cause’s claim to being a cause, the worry seems misplaced in this case. My intuitions about the 
following case are somewhat controversial, and I cannot mount any kind of defense of my view here, 
but I will lay out a case that strikes me as similar to the genus-species case.  
Imagine that there are four one-ton boulders sitting on a scale, and that the scale’s registering 
any weight equal to or greater than one ton causes an alarm to sound. In this world, it seems that the 
actual cause of the alarm’s sounding is the presence of the four boulders on the scale. The four 
boulders’ being on the scale seems to be partially constituted by each individual boulder’s being on the 
scale. The presence of each boulder, therefore, seems (to me anyway) to count as a partial cause of the 
alarm’s sounding, despite the fact that the presence of each boulder is causally sufficient for the 
sounding of the alarm. 
This might be a better example. Imagine a cat that is composed out of number of atoms. It 
seems that any very large and continuous subset of the actual atoms in the same configuration that they 
are in right now could constitute the very same cat. There will be many overlapping, but non-identical 
arrangements of atoms each of which seems to be sufficient for the existence of the very same cat. This  
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seem to be an actual ontocause of the existence of animal, since animal seems to be 
constituted by each of the species.
57 While the presence of any one of these species is 
counterfactually sufficient for the existence of animal, in the actual world animal is 
constituted by a number of distinct species. Animal, however, does not seem to be an 
ontocause of cat or any other species. Cat is, therefore, ontocausally prior to animal.  
On Aristotle’s view, animal is prior in implication (and, therefore, in nature) to 
cat, while cat is ontocausally prior to animal. Which of these sorts of priority should 
we count as ontological priority? In other words, in virtue of which sort of priority 
does it seem more fitting to hold that one thing is a more fundamental being than 
another? Once we understand that animal is prior in implication to cat only because 
cat can’t exist without thereby making it the case that animal exists, it seems strange 
to hold that animal is ontologically prior to cat or that animal is a more fundamental 
being than cat. Rather, it seems that because the being of cat is a cause for the being of 
animal, cat should be taken to be a more fundamental being than animal.
58 And, if I 
am right to see Aristotle’s claims in Categories 5 that the species is more a substance 
than the genus as a claim that the species is prior in substance or prior in being to the 
                                                                                                                                           
leads to a problem if we say that each of them does compose the cat, since one cat can’t both have and 
lack an atom. My intuition in this case is that the cat is somehow maximal. Let X be a collection of 
atoms arranged in a certain way, and let y and z be individual atoms. Say that atoms X+y in their actual 
arrangement would have sufficed for the cat and they would all have been parts of the cat. And atoms 
X+z in their actual arrangement would have sufficed for the cat and all have been parts of the cat. I have 
the intuition (but it’s only an intuition) in this case that the actual constituents of the cat include X, y 
and z. Similarly even though any single species would suffice for the existence of the genus, I have an 
intuition that the actual cause of the genus at any time includes all the subordinate species at that time.   
57   As things stand in the actual world, animal seems to be partially constituted by each of the 
species. However, each of these species would be sufficient to constitute animal on its own.   
58   In cases where x is prior in implication to y because y cannot be caused by anything other than 
x, and x is not a wholly sufficient cause of y, I think that ontological priority and priority in implication 
will match up. Socrates and the NSP pallor in Socrates will meet these conditions. However, even in 
this sort case, it does not seem to be the asymmetrical implication of existence that makes x prior to y. 
Rather, it seems that x is prior to y because y’s existence is ontocaused by x’s existence. Asymmetrical 
implication of existence seems to allow too many irrelevant cases to count as cases of priority. If the 
number four is a necessary existence, then it is prior in implication of existence to me. I am not sure that 
we would want to hold that it is a more fundamental being than I am on this account, however. I am not 
sure that numbers and material substances stand in an ontological priority relations to each other.    
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genus, then Aristotle does take the species to be a more ontologically fundamental 
than the genus. 
Similar reasoning holds in the case of primary substances and their species. A 
species exists because the primary substances exist. The species is constituted by the 
individuals in a way similar to the way in which genera are constituted by their 
species. Furthermore, the existence of each individual cat is sufficient for the existence 
of the species. The individual cat, Sylvester, is an ontocause of cat, while cat is not an 
ontocause of Sylvester. Sylvester is, therefore, ontocausally prior to cat. Nevertheless, 
cat is prior in implication and prior by nature to Sylvester as these types of priority are 
defined in Categories 12. Once again it seems that Aristotle’s claims about priority in 
substance in Categories 5 reveal that ontocausal priority is a better measure of priority 
in substance or priority in being than is priority in implication of existence.  
While Aristotle never explicitly defines ontocausal priority in his discussion of 
priority in Categories 12-13, it is a short step from Aristotle’s claims about one thing’s 
being a cause of being for another to a definition of ontocausal priority. Furthermore, 
while priority in implication and priority in nature conflict with Aristotle’s claims 
about what sorts of beings are fundamental, the notion of ontocausal priority gives us 
an understanding of priority, which validates Aristotle’s claim that individual 
substances are primary beings.  
We might wonder, therefore, why Aristotle fails to recognize a form of priority 
that seems to suit his purposes so well. I am intrigued by an answer to this problem 
suggested by John Cleary in his book, Aristotle on the Many Senses of Priority. Cleary 
postulates that Aristotle’s claims about priority in Categories 12 were made relatively 
early in his career, while he was still largely sympathetic to a Platonic picture of 
ontology. His claims in Categories 5, on the other hand, represent the views of a more  
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philosophically mature Aristotle who is beginning to develop ideas about substance 
that conflict with those of his teacher.
59  
While I am wary about trying to attribute relative dates to various chapters in 
the Categories, I do think that it is interesting to note that priority in implication seems 
to agree with a Platonic view on which Forms are ontologically prior to individuals.
60 
Furthermore, I think that on a Platonic view, priority in implication and ontocausal 
priority do not conflict in the way that they conflict on Aristotle’s view. Forms, for 
Plato, are more ontologically fundamental than particulars. A Form will be prior in 
implication to any of the particular that participate in it. It is impossible for a particular 
to exist in the absence of the Form in which it participates, while the Form could have 
existed without the particular. Furthermore, on the Platonic view, a Form is also 
ontocausally prior to each of its participants. At the very least, this is how Aristotle 
reads Plato’s comments in the Phaedo. At 991b3-4, Aristotle writes, “It is said in the 
Phaedo the Forms are causes both of being and of coming to be.”
61 Furthermore, on a 
certain way of looking at Plato’s  talk about particulars as images or reflections in the 
Republic, we can see Forms as causes of particulars in something like the way in 
                                                 
59   See Cleary (1988), for a more detailed defense of these claims. 
60   I am calling “Platonic” the view that a Form can exist without particular instances, while the 
instances cannot exist without the Form. For some doubts that Plato consistently held such a view see 
Fine (1984). For a discussion about what Aristotle means in attributing to Plato the view that Forms are 
separable or separate (choristos) from particulars see Fine (1984), Morrison (1985a), Morrison (1985b), 
Morrison (1985c), and Fine (1985). In claiming that Plato takes Forms to be ontologically prior to 
individuals, I mean not only that Plato takes Forms to be prior in implication of existence to individuals, 
but also that he thinks that Forms are ontocausally prior to individuals. I think that the two sorts of 
priority come together in Plato in a way that they do not come together for Aristotle. 
61   See also Generation and Corruption 335b10-b16, where Aristotle tells us that things are said 
to be in accordance with Forms, are said to come to be by participating in Forms, and are said to perish 
by losing Forms. Forms, therefore, must be said to be causes of the coming to be of their participants. 
Aristotle criticizes Plato’s view that Forms count as causes for particulars in this way. He claims that a 
Form sometimes exists with a particular, and sometimes exists without that particular. There must be 
something that differs between these two situations, but the Form is the same in both. So the Form 
cannot be the total cause of being of a particular. I will consider this argument briefly in the next 
chapter. For further discussion of these passages, and of Aristotle’s criticisms of Plato, see Annas 
(1982), Fine (1987).   
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which an object is a cause of its reflection.
62 We can think of an object as a cause of 
being for a reflection because the existence of a reflection just is something’s bearing 
the reflecting relation to the object that is reflected. In a similar way, we might think 
that a Form is a cause of being for each of its instances, in that the existence of a 
participant just is there being something that bears the participation relation to a 
Form.
63 On the other hand, the participant is not a cause of being for the Form. The 
existence of the participant, therefore, implies the existence of the Form, not because 
the participant causes the Form to exist, but because nothing other than that Form 
could have caused the participant to exist. Priority in implication, ontocausal priority, 
and ontological fundamentality all go together on Plato’s view. If Aristotle was an 
adherent of broadly Platonic ontological views at the time of his writing Categories 
12-13, it would be unsurprising that he did not distinguish ontocausal priority from 
priority in implication.  
It would also be unsurprising that Aristotle’s discussion of priority in 
Categories 12 and 13 does not fit his own views about the ontological priority of 
primary substances expressed in Categories 5. At some point Aristotle reversed the 
causal and ontological order between universal and particular. On Aristotle’s view, 
                                                 
62   For some passages where Plato talks about the relation between particulars and Forms as 
similar to the relation between reflections , likenesses or images and the things of which they are the 
reflections, likenesses or images, see Republic 509-510, 532b-d, 596a, 596d-e, 597a-b, 598b, 603a-b. 
Timaeus 28-29. Parmenides 132-133 (where Plato seems to be criticizing the likeness analogy). Sophist 
266ff. 
63   It is important to say something about what counts as a participant in a Form on the view that I 
have in mind here. In the Phaedo (102d-e), Plato distinguishes Tallness itself from the tallness in 
Simmias. The former is properly thought of as a Form, while the latter is sometimes called an immanent 
character. Immanent characters are particulars and numerically distinct immanent characters of tallness 
are present in different individuals. We can distinguish the Form of Tallness, the immanent character of 
tallness in Simmias, and Simmias. On the view of Plato that I am considering here, the participation 
relation properly speaking should be taken to hold between Form and the immanent character, rather 
than between the Form and Simmias. Simmias is a participant in Form only by courtesy, in virtue of 
having an immanent character that is a proper participant in the Form. Just as Plato accepts the Tall, the 
tallness in Simmias and Simmias, Aristotle accepts the universal tallness, the NSP tallness in Simmias 
and Simmias. I take Plato and Aristotle to differ mainly in that Plato takes the Tall itself to be an 
ontocause for the tallness in Simmias, while Aristotle reverses this and holds that the tallness in 
Simmias is an ontocause of the universal tallness.   
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particulars imply the existence of universals by being causes of those universals. 
Aristotle’s reversal of the causal order thus results in a tension between priority in 
implication and ontocausal priority, which Aristotle does not seem to recognize in 
Categories 12-13.
64  
In the next chapter, I examine a crucial difference between the ontological 
views of Aristotle and those of Plato. I turn to a discussion between Gail Fine, and 
Gareth Matthews and S. Marc Cohen about the sorts of things that Plato and Aristotle 
take to be  “relational entities”. I characterize a notion of “relational entity” which can 
be used to define ontological priority, and which I think can help capture Aristotle’s 
conception of one thing’s being a cause of being for another. In any ontology, the 
entities that are non-relational will be the fundamental entities. Forms are non-
relational entities on Plato’s view, while particulars are relational—it is of the essence 
of a particular be an image or reflection of a Form.
65 On the other hand, Aristotle takes 
particulars to be prior to universals. Particular substances are non-relational entities, 
while universals are relational—it is of the essence of a universal to be said-of 
particulars. We will see that a thing’s being a relational entity is closely tied to its 
needing something else to serve as a cause of being for it.    
                                                 
64   Aristotle doesn’t seem to recognize the conflict in Metaphysics Δ.11 either. He defines priority 
in nature and substance in terms of asymmetrical implication of existence. He then states that, since 
there are many ways of being, the subject and substance is prior. However, as we have seen the 
implication of existence is precisely backwards in the case of primary substances and their species and 
genera.   
65   Once again, I am thinking of the relation between Forms and immanent characters here, not the 
relations between Forms and things that have a relation to the Form only accidentally. Simmias might 
become short in relation to Phaedo, and the immanent character of tallness that Simmias had in relation 
to Phaedo might cease to exist. However, the tallness in Simmias in no way admits of being short. The 
immanent character of tallness in Simmias is essentially related in some way to the Tall itself. See 
Phaedo 102d ff.  Plato does not tell us what the nature of the relation between the Forms and particulars 
is supposed to be in the Phaedo. In the Republic, Plato compares the relation to reflection or being an 
image, see 509-510, 532b-d, 596a, 596d-e, 597a-b, 598b, 603a-b. In other places, Plato uses the 
language of participation or sharing in (‘metechein’). For example, see e.g. Phaedo 100c5, 101c5, 
Parmenides 129a ff, 131a ff.     297 
CHAPTER 10 
 
RELATIONAL ENTITIES AND PRIMARY SUBSTANCES 
Section 10.1: Introduction 
  In their paper “The One and the Many”, Gareth Matthews and S. Marc Cohen 
offer, on Aristotle’s behalf, an argument against some key features of Plato’s 
ontology. In “Relational Entities”, Gail Fine raises some objections to the argument 
offered by Matthews and Cohen. Fine’s paper has two main points. First, she argues 
that Aristotle is as susceptible as Plato to the argument on offer. Second, she does not 
think that the argument poses a threat to either view. With respect to Fine’s first point, 
I think that we can point to a crucial difference between the views of Aristotle and 
Plato (or at least between Aristotle’s views and those that he attributes to Plato)
1, and 
that once we understand this difference we will see that Plato but not Aristotle is 
subject to the dilemma contained in Matthews and Cohen’s argument. With respect to 
Fine’s second point, I am not sure that Aristotle’s argument need particularly vex 
Plato. In the course of this discussion, I will also offer a suggestion about the 
difference between what have been termed “relational” and “nonrelational” versions 
of realism about universals. As I will draw the distinction, Plato has a relational view 
and Aristotle has a view on which some properties of particulars are not accounted for 
relationally.
2 Once again, however, it is unclear that Aristotle has any compelling 
                                                 
1   The view that I attribute to Plato is a fairly common one, and has been attributed to Plato by 
many commentators going back to Aristotle. On this view, Plato thinks that Forms are separate and 
eternal entities, which are not ontologically dependent on particulars, and upon which the particulars are 
ontologically dependent. Furthermore, particulars have the natures that they do by participating in, 
imitating, or being reflections of Forms. I do not defend this interpretation of Plato in the present work. 
For criticism of the standard view of Plato, see Gail Fine’s On Ideas, and Plato on Knowledge and 
Forms, especially Chapters 11-15.  
2   For use of ‘relational realism’ and ‘nonrelational realism’ see Gail Fine’s “Armstrong on 
Relational and Nonrelational Realism” (1981). At issue in this article is David Armstrong’s claim in 
Universals and Scientific Realism that particulars do not count as possessing properties by bearing a 
relation to universals. The position that I attribute to Aristotle is related to, but not identical to, the view 
that goes by the name ‘nonrelational realism’ in Fine’s (1981) discussion of Armstrong.    298 
arguments that we should accept his theory over Plato’s. In any case, I hope to get a 
bit clearer about what the choice between Aristotle’s and Plato’s theories of ontology 
involves. 
  In section 10.2, I outline and discuss Matthews and Cohen’s presentation of 
Aristotle’s argument against Plato, and sketch the way in which they take Aristotle to 
escape the dilemma with which he confronts Plato. In section 10.3, I discuss Fine’s 
response to this argument. I suggest that, on her understanding of what being a 
“relational entity” consists in, her response to Matthews and Cohen is completely 
appropriate. However, I think that an alternative conception of what it is to be a 
relational entity is available, on which Aristotle has a genuine disagreement with 
Plato. In section 10.4, I offer this alternative account of relational entities, and argue 
that Plato is subject to the dilemma offered by Aristotle. In section 10.5, I attempt to 
explain how Aristotle might avoid the dilemma thus construed. I conclude the chapter 
with a consideration of the similarities and differences between the ontological 
theories offered by Plato and Aristotle. 
Section 10.2: Matthews and Cohen’s Dilemma For Plato 
  Matthews and Cohen begin by attributing a certain theory of predication to 
Plato. Take the sentences, ‘Socrates is wise,’ and ‘Pericles is wise.’ ‘Socrates’ and 
‘Pericles’ refer, respectively, to Socrates and Pericles. ‘Wise’ also refers to something. 
Furthermore, the referent of ‘wise’ in each of our sentences has to be some one thing, 
such that it is in virtue of each man’s bearing a relation to it that Socrates and Pericles 
are each properly said to be wise. According to Plato, the referent of ‘wise’ in both 
sentences is the Form of Wisdom, and our sentences are true if and only if Socrates or 
Pericles participates in the Form of Wisdom.
3 We thus can give an ontological analysis 
                                                 
3   I think that this story is a bit of an oversimplification. In the Phaedo, Plato distinguishes 
between tallness itself (αὐτὸ τὸ μέγεθος) and the tallness in us (τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν μέγεθος). The former is 
the Form Tallness, and the latter seems to be a particular instance of tallness, an immanent character,   299 
of the truthmaker of the sentence ‘Socrates is wise,’ in terms of the entities Socrates 
and Wisdom, and the relation of participation. Furthermore, it seems that Plato will tell 
the same story about all cases in which something is predicated of an individual.
4 We 
can summarize the above in terms of the following principle: 
(P)   Whenever F can be properly predicated of an individual, x, it is 
because x bears a relation of participation to the Form of F-
ness.
5  
(P) is a specific version of a more general principle, which seems sufficient to generate 
the Aristotelian dilemma that we will examine in a moment.   
(P-)   Whenever F can be properly predicated of an individual, x, it is 
because x bears a relation to some entity other than x.  
To put things in a broader context, (P-) is the claim that all predication is 
susceptible to relational analysis. Furthermore, if we specify that the ‘entity other than 
x’ on the right-hand side of (P-) must be a universal, we have characterized a view that 
                                                                                                                                           
which can come into and go out of existence. See Gail Fine’s, “Immanence” (1986) for a discussion of 
immanent characters, and further references to the immanent character literature. Plato distinguishes 
Simmias from the tallness that he happens to possess, and claims that Simmias is tall, not because he is 
Simmias but because of the tallness that he possesses. Insofar as we want to claim that something 
participates in the Form Tallness, we should claim that the immanent character of tallness, rather than 
Simmias, participates in the Form. When I claim that a person participates in a Form, the claim will 
often be elliptical for the claim that the person possesses an immanent character which participates in 
the Form. 
In a similar way, Aristotle will hold that the universal tallness is said-of the nonsubstantial 
particular tallness inherent in Simmias, rather than being said-of Simmias. It is also interesting to note 
that Plato claims that immanent characters are ‘in’ things, and I think that Aristotle’s inherence talk is 
nonaccidentally related to the view that Plato expresses here.  
4   See Matthews and Cohen, “The One and the Many” (1968) p630-631. 
5   My (P) is different than the principle of the same name in Matthews and Cohen (1968) and 
Fine (1983). There is a slight danger that (P) will lead to use-mention confusion. ‘Predication’ in (P) 
refers to a linguistic relation between a predicate expression and an object, and a predicate can be 
properly predicated of a thing if and only if the sentence by which we predicate the predicate of the 
thing is true. (P) is shorthand for the following more clunky principle (P*).  
(P*)  Whenever a sentence, 
α is
 ϑ
 is true, it is true because the entity referred to by 
α
 
participates in the Form referred to by 
ϑ
.   
ϑ
 and 
α
 are schematic letters for which we will substitute the names of a linguistic predicate and an 
individual respectively. (P*) is still somewhat problematic. First of all, we have to take in to account the 
reservation expressed in note 3 above—strictly speaking immanent characters, and not the referents of 
our ordinary proper names, will participate in Forms. Second, (P*) runs the risk of making us attribute a 
Form to every general expression, while Plato probably does not want to do so. I will ignore these 
complications for the time being.     300 
has been called “relational realism about universals”.
6 Matthews and Cohen’s 
argument against Plato can easily be reformulated as an argument against relational 
realism about universals. Matthews and Cohen hold that Aristotle is able to avoid the 
dilemma that he takes to threaten Plato by denying (P-).   
We are not yet in a position to construct Aristotle’s dilemma. In addition, we 
require the following principle: 
(R)   For x to be able to bear any relation R to something else y, x 
must be something in its own right, independently of its bearing 
R to y.
7 
We can now give the argument that Matthews and Cohen offer on Aristotle’s 
behalf.
8 
Matthews & Cohen’s Argument (MCA): 
(1) Assume that Sylvester is properly called a cat. In other words, ‘Cat’ 
is properly predicated of Sylvester.  
∴(2) ‘Cat’ is properly predicated of Sylvester, because Sylvester bears 
the participation relation to the Form of Cathood. [(P), (1)] 
∴(2a) Sylvester bears the participation relation to the Form of 
Cathood.  
(3) The Form of Cathood is something “over against” Sylvester.
9   
∴(3a) The Form of Cathood is something other than Sylvester. [(3)]  
∴(4) Sylvester must be something in his own right, independently of 
bearing a relation to Cathood. [(R), (2a), (3a)] 
(5) It is not the case that Sylvester is anything apart from the Form of 
Cathood.
10   
                                                 
6    See Gail Fine (1981), which is a discussion of Armstrong’s (1978) claim that strictly 
speaking, there is no relation involved in a thing’s instantiating a universal. Armstrong weakens this 
claim somewhat in Armstrong (1989) claiming that there is a “fundamental nexus” which ties together 
universals and particulars. Armstrong (1997) seems to allow that instantiation counts as a fundamental 
relation. For further discussion of some of these issues, see chapter 1.  
7   Matthews and Cohen (1968), p. 633.  
8   Matthews and Cohen (1968) pp. 632-633. For a similar reconstruction of Matthews and 
Cohen’s argument, see also Fine “Relational Entities” pp. 329-331 in Plato on Knowledge and Forms. 
9   Matthews and Cohen (1968) p. 633. I am assuming that this claim represents Plato’s view that 
the Forms are not only non-identical to, but independent of, each of the particulars. The former claim is 
all that we need for (MCA).    301 
∴(5a) It is not the case that Sylvester is anything in his own right, 
independently of bearing the participation relation to Cathood.  
[contradiction between (4) & (5)] 
Given a commitment to (P), Plato can avoid contradiction only by denying either 
(3)/(3a), (4), or (5)/(5a). Matthews and Cohen take Plato to be committed to (3)/(3a), 
and I will assume that it is reasonable to do so. According to Matthews and Cohen, 
once we see that this argument generalizes to every attribute that we might attribute to 
Sylvester, we can see that the denial of the analogue of  (5)/(5a) in every case leads us 
to the position that Sylvester is a bare particular.  
To get the generalized argument to work, however, we require a principle 
stronger than (R): 
(R*) If x bears relations R1,…,Rn to other entities y1,…,yn, and these are all the 
relations that x bears to other entities, then x must be something in its own 
right, independently of bearing R1…Rn to y1…yn.
11 
(R*) guarantees that x is something taken apart from all of its relations to other 
entities, and not just that for each of the relations that it stands in x is something apart 
from that relation.
12 I will assume that Matthews and Cohen intend the generalization 
of (R) to (R*), and hold that Aristotle relies on something like (R*) as well. So, Plato 
can deny (5)/(5a) only if he is willing to hold that Sylvester is something 
independently of all the relations that he bears to other objects. However, any 
predicate applies to Sylvester only because he stands in a relation to the Form 
signified by the predicate. So, Sylvester, in his own right, will not be a thing to which 
                                                                                                                                           
10   Matthews and Cohen (1968),  p. 633. 
11   Throughout this chapter, I give different interpretations of (R), and talk about arguments 
involving different formulations of (R). In each of these arguments, the general conclusion will require 
a generalized form of (R) akin to (R*). However, I will not state all the different formulations of (R*).   
12   What does it mean to say that Sylvester is something independently of his bearing R1…Rn to 
y1…yn? Presumably, we mean not only that we can say that Sylvester is an individual, but that there is 
some way that Sylvester is independently of these relations. If we accept that Sylvester can be said to 
exist without reference to any of the relations that he bears to other things, but that there is no way that 
Sylvester is without reference to these relations, then Sylvester will be a bare particular. Whether it is 
even coherent to hold that there can be a totally bare particular is a difficult question. For some 
discussion, see Armstrong (1978) and Armstrong (1989).   302 
any predicate applies. So whatever Sylvester is in his own right must be a bare 
particular. In fact, things might be even worse for Plato. If Sylvester counts as one 
thing only by bearing a relation to the Form of the One, then Sylvester in his own right 
might not even count as a single entity.  
  Plato could attempt to avoid contradiction by denying (4). However given (2a) 
and (3a), Plato can deny (4) only by denying (R). As a general principle, Matthews 
and Cohen admit that (R) is suspect. There are entities—e.g. shadows, reflections and 
thresholds—that are not anything independently of the relations that they bear to other 
things. For example, “Schubert’s shadow’s being what it is, in fact its very existence, 
is essentially tied to its bearing the relation it bears to Schubert.”
13 Matthews and 
Cohen call entities like Schubert’s shadow “relational entities”. Plato faces the 
following dilemma about Sylvester: either he must maintain that Sylvester is a 
relational entity or he must hold that Sylvester is a bare particular. 
Given a commitment to (P), Plato’s best hope for escaping the contradiction in 
(MCA) would be to claim that Sylvester is a relational entity. For Aristotle to have a 
successful argument against Plato, therefore, he would have to do two things. First, he 
would have to show that his own theory is able to avoid the claim that Sylvester is a 
relational entity. Second, he would have to show that taking Sylvester to be a 
relational entity involves some kind of mistake. Matthews and Cohen claim that 
Aristotle can accomplish both these tasks.  
According to Matthews and Cohen, Aristotle’s own theory is supposed to jump 
through the horns of this dilemma that the (MCA) poses for Plato’s theory. Aristotle is 
able to claim that Sylvester is neither a relational entity nor a bare particular. 
Furthermore, he is able to avoid being led to the contradiction in MCA by denying (2). 
Aristotle is able to deny (2), because he denies both (P) and the more general (P-). To 
                                                 
13   Matthews and Cohen,  p. 633.   303 
deny (P-) is to hold that in some cases F can be properly predicated of x, and this is not 
because x bears a relation to anything other than x. In other words, Aristotle denies 
that a relational analysis of predication is possible in all cases. 
More specifically, according to Matthews and Cohen, Aristotle does not think 
that a relational analysis is possible when we are talking about predicating the genus, 
species and differentia of an entity. While “Sylvester is grey,” might admit of 
relational analysis,  “Sylvester is (a) cat” does not admit of relational analysis. Rather, 
when we say that Sylvester is a cat, we are classifying Sylvester, and such 
classification is to be accounted for in a different way than is predicating a quality of 
Sylvester. In other words, we need to distinguish the nature of the truthmaker involved 
when we say truly, ‘Sylvester is a cat,’ from the nature of the truthmaker involved 
when we say truly that ‘Sylvester is black.’ According to Matthews and Cohen, the 
truthmaker for ‘Sylvester is black,’ involves a relation between Sylvester and 
something else, but the truthmaker for ‘Sylvester is a cat,’ does not involve any such 
relation. They write: 
In place of Plato’s relational account Aristotle’s doctrine of primary 
and secondary substance offers a nonrelational way of understanding 
what it is for Sylvester to be a cat. Every individual is an individual so-
and-so. For Sylvester to be an individual is already for him to be a cat.
14 
This nonrelational understanding of what it is for Sylvester to be a cat is supposed to 
allow Aristotle to escape the dilemma that he poses for Plato. That is, Sylvester will be 
neither a bare particular nor a relational entity. We now turn to the question of whether 
Aristotle successfully escapes his own dilemma, and examine Fine’s criticisms of 
Matthews and Cohen’s argument.  
                                                 
14   Matthews and Cohen, p. 635.    304 
Section 10.3: Fine’s Critique of Matthews and Cohen 
Fine’s critique of Matthews and Cohen’s argument is two-fold. First, she 
claims that Aristotle’s account of property possession by individuals is fully as 
relational as Plato’s. On Fine’s view, (MCA) commits Plato to holding that entities 
like Sylvester are relational entities only if it commits Aristotle to the same view. 
Second, Fine holds that there is no problem with the claim that Sylvester is a relational 
entity. I will develop each of these objections in turn. 
First, it is unclear exactly why Aristotle’s account is supposed to be 
nonrelational according to Matthews and Cohen. Aristotle does distinguish the 
truthmakers involved in predicating an accident of a thing from those involved in 
predicating the genus, species and differentiae of a thing. ‘Sylvester is black,’ is true 
because an instance of blackness inheres in Sylvester, and this clearly involves a 
relation between Sylvester and the nonsubstantial particular inherent in him. However, 
it seems that Sylvester’s bearing a relation to something is also involved in the 
truthmaker for ‘Sylvester is a cat.’ After all, the latter sentence seems to be true 
because the species, cat, is said-of Sylvester. It is true that Aristotle thinks that the 
said-of relation is not the same relation as inherence, but isn’t the said-of relation still 
a relation? Aristotle takes the said-of relation to be a relation that holds between a 
species and members of that species, and between genera and their subordinate 
species. Furthermore, Aristotle does not take the species cat to be identical to 
Sylvester. We would seem then to be able to construct the following argument against 
Aristotle.
15 
                                                 
15   I think that this argument captures Fine’s claim that on a crude version of relational analysis, 
both Aristotle and Plato have relational analyses. The crude version of relational analysis holds that a 
state of affairs is susceptible to relational analysis if and only if the state of affairs is polyadic. Provided 
Aristotle holds that Sylvester’s being a cat is a polyadic state of affairs composed of Sylvester and Cat, 
he seems committed to a relational analysis on the crude version of relational analysis. See Fine (1983), 
p. 328-331.   305 
Parity of Reasoning Argument Against Aristotle (PRA): 
(1) “Sylvester is a cat” is true.  
∴(1a) Sylvester bears the converse of the said-of relation to cat. (from (1))  
(2) Cat is not identical to Sylvester. 
(3) For x to be able to bear any relation R to something else y, x must be 
something in its own right, independently of its bearing R to y. [(R)] 
∴(4) Sylvester is something in his own right, independently of the fact that the 
species cat is said of him. [(1a), (3)] 
(5) But, Sylvester is not something in his own right independently of the fact 
that the species cat is said-of him. [(4) contradicts (5)]  
How is Aristotle supposed to avoid being led to a contradiction? Matthews and 
Cohen tell us that Aristotle’s analysis of Sylvester’s being a cat is nonrelational. 
Presumably, the nonrelationality of Aristotle’s account is supposed to block the 
inference from (1) to (1a). We start out with the fact that Sylvester is properly called a 
cat. Say that the truthmaker for this claim is Sylvester’s being a cat. There are two 
analyses that might be given to Sylvester’s being a cat. Either we analyze the state of 
affairs in terms of something’s inhering in Sylvester, or we analyze the state of affairs 
as something’s being said-of Sylvester. Since we are dealing with the species of 
Sylvester, the proper analysis is in terms of cat’s being said-of Sylvester. This is 
reflected in PRA (1). If Aristotle wants to reject (1a), he seems able to do so only by 
denying that cat’s being said-of Sylvester consists in any sort of relation between 
Sylvester and cat.  Matthews and Cohen endorse such a line of reasoning: 
…[W]here F is either a secondary substance or the differentia of some 
species, what it is for x to be F and for y to be F is not explainable by 
saying that x and y bear some relation to F-ness. Rather it is to be 
explained by reference to the idea of a completely fundamental 
classification. The fundamental character of this classification is 
brought out by saying that, instead of simply ordering individuals that 
have been somehow previously marked off as individuals, this   306 
classification provides the terms in which individuals are said and seen 
to be individuals.”
16  
Aristotle, according to Matthews and Cohen, must hold that Sylvester’s 
bearing a relation to the species cat is not involved in the explanation of the truth of 
“Sylvester is a cat”. There are two ways to take Matthews and Cohen’s suggestion. 
We might deny that Sylvester stands in a relation to cat at all. Or, we might allow that 
Sylvester and cat stand in a relation, but deny that it is virtue of standing in this 
relation that Sylvester is properly called a cat.
17  
How could we deny that Sylvester bears a relation to the species cat, given 
what Aristotle says? Perhaps, to borrow a phrase from Armstrong, Matthews and 
Cohen take the tie between Sylvester and cat to be “closer than a relation”, or to be a 
“nonrelational tie”, or a “nonrelational nexus”.
18 Whatever we call the tie between 
Sylvester and cat, Matthews and Cohen must deny that Aristotle thinks of it as a 
                                                 
16   Matthews and Cohen (1968), p. 636. Matthews and Cohen’s distinction between predicating a 
quality of an individual that has already been marked off, and giving the fundamental classification by 
which an individual is marked off as an individual in the first place resembles Sellar’s discussion in 
“Substance and Form in Aristotle” (1957). Sylvester’s even being an individual that can be a subject for 
properties already involves his being a cat. 
17   In what follows, I endorse the second sort of view.  
18   Armstrong in Universals: An Opinionated Introduction (1989) and especially in A World of 
States of Affairs (1997) allows that there is a relation between universals and particulars, but that this is 
a fundamental relation. Still, even if the relation is fundamental, we need to ask what the natures of its 
relata are supposed to be. Armstrong distinguishes between thin and thick conceptions of a particular, 
the particular taken without its properties and the particular taken together with its properties. 
Nevertheless, although we can conceive of particulars in different ways, we might still want to know 
what it is that is related to the universal. The same sorts of problems seem to come up about the tie 
between universals and particulars whether we call this tie a relation or something else. Considerations 
such as these lead Armstrong, most notably in A World of States of Affairs, to take states of affairs to be 
primitive entities and to take both universals and particulars to be derivative from states of affairs. The 
view that particulars and universals are both abstractions from states of affairs might be the ultimate 
destination of Armstrong’s version of “nonrelational” realism. Armstrong seems to think that we should 
give the same account about all the properties that are possessed by an entity, and that we should accept 
nonrelational realism in all cases of genuine property possession. Aristotle, however, seems to 
distinguish between the cases in which a relational analysis is appropriate and cases where a relational 
analysis is not appropriate. Once we allow a difference in the accounts appropriate to different sorts of 
property possession, we can adopt something like Armstrong’s combinatorial theory of possibility with 
vastly different results. I begin to sketch such a combinatorial account in section 10.4.C. For 
Armstrong’s version of a combinatorial theory of possibility, see Armstrong A Combinatorial Theory of 
Possibility (1989).    307 
relation in the sense referred to in (R).  If we restrict (R) in some appropriate way, we 
cannot infer (4) from the fact that cat is said-of Sylvester. 
    I suppose that this is one way that Aristotle might try to escape the dilemma, 
but it seems somewhat ad hoc to stipulate that the said-of relation is not really a 
relation between a species and a member of the species. It seems similarly problematic 
to stipulate that the said-of relation is a relation, but that it is not the sort of relation to 
which (R) applies.
19 Even if we hold that the said-of relation is a fundamental relation, 
when we keep in mind that (R) is being deployed in the (MCA) against one of Plato’s 
fundamental relations, it is hard to see why (R) cannot be deployed against Aristotle as 
well.  
More importantly, Fine notes that Plato, like Aristotle, distinguishes essential 
from accidental predication. If we are going to say that essential predication for Plato 
is relational, shouldn’t we say exactly the same thing about Aristotle?
20 Conversely, if 
we allow Aristotle to hold that essential predication is nonrelational, shouldn’t we 
extend Plato the same courtesy? So far, then, we have not been able to distinguish 
Aristotle’s view from Plato’s. Anyone who hopes to defend Matthews and Cohen’s 
position must draw a clear line between Plato and Aristotle. I turn to this task in 
sections 10.4 and 10.5.   
                                                 
19   There are two things that might be going on here. We might restate (R) as:  
(R**) If x bears a contingent (non-essential) relation R to something else y, then x 
must be something independently of bearing R to y.  
But, unlike (R), (R**) seems to be trivial. Furthermore, it is now hard to see why we now have any 
objection to Plato, who can easily hold that certain participation relations are essential. On the other 
hand, we might be stipulating that all relations are non-necessary, and that anything that seems to be a 
necessary relation does not actually count as a relation at all. However, it is unclear why we would be 
justified in making such a claim.  
20   This rhetorical question is suggested by Fine’s refined version of the definition of relational 
analyses. According to the refined version, x’s being F is susceptible of relational analysis if and only if 
x’s being F is polyadic, and it is not the case that x is essentially F. If we understand x’s being 
essentially F as x’s being F in every world in which x exists, then on the refined version of relational 
analysis, neither Plato nor Aristotle would think that Sylvester’s being a cat can be given a relational 
analysis. I will suggest a notion of essentiality and relationality later in the chapter on which Plato but 
not Aristotle does think that Sylvester’s being a cat is susceptible of relational analysis.     308 
  I suggest that both Aristotle and Plato accept that Sylvester stands in a relation 
to something in every possible situation in which he exists. Plato thinks that Sylvester 
participates in the Form Cat and Aristotle holds that the universal cat is said-of 
Sylvester. The difference between Plato and Aristotle is over whether or not 
Sylvester’s standing in the relation in question explains or accounts for his being a cat. 
I will argue that Plato thinks that Sylvester’s participation in the Form of Felinity 
explains his being a cat, while Aristotle thinks that cat’s being said-of Sylvester does 
not explain his being a cat. Rather, for Aristotle, Sylvester’s cathood is part of his 
primitive nonrelational nature, and his having this nature plays a role in explaining the 
fact that cat is said-of him.
21 I will turn to these issues in a moment.  First, however, I 
want to examine an additional objection that Fine raises to Matthews and Cohen’s 
interpretation.   
  While Fine thinks that it would be a problem for Plato to hold that Sylvester is 
a bare particular, she claims that there is no threat posed to Plato’s theory by his 
denying (R), and claiming that Sylvester is a relational entity. To better appreciate 
Fine’s point, let’s take another look at what the denial of (R) commits Plato to.  
                                                 
21   As I have noted in earlier chapters, there is some tension between my claim that the said-of 
relation is fundamental and my claim that Sylvester’s being a cat is a fundamental nonrelational fact 
about Sylvester that plays a role in explaining the fact that the species cat is said-of Sylvester. 
Nevertheless, I do not think that this tension is fatal. The said-of relation is a fundamental relation by 
which universals are constituted by particulars. We have the nonrelational fact that Sylvester is a cat. 
The fact that there are species at all, and that one of them, cat, is said-of Sylvester are additional facts 
about the world, and these facts do not reduce to the nonrelational facts about particulars. It might be 
helpful to compare the story that I am attributing to Aristotle with a certain sort of trope ontology 
discussed by Armstrong (1989). I think that Aristotelian particulars have a good deal in common with 
tropes insofar as both are particulars that have a certain nature nonrelationally. On one sort of trope 
theory, we have only tropes and primitive perfect resemblance relations. These relations of resemblance 
are said by Armstrong to be “internal” because the holding of the relation is not supposed to involve 
any ontological commitment beyond the existence of the relata. Once I have these two tropes with these 
particular natures, I already have perfect resemblance.  The work that universals do in the ontology of a 
person who accepts universals is to be done by maximal classes of perfectly resembling tropes. I do not 
think that this is Aristotle’s view. I think that Aristotelian universals represent a real ontological 
commitment beyond the particulars, and I think that the facts about what universals there are cannot be 
reduced to any collection of facts that does not include facts about the holding of the said-of relation. 
Nevertheless, I think that we can talk about the species cat, as the entity that bears the said-of relation to 
all and only the cats, and deny that what it is for each cat to be a cat is for the species to be said-of it.    309 
If we deny a given substitution instance of (R), then we hold that there is an 
entity which bears a relation to another entity, and which is not something 
independently of bearing that relation to the other entity. However, Fine argues that 
we might have reasons independent of Plato’s theory of predication for denying that 
(R) applies to Sylvester. For example, Fine tells us that if we agree with Kripke’s 
views about the essentiality of origins, then we are already committed to the claim that 
Sylvester is a relational entity. Her argument runs as follows: Sylvester bears a 
relation to his parents, and Sylvester does not exist in any world where he fails to bear 
this relation to his parents. Therefore, it is not possible that Sylvester exist 
independently of his bearing this relation to his parents. Therefore, the relevant 
substitution instance of (R) for Sylvester is false, and Sylvester is a relational entity.  
But, Fine argues, claiming that Sylvester is a relational entity in this case 
seems to be harmless. Even if we do not agree with Kripke’s thesis about the 
essentiality of origins the mere fact that Sylvester would be a relational entity on his 
view does not constitute an effective objection to the thesis.
22  
  In her argument, Fine construes independence purely in modal-existential 
terms. One thing’s being something independently of standing in a relation to another 
is equivalent to its being possible for the first to exist without standing in this relation 
to the second. On this interpretation of what it is for a thing to be something in its own 
right, (R) can be more precisely stated as (RF): 
(RF)  If x bears R another entity y, then it is possible for x to exist 
without bearing R to y. 
As we saw above, for a thing to be a relational entity was for (R) to be false of that 
thing. Say that something is a relational entity if and only if (RF) is false of that thing. 
                                                 
22   See Fine (1983), p. 330.   310 
It follows that for a thing to be a relational entity is simply for it to stand in a relation 
to something else in every world in which it exists.
23  
(REF)  x is a relational entity if and only if it is necessary that if x exists 
then x bears a relation to something. 
However, we can distinguish two different claims that we might mean to  make when 
we claim that it is necessary for a thing to stand in a relation to something else. These 
claims correspond to two different ways of placing quantifiers in (REF): 
(REFW) ∀x(x is a weakly relational entity ≡ ∃R  (x exists ⊃ ∃y (Rxy))) 
(REFS)  ∀x(x is a strongly relational entity ≡ ∃R∃y  (x exists ⊃ Rxy))
24    
(REFW) tells us that a relational entity is a thing that must stand in a particular relation 
to some entity or other in every world in which it exists. If something is a relational 
entity according to (REFW), we will say that it is a weakly relational entity. Any 
essentially physical entity might be a weakly relational entity, if it must stand in the 
location relation to some region space-time region or other in every possible situation 
in which it exists. (REFS) tells us that a relational entity is a thing that must bear a 
particular relation to a particular entity in every world in which it exists.  We can call 
these entities strongly relational. On Kripke’s view, I am a strongly relational entity in 
the sense given by (REFS), since I bear the child-of relation to my mother in every 
world in which I exist.  
The notion of relational entity that Fine has in mind is the stronger notion 
defined by (REFS). Furthermore, Fine is surely right to claim that some relations are 
necessary to entities even when these entities are not things like shadow, thresholds or 
                                                 
23   According to Fine, “…a relational entity is an entity that possesses at least one essential 
property relationally,” Fine (1983) p. 327. As I take her claim, it is equivalent to the claim that a 
relational entity is an entity that has at least one relational property essentially, where an entity has a 
property essentially if and only if it has that property in every world in which it exists.  
24   I suppose we could also have:  
(REF*) ∀x(x is a relational entity ≡  (x exists ⊃ ∃R∃y (Rxy))) 
(REF**) ∀x(x is a relational entity ≡ ∃y  ∃R (Rxy)) 
However, these principles will not play a role in the subsequent discussion.    311 
laps. The number six seems to be greater than five in every world in which it exists, 
and the rock in front of me seems to be larger than its left half in every world in which 
it exists. If to deny an instance of (R)—the principle which Matthews and Cohen take 
to do central work in their argument—is simply to deny the corresponding instance of 
(RF), then it is difficult to see how Aristotle differs from Plato, or to see why anyone 
should be worried about denying (R). (RF) just does not seem to be a plausible 
principle. So, a second challenge that faces a defender of (MCA) is to show either that 
denying (RF) in the case of concrete particulars really does lead to some problem, or to 
give an interpretation of (R) on which it says something other than (RF). In the 
following sections, I follow the latter course of action.  
I outline a different sense of independence, on which a thing can be something 
independently of bearing a relation to another thing even if the first bears the relation 
to the second in every possible world in which it exists. Furthermore, I argue that on 
the new sense of independence, Aristotle takes particular concrete individuals to be 
something independently of their relations to universals, while Plato denies that 
individuals are anything independently of their participating in Forms.  
Section 10.4: Toward an Alternative Account of Relational Entities 
This section has three parts. In the first part, 10.4.A, I examine David 
Armstrong’s argument against relational versions of realism about universals, and Gail 
Fine’s criticism of that argument. I agree with Fine that there is a critical flaw in 
Armstrong’s argument, and I attempt to get clear on what Armstrong needs to do to 
have a successful argument against relational versions of realism about universals. 
Examination of Armstrong’s argument and his conception of the nature of an object 
will reveal two importantly different conceptions of the nature of a thing. In addition, 
thinking through Armstrong’s argument will reveal two different conceptions of 
intrinsicness. While I remain agnostic about whether or not Armstrong is correct to   312 
claim that particulars must have their natures independently of relations that they stand 
in to universals, I do think that we can adapt Armstrong’s argument to form an 
argument that every ontology must accept some entity that has a nature independently 
of standing in relations to other things. 
In order to get clearer on the sense of independence invoked in this section, I 
turn to some recent work on non-modal or definitional conceptions of essentiality. In 
section 10.4.B, I outline Kit Fine’s theory of essentiality in terms of real definition. In 
section 10.4.C, I discuss essentiality in combinatorial terms. In each of these 
discussions, I am trying to get at a single underlying conception of essentiality. With 
this conception in place, I return to the discussion of Plato and Aristotle.   
Section 10.4.A: Armstrong’s Argument Against Relational Realism    
One of the problems that Fine has with Matthews and Cohen’s argument has to 
do with the seeming implausibility of (RF). Why should we hold that any entity other 
than a bare particular cannot stand in a relation to another entity as a matter of 
necessity? Fine raises a similar question in her discussion of Armstrong’s objections to 
relational versions of realism about universals in her paper, “Armstrong on Relational 
and Nonrelational Realism”.
25 Because I think it will help illuminate our musings 
about Aristotle, I want to turn to Armstrong’s argument against relational realism, and 
Fine’s critique of that argument for a moment.  
Armstrong claims that transcendent relational realism about universals—the 
view that particulars have their properties by bearing a relation to transcendent 
universals—entails that particulars have no natures of their own. Armstrong’s 
argument runs as follows: 
                                                 
25   Gail Fine “Armstrong on Relational and Nonrelational Realism” (1981).   313 
Armstrong’s Argument Against Relational Realism (AAA) 
(1) Suppose that to possess a property is to bear a relation to a 
transcendent universal. 
(2) For x and y to differ in any way is for x and y to possess different 
properties.  
∴(3) For x and y to differ in any way is for x and y to bear relations to 
different transcendent universals.  
(4) Any difference between x and y that consists in a difference in the 
objects to which x and y bear relations is a relational difference.  
∴(5) All the differences between x and y are relational differences. 
(6) Unless there is a nonrelational difference between x and y, x and y 
have exactly the same nature.  
∴(7) So, x and y have exactly the same nature, and since x and y are 
arbitrarily chosen, all particulars have exactly the same nature.
26  
As Fine points out, there are a number of problems with this argument, the 
most glaring of which is the assertion of (6).
27 No one who accepts a relational account 
of property possession is also likely to accept the account of nature implicit in (6). 
Instead she will claim that for things to differ in nature just is for them to bear 
different relations to universals. Alternatively, someone could accept (6) but point out 
that “relational difference” is ambiguous. The Platonist is as likely as anyone else to 
hold that there is a difference between intrinsic properties like mass, and extrinsic 
properties like being taller than Socrates. The latter properties are often called 
“relational” or extrinsic properties, and we generally think that things that differ in 
their natures have to differ in properties other than these. However, according to the 
Platonist, both intrinsic and extrinsic property possession by a particular is to be 
accounted for in terms of a relation between particulars and universals. So (6) is true if 
                                                 
26   We should understand ‘x’ and ‘y’ as bound by universal quantifiers with widest possible 
scope. I reconstruct this argument from Armstrong (1978) pp. 69ff, cited in Fine (1981), p. 264 ff. See 
also Armstrong’s discussions of bare particulars in Armstrong 1989, and Armstrong 1997.   
27   This is similar to an objection in Fine (1981), p. 265, where she criticizes the restriction of 
natures to nonrelational properties.   314 
by ‘nonrelational difference’ we mean a difference in intrinsic properties, but false if 
we mean a difference that is accounted for without reference to relations to 
transcendent universals.
28 However, on the former construal of ‘relational difference’, 
(4) and (5) are both false.  
If Armstrong is going to push his point against the relational realist, he will 
have to show that there is a conception of nature on which the relational account of 
property possession renders it impossible for particulars to have different natures. To 
put the point differently, Armstrong must show that the relational account of property 
possession somehow runs afoul of our intuitive notion of what it is for an object to 
have an intrinsic nature. What Armstrong needs is an argument to show that an 
account on which all particulars have the natures that they do by bearing relations to 
universals is committed to the claim that all particulars have the same nature.  
I am not sure whether Armstrong can develop such an argument. However, I 
think that it is possible to defend the weaker claim that at least some entities in any 
ontology must have natures that are not relational. In other words, there must be some 
entities, the nature of which is not constituted by the relations that they bear to other 
entities. Insofar as it is possible to make true claims about the natures of these entities, 
we need some account of truthmaking in the case of these claims that does not involve 
relations between distinct entities. Armstrong needs a stronger claim than the one that 
I will defend—he needs a claim that particulars must have nonrelational natures. 
However, on the view that I will defend, particulars might have the natures that they 
do by bearing relations to universals, while universals have their natures 
nonrelationally.  
                                                 
28   Another way of accounting for the ambiguity would be to claim that there is a difference 
between fundamental relations, like instantiation or participation, and ordinary relations, like being 
taller than or being to the left of. I think that the second way of accounting for the ambiguity is 
preferable to the first. Furthermore, I think that Armstrong will need to talk about fundamental relations 
as well.     315 
In the course of defending the weaker claim, we will develop the conceptual 
resources necessary to rescue (MCA) from one of Fine’s objection, viz. the objection 
that Aristotle and Plato are on the same footing with respect to the argument. If Plato 
accepts (P), the claim that everything that we can truly say about a particular is made 
true by the fact that the particular participates in a Form, then particulars will be 
relational entities for Plato. If Aristotle holds that at least some of the true claims that 
we can make about the natures of particulars are not made true by the holding of a 
relation between the particular and another entity, then particulars will be 
nonrelational entities for Aristotle. On the other hand, I do not think that we can 
develop a reply to Fine’s second objection, viz. that Plato needn’t take his ontology to 
be significantly undermined by (MCA). Plato can still accept that there are entities that 
have the natures that they do nonrelationally, provided that he takes these entities to be 
Forms rather than particulars. In the absence of an argument that particulars must 
have nonrelational natures, Plato needn’t be overly worried about (MCA). While I 
hope to establish that Plato and Aristotle have different fundamental ontologies, I will 
not be able to settle the issue with respect to whose ontology is superior in this 
dissertation. I begin my discussion by trying to get clearer on our use of the term 
‘nature’.    
  We can note a certain ambiguity in the use of the term ‘nature’. Armstrong 
claims that the nature of an object is “…the complete conjunction of a particular’s 
properties, itself a property.”
29 As Fine notes, this understanding of nature is 
compatible with the claim that it is part of an object’s nature to bear a relation to a 
universal. In fact, as we have stated it so far, this conception of nature is compatible 
with the claim that an object’s bearing relations to other objects is part of its nature. 
However, we would not normally want to count every relational property of an object 
                                                 
29   Armstrong (1978), Volume II, p.173.    316 
as part of its nature. For example, the fact that I am three feet from a computer screen, 
or in the same room as a glass of water, does not seem to be part of my nature.  
As a first step, we need to distinguish intrinsic properties from extrinsic 
properties. Furthermore, we need to do so in a way that is compatible with various 
accounts of the metaphysics of property possession. For example, as we noted above, 
we need an account of intrinsic property which allows the relational realist to 
distinguish intuitively intrinsic properties from intuitively extrinsic properties.  
  We might follow David Lewis and claim that a thing’s intrinsic properties are 
the ones that it shares with all of its possible duplicates, where duplicates are 
understood to be objects that share all their perfectly natural properties.
30 One problem 
with Lewis’ proposed definition is that we need to help ourselves to a notion of perfect 
naturalness. However, I will ignore this problem in what follows and assume that we 
have some idea of both duplication and naturalness.
31 We should note that Lewis’ 
gloss on intrinsic properties seems to be neutral on the underlying metaphysics of 
property possession. It is consistent with this understanding of intrinsicness that a 
thing possesses all its intrinsic properties by standing in a relation of instantiation to a 
universal.
32 We will call a property “duplicate intrinsic” (d-intrinsic) if it is intrinsic in 
this sense.  
(Duplicate Intrinsic) A property, P, is d-intrinsic if and only if any 
possible duplicate of any possible entity possessing P must possess P.   
We can contrast the understanding of intrinsicness developed above with that 
developed by Lewis and Langton, according to which an intrinsic property will be one 
                                                 
30   See David Lewis “Extrinsic Properties” (1983a), “New Work for a Theory of Universals” 
(1983b). See also Ted Sider “Intrinsic Properties” (1993); See also Brian Weatherson’s entry in the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, “Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties”.  
31   Lewis (1983b) seems content to rest with a very tight circle of definitions. He will define 
intrinsic in terms of duplication, duplication in terms of naturalness, and stipulate that all natural 
properties are intrinsic. See Lewis and Langton (1998) p344-345.   
32   This not Lewis’ view. He takes properties to be sets of possibilia and takes naturalness to be a 
primitive attribute of some of these sets.    317 
that an object can possess independently of whether it is lonely or accompanied.
33 An 
object is lonely if and only if it is the only entity in a world, and accompanied if and 
only if it is one of a plurality of entities in a world. We can define what it is for a 
property to be “independence intrinsic” or i-intrinsic in the following way: 
(Independence Intrinsic) A property, P, is i-intrinsic if and only if the 
possession of P by any possible entity is independent of whether or not 
it is the only entity that exists. 
We should notice that this definition does rule out certain views about the metaphysics 
of intrinsic property possession. For example, it seems to rule out an understanding on 
which a particular has an i-intrinsic property by bearing a relation to a universal. If an 
entity has a given property only by bearing a relation to a universal, then the entity 
cannot have that property in any world in which the universal fails to exist. Therefore, 
nothing can have the property in a world in which it is lonely and the property is not 
an i-intrinsic one.  
If we want to talk about the nature of a thing as the complete conjunction of its 
properties without letting in problematic properties like being 3 feet from a computer 
screen, we should confine ourselves to the thing’s intrinsic properties. If we take the 
intrinsic properties of a thing to be those properties that are i-intrinsic, Armstrong’s 
argument against relational realism goes through very quickly. So, for the moment 
let’s say that the properties that are part of a thing’s nature are the d-intrinsic 
properties.
34 Armstrong allows that some of the properties that belong to a thing’s 
                                                 
33   See David Lewis and Rae Langton “Defining Intrinsic” (1998). This article is an attempt to 
rescue a suggestion by Jaegwon Kim in “Psychophysical Supervenience” (1982) from objections raised 
by Lewis (1983a) and (1983b). Kim originally defined intrinsic properties as those properties that could 
belong to an unaccompanied thing. However, as Lewis (1983a) notes, being unaccompanied seems to 
be a non-intrinsic property.  
34   There is some indication that Armstrong intends us to understand natures to be confined to d-
intrinsic properties. In his comments on thick and thin particulars, for example, Armstrong tells us that 
thick particulars involve nonrelational (d-intrinsic) properties in a way that they do not involve 
relational (d-extrinsic) properties. See Armstrong (1978) and (1989).  
  Armstrong’s argument for this claim is a curious one, given the fact that he seems to include 
contingent properties in the natures of entities. He tells us that particulars are supposed to meet Hume’s   318 
nature are accidental properties. These are properties that the entity does possess but 
which it could fail to possess. The nature of a thing on this understanding of ‘nature’ is 
the its total d-intrinsic character. This gives us the following as a definition of a 
property’s being part of a thing’s “d-intrinsic nature” or dn-nature:   
(NAT1) A property, P, is part of a thing, x’s, dn-nature =df P is an d-
intrinsic property of x. 
In addition to the sense of ‘nature’ given in (NAT1), there is a common use of 
the word ‘nature’ to refer to the essence of a thing. What belongs to a thing’s nature is 
supposed to be a stable and necessary feature of a thing, whereas other features are 
merely accidental to it. On one common way of understanding essentiality in modal 
terms, a property is essential to a thing if and only if the thing has that property in 
every possible situation in which it exists. The properties that belong to a thing’s 
nature are the properties that it possesses in every possible situation in which it exists. 
On this understanding of ‘nature’, we get the following definition of what it is for a 
property to be part of a thing’s “necessity nature” or n-nature:  
(NAT2) A property, P, is part of a thing, x’s, e-nature =df x could not 
exist without possessing P.  
It is clear that these two understandings of ‘nature’ can come apart. A property can be 
part of a thing’s dn-nature, but fail to be part of a thing’s e-nature. There can be 
accidental d-intrinsic properties, and necessary d-extrinsic properties. 
I want to suggest a third understanding of the term ‘nature’, and use it to 
analyze the differences between Aristotle and Plato’s accounts of property possession, 
                                                                                                                                           
criterion for substances—they must be logically capable of independent existence. But in a world where 
a given particular was the only thing that existed, it would not have any of its relational properties. 
Therefore the relational properties are not “part of the being” of a particular in the way that the 
nonrelational properties are. This argument makes it seem as though necessary possession of a property 
is a necessary condition for a property’s being part of a thing’s nature. But, in that case, no accidental 
property at all should be part of a thing’s nature, including accidental d-intrinsic properties. See Fine 
(1981) p265 for a similar objection, and further discussion. Furthermore, if Armstrong is using 
“relational property” in a way that includes all properties that are not i-intrinsic, his argument will be 
valid, but his premise will be something that no relational realist will accept.    319 
and between relational and nonrelational theories of property possession in general. 
The problem with taking a thing’s dn-nature to be its nature is that too many 
accidental properties then count as part of a thing’s nature. Understanding a thing’s 
nature as its e-nature, however, is also problematic. There are all sorts of predicates 
that characterize a thing in every possible world, but which do not intuitively seem to 
be part of the nature of that thing. For example, ‘Sylvester is a thing existing in a 
world where 2+2=4,’ is true in every possible world in which Sylvester exists. 
However, we do not think that this sentence reveals anything about the nature of 
Sylvester.  
The third conception of nature that I want to develop has something in 
common with each of the first two, but does a better job of capturing what we 
ordinarily mean in talking about the nature of a thing. The properties that belong to the 
nature of a thing are the properties that are necessary to it, and which it has because of 
what it is. These seem to be the properties that are both intrinsic to a thing, and 
necessary to that thing. However, we will get different results if we understand 
intrinsic properties as d-intrinsic properties than we will if we understand them as i-
intrinsic properties.  
We might simply conjoin the requirements given in (NAT1) and (NAT2) above 
and claim that the properties that belong to a thing’s nature are those d-intrinsic 
properties that a thing has in every possible world in which it exists. We can call such 
a property part of a thing’s dn-nature:  
(NAT3) A property, P, is part of a thing, x’s, dn-nature =df P is a d-
intrinsic property and x could not exist without possessing P. 
Because we have defined a thing’s dn-nature in terms of d-intrinsicness, whether a 
property counts as part of a thing’s dn-nature is independent whether we give a 
relational or nonrelational account of property possession.    320 
  Alternatively, we can hold that a property is part of a thing’s nature only if it is 
an i-intrinsic property that the thing possesses necessarily. We can define in-nature as 
follows: 
(NAT4) A property, P, is part of a thing, x’s, in-nature =df P is an i-
intrinsic property, and x could not exist without possessing P. 
The properties that are part of a thing’s in-nature are those properties that it 
possesses both necessarily and independently of any relations that it bears to other 
things.
35 Whether a property belongs to the in-nature of a thing does depend on the 
underlying metaphysics of property possession. No property that a thing has by 
bearing a relation to a universal will be an i-intrinsic property of that thing. Therefore, 
no property that a thing has by bearing a relation to a universal will be part of the in-
nature of a thing.  
In (AAA), Armstrong argues that a relational account of property possession 
for particulars commits us to the claim that all particulars have the very same nature. 
Armstrong’s conclusion follows if we take the nature of a thing to be its in-nature. It 
seems to me that the correct response to (AAA) by the relational realist is to agree that 
all particulars have the same in-nature. However, the relational realist can still 
distinguish the properties that belong to the dn-nature of a thing from the properties 
that belong to a thing accidentally. For Armstrong’s argument to be successful, he 
would need to show that there is a problem with taking all particulars to have the same 
in-nature. I do not know whether or not such an argument can be developed. However, 
I do think that we can develop an argument that some of the entities in our ontology 
have to have in-natures.
36  
                                                 
35   Necessary possession of a property seems to follow from the i-intrinsicness of the property. If 
a thing has a property independently of whatever else exists, then it would seem to have that property in 
any possible situation in which it exists in which case the property is part of its n-nature.   
36   Furthermore, unless we think that only one thing has an in-nature, it will also be the case that 
some things differ from each other with respect to their in-natures.    321 
Let’s say that all particulars have their attributes by standing in the 
fundamental relation of instantiation to universals. Furthermore, let’s say that 
particulars typically have different dn-natures. It follows that particulars stand in an 
instantiation relation to some universals in every world in which they exist. 
Furthermore, it is in virtue of their standing in these relations that particulars have the 
dn-natures that they have. For example, it belongs to Socrates’ dn-nature to be human, 
and it belongs to Sylvester’s dn-nature to be a cat. Socrates’ being a human in any 
world is his instantiating the universal humanity in that world. Sylvester’s being a cat 
in any world is his instantiating the universal felinity in that world. We are now in a 
position to ask the following question of the relational realist: why is it that standing in 
the instantiation relation to felinity makes something a cat, while standing in the same 
relation to humanity makes something a human? Presumably, the relational realist will 
answer that the universal humanity is a different sort of thing than the universal 
felinity. We can now ask how we account for the natures of the universals. Either the 
universals will have distinct in-natures, or they differ only in relations that they bear to 
other things. But then differences between the universals humanity and felinity must be 
explained by differences in the things to which they are related.  
We are now in a position to formulate a classic trilemma. Either we have an 
infinite regress in which the nature of each thing is explained by its relations to some 
further thing, the nature of each thing is to be explained by its relations to other things 
but there is a circle of explanations, or we have some things that differ primitively 
with respect to their in-natures and we explain the differences between the natures of 
other things in terms of these primitive differences. On the first two options, I do not 
think that we will have an adequate explanation for differences in the natures of   322 
things. So there must be some entities that differ with respect to their in-natures.
37 It 
remains to defend my claim that the first two options fail to explain differences in the 
natures of things.  
There are two problems with the infinite regress version of relational natures. 
First, there is the problem of ontological profligacy. We need to accept infinite 
hierarchies of entities in every case where we need to explain a difference between 
entities. Second, it is unclear that these infinite hierarchies will actually succeed in 
explaining anything. If at each point in the regress, we lack an explanation for 
differences in the natures of things, making the regress infinite does not seem to help. 
Furthermore, there are infinite regresses involved in the explanation of each 
nature. For simplicity imagine that each entity instantiates only one higher-order 
universal. Sylvester is the way he is because he instantiates something, which 
instantiates something, and so on. Socrates is the way he is because he instantiates 
something, which instantiates something, and so on. In what way does the infinite 
totality of entities involved in the explanation of Sylvester’s nature differ from the 
infinite totality of entities involved in the explanation of Socrates’ nature? I can see no 
way in which it does. In each case, we have an infinite regress in which at every point 
we lack an adequate explanation for the nature of the particular entity. I conclude that 
the difference in nature between Socrates and Sylvester has not yet been explained.
38  
                                                 
37   Strictly speaking, there is a fourth option. We might explain all the differences between the 
natures of things relationally, but hold that there are different fundamental relations that things can 
stand in to each other. For example, humanity and felinity might not differ in their in-natures, but the 
differences between Sylvester and Socrates will be explained by the fact that Socrates stands in the 
“manstantiation” relation to humanity while Sylvester stands in the “catstantiation” relation to felinity. 
However, I can see no reason for adopting this view rather than one on which either particulars or 
universals differ with respect to their in-natures.  
38  The second argument against an infinite regress of things the natures of which are all explained 
relationally is similar to the argument against ontological structuralism below. Any infinite chain in 
which each thing is supposed to have its nature explained by something else will be structurally 
isomorphic to any other infinite chain.      323 
The other alternative that avoids primitive differences in the in-nature of things 
attempts to account for differences in the natures of things by allowing circular 
explanations. A thing will have the nature that it does because of its location in a web 
of relations. We might call such a view “global ontological structuralism”. Global 
ontological structuralism seems subject to the following objection familiar from 
arguments against causal structuralism about the individuation of properties.
39 It will 
be impossible for there to be two different possible situations containing objects with 
different natures that stand in the same pattern of relations to each other.  
For the sake of an example, imagine two different possible worlds each of 
which contains exactly two objects. In the first worlds, Sylvester instantiates felinity, 
                                                 
39   For a discussion of causal structuralism, see John Hawthorne “Causal Structuralism” (2001). 
Radical causal structuralism is the view that all there is to the identity of any property is its contributing 
certain conditional causal powers to the objects that possess it. However in stating the conditional 
causal powers definitive of any property, we need to talk about other properties, which in turn can be 
replaced with the statement of the causal powers that they bestow on entities possessing them. In the 
end, we end up with something like a Ramsey sentence in which every referent to a property has been 
replaced with a variable, and we have only a statement of a causal structure with no reference to any 
particular properties. The Ramsey sentence will be similar to the statement of the natures of worlds 1 
and 2 below.  
  If we think that it is possible for two or more different sequences of properties to satisfy the 
resulting Ramsey sentence, then it seems that something other than the pattern of causal relations is 
needed to individuate properties. Radical causal structuralism is often attributed to Sydney Shoemaker 
on the basis of his paper, “Causality and Properties” (1980) reprinted in Identity, Cause and Mind 
(1984). However, according to an appendix to Hawthorne (2001), Shoemaker suggests a more moderate 
form of causal structuralism on which we can define a property in terms of its causal relations only if 
we maintain reference to the other particular properties to which it stands in these relations. We will not 
be able to identify all sequences of properties satisfying the same Ramsey sentence with one another. 
On the moderate picture, while it will be necessary to a property that it bear certain relations to other 
properties, it will not be the case that the natures of all the properties involve nothing other than there 
standing in a certain pattern of relations to something or other.  
  We can distinguish two versions of moderate structuralism. On one version purely haecceitistic 
qualities will be all that distinguish two distinct properties that stand in the same pattern of relations to 
other properties. Properties might all have the very same in-nature, but there will be brute facts about 
which property is which. The other version will allow that there are differences between the in-natures 
of at least some distinct properties and that part of what explains the differences between two properties 
standing in the same pattern of causal relations is that they stand in these patterns to things that have 
different natures. On the latter version of moderate causal structuralism, we will have some entities that 
differ in their in-natures. On the former version, I cannot see how bare numerical differences in the 
things to which two properties stand in causal relations can account for anything other than a numerical 
difference between the two properties. We will not have explained any way in which the nature of one 
property differs from that of another.     324 
and felinity is instantiated by Sylvester. In this world, Sylvester has the nature that he 
does because he instantiates felinity, and felinity has the nature that it does because it is 
instantiated by Sylvester. So Sylvester has the nature that he does because he 
instantiates something that is instantiated by him. So, Sylvester has the nature that a 
thing has when it has the property of instantiating something that instantiates it. 
Similarly felinity has the nature that a thing has when it is instantiated by something 
that instantiates it. We can represent the nature of Sylvester and felinity as follows: 
Nature of Object 1: λx[∃y(Ixy & I*yx)] 
Nature of Object 2: λx[∃y(I*xy & Iyx)] 
Similarly we can represent the nature of the entire world as follows: 
Nature of World 1: ∃u∃v(λx[∃y(Ixy & I*yx)]u & λx[∃y(I*xy & Iyx)]v) 
Now imagine a world that contains only Socrates and humanity, in which 
Socrates instantiates humanity. This is a world in which the very same pattern of 
relations holds as held in the world containing Sylvester and felinity. Therefore, the 
nature of this world can be expressed as follows: 
 Nature of World 2: ∃u∃v(λx[∃y(Ixy & I*yx)]u & λx[∃y(I*xy & Iyx)]v) 
Worlds 1 and 2 have precisely the same nature as one another.
40 However, this 
result is intuitively incorrect. The intuition that these worlds have different natures is 
very difficult to shake. One of them contains a particular cat, and the property of 
felinity. The other contains a particular human being and the property of humanity.
41 
                                                 
40   Notice that it won’t help to try to distinguish the two worlds by pointing to purely haecceitistic 
differences. While such differences might be useful in numerically distinguishing Sylvester from 
Socrates, or humanity from felinity, they will do nothing to explain the qualitative differences that we 
intuitively take to hold between worlds 1 and 2.   
41   Alternatively consider a world that contains Socrates, Sylvester, humanity, and felinity. The 
purely relational nature of Sylvester and Socrates will be the same, and the relational natures of 
humanity and felinity will be the same. We seem to have no capacity to explain what accounts for the 
differences in the natures of things. What makes it the case that one of the particulars is a cat and the 
other a human being? Furthermore, there seems to be no good reason to rule out the possibility of such 
symmetrical worlds. This example here seems similar to Hawthorne’s (2001) objection against causal 
structuralism from the possibility of worlds with symmetrical patterns of conditional causal power 
distribution.    325 
Furthermore, there is no good reason to rule out a priori the possibility of two worlds 
in which the same patterns of relations are realized by things with different natures. 
But if we cannot rule out this possibility, then global ontological structuralism would 
seem to be false.    
Two horns of our trilemma have proven to be problematic. We can’t accept an 
infinite regress of relational explanations of the natures of things, nor can we accept 
circular explanations of the natures of things. The only option left is to accept that at 
least some things differ with respect to something other than the things to which they 
are related. In other words, at least some things differ with respect to their in-natures. 
Notice, however, that nothing in the argument given requires that it is particulars 
which differ from each other in their in-natures. It is completely open to the relational 
realist to claim that universals rather than particulars are the things that differ with 
respect to their i-intrinsic properties. As I will argue below, it is plausible to attribute 
this sort of view to Plato.  
First, however, I want to outline a conception of essentiality that differs from 
the modal conception of essentiality implicit in the formulation of (RF), (REFw), and 
(REFS). In the following two sections, I will outline a conception of essentiality, which 
has been developed by Kit Fine.
42 On Fine’s view, essentiality is not defined in modal 
terms, but is defined in terms of the real definition of an entity. Modality is, in turn, to 
be defined in terms of essentiality. With the definitional conception of essence in 
                                                 
42   See Kit Fine “Essence and Modality” (1994b), “Senses of Essence” (1994c), “Ontological 
Dependence” (1995a), “The Logic of Essence” (1995c), “Semantics for the Logic of Essence” (2000). 
See also Fabrice Correia “Propositional Logic of Essence” (2000), and “Generic Essence, “Objectual 
Essence, and Modality” (2006). I became aware of the second article by Correia after writing this 
chapter. Correia’s distinction between the objectual essence and generic essence strikes me as a 
important one, and much of what I say here could be reformulated with this distinction in mind. In 
making statements about the objectual essence of a thing, we reveal what it is to be that thing; for 
example, we reveal the objectual essence of Socrates when we tell you that he is a rational animal. In 
making statements about generic essences, we say what it is for something to be of a certain sort; for 
example we reveal the generic essence of being a human when we say that being human is being 
rational and animal.      326 
place, we can give a different account of what it is for an entity to be a relational entity 
than we were able to give above. Furthermore, on this conception of what it is to be a 
relational entity, we will be able to distinguish Plato’s view about the nature of 
particulars from Aristotle’s. 
Section 10.4.B: Essence as Real Definition  
It has been quite common among philosophers to give a modal analysis of 
essentiality.
43 The claim, ‘x is essentially F,’ is understood as the claim that it is 
necessary that x is F. ‘It is necessary that x is F,’ however, is ambiguous between a 
categorical and a conditional reading. Taking a possible-worlds semantics of modality 
for granted, the categorical and conditional readings can be represented by (ME1) and 
(ME2) respectively.
44 
(ME1) For any object, x, and property, F, x is essentially F, if and only 
if x is F in every possible world.  
(ME2)  For any object, x, and property, F, x is essentially F, if and only 
if x is F in every possible world in which x exists.
  
Both (ME1) and (ME2) are subject to certain difficulties. If we accept that x can be F, 
only in worlds where x exists, then (ME1) will entail that only necessary existents 
have any properties essentially. On the other hand, (ME2) entails that every entity is 
essentially existent, since every entity exists in every possible world in which it 
                                                 
43   At least it has been popular among philosophers in the analytic tradition since Saul Kripke, 
Ruth Barcan Marcus, and others developed a rigorous way of treating de re modal claims, and provided 
a highly natural way of thinking about claims about the essences of things independently of the way that 
those things are described, thus repopularizing what Quine calls an invidious Aristotelian essentialism, 
in his “Three Grades of Modal Involvement” (1953), see also Quine’s “Reference and Modality” 
(1961). See Kripke “Semantical Considerations on Modal Logic” (1963a), “Identity and Necessity” 
(1971), Naming and Necessity (1972)/(1980); Marcus “Modalities and Intensional Languages” (1961); 
Alvin Plantinga “World and Essence” (1970), The Nature of Necessity (1974); and Graeme Forbes The 
Metaphysics of Modality (1985).  
44   The observation of the two readings and the attendant difficulties of each are further discussed 
in Fine (1994).      327 
exists.
45 Neither of these complaints is decisive, but a proponent of either (ME1) or 
(ME2) owes us some account of how the complaints are to be dealt with.  
  Kit Fine offers two additional arguments against a modal understanding of 
essentiality.
46 The first argument attempts to show that modal conceptions of 
essentiality allow too many irrelevant properties into the essence of an entity. The 
second attempts to show that there are certain asymmetries in relations between 
objects that cannot be captured on a modal conception of essentiality. We shall look 
briefly at each of these arguments.  
  First let us consider Fine’s relevance objection to modal conceptions of 
essence. Take any necessary fact at all, e.g. the fact that 2+2=4. Take the property, 
being such that 2+2=4. In every possible world, this property will belong to every 
object in that world. Therefore, the property will be essential to every object. 
However, being such that 2+2=4 seems entirely irrelevant to the nature of most 
objects, and we might balk at allowing such irrelevant properties to be part of a thing’s 
essence.
 47 
                                                 
45   Some people have no problem with this result. Forbes (1985), who seems to accept (ME2), 
claims that there is no problem holding that all entities are essentially existent provided we do not take 
this to imply that all entities are necessarily existent. Furthermore, it might be open to a defender of 
(ME2) to insist that this argument mistakenly treats existence as a property of objects. I am not sure 
what we should say about this issue.  
46   See Kit Fine (1994), (1995a), and (1995b).  
47   There are interesting connections between the sorts of charges of irrelevance lodged against 
modal conceptions of essence, and similar charges lodged against ordinary understandings of 
entailment. K. Fine (1994) seemingly balks at simply adding relevance constraints to ordinary modal 
logic as an attempt to save modal conceptions of essence. However, Fine’s logic of essence (1995c) 
seems very much like a modal logic with relevance constraints added to the modal operators. Fine 
thinks that his system grounds the imposition of these sorts of constraints by holding that the truth of 
essentiality claims is grounded in the real definitions of entities. His objection to adding relevance 
constraints to ordinary modal logic really seems to be aimed at the attempt to add relevance constraints 
without producing a metaphysical justification for their addition. Any attempt to justify the imposition 
of relevance constraints on ordinary modal logic will have to be based in something other than 
modality. In conversation Fine claimed that his point is that any attempt to justify adding relevance 
constraints to deal with objections to modal conceptions of essence will need to be grounded in 
something like a definitional conception of essence.    328 
  Second, let us consider Fine’s asymmetry argument. Fine uses the example of 
Socrates and the set {Socrates}. We seem to be able to say both that Socrates is a 
member of {Socrates} in all worlds where he exists, and that {Socrates} has Socrates 
as a member in all worlds in which {Socrates} exists.
48 However, there seems to be a 
certain asymmetry when we think about the essences of Socrates and {Socrates}. It 
seems that what it is to be the set {Socrates} just is to be something which has 
Socrates as its only element.
49 Conversely, it does not seem that what it is for a thing 
to be Socrates just is for it to be the thing that is the sole member of a certain set.
50 
One natural way of expressing this fact would be to claim that being the set containing 
only Socrates is [part of] the essence of {Socrates}, but that being the sole member of 
{Socrates} is not [part of] the essence of Socrates. Given the modal conception of 
                                                 
48   Although, see David Lewis Parts of Classes (1991), where he claims that on some counterpart 
relations, the counterpart of α will not be a member of the counterpart of {α}, and that the necessity 
will, therefore, not hold under these counterpart relations. I find Lewis’ views about this pretty baffling, 
and will assume that, at the very least, α is an element of {α} in every world in which α exists. I am not 
sure whether {α} exists in any worlds where α does not exist, and whether, if {α} does exist in an α-
free world, it has α as a member in that world. I am assuming that α is a member of {α} in every world 
where {α} exists. There are many difficulties in the example that might arise due to disagreements 
about the nature and existence of sets, but I think that the example makes the main point about the 
distinction between necessity and essentiality relatively clear.   
49   The language here recalls Aristotle’s use of ‘to ti ên einai’ (‘the what it was to be’), ‘to ti esti’ 
(‘the what it is’) and ‘to einai +dative complement’ (‘to be for ____’) in talking about the essences of 
things. Fine takes his thoughts about essence to be deeply Aristotelian in spirit.  
50   The following considerations also support our thinking that there is an important asymmetry at 
issue between singletons and their members. Knowledge of what the set {α} is in itself, seems to be 
enough to justify our claim that {α} contains α. Furthermore, knowledge of what the set is in itself 
seems sufficient to justify us in claiming that α exists in any world where {α} exists. On the other hand, 
in addition to knowing what α itself is like, we seem to have to know something more to know that α is 
a member of the set {α}. We have to know something about singletons, viz. that a singletons are sets 
that contain exactly one object. Furthermore, knowledge of what α is in itself, will not justify us in 
claiming that {α} exists in every world in which α exists. In addition, we need to know something 
about the existence conditions for sets. In each case, we seem to need to know something beyond the 
nature of α to be justified in beliefs about {α}, while the converse is not the case. Furthermore, it is 
natural to distinguish {α} from another set {β} by pointing out that one is the set containing α and that 
the other is the set containing β. On the other hand, it would seem to be odd to distinguish α from β by 
pointing out that they are members of different sets.   329 
essence, however, we have no way of expressing this asymmetry in the relationship 
between Socrates and {Socrates}.
51  
Both Plato and Aristotle hold that when we reveal the essence of a thing, we 
say what that thing is. But it just doesn’t seem to be the case that part of what it is to 
Socrates is to be the thing that is the sole member of a certain set. Furthermore, being 
such that 2+2=4 does not seem to be part of the nature of Socrates. It seems, therefore, 
that the mere fact that a thing possesses a property in every world is insufficient for 
belonging to the essence of a thing.  
  The definitional conception of essence solves both the relevance and 
asymmetry problems raised for the modal conception of essence. The fact that 2+2=4 
is not part of the real definition of Socrates, shows that it is not essential to Socrates 
that he be a thing such that 2+2=4.  Furthermore, while it does seem to belong to the 
real definition of {Socrates} that it contain Socrates, it does not seem to be part of the 
real definition of Socrates that he be contained by {Socrates}. The definitional 
conception of essence is in accordance with our intuitions in these cases. However, we 
still need a more illuminating account of what it is for a property to belong to the 
essence of a thing.  
K. Fine develops a rigorous account of essentiality by drawing an analogy 
between analyticity and essentiality.
52 We will begin with a brief discussion of 
analyticity. Consider the following definition of what it for a sentence to be analytic.   
                                                 
51   The asymmetry noted here is also used by K. Fine to define a type of ontological dependence 
on which an item can be ontologically dependent on something that exists in all and only the possible 
worlds where it exists. See Fine (1995a). Notice that Aristotle is aware of a similar asymmetry. As we 
saw in Chapter 9, Aristotle allows that one object can be ontologically prior to another even in cases 
where the two reciprocate as to the implication of existence, provided that the first is somehow the 
cause of the existence of the second. I do not think that we can adequately capture Aristotle’s view with 
a possible worlds conception of essentiality.  
52   See Fine (1994), (1995b), (1995c), and (2000). See also Correia (2000). In Fine (1994), he 
suggests that analyticity and essentiality are at bottom the very same thing.   330 
(AN1) A statement is analytically true if and only its truth follows 
from the meanings of our terms.
53 
As it stands right now, (AN1) fails to be precise in an important way. Say that the 
meaning of a term is a set of definitional sentences. The truth of a sentence follows 
from the meaning of a term if and only if the sentence is entailed by the set of 
definitional sentences for that term. There is one notion of analytic truth which we 
could take to be expressed by (AN1), on which the set of analytically true sentences is 
the set of sentences entailed by the definitional sentences for every term in a language. 
However, there is room for a finer-grained notion than this one. A sentence can be true 
in virtue of the meanings of some terms rather than others. For example, the truth of 
‘All bachelors are unmarried,’ seems to have nothing to do with the meaning of ‘dog’, 
but seems to have something to do with the meaning of the term ‘bachelor’. In order to 
capture this finer-grained notion, Fine introduces the notion of a sentence’s being 
analytic in a set of terms. 
(AN2) A sentence, s, is analytic in τ (a set of terms) if and only if the 
set of all the definitional sentences for all members of τ entails s.
 54  
                                                 
53   We might replace (AN1) with a more rigorous definition suggested and subjected to rigorous 
criticism by Quine in his paper “Two Dogmas of Empiricism” (1951). We can begin with a notion of a 
sentence’s being a truth of logic. A sentence is truth of logic only if it is a logically valid sentence, i.e. if 
and only if the sentence is true on every interpretation of its non-logical vocabulary. Next, we need a 
notion of sameness of meaning for expressions in a language. We can then give a more rigorous 
formulation of (AN1) as follows: 
(AN1*) A sentence is analytic if and only if it can be transformed into a truth of logic 
by freely substituting for the expressions in the sentence expressions with the same 
meaning. 
Quine claims that the distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences cannot be maintained 
because there is no proper notion of sameness of meaning available. For further discussion of 
analyticity, see also Quine’s “Truth by Convention” (1936), “Carnap and Logical Truth” (1956), Hilary 
Putnam’s (1965) “The Analytic and the Synthetic”, and Paul Bogohossian’s “Analyticity Reconsidered” 
(1996) and  “Analyticity” (1997). 
54   The notion of entailment involved here is a purely logical one, as opposed to metaphysical 
necessitation. ‘2+2=4’ is not entailed by the sentence ‘∀x (Bachelor (x)≡Unmarried(x) & Male(x))’, 
even though the latter is true in all and only the worlds where the former is true. There is still a worry 
about sentences that are logical truths. Any logical truth follows from the meaning of any term at all. I 
will set this worry aside, but I think that we might need to put relevance constraints on the notion of 
entailment in (AN2).      331 
Notice that what sentences are analytic in a set of terms is crucially dependent 
on what the definitional sentences for the relevant terms are.
55 We will call the set of 
all the definitional sentences in a language a “Dictionary” for that language. Take the 
following as a proposal about the proper definitional sentences for a chunk of a 
language. 
Dictionary 1: 
Term    Set of Definitional Sentences for Term 
Bachelor:  {‘∀x(x is a bachelor ≡ (x is a man & x is unmarried).’}    
  Unmarried:  {‘∀x(x is unmarried ≡ it is not the case that x is legally wed.’}  
  Man:    {‘∀x(x is a man ≡ (x is a male & x is human).’} 
Human:   … 
Married:  … 
… 
If Dictionary 1 is correct, then the sentence ‘All bachelors are unmarried men,’ will be 
analytic in {‘bachelor’}, but will not be analytic in {‘unmarried’}, {‘man’}, or 
{‘unmarried’, ‘man’}. Perhaps, however, Dictionary 1 is not the correct about the 
definitional sentences, and we can consider an alternative. 
Dictionary 2: 
Term    Set of Definitional Sentences for Term 
Unmarried:   {‘∀x(x is unmarried ≡ (x is a bachelor ∨ x is a spinster)’}  
Man:  {‘∀x(x is a man ≡ (x is at least 16 years old & x is not a spinster 
& x is not a wife)’.} 
Bachelor:  {‘∀x(x is a bachelor ≡ (x is an adult male human & x is not a 
husband & x is not a widower)’} 
                                                 
55   On this view, we can see the reluctance to accept analytic truth as a reluctance to accept that 
certain sentences about a thing count as definitional.     332 
If Dictionary 2 is correct, then ‘All bachelors are unmarried men’ will be analytic in 
{‘unmarried’, ‘man’}, but not in {‘bachelor’}. Questions about what sentences are 
analytic in a given set of terms will be answerable only once we are given a dictionary 
for the relevant chunk of a language. However, there might be good reasons for 
preferring one dictionary to another; for example, Dictionary 1 is surely more 
plausible than Dictionary 2.
 56  
  We can define analyticity in terms of analyticity-in. A sentence is analytically 
true if and only if it is analytic in the set containing all the terms of the language. On 
the other hand, we cannot define analyticity-in in terms of analyticity. So, if we think 
that it is plausible to claim that a sentence can be true due to the meaning of some 
terms rather than others, we should take analyticity-in as a basic notion, and take 
analyticity to be a derivative notion.
57     
  Fine recommends the following analogy: essentiality is to necessity as 
analyticity-in is to analyticity. We can take a necessary proposition, and we can ask 
what makes the proposition true. The truthmakers for necessary proposition will 
involve the natures of some objects, and will not involve the natures of others. 
Socrates’ being a man has something to do with the nature of Socrates, but nothing to 
do with the nature of any mathematical objects. Just as individual terms were said to 
have canonical definitions in our discussion of analyticity-in, individual entities have 
essences or real definitions. Just as analyticity-in was relativized to sets of terms, 
essentiality or ‘necessity-in’ can be relativized to sets of entities. 
(DE1) A proposition is necessary-in a set of objects, if and only if the 
truth of the proposition follows from the real definitions of the objects 
in the set.  
                                                 
56   If we think that there is no fact of the matter about which dictionary is correct for a language, 
then we will think that there is no fact of the matter about which sentences are analytic in which sets of 
terms. I will leave aside questions about whether there is a unique correct dictionary for any language.   
57   This is a bit too quick. However, Fine considers attempts to take analyticity as a more basic 
notion in (1994), and argues convincingly that they fail.     333 
(DE2) For any object, x, and proposition P, it is essential to x that P if 
and only if P is necessary-in {x}.  
(DE3) For any object, x, and property, F, x is essentially F, if and only 
if the proposition that x is F is necessary-in {x}.
58   
(DE3) is offered as an alternative to (ME1) and (ME2), and we can see that there 
might be attributes that x has in every possible world, which are not essential to x 
according to (DE3). Any attribute that a thing has in every possible world, the 
possession of which is not implied by the real definition of a thing, will be a necessary 
but non-essential attribute of that thing.  
What propositions are necessary-in what things will depend on what the 
essences or real definitions of objects are, and there are substantial disagreements on 
this score. Take the example of Socrates and {Socrates}, and compare two different 
theories about the natures of sets and individuals. According to the first theory, it 
belongs to the real definition of a set that it have exactly the members it does. 
{Socrates} just is the object that has Socrates as its sole member. According to the 
same theory, say that the essence of Socrates is his soul—to be Socrates is to be the 
being with this soul. Then the proposition that Socrates is a member of {Socrates} will 
be true in virtue of the nature of {Socrates}, but will not be true in virtue of the nature 
of Socrates. It is not part of Socrates’ nature to belong to any set.  
However, this theory might be mistaken about the natures of Socrates and 
{Socrates}. If we had a theory on which individuals like Socrates were simply 
abstractions from sets, we would have a different answer to the question: In virtue of 
what is the proposition that Socrates is a member of {Socrates} true? If to be Socrates 
just is to be the sole member of {Socrates}, then the proposition that Socrates is a 
member of {Socrates} will be true in virtue of the nature of Socrates. Part of the task 
                                                 
58   We might be more careful about use and mention in (DE3). Where 
ϕ
 is a predicate and 
α
 is 
an individual constant,  
It is essential to α that α is ϕ
 is true if and only if the proposition expressed by 
α is ϕ
 is necessary in the singleton of the referent of 
α
.       334 
of ontology, then, is to figure out the correct real definitions of objects. For example, 
the first theory is surely more plausible than the second.   
  Once we have the idea of necessity-in, we can define necessity simpliciter as 
truth in virtue of the nature of all objects whatsoever. On the other hand, we will not 
be able to begin from the ordinary modal conception of necessity, and define 
essentiality. We are better off, therefore, taking the real-definitional understanding of 
essentiality as primitive and defining necessity in terms of it.
59  
With this understanding of essentiality in terms of real definitions in place, we 
can do two things. First, we can state a new version of Matthews and Cohen’s 
principle (R) in terms of essentiality: 
(RE) If x bears R to a distinct entity, y, then it is not essential to x that x 
bear R to y.  
If we put (RE) explicitly in terms of real definitions, we get: 
(RRD) If x bears R to a distinct entity, y, then it is does not follow from 
the real definition of x that x bears R to y.  
Second, we can outline a new conception of what it is for an entity to be a relational 
entity. An entity is relational if and only if the relevant substitution instance of (RE) 
and (RRD) fails. An entity will be a relational entity if and only if it is essential to that 
entity that it bears a relation to a distinct entity. In terms of real definitions, an entity is 
relational if and only if it follows from the real definition of that entity that it bears a 
relation to a distinct entity.  
Just as we distinguished weakly and strongly relational entities in (REFW) and 
(REFS), can also distinguish weakly relational entities from strongly relational entities 
on the essentialist picture:  
(REEW)     ∀x(x is a weakly relational entity≡ ∃R(It is essential to x that 
∃y(Rxy)))  
                                                 
59   For further elucidation of the definitional conception of essence, see Fine (1994), and (1995b). 
For a formal logic of essence see Fine (1995c), and for a semantics, see Fine (2000).    335 
(REES) ∀x(x is a strongly relational entity≡ ∃R∃y(It is essential to x that 
Rxy)) 
(RERDW)   ∀x(x is a weakly relational entity≡  
  ∃R(It follows from the real definition of x that ∃y(Rxy))) 
(RERDS)  ∀x(x is a strongly relational entity≡  
  ∃R∃y(It follows from the real definition of x that Rxy)) 
We can now restate Matthews and Cohen’s challenge to Plato in terms of 
essentiality. If all attribute possession is a matter of bearing a relation to a distinct 
entity, then either there are no attributes that Sylvester has essentially or it follows 
from Sylvester’s real definition that there is a certain entity to which he bears a 
relation. In the latter case, Sylvester will be a strongly relational entity. In what 
follows, we will examine how Matthews and Cohen’s argument fares given (RE). 
However, first let us turn to an alternative way of thinking about essentiality which 
will be helpful in our subsequent discussion.   
Section 10.4.C: A Combinatorial Approach to Essentiality. 
In this section, I present a series of toy models designed to elucidate the 
concept of essentiality by analogy. We can begin with a model that contains two types 
of objects, colored pegboards and pegs with heads of different geometric shapes. Say 
that we have three pegs: round, square, and triangular [r,s,t], and two pegboards: blue 
and crimson [B, C]. Further say that each pegboard can hold anywhere from zero to 
three pegs. Say that we want to model some portion of a language using this peg-
pegboard system. The language will have three individual names {‘Ralph’, ‘Sara’, 
‘Tom’}, and two predicates {‘blue’, ‘crimson’}. We’ll say that every individual 
constant in the language refers to a peg, an element of {r,s,t}. Every predicate term 
refers to a pegboard {B,C}. Where 
Φ
 is a predicate term and 
α
 is an individual 
constant, any atomic sentence of the form 
α is Φ
 is true if and only if the object 
referred to by 
α
 is in the pegboard referred to by 
Φ
. We can add ordinary induction 
clauses for the logical connectives, and extend the language to allow quantification   336 
over {r,s,t} and {B,C}. Furthermore, let’s allow that ‘Ralph’, ‘Sara’ and ‘Tom’ rigidly 
designate respectively r, s, and t, and ‘blue’ and  ‘crimson’ likewise rigidly designate 
the blue and crimson pegboards.     
On the assumption that which hole in a pegboard a peg occupies is not a 
relevant difference between arrangements, there are 27 ways to arrange our five 
objects. The pegs and pegboards are combinatorial atoms, which can be arranged to 
make certain sentences in our language true or false. Notice, however, that these 
combinatorial atoms have an intrinsic nature. In every one of our models, r is a round 
peg, s is a square peg, t is a triangular peg, B is a blue pegboard and C is a crimson 
pegboard. While the various relations between the pegs and pegboards vary from 
model to model, the natures of the pegs and pegboards themselves are constant. 
However, the intrinsic natures of the pegs and pegboards are not relevant to the truth 
and falsity of any of the sentences in the language that we introduced above.
60    
                                                 
60   The combinatorial system that I outline here differs in many respects from that offered by 
Armstrong in his A Combinatorial Theory of Possibility (1989). First, Armstrong, following Skyrms, in 
“Tractarian Nominalism” (1981), takes states of affairs to be the most basic entities. A state of affairs is 
non-mereologically constituted by a particular and a universal. Armstrong insists that the particular in 
the state of affairs and the universal do not stand in any relation to each other, rather they are too closely 
connected to be related. Nonetheless, Armstrong allows that we can distinguish the universal and 
particular parts of a state of affairs.  
Armstrong allows that each universal is an entity that has a nature and differs from other 
universals, but claims that every thin particular is in itself indistinguishable from every other thin 
particular. Rather, particulars taken as thin particulars, are simply numerically different than one 
another. Notice, that thin particulars seem to have all the problems that Armstrong associates with the 
particulars that he says are posited by relational realism, whether transcendent or immanent. These 
particulars, that is, have no nature independently of standing in the nonrelational connection to various 
universals. While Armstrong’s thin particulars are simply numerically different from one another, these 
particulars are not bare because they cannot exist without instantiating at least one property. But at this 
point, we can raise the same objection to Armstrong that he raises for the relational realist—Armstrong 
tells us that the relational realist needs an explanation for the nonexistence of bare particulars, and that 
the relational realist can only hold that it is a brute synthetic necessity that no bare particulars exist. 
However, we can ask Armstrong why thin particulars are unable to exist uninstantiated. It seems he will 
need to posit as synthetic and brute a necessity as the one purportedly relied on by the relational realist. 
So, if Armstrong wants to hold that states of affairs have universals and particulars as real components, 
it is unclear why his theory is superior to the relational realism that he attacks.   
Armstrong might escape the problems above by claiming that universals and particulars are not 
real components of states of affairs. He can claim instead, that states of affairs are primitive, and that 
both universals and particulars are simply abstractions from these states of affairs (see Armstrong 
(1997) for a defense of this view). However, if he does so it is unclear that he can maintain his version   337 
However, imagine that we now expand our language to contain some new 
predicates, ‘is triangular’, ‘is square’, and ‘is round’. Furthermore, say that a sentence 
of the form 
α is triangular
 is true if and only if the peg referred to by 
α
 has a 
triangular head, and so on. Notice that while ‘t is triangular’ and ‘t is blue’ are 
syntactically indiscernible, the underlying truthmakers for the sentences are 
different—‘Tom is blue’ is true in any model where t is inserted in B, ‘Tom is 
triangular,’ is true in any model containing t because of the intrinsic nature of t itself.
61 
The truthmaker for the first sentence involves a relation between t and something else, 
while the truthmaker for the second involves only the nature of t. So, the intrinsic 
natures of the objects that are available for recombination in our models guarantee 
certain facts about every possible combination of the objects. 
Notice that the nature of the combinatorial relation taken together with the 
nature of the combinatorial atoms will guarantee other facts about every possible 
                                                                                                                                           
of combinatorialism. The advantage of combinatorialism is supposed to consist in its giving a theory of 
possibility in terms of actual entities. Can the combinatorialist still claim this advantage if the entities to 
be recombined are themselves simply abstractions from actual entities? If the basic entities are states of 
affairs, then shouldn’t states of affairs, not particulars and universals, be the entities that are available 
for recombination? On the other hand, if particulars and universals are available for recombination, then 
doesn’t there have to be something that each of these is like taken apart from any combination?  
We can criticize the picture that Armstrong gives of his combinatorial system. He tells us that 
there is a board, in which we stick hooks that represent individuals. We then hang markers on these 
hooks to represent universals, and connect hooks by pieces of colored string to represent relations. In 
this model, the hooks are entities that have a nature, even if it simply the ability to bear various markers. 
Hooks are different sorts of things than strings and markers, and presumably particulars are intrinsically 
different than universals in the analogous respect. Armstrong also tells us that the mere switching of one 
hook for another does not represent a difference between models. But it is unclear why this is supposed 
to be so. I seem to be able to say truly that there used to be one hook here, and now there is another. All 
that the truth of this statement relies on is the bare numerical difference of the hooks. It is one thing to 
claim that the numerical identity of a hook is not relevant to making true sentences in our actual 
language. It is a different thing to claim that there is no possible extension of our language on which the 
numerical identity of a peg could play a role in making true a sentence. What Armstrong might reply is 
that the hook model fails to be analogous in an important respect to the world which actually models 
our sentences.       
61   We might also allow, in addition to sentences like ‘Ralph is blue,’ a sentence ‘Blue is blue,’ 
where the latter is taken as an instance of predication telling us what the referent of ‘blue’ is like, rather 
than as an identity claim. Despite the fact that both sentences contain ‘is blue’ the first is true in any 
model where r is inserted in B because of a relation that r bears to B, the second seems to be true 
because of the nature of the blue pegboard itself. Pegboards are blue or not blue because of their 
intrinsic natures, pegs are only blue or not blue by bearing or failing to bear a relation to a pegboard.    338 
model. For example, no peg can be inserted in two pegboards—it follows that there is 
no model making true ‘Ralph is crimson and Ralph is blue’. No peg can both be 
inserted and fail to be inserted in a given pegboard. Still other sentences like ‘Ralph is 
crimson,’ are made true by some models due the specific way in which the pegs are 
combined with the pegboards in those models.  
What is necessary is what is true in all possible models. What is essential to an 
object is what is true in all possible models because of the intrinsic nature of that 
object. So on the system of models that we are looking at here, “It is essential to Tom 
that Tom is triangular,” is true, but “It is essential to Tom that Tom is not both blue 
and crimson,” is false. “Tom is not both blue and crimson,” is true in every model, but 
the fact that it is true in every model does not follow from the intrinsic nature of t.  
We could also add further constraints to our construction of models. For 
example, we might accept as a primitive rule governing acceptability of models that 
every pegboard must contain at least one peg.
62 This additional rule will eliminate 15 
of our original 27 possible combinations. Notice, however, that whether such a rule on 
acceptable models obtains is independent of the natures of the pegs and the pegboards. 
Given the above limitation on acceptable models, ‘Something is blue,’ will be true in 
every acceptable model. ‘Tom is triangular,’ will also be true in every acceptable 
model. Nonetheless, the sources of these truths will be different facts about the 
models. While ‘Tom is triangular,’ is true in every model because of the nature of the 
                                                 
62   Such additional rules seem to be what is involved in what Armstrong calls “synthetic 
necessity” in “Against Ostrich Nominalism” (1980). See Gail Fine (1981) for some discussion p267ff. 
Armstrong claims that a relational account of property possession cannot rule out bare particulars and 
uninstantiated universals. On his view, if instantiation is simply a relation that holds between distinct 
entities, then the natures of the entities themselves does not guarantee that every universal be 
instantiated and that every particular instantiate some universals. Any necessity of instantiation will 
then be akin to our no empty pegboards rule. But, Armstrong tells us that such additional rules, and the 
“synthetic necessities” to which they give rise, are unmotivated. See note 57 above for additional 
discussion.    339 
peg referred to by ‘Tom’, the former sentence will be true in every model because of 
the presence of the additional rule in our system.  
So far, all of the entities that we have considered are combinatorially 
independent of one another. However, we might have a model in which this feature 
was not present. For example, take the holes in the pegboards as the referents of our 
individual names. A claim that something has a color will be true if and only if the 
hole referred to by the name is in the appropriate pegboard. A claim that something 
has a shape will be true if and only if the appropriately shaped peg is in the hole 
referred to. Holes do not seem to be combinatorially independent of the pegboards that 
serve as their hosts. To even specify a hole as an entity for recombination is to specify 
a thing that by its very nature bears a relation to the pegboard that it is in. Similarly, 
given that the pegboards are exactly the same in all models, we cannot even specify a 
pegboard for recombination without specifying a thing that has certain holes in it. 
When it follows from the intrinsic nature of an entity that it stands in a relation to 
something else, the entity stands in that relation essentially.  
  When we shift our thinking from the toy models above to the world that 
actually serves as a model for our claims and think about the ways in which the 
entities in our world could be recombined, we start to get a picture of what sorts of 
things are essential to objects. For a thing to have an attribute essentially is must be the 
case that there is no acceptable recombination of entities on which the entity lacks that 
attribute, and it must be due to the nature of the entity independently of all the things 
from which it is combinatorially independent. If an entity cannot even be specified for 
recombination independently of its bearing a relation to distinct entity, then it will be a 
relational entity.   
To think a bit more about what it is for an something to be a relational entity 
on this picture, I want to return to an earlier example used to distinguish essentiality   340 
from necessity. Take the object {Socrates}. At least on some understandings of the 
nature of sets, what it is to be {Socrates} just is to be the object that bears a certain 
relation to the object Socrates—call this relation “singletoning”.
63 It is not merely the 
case that {Socrates} singletons Socrates in every possible world, or singletons 
Socrates in every possible world where {Socrates} exists. Rather, to be {Socrates} just 
is to be the thing that singletons Socrates.  
Let’s look at another model. Imagine that we have a model in which ordinary 
objects are represented by tennis balls. To form the singleton of an object we attach a 
red marker to the object. To form a singleton of the singleton, we attach a red dot to 
the first red dot, and so on.
64 So if ‘Socrates’ refers to a tennis ball ‘{Socrates}’ refers 
to that tennis ball with the red dot attached. However, the red dot on the tennis ball is 
not the referent of any term at all in our language. Now imagine that we pick out the 
singleton of an object for recombination. What we are picking out is a ball with a red 
dot attached—{Socrates} is represented as a ball-with-attached-dot. It follows from 
the very nature of the singleton, that if we grab it to stick in a model we have to also 
grab the object that it is the singleton of. On the other hand, we can pick out ordinary 
objects for recombination without thereby picking out their singletons. Again, this is 
not to claim that there are any acceptable models containing Socrates but not 
{Socrates}. But whatever it is that makes such models unacceptable, it is not the 
                                                 
63   There are a number of difficult issues about sets here, and I do not want to take a stand on any 
of them. Just what the singleton relation is supposed to be is a really thorny issue. See Lewis, Parts of 
Classes (1991) for additional discussion. In any case, I am simply trying to use the case of sets to 
illustrate a point about essentiality. If you believe in real definitions, and think that the real definition of 
{α} is the thing that singletons α, then bearing the singleton relation to α is essential to {α}. In this 
section, I am arguing that the fact that {α} cannot even be specified for recombination independently of 
singletoning α 
64   Compare this model to Lewis’s “Lasso Hypothesis” in Lewis (1991) pp42-45, where a 
singleton of an object is that object surrounded by a lasso. I do not know whether this model will 
adequately capture set theory, even if we let in spooky objects like lassos. What is essential about these 
models is that singletons of objects are formed by something’s being done to those very objects. It 
seems that the singletoning relation is internal to the singleton, but external to the thing singletoned—
where internal and external can both be given essentialist glosses. A relation to an entity is internal to an 
object if and only if it is essential to the object that it stands in that relation.       341 
nature of Socrates. Rather, in this case there seems to be a rule akin to the ‘no empty 
pegboards’ rule, which tells us that every object in a model has a singleton in that 
model. The fact that {Socrates} is a singleton of Socrates is modeled in our system by 
the fact that a tennis ball with a red dot on it has that tennis ball as a constituent. Not 
only is it true in every acceptable model that this tennis-ball-plus-dot has this tennis 
ball as a part, it follows from the very nature of this tennis-ball-plus-dot that it stands 
in this relation. {Socrates} is not even combinatorially independent of Socrates. I take 
this fact to be another way of stating that {Socrates} stands in the singletoning relation 
to Socrates is essentially.  
I suggested above that we might restate (R) in terms of (RE), and I said that 
(RE) was equivalent to a principle stated in terms of real definitions. We might also 
restate (R) in combinatorial terms: 
(RC)  If x stands in a relation R to a distinct entity y, then x’s standing in 
R to y does not follow from the nature of x taken as a subject for 
recombination.  
(RC) amounts to an assertion that every entity which can be recombined is 
combinatorially independent of every other entity with which it can recombined.  In 
other words, every entity in the world is a combinatorial atom, i.e. a thing that is 
combinatorially independent of every other entity in the world. Any differences 
between the natures of combinatorial atoms, considered independently of any relations 
that they stand in to other things, will consist in differences between the i-intrinsic 
features of the entities. Furthermore, differences between the in-natures of things will 
be differences between those things taken as combinatorial atoms.     
As we have already seen, (RC) does not imply (RF). Even if x’s essence is 
independent of any relation that x stands in to y, it might still be the case that x stands 
in the relation to y in every possible model. However, the source of the necessary 
connection between x and y will not be found in the nature of x taken as a   342 
combinatorial atom.
65 (RC) is false of an entity only if it is impossible to specify that 
entity for recombination without thereby specifying it as a thing that stands in a certain 
relation to something else.  
Relational entities are entities that are not combinatorial atoms. For an entity to 
be a relational entity, on this picture, is for it to follow from its nature, considered as a 
subject for recombination, that it stand in a certain relation to another entity. In other 
words, without specifying any additional restrictions on acceptable recombination, the 
mere fact that we want to include an entity in a model guarantees that we are including 
in our model a distinct entity that stands in a particular relation to this entity. For 
example, without any further restrictions on recombination it follows from the very 
presence of {Socrates} in a model that {Socrates} singletons Socrates. In such a case, 
we would say that {Socrates} is combinatorially inseparable from standing in the 
singletoning relation to Socrates. We might define being a strongly relational entity in 
terms of combinatorial inseparability as follows:  
(RECS) ∀x(x is a strongly relational entity =df 
∃R∃x(x is combinatorially inseparable from y, and to specify x 
as an entity to be recombined is to specify it as an entity that 
stands in R to y))
66   
                                                 
65   The source of necessity might be something like the axioms about acceptable combinations in 
the peg/pegboard system, which seems to be some kind of brute synthetic necessity. When Armstrong 
questions the necessity of such synthetic necessities, we can see his argument in something like the 
following terms: given that are certain combinatorial possibilities are precluded, we can ask why they 
are precluded. Shouldn’t the metaphysical impossibility of a combination depend on something about 
the natures of the things to be combined? For example, take the relation of insertion as the 
combinatorial relation. The reason that B can’t be combined with C has to do with the natures of B and 
C; pegboards just aren’t intrinsically of the right sort to be inserted into each other. So the no pegboard-
pegboard combination seems to have a basis in the nature of the entities in the system and the nature of 
the combinatorial relation. On the other hand, the no empty pegboards axiom seems to have no basis in 
any other facts about the system. To put this restriction on acceptable combinations seems entirely 
brute. If we balk at such brute restrictions, we have to pay some cost to accept necessary non-essential 
combinations. I’m not sure that we should balk at such brute restrictions.  
66   It is significantly more difficult to say what it is for an entity to be weakly relational on the 
combinatorial picture. It order to characterize what it is for an entity to be weakly relational, we need to 
think in terms of building a model out of entities rather than in terms of specifying an entity for 
recombination already present in a model. For an entity to be a weakly relational entity is for the it to 
have a nature that precludes its being present in a model without its standing in a specific relation to   343 
  In talking about essences in terms of real definitions and in terms of 
possibilities for recombination, I have been trying to get at one underlying conception 
of essentiality. An attribute will be essential to an object if the object’s possessing the 
attribute follows from the real definition or identity of that object.
67 Thinking about 
recombination provides a way of thinking about what is involved in the real definition 
of an object. When we ask what belongs to the essence of an object, we are asking 
what sorts of things are guaranteed to be true of an object given its availability for 
recombination? On the picture that I’ve sketched above, the things that are guaranteed 
to be true of an object in this way are essential to it. I take (RC) and (RRD) as 
equivalent glosses of (RE), and I want to restate Matthews and Cohen’s argument 
taking (R) as (RE) rather than as (RF).
 68 
Section 10.5: Restating Matthews and Cohen’s Argument 
According to Matthews and Cohen, Plato thinks that all attribute possession by 
a particular is a matter of that particular’s participating in a Form. Let’s attempt to 
understand this account of attribute possession in combinatorial terms. Plato allows 
that are certain entities that are Forms, e.g. the Form of Viciousness, and other entities 
that are particulars, e.g. Sylvester. “Sylvester is vicious,” is true because the entity 
                                                                                                                                           
some entity or other in that model. It needn’t be the case that it is combinatorially inseparable from any 
particular entity in any particular model. On the assumption that it belongs to the nature of any physical 
entity to have some extension, then presence of any essentially physical entity in any model requires 
that it have some location or other. Every essentially physical entity is, therefore, weakly relational.  
I am not entirely happy with the account above. In talking about weakly relational entities, the 
definitional account of essentiality is easier to work with. The difficulty of giving a clear account of 
weakly relational entities in combinatorial terms might make it necessary to abandon the claim that the 
combinatorial account and the definitional account of essentiality are interchangeable. The main 
problem seems to be that combinatorial inseparability is a relation that holds between entities, it isn’t 
possible to bear the relation to something or other without bearing the relation to a specific thing. In the 
discussion of Matthews and Cohen’s argument, strong relationality will be the only sort of relationality 
at issue. However, weak relationality will become important in the discussion of Aristotelian universals 
later in the paper.    
67  In talking about the identity or real-definition of an object, I am trying to get at the same thing, 
what the object is. While Aristotle does not think that individuals can have definitions, I will sometimes 
use the term real definition when talking about particulars.     
68   Subject to some doubts expressed in note 66.   344 
Sylvester and the entity Viciousness are appropriately combined. In other words, 
Sylvester participates in Viciousness.  
In our discussion above, we took the peg t and considered it apart from its 
standing in any combinatorial relations to pegboards. We saw that this peg had a 
nature, e.g. it was triangular rather than round, and that this nature was constant 
through all possible recombinations of t with other entities. We also saw that it was 
possible to claim that facts about the nature of t, rather than facts about the 
combinatorial relations that t bore to other things could play a role in making certain 
claims true.   
If we consider our own world as a model, we can ask whether Sylvester has a 
nature independently of the relations that he bears to other entities. We are now in a 
position to restate something like the dilemma that underlies Matthews and Cohen’s 
argument. If Sylvester, specified as a combinatorial atom, has such a nature, then his 
having that nature is independent of how he can be recombined with any Form. So, 
there is something about Sylvester that is not to be explained by his bearing a relation 
to a Form.
69 But what if we insist that every time we truly predicate anything of 
Sylvester, we do so only because of a relation that Sylvester bears to a Form? In this 
case, Sylvester, taken as a combinatorial atom, seems to have no attributes at all.
70  
We have one other option. We can insist that Sylvester has any attribute at all 
only by bearing a relation to the appropriate Form, and further say that Sylvester, 
specified as a subject for recombination, does have a nature. However, we must then 
                                                 
69   We need not insist that it is possible for Sylvester to exist without entering into certain 
relations with other things. As I noted above, there can be other restrictions on what combinations are 
acceptable ones. However, even if it is necessary that Sylvester stand in certain relations to other 
entities, it need not part of Sylvester’s essence that he enters into such relations. The source of the 
necessity in this case will not be the nature of the Sylvester atom, but is something else about the 
system. Similarly, I need not insist that Socrates can exist in a world where {Socrates} does not exist in 
order to deny that his belonging to the set is an essential property.  
70   At least he has no attributes that qualitatively, as opposed to numerically, differentiate him 
from anything else.    345 
deny that Sylvester is by nature combinatorially independent of every Form. For at 
least some Forms, the Form of Felinity will be a prime example, we cannot even 
specify Sylvester as a subject for recombination without thereby specifying a thing 
that stands in a relation to this Form. It follows that Sylvester will not be a 
combinatorial atom. Rather, Sylvester will strongly relational entity in the sense of 
(REES). Plato will have to deny the substitution instance of (RES) for Sylvester and 
Felinity.    
  (RE) tells us that no entity can essentially bear a relation to a distinct entity. We 
have already seen a counterexample to (RE) as a general principle. {Socrates}, for 
example, is not even combinatorially independent of Socrates, since it belongs to the 
essence of {Socrates} that it bears the singleton relation to Socrates. On the other 
hand, Socrates is combinatorially independent of {Socrates}, and it does not follow 
from his real definition that he stands any relation to {Socrates}.
71 As a result, 
{Socrates} is a relational entity in the senses of (RE), (RRD) and (RC).
72  
According to the argument attributed to Aristotle by Matthews and Cohen, 
Plato’s commitment to (P) and (P-) commits him either to the existence of bare 
particulars, or to the claim that objects like Sylvester are relational entities. We have 
already seen that (RE), on which the current formulation of Matthews and Cohen’s 
                                                 
71   Why is it the case then that Socrates belongs to {Socrates} in every world where he exists? 
This necessity seems to be external to the nature of Socrates and would seem dependent on something 
like a principle of set composition—∀x∃S x is the only member of S. What makes this principle true? Is 
it a fact about the membership relation? Can we then say that the fact that Socrates belongs to 
{Socrates} follows from the nature the membership relation?  
A similar question arises in the case of mereology. Say that AB is the sum of A and B, and that 
sums exist in all and only the worlds where all the parts of the sums exist. The claim “If AB exists then 
A and B exist,” seems to follow from the nature of AB. What about the claim “If A and B exist, then 
AB exists”? This seems to follow from a principle of unrestricted composition. If a principle of 
unrestricted composition is true, what is it true in virtue of? Is it true because of the nature of the 
summing function?   
72   Other relational entities might be things like: the life of Socrates, the beliefs of Socrates, the 
functioning brain of Socrates. Anything whose very nature consists in its bearing a certain relation to 
Socrates, will be a relational entity in the sense under consideration. Similarly, if the essence of 
Socrates is to bear a relation to something, then Socrates will be a relational entity.     346 
argument depends, is not a true generalization. Any argument that relies on (RE) as a 
premise, therefore, will be unsound. Matthews and Cohen realize as much, when they 
point to objects like Schubert’s shadow as relational entities. Nevertheless, they claim 
that it is simply implausible to say that Sylvester, or any other similar entity of the sort 
that Aristotle would count as a primary substance, is a relational entity. Let’s call 
entities like Sylvester, entities that Aristotle would count as primary substances, ‘ps-
entities’. In essence, to formulate a sound argument, Matthews and Cohen need the 
following restricted version of (RE).  
(RE*)  If x is a ps-entity, and x bears R to y, then it is not essential to x 
that x bear R to y. 
  As we saw in the example above Plato can hold onto (P-) and can hold that ps-
entities have a nature, only by denying (RE*). Does Aristotle have any argument that 
we should accept (RE*)? Matthews and Cohen claim that Aristotle argues for (RE*) in 
chapter 7 of the Categories, by arguing that no primary substances are relatives (ta 
pros ti). However, I do not think that the relational entities that we have been 
examining should be identified with the relatives discussed by Aristotle in the 
Categories.
73 First, Aristotle’s category of relatives does not even seem to be 
extensionally equivalent to the class of things that are relational entities according to 
his ontology. Relatives are only one of nine categories of accident enumerated in the 
Categories. However, Aristotle seems to take all nonsubstantial entities to be 
relational entities in the sense of (REE). For example, every nonsubstantial particular 
inheres in a particular substance, and it follows from the very nature of that 
nonsubstantial particular that it bears the inherence relation to its substance. So the 
                                                 
73   For some additional Aristotelian arguments involving relatives, see Alexander’s commentary 
on Aristotle’s Peri Idiôn in his commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics, and Gail Fine’s commentary on 
the relevant passages in Alexander in her On Ideas (1993), especially chapter 13. I am not sure how to 
assimilate the notion of relatives in that passage with the notion of relatives in the Categories.     347 
instance of pallor in Socrates is combinatorially inseparable from Socrates, and it is 
part of this pallor’s essence that it inhere in Socrates.
74  
Every accident inheres in a substance, and I will argue that it follows from the 
very nature of the accident that it could not exist without inhering in this substance.
75 
Relatives are distinguished from other accidents by the fact that it belongs to their 
nature to stand in a relation of correlativity to another relative. For example, the 
instance of taller in Phaedo inheres in Phaedo, but also implies the existence of the 
instance of shorter that inheres in Socrates. Relatives are, therefore, doubly relational 
entities.
 76      
Furthermore, the relation of correlativity that characterizes relatives seems to 
be a symmetrical relation. An entity is a relative if and only if it is spoken of in 
relation to a correlative that reciprocates—i.e. if it is spoken of in relation to the first 
entity. However, this symmetry need not be present in the case of relational entities. 
An entity x is a relational entity if and only if it follows from the essence of x that x 
bears a relation to y. It need not also follow from the essence of y that y bear a relation 
to x.
77 At best Aristotle’s denial that ps-entities are relatives would show that they fail 
                                                 
74   Two notes are needed here. First of all, particulars are not things that Aristotle takes to have 
definitions as he uses the term ‘definition’. Nevertheless, I take it that the very nature of Socrates’ pallor 
involves its inhering in Socrates. In this case, the fact that the pallor inheres in Socrates does not explain 
its qualitative nature which do not differentiate it from any other instance of pallor, but its inhering in 
Socrates is involved in its being the particular thing that it is. Secondly, in chapter 8 I worried that the 
Aristotelian definition of two right angledness, in terms of its genus and species would not make any 
reference to triangle. Nevertheless, I wanted to defend Aristotle’s claim that two right angledness is a 
kath’ hauto property of triangle. Even if the proper Aristotelian definition of two right angledness does 
not mention triangle, I think that there is some sense in which Aristotle thinks that what it is to be two 
right angled is to be a two right angled triangle. A two right-angled triangle is a compound entity 
consisting in the holding of the inherence relation between an instance of two right angledness and a 
particular triangle. In this way, I take it to follow from the real definition of any nonsubstantial entity 
that there is a substance in which it inheres.      
75   On the definition of ontological dependence given in K. Fine (1995a), this means that the 
accident is ontologically dependent on the substance.  
76   For more on this issue, see my discussion of Owen’s “collapse of the categories” argument in 
chapter 3.    
77   Take the case of {Socrates} and Socrates. The former is a relational entity, while the latter is 
not.    348 
to essentially bear the correlativity relation to anything. However, this still leaves open 
the possibility that ps-entities essentially stand in other relations to things. Thus, I do 
not think that Aristotle’s claims about relatives in Categories 7 constitute a general 
argument against taking ps-entities to be relational entities in the sense of relational 
entity that I currently have in mind.  
I will argue that while Aristotle takes ps-entities to be nonrelational, Plato 
takes such things to be relational. Furthermore, I think that these claims are closely 
related to basic views that Plato and Aristotle hold about ontological priority. Plato 
holds that Forms are ontologically prior to individuals, while Aristotle holds that 
individuals are ontologically prior to universals.
78 I can think of no knockdown 
argument that either Plato or Aristotle has in favor of his own ontological theory or 
against that of his opponent, and any detailed discussion of their attempts at such 
arguments would require a separate treatment.
79 Therefore, my aim in this chapter is 
mainly to distinguish clearly between Aristotle and Plato using the apparatus that has 
been developed. Judgment about whose view is superior will have to wait.   
Being a relational entity is closely tied to being an entity that is ontologically 
dependent on something else. Following Kit Fine, I think that ontological dependence 
is best cashed out in terms of essentiality. Furthermore, we should distinguish 
ontological dependence from modal-existential dependence in the same way that 
necessity is distinguished from essentiality. We have the following two conditions: 
(MED) x is modal-existentially dependent on y =df Necessarily (if x 
exists then y exists).
80 
                                                 
78   I talk about these claims at greater length in chapter 9.  
79   For a study of some Aristotelian objections to Plato’s ontology (or at least to the ontology that 
Aristotle attributes to Plato), see G. Fine On Ideas (1995).  
80   To even call the relation expressed in (MED) a form of dependence seems wrong. All that is 
really expressed here a type of covariance. Dependency in contrast, seems to require considerations of 
relevance that are absent from a system that contains only necessity and material implication. In chapter 
IX, I suggest that Aristotle has a similar insight in mind when he distinguishes mere implication of 
being from being a cause of being. See chapter IX for additional discussion of this issue.    349 
(OD) x is ontologically dependent on y =df It follows from the real 
definition of x that if x exists then y exists.
81        
If x is a strongly relational entity, then there is an entity to which x essentially bears a 
relation. However, if there is an entity, y, to which x essentially bears a relation, then it 
will follow from the real definition of x that x exists only if y also exists, and x will be 
ontologically dependent on y. So all strongly relational entities are ontologically 
dependent on the things to which they are essentially related. Moreover, we will see 
below that weakly relational entities also exhibit a kind of generic ontological 
dependence, in that it follows from the essence of a weakly relational entity that if it 
exists some other entity of a given type exists. 
  Relational entities are, therefore, the sorts of things that have dependent 
natures. Let’s say that x is a strongly relational entity, and that it is part of x’s nature to 
bear R to the entity y. If we were going to fully analyze the nature of x, we would need 
to fully analyze the nature of y as well. Say that both {Socrates} and Socrates are 
relational entities. To be {Socrates} is to be the thing that singletons Socrates, and to 
be Socrates is to be a thing that has a certain soul. So to be {Socrates} is to be the 
thing that singletons the thing with that soul. If x is a weakly relational entity, then it 
belongs to the nature of x that can exist only by standing in a specific relation to some 
particular or other. While it is not in x’s nature to be dependent on a specific entity, x 
still has a dependent nature. When something does not have a dependent nature, then 
we will say that the thing has a primitive nature.
 The primitive nature of an entity that 
has such a nature will consist in its i-intrinsic attributes.    
  The notion of ontological dependence that we have characterized in terms of 
essentiality can also be used to capture Aristotle’s notion of one thing’s being a cause 
of being for another. As I claimed in the last chapter, we should understand the claim 
that x is a cause of being for y in terms of a sort of constitution of y’s existence by x’s 
                                                 
81   For a discussion and defense of this notion of ontological dependence, see K. Fine (1995a).    350 
existence. When y is a strongly relational entity that is ontologically dependent on x, 
what it is for y to exist is for y to bear a certain relation to x. But if y’s existence just is 
its bearing a relation to x, then x seems to be a constituent in the very existence of y, 
and to be a cause of being for x.
82 The story in the case of weakly relational entities is 
a bit more complex, and I will discuss it when I turn to a closer examination of 
Aristotle’s theory.
 83  
Broadly speaking, there are three regions in logical space that an ontological 
theory might occupy. According to a given ontological theory: either all entities have 
primitive natures; some entities have primitive natures and others have dependent 
natures; or all entities have dependent natures. I take it that neither Plato nor Aristotle 
holds a view of the first type. Rather, each accepts that some entities that have 
dependent natures.
84  
In an ontology of the second type, the essences of some entities involve no 
relations to other entities. These entities are ontologically primitive, and are not 
ontologically dependent on anything else. They also have primitive natures and their 
being what they are does not depend on the nature of anything else. Other entities on a 
theory of the second type are ontologically dependent entities with dependent natures. 
There are two ways that an ontological theory of the third type might go. First, 
it might be the case that the nature of an entity never depends on any relation to a 
thing whose nature depends on bearing a relation to it. In this case we will have an 
infinite regress of dependent natures. Notice that on this view, every entity will be 
                                                 
82   In this way, I think that an object is a cause of being for its shadow. This shadow’s existence is 
constituted by its bearing a relation to the object of which it is a shadow. In a similar way, a particular 
substance is  a cause of being for the nonsubstantial particulars that inhere in it.  
83   It is in this way that I think Aristotle can take particulars to be causes of being for universals. 
At any given time, a universal exists by having at least one instance exist.  
84   A view on which all entities have primitive natures is a view on which every entity is a 
combinatorial atom. One such view on might be a modified relational version of Armstrong’s 
combinatorial system, which accepts haecceities. There are individuals and universals, and these can be 
recombined in any way whatsoever.      351 
ontologically dependent on something else and there will be no circles of ontological 
dependence. I think that such an ontology is implausible for the same reasons that I 
argued that some things must have in-natures in section 10.4.A.
85  
Alternatively, it might be the case that every entity has a dependent nature and 
is ontologically dependent on another entity, but that some cases of dependence are 
reciprocal. In this case, the ontology will exhibit a circular pattern of dependence. We 
might have a completely holistic pattern of dependence, in which the nature of every 
entity depends on the nature of every other entity.
86 However, the pattern of 
dependence need not be completely holistic. We might have one or more groups of 
entities, the natures of which depend on nothing other than the natures of other 
members of the group, and also have members outside these groups that ultimately 
depend on the members of these groups.
87  
  I will assume that both Plato and Aristotle have theories of the second type. 
Some entities will be primitive, while others will be essentially relational. I take the 
fundamental disagreement between Plato and Aristotle to be over which entities are 
which. I will argue that Plato, at least on one interpretation, takes ordinary particular 
entities like cats and dogs to have dependent natures, while Aristotle takes such 
entities to have primitive natures.
 88    
                                                 
85   While I think that an ontology on which there is an infinite regress of  relational natures is 
implausible, there is a case that I am worried about on which it seems to be possible for there to be an 
infinite regress of ontological dependence. For example, assume that mereological essentialism is true, 
and that there are no mereological atoms. Each sum then seems to be a strongly relational entity. If 
there are no other entities, then we would seem to have a counterexample to both my current claim, and 
the argument that I gave in section 10.4.A. For now I will bite the bullet and insist either that there can 
be no such world, or that sums are not distinct form their parts in the sense required by (RE).  
86   For reasons given in section 10.4.A, I think that this sort of ontology is implausible.   
87   We can create the same sort of objection to this case that we did for global ontological 
structuralism in 10.4.A.  
88   I think that Aristotle interprets Plato in something like the way that follows. However, it is 
beyond the scope of this project to defend this interpretation against alternatives. For a discussion of 
Aristotle’s interpretation of Plato, and Aristotle’s shortcomings as an interpreter, see Gail Fine 
“Separation” (1985) and On Ideas (1993). For an interesting alternative interpretation of Plato, see Gail 
Fine “Immanence” (1986), according to which Plato takes Forms to be something like scattered 
particulars which contain all existent immanent characters as parts, and which also contain parts other   352 
  Some interpreters of Plato, following Aristotle, assert that Plato takes Forms to 
be separable from sensible particulars.
89 The separability in question is supposed to 
imply that the Forms have a capacity for independent existence. Let’s say that x has a 
capacity for existence independent of y if and only if it is possible that x exists and y 
does not exist. If x has this capacity, then x cannot be ontologically dependent on y. 
But if x is not ontologically dependent on y, then it cannot belong to x’s essence to 
stand in any relation to y. The separability of Forms implies that Forms do not 
essentially stand in any relation to sensible things.  
We could guarantee the same conclusion using a weaker notion of separability, 
according to which x is separable from y if and only if it is not essential to x that it 
bear any relation to y. Imagine, for example, that mathematical entities like numbers 
are necessary existents but that they are not Forms.
 90 On the assumptions that 
mathematical entities have all of their attributes necessarily, and that a mathematical 
entity has an attribute by standing in a relation to a Form, it will be necessary to any 
Form that it stands in the relations that it does to any mathematical entity. 
Nevertheless, Plato will deny that it follows from the nature of the Form that it stands 
in these relations. As a result, the Form will be separable from the mathematical entity 
even though they exist in all the same possible situations. Furthermore, if the 
                                                                                                                                           
than those immanent characters. If this is Plato’s view, then a few things follow. First, depending on the 
sort of whole that Forms are it may or may not be the case that Forms are primitive. Second, it does not 
seem that immanent characters will be ontologically dependent on Forms, in the sense of ontological 
dependence I have suggested. For a view of the nature of Forms in the middle dialogues that is  close to 
what I have in mind, see M. M. McCabe’s Plato’s Individuals (1999).  
89   For an in depth discussion of the issue of separation in Plato and Aristotle, see G. Fine (1984), 
(1985), Morrison (1985a), (1985b), (1985c). See also Devereaux “Separation and Immanence in Plato’s 
Theory of Forms” (1994). I will use ‘separable’ rather than ‘separate’ to render ‘choristos’. 
Nevertheless, I think that separability and separateness might come to the same thing on my view. For x 
to be separable from y in the way that indicates ontological independence is for it to be nonessential to x 
that it bears any relation to y. But what is separable in this way is also separate in so far as it is a fully 
independent entity.     
90   Plato has an example of the number three and the Odd in the Phaedo 103e-104c, in which, 
however, he seems to imply that numbers can be destroyed.    353 
mathematical entity is has a relational nature and essentially participates in certain 
Forms, then the mathematical entity will not be separable from the Form. 
The separability of Forms guarantees that Forms are not ontologically 
dependent on individuals. Whether Forms are ontologically dependent on other Forms 
is a difficult question.
91 But it seems plausible to hold that Plato takes at least some 
Forms—perhaps the Form of the Good is an example—to be ontologically 
fundamental and to have primitive natures.
92 Since the Form of the Good has no 
essential relations to other things, we cannot explain either the existence or the nature 
of that Form in terms any relations that it stands in to anything else. If the Form of the 
Good is the only primitive being, then it will be a cause for the existence and nature of 
all other entities, while its own existence and nature will be completely nonrelational.  
It follows that the truth of any statement about the nature of the Form of the 
Good will not involve any relation that the Good bears to anything else, but will 
involve only the Good itself. It might be helpful to compare this case with the 
discussion of the peg-pegboard model above. While the truthmaker for ‘Tom is blue’ 
involved a relation between t and B, the truthmaker for ‘Tom is triangular,’ involved 
only t itself. Any claim about an essential attribute of the Form of the Good will 
similarly have a nonrelational truthmaker.  
  Plato does not take Forms to be dependent on particulars, but takes particulars 
to be ontologically dependent on Forms. There are two cases that we should examine. 
First we will look at the relation between ps-entities, like Sylvester, and the Forms 
                                                 
91   It is also a question that I will not attempt to answer here.  
92   It is not my intention to defend this interpretation here, although some of Plato’s claims about 
the Good in Republic V incline me to accept a view like the one that I outline here. For an example of 
someone who thinks differently about the Form of the Good, see T.H. Irwin Plato’s Ethics (1995). It is 
not essential to what follows that Plato takes the Form of the Good to be a nonrelational entity, but it is 
essential that he takes some Forms to be nonrelational entities and I believe that he does do so. If Plato 
thinks that all entities have relational natures, then I think that he faces the problem of global 
ontological structuralism. For my purposes here, I attribute to Plato a view that avoids this problem, and 
I use the Form of the Good as an example of a nonrelational entity.    354 
involved in the attributes that ps-entities have essentially. Next, we will look at the 
relation between ps-entities and the Forms involved in their possession of non-
essential attributes.   
Say that Plato accepts (P-), and holds that a relational analysis is possible for 
every state of affairs which involves a particular entity’s having some attribute. The 
analysis available in the case of Sylvester’s being a cat might be the following: 
Sylvester stands in the participation relation to the Form of Felinity. Furthermore, say 
that Plato holds that Sylvester is not only necessarily feline, but is essentially feline. In 
other words, it follows from the real definition of Sylvester that Sylvester is a cat. It 
follows that Sylvester essentially stands in the relation of participation to the Form of 
Felinity. Part of what it is to be Sylvester, is to be feline, but to be feline just is to bear 
a relation to the Form of Felinity.
93 So Sylvester, on this view, is a relational entity.   
  Matthews and Cohen’s choice to give shadows and reflections as examples of 
relational entities is particularly apt, given some of the metaphors that Plato uses in 
discussing the  relationship between sensible objects and Forms. Plato sometimes 
draws an analogy between the relation that sensible things bear to Forms and the 
relation that reflections, shadows, or imitations bear to the things of which they are 
reflections, shadows or imitations.
94  
At Timaeus 29b, for example, Timaeus relates that the sensible world is an 
image (eikôn) of something stable, fixed, and transparent to the understanding. 
Timaeus goes on to provide an intricate theory of the way in which the visible world is 
                                                 
93   While I am sticking with the Sylvester and Felinity example, I am not sure whether Plato holds 
that there are Forms like Felinity in the Phaedo. In the Parmenides (130 b-c), Socrates expresses some 
uncertainty about whether there is a Form for human, fire and water. I think that the basic point here 
could be restated in terms of a Form of Tallness, and the immanent characters of tallness that are in 
certain individuals.    
94   There are a variety of passages that are susceptible of a variety of interpretations. Here are 
some: Republic 509-510, 532b-d, 596a, 596d-e, 597a-b, 598b, 603a-b. Timaeus 28-29. Parmenides 132-
133 (where Plato seems to be criticizing the likeness analogy). Sophist 266ff.    355 
modeled on something else. In Republic X, we are told that the artisan makes artifacts 
that imitate Forms. Painters and poets then imitate the products of the crafts, and thus 
produce imitations of imitations. The relation that a painting of a sensible bed bears to 
the sensible bed is analogous relation that a sensible bed bears to the Form. It is 
especially interesting to look at Socrates’ claim at 596d-e that Glaucon would be able 
to make all things—the sun, all the things in the sky, himself—in a way by carrying a 
mirror around with him. Glaucon points out that he would only produce appearances 
of things and not the true beings. Socrates replies that the world of particulars stands 
to the Forms just as Glaucon’s reflections stand to the things reflected. And at 
Parmenides 132d, Socrates suggests that participation is a matter of the sensible’s 
being made in the image of the Form. In the following discussion, I want to take very 
seriously the suggestion that sensible particular things are somehow images or 
reflections  of Forms.  
 What is it for one thing to be an image of another?
95 The relation of an image 
to thing imaged is not simply a relation of resemblance or likeness. First, resemblance 
is symmetrical, but the image-of relation is not. Second, for one thing to be an image 
of another the first has to be appropriately and non-accidentally connected to second, 
but mere resemblance requires no such connection. One thing will not be an image of 
another, if the first resembles the second as a result of pure accident. In this respect, 
the relation between an image and the thing of which it is an image seems to have 
much in common with the representation relation.
96  
Nevertheless, the image relation involves more than just representation. A 
word can represent an object, but we do not say that the word is an image of the 
                                                 
95   See G. Fine (1983), pp336-337, for additional discussion of this question. Many of my 
thoughts on this issue are a result of trying to expand on what Fine says in her paper.  
96   Causation is one connection most commonly thought to underlie representation. For the 
application of the causal theory of reference to the image relation, see Fine (1983).   356 
object.
97 We generally think that any combination of letters could have played the role 
of representing any object at all. The nature of the particular word used to represent an 
object is, therefore, largely independent of the nature of the object represented. On the 
other hand, the intrinsic nature of an image is influenced by the nature of the thing 
represented. Had the thing imaged been different in certain crucial characteristics, the 
image would also have been different. For certain types of image, it is clear that we 
require the image to resemble the thing imaged in certain respects.
98 For one entity to 
be an image of another, certain relations must obtain between the intrinsic 
characteristics of the entities, such that had these relations failed to obtain the image 
relation would also have failed to obtain.  
To extend an example of Gail Fine’s, imagine that I am painting a picture of 
Ronald Reagan, and that Reagan plays a role in causing the painting to come to be. 
Furthermore, say that I fully intend the picture to represent Reagan. But, I am a 
terrible painter, and, due to my lack of control over the paints, my painting ends up 
looking like an undifferentiated gray blob. We might think that the painting represents 
Reagan, without thinking that it is an image of Reagan.
99 For a painting to count as an 
image of Reagan, at the very least the painting has to look the way it does because 
Reagan looks the way he does.
100 We can make a similar point about the relation 
between Forms and sensibles. For a sensible thing to be an image of a Form, the 
                                                 
97   I am assuming that it is purely conventional what word represents what object. If various 
phonemes naturally represent various qualities of objects, then the word-referent relation will be more 
like the image-imaged relation.  
98   There are a number of controversial issues here. I am assuming that resemblance is one type of 
connection between the natures of images and the natures of the things imaged. Other relations might 
serve equally well—for example, certain isomorphisms might underlie the image relation in the case of 
maps or graphs.  
99   Imagine that I am such a bad painter, that the picture would have looked exactly the same no 
matter what Reagan looked like. 
100   Whether the painting has to look like Reagan is another question. It might turn out that there 
are different sorts of images of Reagan, and that some must bear a visual resemblance to Reagan while 
others needn’t do so. For something to count as a picture of Reagan, it might need to by visually similar 
to Reagan in some way.     357 
sensible has to have the nature that it does at least in part because the Form has the 
nature that it does.        
If one thing is an image of another, then the first must be related to the second 
in the way we have been examining. Gail Fine discusses an objection by John Boler, 
involving the distinction between its being essential to a thing’s being a copy that it 
bear a certain relation to the thing copied, and its being essential to the thing which is 
a copy that it bear this relation to the thing which is copied.
101 Boler seems to think 
that a painting, which is in fact a portrait of Ronald Reagan, could have existed 
without being a portrait of Reagan. Fine disagrees, holding that things which are 
images are essentially images.  
For our purposes here, it is not necessary to take a stand concerning images in 
general.
 102 However, Plato clearly holds that certain sensibles are essentially images of 
certain Forms. To be a cat is to be an image of the Form of Felinity, and to be this 
particular cat is to be this particular image of the Form of Felinity. The individual cat 
seems to be both what it is and the way it is because it is an image of Felinity. On the 
other hand, if Felinity is ontologically fundamental, then there can be no further 
relational analysis of the nature of Felinity. It is simply a brute fact about the world 
that Felinity has the nature that it does. On any theory that accepts the existence of 
ontologically fundamental entities, facts about the nature and existence of the 
ontologically fundamental entities will be brute in this way.  
We might wonder what is involved in a thing’s being one particular image of a 
Form rather than another. This question seems to arise only in the case of relational 
                                                 
101   See Fine (1983) p.336 n.23. 
102   I tend to think that in the case of paintings, there are probably two distinct but coincident 
objects. One is essentially an image, and the other is physical entity which is not essentially related to 
the thing copied. However, I think that the relation that Plato is trying to get at between Forms and 
sensibles is such that a copy of a Form is essentially a copy of that Form. The real definition of a 
sensible thing requires that it be an image of certain Forms. Furthermore, I do not think that there will 
be any entity coincident with the image that is only contingently related to the Form.   358 
entities where multiple entities all essentially stand in the same relation to a single 
object. In the case of {Socrates} and Socrates, there is only one entity that singletons 
Socrates, and the entirety of the essence of {Socrates} seems to involve only its 
singletoning Socrates. Anything that bears the singletoning relation to Socrates is thus 
identical to {Socrates}.  
On the other hand, both Socrates and Callias are essentially images of the 
Form of Humanity. However, Socrates is not identical to Callias. Furthermore, it 
seems to be essential to Socrates that he is distinct from Callias, since it seems to 
follow from the nature of anything that it is not something else. The entirety of the 
nature of Socrates, therefore, seems to involve more than bearing the imaging relation 
to the Form of Humanity. But, if this is true, then there seems to be something that 
belongs to the nature of Socrates which not explainable by the fact that he stands in a 
relation to any Form. It might be helpful here to think again of the mirror analogy 
from Republic X. Two reflections of the sun are each essentially reflections of the sun. 
What makes one reflection a different reflection than another might be accounted for 
by the fact that one mirror is different than another mirror. While its bearing the 
reflection relation to the sun is responsible for the qualitative nature of each reflection, 
the numerical distinctness of the two reflections seems to require another explanation. 
If the analogy between reflections and particulars is taken seriously, we might ask 
what plays the role of the mirror in Plato’s ontology. 
Given the fact that the mirror is clearly something that has a nature 
independently of standing in the reflecting relation to any object, Plato’s accepting (P) 
would already seem to require him to hold that the mirror analogy is inexact. On the 
mirror analogy, for a particular reflection to exist is for a mirror to stand in the 
reflecting relation to an entity. The reflection appears to be ontologically dependent on   359 
both the mirror and the thing reflected. But the mirror and the object reflected seem to 
be ontologically independent of one another.  
In the case of {Socrates} and Socrates, matters are different. It does not seem 
that for {Socrates} to exist is for any object other than {Socrates} to stand in a relation 
to Socrates. Rather for {Socrates} to exist is just for {Socrates} to stand in a relation 
to Socrates. If the relation between Callias and Humanity is like the relation between 
{Socrates} and Socrates on the account outlined above, then the existence of Callias is 
not to be explained in terms of a relation between anything other than Callias and 
Humanity. Rather for Callias to exist is for Callias to participate in Humanity. 
However, if we accept this claim, then there seems to be no explanation for the 
numerical distinctness of Callias from Socrates akin to the explanation for the 
numerical difference of one reflection from another. Accordingly, Plato might have to 
hold that the numerical difference between particulars is simply a brute fact.
103 It is 
just a brute fact that there are two participants in the Form of Humanity.     
Aristotle raises objections, in the Metaphysics and Generation and Corruption, 
to Plato’s claim that Forms are causes of being and becoming for particulars.
104 These 
objections are closely related to this question about the nature of particulars. First, let’s 
consider the claim that Forms are causes of the coming to be of particulars. It seems 
that a Form cannot be the sole cause of the coming to be of a particular. Forms are 
                                                 
103  The problem here is essentially the problem of individuation of particulars. Instead of claiming 
that numerical difference is brute, Plato might attempt to develop a line similar to the one developed by 
interpreters of Aristotle who hold that all substantial forms are universals. Plato might say that matter or 
some other principle of individuation is involved. Perhaps to be Socrates is to be an image of the Form 
in this bit of the receptacle. If Plato follows this line, he will have to explain how matter can serve as a 
principle of individuation without having an essential nature of its own. While I cannot give this issue 
the thorough treatment that it deserves in here, I have two hunches. First, I suspect that Aristotle does 
not accept this sort of view about the individuation of particulars. Second, I suspect that we might 
develop an argument in favor of Aristotle’s ontology and against Plato’s from considerations about 
what makes something the particular thing that it is. 
104   In both De Generatione et Corruptione II.9 (335b7-23) and Metaphysics A.9 (991b3-9), 
Aristotle explicitly refers to Plato’s theory in the Phaedo. The text at Metaphysics A.9 is repeated at 
M.5  (1080a2-8). For discussion of these passages, see Annas (1982) and especially G. Fine’s “Forms 
as Causes” (1987).   360 
eternally stable, but particulars come into existence at one time rather than another. If 
there is to be a sufficient account for why this particular comes into existence at this 
time, the this condition must involve more than simply the fact that a certain Form 
exists and has the nature that it does. Second, let’s consider the claim that a given 
Form is a cause of being for a given particular. For a Form to be a sufficient cause of 
being for this particular would seem to require that the particular’s being the particular 
thing that it is is completely accounted for by the nature of the Form. However, this 
would seem to require that we account for the fact that this particular rather than 
another on exists in terms of facts about the nature of the Form. I am not certain how 
Plato should respond to these worries, and there are many tricky issues involved.
105   
I turn to Plato’s account of the relation between sensible particulars and the 
attributes that they have non-essentially. Many things are true of Sylvester in addition 
to his being a cat. For example, he is both black and persistent. However, these 
attributes do not even seem necessary to Sylvester, let alone essential.  It seems 
incorrect, therefore, to say that Sylvester is an image of Blackness and Persistentness 
in the same way that he is an image of Felinity. We cannot hold both that for Sylvester 
to have any attribute is for him to participate in the appropriate Form, and that 
participation in a Form is the same as being essentially an image of that Form. So what 
sorts of truthmaker will Plato offer for the claim that Sylvester is persistent?  
Plato suggests an answer to this problem in the Phaedo at 102a10-103a2. 
Socrates has just gotten his interlocutors to agree that there are various Forms, and that 
other things are called by the names of the Forms because they participate 
(metalambanein) in the Forms. Socrates then points out that we truly say of Simmias 
both that he is taller than Socrates and that he is shorter than Phaedo. We are 
committed to claiming that both tallness and shortness are in Simmias. One and the 
                                                 
105   For more on the issue of Forms as causes, see Annas (1982), and Fine (1987).   361 
same thing appears to have contrary attributes, and this seems to be a problem. One 
way to remove the problem would be to point out that Simmias is said to have 
seemingly incompatible properties in relation to different things. Properties that seem 
to be incompatible prima facie needn’t be  incompatible once we see that a subject has 
each in relation to a different thing. Plato, however, does not follow this strategy to 
remove the problem.  
Instead the character of Socrates gets his interlocutor in the dialogue to agree 
that the statement ‘Simmias is taller than Socrates,’ is not true stated in those words.
106 
What Plato means here is not that the statement is false, but that the statement does not 
clearly reveal the underlying structure of its truthmaker. Plato goes on to reveal more 
clearly the underlying structure of the truthmaker for the claim. He tells us that it is not 
due to his being Simmias that Simmias is taller than Socrates, but because of the 
tallness that Simmias happens to have. Similarly, Simmias is not taller than Socrates 
because Socrates is Socrates, but because Socrates has shortness.
107  Socrates tells us 
that, strictly speaking, it is the tallness in Simmias that is larger than the smallness in 
Socrates.
108  
Furthermore, Plato tells us that neither the Form of Tallness, nor the tallness in 
Simmias, is short in any way. Entities like the tallness in us are sometimes called 
“immanent characters”, and Plato distinguishes such entities from Forms, and from the 
entities in which they are said to be.
109 Furthermore, it seems that immanent characters 
                                                 
106   At 102b8-9 Socrates asks “Do you agree that the claim ‘Simmias is taller than Socrates,’ as 
said with these words is not even true?” (“ὁμολογεῖς τὸ τὸν Σιμμίαν ὑπερέχειν Σωκράτους οὐχ ὡς 
τοῖς ῥήμασι λέγεται οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἔχειν;”)  
107   See Phaedo 102c1-d4. 
108   This is how I take Plato’s claim that “Simmias is called both short and tall, being between the 
two, presenting his shortness to be overcome by the tallness of the one, and his tallness to overcome the 
shortness of the other.” (102c10-d4, translation Grube)    
109   Phaedo 102d5-103a2. Plato distinguishes ‘the tallness itself’ (‘auto to megethos’) which I take 
to refer to the Form of Tallness, from ‘the tallness in us’ (‘to en hêmin megethos’) which I take to refer 
to an immanent character. Immanent characters are particulars that belong to a single particular, and 
there can be multiple numerically distinct immanent characters of the same sort in different individuals. 
Plato’s claim that immanent characters are ‘in’ things calls to mind Aristotle’s inherence talk in the   362 
are strictly speaking the things that are called after and participate in the relevant 
Forms. Whenever an entity seemingly has conflicting attributes, we will be able to 
analyze the situation in terms of there being two immanent characters of conflicting 
Forms in that entity. Furthermore, neither of these immanent characters is itself a thing 
that has conflicting attributes.  
We are now in a position to give an analysis of the truthmaker for the claim 
‘Sylvester is persistent’. There is an immanent character of the Form of Persistentness 
in Sylvester, which essentially participates in the Form of Persistentness. This 
immanent character is a strongly relational entity, since it is essential to it to be an 
image of the Form. Sylvester essentially stands in a relation neither to this immanent 
character of persistentness, nor to the Form of Persistentness. It seems that the relation 
between Persistentness and its immanent characters is the same participation relation 
that holds between Felinity and Sylvester, and that we might, therefore, count 
Sylvester as an immanent character of the Form of Felinity.
 110  
On the picture of Plato’s ontology I have given, there are two basic sorts of 
entities: Forms and immanent characters. I have argued that Plato takes immanent 
characters to be strongly relational entities, and that immanent characters essentially 
participate in Forms. Plato, therefore, denies (RE*). Plato’s denying (RE*) is, however, 
entirely natural given the fact that he takes Forms to be ontologically prior to 
                                                                                                                                           
Categories. Furthermore, on the interpretation that I favor, Aristotle’s ontology is like Plato’s in that 
both accept qualitative particulars in addition to qualitative universals or Forms.   
110   I have been unable to find any evidence to settle the question of whether Plato thinks that it is 
essential to the immanent character of persistentness in Sylvester that it is in Sylvester. However, were 
Plato to think that is essential for the immanent character to be in the object that it is in, the relation 
between immanent characters and ps-entities would be very similar to the relation that Aristotle takes to 
hold between nonsubstantial particulars and primary substances. I have also been unable to determine 
whether Plato wants to divide Forms into substance Forms and accident Forms. In the Phaedo, Plato 
distinguishes fire and snow from heat and cold. He also distinguishes the number three from the 
oddness that belongs to three, and the immanent character of aliveness in the soul from the soul. 
Whether Plato thinks that the soul is a subject for aliveness in the way that Aristotle thinks that a 
primary substance is a subject for a nonsubstantial particular, however, is not clear. In the Parmenides, 
Socrates expresses some uncertainty about whether there is a Form for human being, fire and water 
(130c1-2).    363 
individuals. We still have to see whether Aristotle is also committed to holding that 
ps-entities like Sylvester are relational entities.   
In section 10.3, I outlined a parity of reasoning argument that we could run 
against Aristotle to show that he is just as strongly committed to the claim that 
Sylvester is a relational entity as Plato is. I do not think that Aristotle holds that there 
is any possible situation in which Sylvester exists, but in which the species cat is not 
said-of Sylvester.
 111 So, Aristotle takes it to be necessary to Sylvester that the species 
cat is said-of him. On the definition of strongly relational entity given in (REFS), then, 
Sylvester counts as a strongly relational entity for both Aristotle and Plato. However, I 
think that Aristotle can deny that Sylvester is a strongly relational entity in the sense 
given (REES). While he will accept that it is necessary to Sylvester that cat be said-of 
him, Aristotle will deny that it is essential to Sylvester that cat be said-of him. 
Furthermore, this denial is strongly connected with Aristotle’s taking things like 
Sylvester to be ontologically basic entities.   
The claim that it is not essential to Sylvester that cat is said-of him initially 
appears to be problematic. Aristotle clearly thinks that Sylvester is a cat essentially. If 
anything belongs to Sylvester’s nature, then his being a cat does. Earlier in this work, I 
considered the claim that Aristotle takes the inherence and said-of relations to be 
fundamental relations by which entities are combined to yield truthmakers for our 
claims about the world, and in terms of which predication is to be analyzed. According 
                                                 
111   In this respect, my view differs from that of Terence Irwin, who thinks that it is not necessary 
to Socrates that the universal human be said-of him. Irwin argues that Aristotle requires a universal to 
be predicated of a plurality of individuals for it to exist. (See Irwin’s Aristotle’s First Principles (1988), 
pp.40-43.) A nice feature of Irwin’s view is that does not require that human be prior in implication of 
existence to a particular human being. Socrates could exist in the absence of all other human beings. In 
such a case, Socrates would exist but the universal human would fail to exist and fail to be said-of 
Socrates. Therefore, it would be possible for Socrates to exist without having the universal human said-
of him. If having human said-of him is not necessary to Socrates, then it cannot be essential to him 
either. If Irwin is right about the nature of universals, it follows that Socrates’ nature is not dependent 
on that of the universal human. I discuss my reasons for rejecting Irwin’s actual plural instantiation 
requirement view in chapter 7.   364 
to the interpretation that I was considering, when we utter a sentence like ‘Sylvester is 
black,’ we predicate an accident of Sylvester. I will call such sentences instances of 
accidental predication.
112 Instances of accidental predication are made true by the 
holding of the inherence relation between a non-substance and a substance. In the case 
of our example, the sentence is made true by the inherence of a nonsubstantial 
particular blackness in the particular substance Sylvester.  
On the other hand, we use a sentence like ‘Sylvester is a cat’ to predicate 
something essential of Sylvester, to reveal what Sylvester is rather than the attributes 
that Sylvester happens to have.
113 I will call such sentences instances of essential 
predication. I assume that whenever an instance of essential predication of the form 
α 
is (a) Φ
 is true, a sentence of the form 
It is essential to α that α is (a) Φ
 is also true 
in the sense given by (DE3). In other words, the truth of the proposition follows from 
the nature of the subject α. Whenever there is a true case of essential predication, the 
said-of relation holds between an entity and the species, genus or differentia of that 
entity. It is natural to go further, and claim that instances of essential predication are 
made true by the holding of the said-of relation between a species, genus or differentia 
of an entity and that entity. In the case of our example, the further claim would be that 
the sentence is made true by the fact that cat is said-of Sylvester. 
According to this story, the underlying truthmakers for both essential and 
accidental predication involve the holding of a fundamental relation between two 
                                                 
112   According to Aristotle, it needn’t be the case that instances of accidental predication are 
contingent. Aristotle thinks that some of the necessary attributes of a thing are not part of that thing’s 
real definition, for example it is a necessary property of triangles that they have interior angles equal to 
two right angles. However, it is not essential to triangles that they have two right angles. Therefore, 
‘Having two right angles belongs to triangle,’ involves accidental predication. These sorts of cases 
provide some evidence that necessity and essentiality come apart for Aristotle.    
113   The distinction here is a familiar one. Paul Grice invented the terms ‘IZZ’ and ‘HAZZ’ to 
distinguish essential from accidental predication. See Grice (1988) “Aristotle on the Multiplicity of 
Being.” See also, Alan Code’s (1983) “Aristotle: Essence and Accident,” See also S. M. Cohen’s 
website, which summarizes and explains both articles: 
http://faculty.washington.edu/smcohen/433/GriceCode.pdf.   365 
entities. We can call such truthmakers relational truthmakers. I will assume that the 
truthmakers for accidental predication are relational, and that the analysis in terms of 
inherence given above is basically correct. We can confine our attention then to 
instances of essential predication.  
Aristotle’s holding both (i) that there are true instances of essential predication 
with primary substances as subjects, and (ii) that all instances of essential predication 
have relational truth makers, commits him to the claim (iii) that primary substances 
are strongly relational entities. I have argued that strongly relational entities cannot be 
ontologically prior to the things to which they are essentially related. However, as we 
saw in chapter 9, Aristotle wants primary substances to be ontologically prior to their 
species and genera.  
Something has to give. I take the ontological priority of primary substances to 
be non-negotiable for Aristotle. I also see no way to coherently deny that Aristotle 
takes there to be true instances of essential predication about primary substances. The 
only alternative open to Aristotle seems to be for him to deny that true instances of 
essential predication have relational truthmakers.
114  
On the resulting view, Aristotle will hold that ‘Socrates is human’ is an 
instance of essential predication, and he will hold that human is said-of Socrates in 
every world in which Socrates exists. However, he will deny that for Socrates to be 
human is for human to be said-of Socrates. To put the same point in the formal mode, 
Aristotle holds that as a matter of necessity the sentence, ‘Socrates is human,’ is true if 
and only if human is said-of Socrates. However, he denies that ‘Socrates is human,’ is 
true because human is said-of Socrates, or in virtue of the fact that human is said-of 
                                                 
114   It is important to keep in mind as this point that ‘essential predication’ is not being used to 
name a relation between entities. I am saying that certain true sentences are instances of essential 
predication, and then claiming that the underlying truthmaker for these sentences does not involve any 
relation between entities.    366 
Socrates.
115 Rather, as I will argue in a moment, Aristotle takes the order of 
explanation to go in the other direction. Human is said-of Socrates because Socrates 
has the nonrelational nature that he does.  
First, however, I want to say a bit more about what the truthmakers for 
instances of essential predication look like on this interpretation of Aristotle. The only 
entity that will be involved in the truthmaker for ‘Socrates is human,’ is Socrates 
himself.
116 In the pegboard example in section 10.4.C, we saw that two sentences 
could be syntactically alike even in cases where the truthmakers for those sentences 
were quite different. For example, ‘Tom is blue,’ and ‘Tom is triangular,’ have the 
same grammatical form. The first sentence is made true in our model by t’s standing 
in the insertion relation to B. The truthmaker for the second sentence involves no 
entity in our model other than t itself. The peg t in our original model was 
combinatorially separable from every other entity in that model. In addition, we saw 
that t had a nature independently of any of the combinatorial relations that it entered 
into with any other entity in our model, and this nature was stable across all possible 
                                                 
115   On the view that I have been arguing for throughout this work, the said-of relation is a relation 
that holds between universals and parts of these universals. Human has Socrates as a part. However, 
there is some way that Socrates is independently of his being a part of the universal. It does seem 
somewhat odd to think that the entire nature of a part is to be accounted for by the fact that it is part of a 
whole. However, take away the fact that Socrates is a part of human and ask whether there is anything 
essential to Socrates. It seems to me that we should still say that he in human. His being human, in that 
case, is not accounted for by the fact that human is said-of him. His being human is not accounted for 
by any relation to any other entity. Nevertheless, I do not deny that Aristotle does accept that there are 
universals. These universals are wholes which bear the said-of relation to the appropriate particulars. 
The fact that a universal bears the said-of relation to a particular is not analyzed in terms of any further 
relations between entities. Therefore, the said-of relation counts as a fundamental relation.  
116   In fact, I do not think that the pronoun ‘himself’ is entirely appropriate in this case. Socrates’ 
being male seems to involve a relation that Socrates stands in to an entity other than himself. If the 
account that I am suggesting is correct, then every member of an infimae species will turn out to be 
perfectly similar to every other member of that species. I think that Aristotle and Plato are similar on 
this score. On Plato’s account, the nature of any immanent character is exhausted by its being an image 
of the Form of which it is an image. Any non-numerical differences between two individuals that are 
subjects of the same essential predicates will have to be explained in terms of things that they are 
related to accidentally, where some accidents are nevertheless necessary.       367 
combinations of t with other things. Furthermore, t’s being triangular in any model 
was guaranteed by the very identity of t.  
I think that Aristotle has a similar account of the truthmakers for instances of 
essential predication. While the truthmaker for ‘Socrates is brave,’ involves a relation 
between Socrates and an instance of bravery, the truthmaker for ‘Socrates is human,’ 
involves nothing other than Socrates. Socrates is not a relational entity, and is a thing 
that has a determinate nature apart from any relation he stands in to anything else. 
Moreover, it is the nonrelational nature of Socrates which accounts for the truth of the 
claim that he is human. The truth of any true instance of essential predication will be 
grounded in the identity of the subject of that instance of predication. The claim that 
Socrates is human is grounded in the nature of Socrates and the claim that Callias is 
human is grounded in the nature of Callias. Primary substances will also be brute 
individuals on this interpretation of Aristotle. The explanation for the numerical 
diversity of two distinct human beings, like Socrates and Callias, follows directly from 
the identities each of them.
117 In these ways, primary substances are nonrelational 
entities. 
                                                 
117   In saying that the individuation of a primary substance is primitive, I mean that we do not need 
to give any analysis in terms of other things of what it is for this thing, rather than a numerically distinct 
thing, to exist in a possible situation. For example, what it is to be Socrates rather than Callias is not to 
be explained in terms of any relations that each of them bears to any other more primitive entities. 
Furthermore, I take Aristotle to be a haecceitist in the sense that two worlds could be indiscernible yet 
differ with respect to which objects were in the world. Nevertheless, I think that Aristotle only need be 
a haecceitist about primary substances, since the individuation of all other particulars will be derivative 
on the individuation of primary substances. For more about haecceities, see Lewis On the Plurality of 
Worlds (1986), Kripke naming and Necessity (1980), Bob Adams “Primitive Thisness and Primitive 
Identity” (1979).  
Imagine that we have two human beings, Dion and Theon. On my view, Aristotle takes all 
human beings, considered just with respect to their essences, to be indiscernible from one another. 
Nevertheless, there will be primitive differences between a world containing only Dion and a world 
containing only Theon. Now imagine that Dion and Theon are also indiscernible with respect to all their 
accidents, and consider a world containing only Dion and a world containing only Theon. The fact that 
a particular pallor in one world is numerically distinct from a particular pallor in another world will be 
accounted for by the fact that one inheres in Dion, while the other inheres in Theon.        368 
  Aristotle takes primary substances to be nonrelational entities. But what about 
the other sorts of entities in Aristotle’s four-fold division of the things that are: 
substantial universals, nonsubstantial particulars, and nonsubstantial universals? We 
will look briefly at each sort of entity in turn.  
  Aristotle takes substantial universals to be weakly relational entities. As we 
saw in the last chapter, a species like human is prior in implication to an individual 
like Socrates. For any individual member of a given species, it is possible for the 
species to exist without that individual, but it is not possible for the individual to exist 
without the species. However, as I argued in the last chapter, the existence of an 
individual seems to imply the existence of a species in the way in which a sufficient 
cause implies the existence of its effect, rather than in the way in which the existence 
of an effect implies the existence of a necessary precondition for that effect. Aristotle 
takes the individual to be a cause of being for the universal.  Aristotle’s view differs 
from that of Plato, for whom the Form is a cause of being for each of its participants. 
On Aristotle’s view, no universal can exist without having at least one instance. So, it 
is necessary to the existence of any universal that it stands in the said-of relation to at 
least one appropriate particular. Any substance universal would, therefore, seem to 
count as a weakly relational entity according to (REFW) above.  
However, to count as a weakly relational entity according to (REEW) it must be 
essential to the substance universal that there be at least one entity it is said-of. 
Accordingly, we have to ask whether it follows from the very nature of a secondary 
substance that it be said-of at least one appropriate particular. I think we should 
answer this question in the affirmative. On the view of Aristotelian universals I 
outlined in chapter 7, substance universals are compositionally plastic wholes which 
contain the particulars they are said-of as parts. But, while universals are 
compositionally plastic, there are limits to the sorts of parts that can constitute them.   369 
For example, human contains all and only the particular humans as parts. I take these 
limitations on the possible constitution of a universal to follow from the nature of that 
universal. What it is to be the universal human is to be the thing said-of all and only 
the human beings; equivalently it is to be the thing that is entirely constituted in any 
possible situation by the particular human beings that exist in that situation.
118 It 
follows, therefore,  from the nature of human that it stands in the said-of relation to at 
least one particular human being. If this reasoning is correct, then Aristotle will take 
substantial universals to be weakly relational entities even in the stronger sense given 
in (REEW).
119  
                                                 
118   If we claim both that to be the universal human is to be the things that it is said of all the 
particular humans, and that for a particular to be human is to have the universal human said-of it, our 
account will look circular. I think that we can avoid this circularity by claiming that each of the 
individual humans are human, not because the universal is said-of them, but because of its nonrelational 
nature. In addition, I think that Aristotle should claim that each individual human is indistinguishable 
from every other human being, when we take all of them without their various accidents. We can then 
specify the species universal human as the thing that is said-of all the particulars perfectly resembling 
any particular human that we care to indicate. This procedure bears some resemblance to one used by 
trope-theorists to define perfect similarity classes of tropes. It is somewhat trickier to use this sort of 
procedure to specify more general universals in which there is not perfect resemblance among all the 
particulars. For example, it will be harder to specify genera. See Armstrong (1989) for further 
discussion of the merits of this proposal.  
Like the trope theorist, or any other theorist who takes particulars to be prior to universals, 
Aristotle is going to lose the ability to explain the resemblance of two members of the same species in 
terms of the fact that they bear a fundamental relation to a single universal. If this is a serious cost, then 
Plato’s theory has an advantage. However, the advantage might be short-lived, if we want to make 
resemblance claims about two or more entities that Plato holds to be fundamental. For example, what 
accounts for the fact that two color Forms resemble each other insofar as they are both color Forms? 
The only way to avoid the problem entirely would be (i) to avoid the need to refuse to make any 
resemblance claims at all concerning two or more fundamental entities, a step which seems difficult to 
accept; or (ii) to deny that there are two or more fundamental entities, which also seems difficult to 
accept.    
119   As I mentioned previously in this chapter, it is hard to give a gloss of weak relationality in 
combinatorial terms. Here is the best I can do. Although, we can indicate human as an entity for 
recombination independently of its bearing the said-of relation to any of the particular humans in the 
world, it follows from the nature of human both that we cannot include it in any model in which it is not 
said-of at least one human and that human cannot fail to exist in any world where at least one human 
being exists. Strictly speaking, human is a weakly relational entity because of the truth of the first 
conjunct. By way of analogy, imagine that human beings are essentially physical entities composed of 
atoms. While a human being might be specified for recombination independently of its having any 
particular atom as a part, I cannot include that human being in a world in which it has no atoms as parts. 
Human beings, on this view, turn out to be weakly relational entities.    370 
The fact that substantial universals are weakly relational entities is importantly 
connected to the fact that primary substances count as causes of being for secondary 
substances. For example, the nature of human requires both that it stand in the said-of  
relation to at least one individual human in any situation in which it exists, and that it 
is said-of every individual human in any possible situation in which it exists. Say that 
human is said-of exactly three entities in a given situation. The fact that human can 
exist without each of these entities shows that the nature of human is not wholly 
exhausted by the fact that it is said-of these very entities. Nevertheless, in this 
particular situation human satisfies the requirements of its nature by being said-of 
these particular humans. Similarly, while human could have had another cause of its 
being, in this situation these humans are the actual causes of its being.
120 As I argue in 
chapter 9, it is in this way that Aristotle is justified in taking the individual humans to 
be ontologically prior to the species universal human.  
  Nonsubstantial particulars have a nature that is independent of their being 
things that nonsubstantial universals are said-of. In addition, instances of essential 
predication with nonsubstantial particulars as subjects will have nonrelational 
truthmakers. ‘This particular pallor is pale,’ for example, will be made true simply by 
the nature of the nonsubstantial particular. Nevertheless, nonsubstantial particulars 
will be strongly relational entities on Aristotle’s account, since it is essential to them to 
inhere in the substances in which they inhere. In this way, a nonsubstantial particular 
                                                 
120   The relation between human and the particular totality of humans that composes it in any 
situation strikes me as having a lot in common with the relation of realization. See chapter 7 for more 
discussion of the application of realization talk to the relation between universals and their instances. 
For further discussion of the nature of various types of realization, see Sydney Shoemaker’s Physical 
Realization (2007). I take the constitution of an entity by other entities to be a sort of realization, or at 
least to belong to the same general family of relations as realization. In the case discussed here, it is 
important to point out that each individual human being on its own could have causally sufficed for 
human, and in this way human seems overdetermined. I discuss this sort of overdetermination further in 
chapter 9.    371 
will be similar to {Socrates}, in that a nonsubstantial particular is not combinatorially 
separable from the primary substance in which it inheres.  
To specify a particular pallor as a subject for recombination, I must specify it 
as a thing inherent in this particular primary substance. A nonsubstantial particular’s 
being the individual that it is requires that in inhere in the primary substance that it 
inheres in. Nonsubstantial particulars are ontologically dependent on primary 
substances. Primary substances count as causes of the being of nonsubstantial 
particulars by being entities on which nonsubstantial particulars are ontologically 
dependent. Nevertheless, the nature of a nonsubstantial particular is not purely 
relational. The instance of pallor in Socrates is not the same in its essence as the 
instance of snub-nosedness in Socrates, although both entities are essentially inherent 
in Socrates. While it follows from the essence of an instance of pallor that it inheres in 
Socrates, the essence is not exhausted by the thing’s being inherent in Socrates. In this 
way, the instance of pallor differs from {Socrates}, the entire nature of which seems to 
be exhausted by its singletoning Socrates.
121  
  Finally, nonsubstantial universals appear to be doubly relational. They stand to 
nonsubstantial particulars as substantial universals stand to primary substances. What 
it is to be the universal pallor is to be the thing that is said-of every nonsubstantial 
particular pallor. In addition nonsubstantial universals seem to be strongly relational 
entities since it is part of their essence to inhere in substantial universals. For example, 
color essentially stands in the inherence relation to body. It follows from the essence 
of a nonsubstantial universal that its existence requires both the existence of the 
                                                 
121   We can distinguish the nonsubstantial particular’s being the way it is—its having a nature that 
is like or unlike that of other nonsubstantial particulars—from its being this particular entity. The 
suchness of a nonsubstantial particular is accounted for nonrelationally. However, to the extent that it is 
a particular, its being the particular that it is depends on its inherence in this particular substance. On 
problem concerns different nonsubstantial particulars of the same sort possessed by a single substance 
at different times. What differentiates the sunburn that I have now from the perfectly similar sunburn 
that I had last year?    372 
particular secondary substance in which it inheres, and the existence of some 
appropriate nonsubstantial particular. However, it follows from the nature of any 
nonsubstantial particular that it can exist only if the subject in which it inheres exists. 
So it follows from the nature of a nonsubstantial universal that it exists only in those 
worlds where some appropriate primary substance also exists.  
Every nonsubstantial universal has the nonsubstantial particulars which 
constitute it as causes of its being. These nonsubstantial particulars, in turn, have the 
primary substances in which they inhere as causes of being. On the assumption that 
being a cause of being for a thing is transitive, certain primary substances are the 
ultimate causes of being for any nonsubstantial universal whenever it exists.
122 
  On Aristotle’s account, whenever anything other than a primary substance 
exists, it has primary substances as causes of its being. While a primary substance has 
the nature that it does primitively, every other entity is essentially relational. 
Furthermore, while instances of accidental predication are susceptible of relational 
analysis on Aristotle’s account, true instances of essential predication will have 
nonrelational truthmakers.  
The idea of a nonrelational truthmaker might seem somewhat strange at first 
glance. The instances of essential predication that we have looked at seem like they 
are susceptible of relational analysis, and to deny that this is so has a cost. However, I 
think that this is a cost that any ontology will have to bear, if it allows us to say 
anything about the natures of fundamental entities. I have argued that we can explain 
why anything has the nature that it does, only if we allow that the natures of some 
entities are not accounted for relationally. The account that Aristotle gives of Socrates’ 
being human will be similar to the account that Plato will have to give for true claims 
                                                 
122   This assumption strikes me as reasonable, but I am not totally certain that it is true. If one thing 
is a ground for the being of another, which is in turn a ground of being for a third, then the first would 
seem to be a ground of being for the third.   373 
about the nature of at least some of the Forms. Any ontological theory according to 
which some entities are ontologically primitive but still differ in nature from each 
other will need to tell a similar story about how to account for true and essential 
claims about its ontologically primitive entities.  
So Plato and Aristotle do not seem to be alone in having to give such an 
account. An ontological theory would require no nonrelational truthmakers only if that 
theory held that every entity had a purely relational essence. However, I have argued 
that no view on which every entity has a purely relational essence can make sense out 
of the claim that anything’s nature differs from anything else’s nature.     
In this chapter, I have offered an account of what it is to be a relational entity 
on which Plato does, but Aristotle does not, take particular entities like Sylvester the 
cat to be relational entities. I have also sketched two very different ontological 
theories. In the course of doing so I hope to have highlighted some of the 
considerations that must be brought to bear in choosing between these theories. 
However, I still do not find myself in a position to choose between these theories.   374 
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